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The philosopher believes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the 
building: posterity discovers it in the bricks with which he built and which are then 
often used again for better building: in fact, that is to say, that that building can be 
destroyed and nonetheless possess value as material.
(F. Nietzsche, 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims' 1879)
For the comparatist:
Pieenla patria casual o eligida; corazón, cabeza en el aire del mundo 
(Keep your feet on your native or chosen homeland and your head and heart
in the air of the world)
(Juan Ramón Jiménez, quoted in B. Grossfeld, The Strengths and Weakness of
Comparative Law' (1990), pg.40).
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INTRODUCTION
This essay attempts to apply two theories to the legal protection of civil 
liberties in the process of comparing the liberty to assemble in France and 
England.1 This is attempted in order to show that theory can be of relevance 
to the formulation of legal measures to protect civil liberties. The two theories 
that are applied are jurisprudential and comparative, and it will be shown 
that when employed they point to concrete reforms of the protection of the 
liberty to assemble. These concrete reforms will then be applied to resolve 
two practiced problems: the Bill of Rights debate in the UK and the protection 
of civil liberties in the European Union (EU). In effect, an attempt will be 
made to apply theory to practice. This recourse to theory in order to resolve 
practical legal problems is presented as an example of what theory can 
achieve. More particularly, it should be seen as a reason for utilising theory as 
regards the law regulating civil liberties, that has hitherto not generally been 
the case in England. Accordingly, the general background of this study is a 
view that theoretical perspectives concerning civil liberties are not used to 
their fullest in the formulation of legal protection and that this is to the 
detriment of English civil liberties.
Given this aim of trying to show the practical benefits of theory, it can be 
asked why the liberty to assemble is focused upon. The response to this 
question is dealt with in detail below (chapter III) but can be briefly stated 
here. This liberty is claimed to be of historical and contemporary significance, 
whilst at the same time its nature is of a complex and uncertain kind, which 
would benefit from the clarification that theory is claimed to provide. Lastly, 
it is claimed that its exercise makes particularly explicit the types of decisions 
and difficulties that the legal regulation of civil liberties has to grapple with.
A second question concerns the choice of France as a legal system with which 
to compare the English regulation of this liberty. The justifications for this 
choice are theoretical. It is claimed that according to the jurisprudential view 
of civil liberties that is formulated in this study (chapter I) and comparative 
theory (chapter II), France presents an excellent example of a jurisdiction that 
adopts this jurisprudential view, along with England. Briefly stated, a
1 This study, as will presently be explained, will be solely concerned with the law of England 
and Wales. References to English law therefore also refer to Wales.
political conception of civil liberties is argued for on the basis of a 
jurisprudential theory of civil liberties. This theory also happens to support 
the dominant view of civil liberties in England. By then using comparative 
theory, the generally overlooked similarity of the French conception of civil 
liberties is revealed and the comparison with France is therefore justified. The 
two theories therefore work in partnership.
It should be underlined that this choice of France is based upon a particular 
jurisprudential viewpoint. Consequently, its is not denied that other theories 
of civil liberties can be formulated. Indeed, it is accepted that another theory 
of civil liberties would indicate other comparisons, by utilising comparative 
theory to search for characteristics, other than a political conception of civil 
liberties. Thus, the theory of civil liberties that is applied here is not claimed 
to be the single true theoretical conception of civil liberties. Such a claim 
would be tantamount to stating that other conceptions in other countries, for 
example, those in Germany and the United States of America should be 
replaced by the conception formulated in this essay. This somewhat 
universalistic and strong claim for the theory is not made here. Instead, it is 
asserted that all communities construct certain fundamental values, that in 
current times are increasingly referred to as civil liberties. Typically, they 
involve political and social questions and choices but the degree to which this 
is reflected in the particular legal methods for their regulation varies 
according to different underlying jurisprudential views, political and social 
experiences and cultures.
Therefore, in a sense, all civil liberties are political because they are 
constructed by political communities but the theory advocated here also 
stresses this political nature in the way the law is used to protect these 
fundamental values. This essay presents a particular theory of civil liberties 
whose claimed benefits are that it would be supported by both critics and 
advocates of civil liberties and that it provides a reason to protect civil 
liberties; in that they are claimed to be the social and political values of 
particular communities. The existence of other views which explain these 
social and political values is therefore not denied. As a final related 
consequence, if the theory that is put forward is objected to, such an objection 
must be based on theoretical grounds. It will hence not be an objection to the 
application of theory in general but rather to the application of this particular 
theory.
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Following these brief remarks on the two theories that will be applied in this 
study, attention will turn to the two practical issues to which they will be 
applied. As regards the Bill of Rights debate in the UK, it is argued that the 
jurisprudential theory here developed points to particular methods of 
protecting civil liberties, including a focus on specific civil liberties; hence the 
study of the liberty to assemble. Comparative theory is then used and as a 
result it is seen that very similar methods are generally found in French law 
and in the regulation of the liberty under study in particular. As a 
consequence, possible reforms in the protection of civil liberties in England 
can be taken from the example of France, given that protection has been the 
main concern behind the Bill of Rights debate.
As regards the protection of civil liberties in the European Union, 
comparative theory shows that comparisons between the Member States of 
the kind undertaken in this study will be needed in the future in order to 
protect civil liberties in the EU on the basis of commonly agreed standards. 
Thus, by concentrating on the liberty to assemble as an example of what can 
be achieved for this one particular liberty, it is hoped to provide the 
beginnings of a comparative method for all civil liberties in the context of the 
EU. In accordance with the aim of this study, it will be argued that the fruitful 
application of theory to these issues provides a powerful reason for a more 
theoretical approach to the regulation of civil liberties in the in England.
It will be immediately noted that these two practical concerns have 
ramifications that go beyond the English legal system. The Bill of Rights 
debate has consequences for the entire United Kingdom and not simply 
English law, while evidently the protection of civil liberties in the European 
Union also involves its other Members States, as well as the Union 
institutions themselves. However, it must be underlined that this study 
moves outwards from the perspective of a tendency not to advert to theory in 
England and that even given the wider scope of the practical issues, the 
application of theory to them is still claimed is used as an example of what 
can be accomplished by theory, if only it is adverted to more often in the 
English law on dvil liberties.
This last point leads on to the origins or background of this study which have 
only been briefly mentioned up to now and deserve a more detailed
v
explanation. This study can thus be seen as a response to two general 
tendencies in the legal study of civil liberty in England: firstly a failure to 
have regard to the jurisprudential issues that concern civil liberties and 
secondly, a tendency to make comparisons with other common law systems, 
as opposed to those belonging to other legal families. Both these tendencies 
are claimed to have a common cause: the failure to have regard to theory - in 
the one case jurisprudential, in the other comparative.
The application of theory to the legal protection of the liberty to assemble 
results in a series of practical measures and proposals to protect that liberty. 
Firstly, it indicates that detailed and specific statutes will be of more use in 
protecting the liberty than a general and somewhat brief enactment in a Bill of 
Rights. This is not to say that a Bills of Right would serve no purpose but 
rather that the bulwark of protection should be more detailed provisions. 
Secondly, the jurisprudential theory supports legal mechanisms that allow for 
changes in what are considered to be the civil liberties of a community and 
the values that they protect. This results in a preference for statutory 
protection, as opposed to what would be the relatively more fixed and 
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights that has traditionally been called 
for. Thirdly, comparative theory reveals that France and England have certain 
traditions and legal methods in common, as far as both civil liberties in 
general and the liberty to assemble. By reason of these similarities, 
comparisons between the two systems in the area of civil liberties should be 
undertaken despite the fact that they belong to different legal families. 
Protection of civil liberties in the EU, in particular, is claimed to necessitate a 
comparative analysis of this type for all the Member States and for other civil 
liberties, if the claim by the European Court of Justice to protect them using 
common traditions is to be taken seriously.
These measures and proposals are therefore generated by theory and they 
also provide the comparative criteria by which to compare and evaluate the 
legal regulation of the liberty to assemble in France and England (chapters 
VII-IX). The capacity of theory to produce practical methods of protection 
will consequently be shown. However, other comparative criteria and 
measures will also be drawn from the United States of America and the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950). This is because firstly, these systems are generally 
considered to provide high standards of protection and thus they provide a
standard with which to compare some of the reforms suggested in this study. 
Secondly, on certain occasions they provide other measures that are not 
provided for by the theory of civil liberties but are nevertheless compatible 
with it. This shows that even in those systems that do not share the 
conception of dvil liberties that is adopted in this study, there are still legal 
measures that because of the high degree of protection that they accord, 
deserve to be enaded. This point ties in with the one made earlier as to the 
existence and value of other theories of dvil liberties and furnishes another 
reason why this theory does not claim to be the sole possible conception of 
dvil liberties. Nevertheless, as already stated, the legal mechanisms derived 
from outside the theory are compatible with it and as a result their use is not 
an adoption of their underlying theories of civil liberties. On the contrary, 
they are used because they add a further dimension of protection that is not at 
odds with a political conception of dvil liberties.
The challenge of transforming theoretical perspectives into concrete 
institutional mechanisms is claimed not to be an insurmountable one. On the 
contrary, it is claimed to be a challenge that once taken up promises the 
reward of revealing new avenues or shedding new light on possible paths for 
legal regulation that have for long lain forgotten.
Lastly, and before commencing, a word will be said about the methodological 
structure of the argument made here. This study adopts a three-stage 
approach that is itself derived from comparative theory. More precisely, this 
is an approach suggested by Zwiegert and Kotz,2 according to whom 
comparative analysis should first set out the legal problems to which the 
analysis is addressed. Secondly, it should set out a description of the law in 
each of the jurisdictions to be compared. Thirdly, a comparison should be 
made, before fourthly, an evaluation is carried out. In this study, comparison 
and evaluation are carried out at the same time and correspondingly, the 
study is divided into three, rather than four, substantive Parts.
Part I provides a more detailed explanation of the tendendes and problems to 
which the study responds, the theories that underlie comparison and the two 
areas of practical concern to which theory is applied. Consequently, the
2 K. Zweigert and H. K6tz (trans. T. Weir), 'An Introduction to Comparative Law' (Vol. I) 
(1987), 31-46.
alleged lack of theory in the English approach to civil liberties is investigated 
further and then jurisprudence and comparative theory are examined in order 
to show how they may be applied as regards the two practical concerns. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the political conception of civil liberties are 
explained. The reasons for choosing the liberty to assemble are also presented 
here, as well as a definition of what is meant by this liberty. Definition will be 
seen to be very important in order to try to set out a subject of comparison 
that does not at the outset impose an English conception of the liberty.
Part II provides a description of the law regulating the liberty to assemble in 
France. Since, as has already been mentioned, the study moves from the 
perspective of problems concerning English civil liberties and given the 
constraints of space, English law will not be set out here, although succinct 
explanations will be given when comparison is made with France.
It is this comparison that is undertaken in Part III, along with evaluation. As 
already noted, evaluative criteria will be drawn from both the theory of civil 
liberties formulated in the study and methods of protection in the United 
States and the European Convention. Conclusions will be drawn as to firstly, 
the protection of the liberty to assemble and secondly, the Bill of Rights 
debate and the protection of civil liberties in the EU. Finally, some general 
conclusions are drawn. These concern the reforms revealed by comparison 
and the relevance of theory to the law relating to civil liberties in England, of 
which, to once again underline, this essay seeks to be an example.
PART ONE 
THE NEED FOR THEORY
The three chapters in this section introduce the theoretical foundations of this 
work. In Chapter I, the need for jurisprudential theory to resolve the practical 
problem of protecting civil liberties is argued for, as well as an analysis that 
concentrates on specific civil liberties. It will also be shown that these 
theoretical issues are generally not addressed in England. Chapter II, on the 
other hand, argues for the need and relevance of comparative theory to legal 
protection and shows how this theory is also not fully utilised in England. It 
also provides a more detailed justification for comparison with France and a 
general overview of the French methods of protecting civil liberties, before 
finally arguing that comparative theory should be applied to another practical 
issue: that of the legal protection of civil liberties in the European Union. 
Chapter III sets out the reasons why the liberty to assemble has been chosen 
as an example of a liberty to which theory can be applied in order to indicate 
practical reforms, as well as defining it for the purposes of the comparison
between France and England.
CHAPTER I
CIVIL LIBERTIES THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First an attempt will be made to bring to 
the surface the jurisprudential issues that underlie the legal protection of 
human rights1 and to argue that in England there is tendency to ignore them. 
This is attempted by linking jurisprudence to an aspect of this body of law 
that centrally concerns the reform of human rights protection: the Bill of 
Rights debate. It will be seen that behind many of the disagreements and 
proposals in the debate there are conflicting philosophical positions as to 
what are the values and content of human rights. Essentially, there is no 
overall agreement as to why human rights are protected and furthermore 
different human rights seem to be supported by alternative theoretical 
arguments. While not holding out the promise of resolving all the 
disagreements, jurisprudential theory provides reasons for seriously 
questioning whether reform via the enactment of a Bill of Rights would be the 
best way of increasing the protection of civil liberties in England, given both 
the noted disagreements and the differences between specific human rights 
that a jurisprudential enquiry also reveals.
A second aim is to formulate a jurisprudential theory of human rights which 
can take account of these disagreements. This is a theory that accords an 
importance to political forces (in the widest sense of pertaining to a 
community of citizens) in the regulation of civil liberties. Furthermore, this 
theory justifies the study of a specific liberty, such as the liberty to assemble. 
Finally, it will be seen that the theory is eclectic because it is composed of 
insights and areas of possible agreement between both supporters and critics 
of human rights. More precisely, it is argued that there is a consensus that 
human rights are the constructed values of communities, which in turn 
suggests reasons why supporters and critics of human rights should favour 
their protection. While there is disagreement as to what these particular
1 From henceforth, the terms 'human rights' and 'civil liberties' are used interchangeably in 
this study. The reason for this is based upon the jurisprudential theory and is consequently 
set out below. However, it is recognised that the two are different concepts.
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values are, the consensus nevertheless provides a basis for searching for 
reforms that permit human rights to be respected, while at the same time 
leaving them open to changes in the values of the community that has 
constructed them. The jurisprudential theory that is formulated in this 
chapter is therefore centrally concerned to allow for change and not to fix civil 
liberties in such a way that they are placed beyond change by the community; 
in other words, political change. For the sake of convenience, this theory will 
sometimes be referred to as the 'political conception' of civil liberties but it 
should be underlined that the emphasis of the political is but one aspect of 
this theory.
Finally, this chapter constitutes the first step in explaining the reasons for 
comparing the liberty to assembly in France and England: it presents 
arguments for looking at specific human rights and for developing methods 
of protection that take in account their particularity, as opposed to general 
methods, such as a Bill of Rights.
SECTION I
REFORM WITHOUT THEORY: THE BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE AS A
PRACTICAL EXAMPLE
In order to argue for the relevance of theory to the protection of human rights 
the Bill of Rights debate will be used.2 The reasons for this choice are that 
firstly, this debate is centrally concerned with the practical means by which 
human rights are protected in England, secondly, it is an issue that has for the 
last twenty-five years attracted the attention of many legal commentators and 
thirdly, it provides an example of an area of civil liberties law in which the 
underlying jurisprudential questions concerning human rights are present 
but not generally adverted to.
It will be contended that the result of not adverting to jurisprudence is that 
there is a lack of clarity as to the nature of disagreements in the debate and a
2 As was noted above, this study concerns the law regulating the liberty to assemble in 
England and Wales but clearly the Bill of Rights debate has implications for all parts of the 
United Kingdom. However, the debate is used here to illustrate the problems behind the 
dominant approach of English law, although the possible relevance to other legal systems in 
the Union of the conclusions that are drawn is not denied.
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tendency to opt for reforms that ignore the jurisprudential qualities of human 
rights. Indeed, the very argument in favour of the enactment of a Bill of 
Rights will be revealed to be based on a contested theoretical view. The 
history and arguments of the Bill of Rights debate have been comprehensively 
set out elsewhere3 and so they will not be rehearsed in detail here, instead 
attention will be focused on its little noted nature and underlying philosophy.
Three jurisprudential questions will be shown to lie behind the debate as to 
whether to enact a Bill of Rights. Firstly, that behind the debate there are 
different theoretical views as to what human rights are. It is argued that there 
cannot be a coherent call for the greater protection of civil liberties via the 
enactment of a Bill of Rights while there is still such radical disagreement as 
to what are human rights. Revealing this jurisprudential uncertainty, also 
reveals that a Bill would fix a particular conception of rights, as opposed to 
others. By fixing a particular conception, the adoption of different conceptions 
and therefore political change would become more difficult.
Secondly, it will be shown that a Bill would often privilege human rights 
against other interests. In order to justify this privileging it must be clear what 
the importance and value of human rights are and, at the same time, how far 
they can be protected as opposed to other values. It will be seen that there is 
also wide jurisprudential disagreement as to the value of human rights and 
that it may consequently be asked whether they should override other 
interests, as would generally be the case with a Bill of Rights.
Thirdly, it will be claimed that the effect of the enactment of a Bill of Rights 
would be to introduce a very general form of protection for all the diverse 
rights included in the Bill. It is argued that on the contrary, in order to protect 
civil liberties, specific mechanisms that are tailored to the specific and 
particular needs of each liberty will need to be formulated. This reflects a 
theoretical interest in bringing to the fore difference on the basis that 
difference is often obscured by generality.
These issues may be somewhat simply summarised as what are human rights, 
why protect them and how should they to be protected. They will each be dealt
3 See for example, J. Jaconelli, 'Enacting a Bill of Rights' (1980), M. Zander, 'A Bill of Rights?' 
(1985) and P. Wallington & J. McBride, 'Civil Liberties and a Bill of Riehts' (1976).
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with in turn, but first the way in which the Bill of Rights issue is claimed to be 
generally treated will be briefly presented.
THE GENERAL APPROACH
It is only recently that participants in the debate have had regard to 
jurisprudence. An important example of this recent interest in theory is an 
article by Waldron in which he questions the wisdom of enacting a Bill of 
Rights, given the wide jurisprudential disagreements that concern them.4 This 
article will be referred to in greater detail below but it is mentioned here in 
order to show that it is very much the exception to the general approach in 
the literature on this subject.5 More often than not, theories of civil liberties 
are simply not adverted to.6
Indeed, the approach to the Bill of Rights question may be seen as indicative 
of the general approach to the law of human rights which is not to advert to 
theory.7 However, recently, as in the Bill of Rights debate, there have been 
signs of a change in this general approach. This is instanced by Feldman's, 
analysis of civil liberties in England and Wales, which begins with a detailed 
examination of the theoretical justifications of human rights.8 Nevertheless, it 
should be underlined that the dominant approach is not to apply theory to 
practice.
The approach to the Bill of Rights debate can therefore be seen as a particular 
example of a more general approach to human rights in England. It will now 
be shown that behind the debate there are important and problematic 
jurisprudential issues, suggesting that such a protection would not be the best 
way of protecting civil liberties and that this results in an argument for
4 'A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ Ox.J.L.S. 13 [1993] 18.
5 Another notable exemption is the study by E. Barendt of the right to free speech; 'Freedom 
of Speech' (1987), especially, 8-23.
6 Among the many examples, see I.N. Stevens & D.C.M. Yardley, The Protection of Liberty' 
(1982), chp.6, R. Dworkin, 'A Bill of Rights for Britain' (1990) and A.J.M. Milne, 'Should We 
Have A Bill of Rights?' [1977] 40 M.L.R., 389. An exception is provided by J. Finnis, 'A Bill of 
Rights for Britain?: The Moral of Contemporary jurisprudence*. Proceedings of the British 
Academy (1985).
7 As examples of this see, S.H. Bailey, D.J. Harris and B.L. Jones, 'Civil Liberties: Cases and 
Materials' (1991), where a comprehensive analysis of the legal regulation concerning different 
dvil liberties is undertaken but with no reference to theories of jurisprudence and similarly, 
the study by G. Robertson, 'Freedom. The Individual and the Law' (1989).
^ Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales' (1993), 3-34.
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improving the protection of human rights via other measures, which have 
generally been neglected in the debate.
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS?
Those who have argued for and against the enactment of a Bill of Rights have 
come from all sides of the political spectrum. Thus, some have argued for a 
Bill of Rights in order to protect individual rights from encroachment by 
legislation from the Left9 and in similar terms some have argued that human 
rights need to be protected from the laws enacted by a government of the 
Right.10 What becomes clear is that human rights are not a politically neutral 
category. Put at its simplest, they mean different things to different people.11 
Some commentators have recognised this political disagreement and argued 
for a Bill of Rights based upon a broad political consensus12, often by basing 
the text on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 (ECHR).13
However, behind these ostensibly political differences are deep theoretical 
disagreements as to the nature of human rights. The first reflects the 
jurisprudential debate as to whether human rights should be positive (as with 
social and economic rights) or negative (as with civil and political liberties).14
9 For example, Sir Keith Joseph, ’Freedom Under the Law' (1975).
10 C. Thomberry, 'A Charter of Human Rights' (1976).
11 Wallington & McBride, op. tit.,7, go even further;
'...essentially a Bill of Rights is one of those conveniently elastic concepts which mean 
whatever their proponents what them to mean.'
12 P. Wallington, 'What Does A Bill of Rights Mean In Practice?' in C. Campbell (ed.), Do We 
Need A Bill of Rights?' (1980), 38 notes;
There is in fact a fundamental paradox about Bills of Rights, in that there is little value in 
introducing a Bill which serves to accentuate or perpetuate divisions within the community 
or between communities - whether it be between the trades unions and the others over an 
issue like the "closed shop", or between the communities in Northern Ireland - but a Bill of 
Rights that commands united support is unlikely to extend much beyond a platitudinous 
affirmation of what is already the position.'
13 See for example, Lord Scarman, 'Human Rights: The Current Situation* in Campbell, op. 
tit., 2 at 8, K.D. Ewing & C. Gearty, 'Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modem 
Britain' (1990), 263 et. seq., P. Thorton, Decade of Decline: Civil Liberties in the Thatcher 
Years' (1989), 93-6, Zander, op. tit., 83, Liberty (formerly the National Council for Civil 
Liberties), 'A Bill of Rights'. Briefing no.13, (1989), Robertson, op. tit., 397 et. seq. and the Bill 
of Rights in the draft constitution for the UK by the Institute For Public Policy Research, The 
Constitution of the United Kingdom' (1991).
14 For this distinction, see Wallington & McBride, op. tit., 11. For a discussion of the 
development of these different kinds of human rights, see C. Palley, The United Kingdom 
and Human Rights' (1991), 1-106; for a philosophical explanation of the differences, see I. 
Berlin, Two concepts of Liberty' in 'Fpwr fewys Pn Libflty' (1969), 118 and it is noted by L.
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Another relevant jurisprudential debate is that as to whether human rights 
are natural rights (as being founded on some universal and unchanging 
quality that is found in nature)15 or whether they are constructed by different 
communities, thus being part of the positive law of that community.16
These debates have been dealt with by theorists at length and so will not be 
rehearsed here but it will be claimed that the responses to these questions will 
affect the content of the human rights that are enshrined in a Bill. Divergent 
positions in the debate can be seen to be based on theoretical grounds, which 
themselves are sites of disagreement.
Given the political differences as to what human rights are, it then may be 
asked what improvement the addition of jurisprudential disagreements 
would have. The response to this question is that the addition of theory to the 
Bill of Rights debate acts as a reminder that controversial choices will and are 
being made as to which rights to enact. The fact that philosophers of law do 
not agree as to the nature of human rights means that the choices that are 
made between these views are therefore political. If human rights are about 
political choices, it may then be asked if it is legitimate to seek to protect them 
from other political choices, as a Bill of Rights would seek to do. The 
connection with jurisprudence also acts as a reminder that in enacting a Bill of 
Rights no moral high ground is being claimed because any list of rights 
reflects a choice of particular political conceptions, in which no particular 
conception has been shown to be more morally legitimate than the others. 
However, a Bill would seek to protect human rights by placing a certain 
conception of human rights, and therefore a certain political choice, beyond 
the reach of ready change on the part of the community.
Most commentators in the debate assume a large degree of consensus, when 
in fact it does not seem that such exists. For example, Wallington and
M. Diez-Picazo & M.C. Ponthoreau ("The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Some 
Comparative Remarks’ (1991) EUI Working Paper No.91/20, 6) that between these two 
traditional categories reference is now increasingly made to rights characterised by 'the 
collective nature of the interests at stake..', for example the environment and artistic 
patrimony (c.f. M. Cranston, 'What Are Human Rights?' (1973) and D.D. Raphael (ed.), 
'Political Theory and the Rights of Man' (1967), chps.4,5 ,8  & 9).
15 J. Finnis, 'Natural Law and Natural Rights' (1980), 198-230 and H.L.A. Hart. The Concept 
of Law' (1961), 181-207.
16 See for example, Feldman, op. cit., 20-33.
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McBride, whilst noting that there are divergent views as to what human 
rights are and consequently what activities and interests they protect, state 
that it would be wrong and dangerous to place one particular political 
ideology in stone.17 Therefore, the Bill of Rights should protect human rights
within the framework of the broad political consensus of the liberal democratic tradition. It is 
not an agency of revolution or counter-revolution.18
The authors claim that a Bill of Rights should protect rights which are part of 
a consensus that exists around liberal democracy.19 However, the existence of 
divergent views, as was shown above, within this consensus means that at 
most the degree of consensus is small.20 At the same time there is also a 
tendency to assert that the Bill of Rights would enshrine rights that were 
somehow beyond the political mêlée; rights that would be neutral as between 
the different political, and therefore jurisprudential, options;
Civil liberties are not rights in opposition to any particular kind of political or economic 
system, but rights apart; indeed the essential precondition to the free flow of political ideas 
and the development of political groupings.21 4
It is not claimed that this view of human rights as a precondition to political 
activity is to be rejected and indeed it will be seen in the next section that it is 
similar to the conception of human rights adopted in this study, but it is 
rather claimed that there is no neutral or objective conception that lies beyond 
political and philosophical choices.
17 op. cit., 13.
18 op. cit., 13.
19 op. cit., 13.
20 This point seems to be conceded at op. cit., 42;
In principle there should be no difficulty in sitting down and writing out a list of the rights 
that should be protected as fundamental, and the situations in which these rights should be 
curtailed in the interests of the state, or of others. In practice, this is by no means 
straightforward. If it is accepted that a Bill of Rights should be based on a reasonable 
consensus of opinion, some rights immediately become controversial. Ought there to be a 
right to belong to a Trade Union as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
Britain has endorsed? How should the right to own property be balanced against claims of 
compulsory purchase or of nationalisation measures? It would be easy to multiply the 
examples of potential difficulties. If it were possible to draft a Bill of Rights that would satisfy 
the demands of civil liberties activists, it would most likely be too strong meat for a 
proportion of the population. Conversely a Bill satisfactory to the Whitehall axis would seem 
small beer in the quest for adequate protection of civil liberties.'
21 op. cit., 13.
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Other commentators tend not to advert to these jurisprudential differences, 
thus both of the studies of civil liberties by Robertson and Bailey, Harris and 
Jones22 begin without investigating what human rights are. The former study 
commences with a few examples of recent restrictions of rights and then in 
the later more in-depth studies that constitute the main body of the work, no 
inquiry is made as to the theoretical basis of these rights and indeed, whether 
they are in fact human rights. What therefore seems to be assumed is that 
there is an agreement as to what they are. On the other hand, the latter study 
begins with an analysis of how human rights are protected in England, this 
leads to the observation that the dominant conception of human rights is one 
of negative liberty,23 which is commonly attributed to the constitutional 
theory of A. V. Dicey.24 However, there is no further discussion of the 
existence of alternative or competing conceptions. This negative conception 
has been much criticised because it does not provide for positive rights25 but 
by not adverting to theory in this criticism, no attention is paid to the problem 
that there is no general agreement as to what positive human rights are or 
should be - once again the jurisprudential difficulties reveal themselves.
22 see n.7, supra.
23 The authors, op. cit., 1-2, quote from the Home Office's 'Legislation on Human Rights. With 
Particular Reference to the European Convention. A Discussion Document' (1976), paras.2.OI­
OS).
24 For example, E. Barendt, 'Dicev and Civil Liberties' P.L. [1985] 596, Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 
7-13 and more generally, see I. Harden & N. Lewis, 'The Noble Lie: The British Constitution 
and the Rule of Law’ (1986).
25 Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 11. It should be noted that the English conception of negative 
rights and the negative conception of liberty that is commonly seen to underlie civil and 
political liberties are not the same. The former refers to the manner in which rights appear in 
English law; predominately as a sphere of liberty around the individual in which he/she is 
free to act but the degree of liberty can be restricted by the operation of law. It is essentially a 
right to non-interference and approximates to a Hohfeldian privilege (see W.N. Hohfeld, 
'Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In ludicial Reasoning' (1919)). This concept is 
commonly referred to in English law as a liberty (see, D. Feldman, op. cit., 8 et. seq. and the 
remarks by Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Malone v Commr. of Police (No.2i [1979] AH E.R. 620 
at 630). Civil liberties secure activities that one is free to do or not to do; they only impose 
duties of non-interference.
On the other hand, the negative conception of liberty is an expression of value and is 
associated with the theory of Isaiah Berlin (op. cit., 118-72). It expresses the value of individual 
autonomy and is traditionally supported by liberals and indeed the Western political 
tradition. It is freedom from, as opposed to freedom to, in which the individual can develop 
according to his or her own desires and choices (see I. Berlin, op. cit., 122-31 and A. Arblaster, 
'The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism' (1984), 42-66). Essentially, the former is a legal 
category, whereas the latter is philosophical. Despite their differences, the two are related, in 
that whether a legal system emphasises liberties or rights will depend on the whether it 
adopts a generally negative or positive philosophy as regards liberty, however, even where a 
negative philosophy predominates, there may well be significant emphasis on the use of 
positive rights to give effect to liberty in the law (Feldman, op. cit., 9-10).
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New human rights, or at least, those that are not immediately within the civil 
and political/negative conception of human rights are sometimes asserted 
but once again without adverting to the fact that they reflect a choice.26 For 
example, in his pamphlet detailing the alleged decline of civil liberties in 
Britain under Margaret Thatcher, Thornton details the increase in race and 
sex discrimination and the growing intolerance towards homosexuals, trade 
unions and travellers.27 However, these are not rights that are commonly 
found in the type of 'consensus' Bill of Rights that Wallington and McBride 
envisaged above and it is unclear that the Bill of Rights based on the 
European Convention that he later advocates would encompass these 
rights.28 Indeed, Thornton implicitly acknowledges this by asserting that 
specific statutes should be enacted to deal with these human rights.29 This 
shift away from the Bill of Rights towards other forms of protecting human 
rights is made possible once it is clear that there are different and strongly 
contested conceptions of human rights. It is then realised that these different 
conceptions may not be best protected by a Bill Rights.30 Once again, by 
making the uncertain jurisprudential, and thus the political, position clear, it 
can be asked whether a Bill of Rights is a suitable means to protect such 
contested and controversial values.
As mentioned earlier, Waldron has recently posed similar questions as 
regards the Bill of Rights from the point of view of liberal jurisprudential 
theory. More specifically, two of his arguments are of relevance here. In the 
first place, he claims that the entrenchment of human rights in a document 
that seeks to fix them against ready change shows a mistrust for the views of
26 See for example, M. Rosenbaum, 'Children's Rights'. 'C. Heginbotham, 'Mental Health and 
Civil Rights' and S. Shaw, 'Prisoners' Rights’ in P. Sieghart (ed.) 'Human Rights in the United 
Kinedom' (1988), 7-17, 29-39 & 40-9, respectively and see generally, the rights analysed in R. 
Blackburn (ed.), 'Rights of Citizenship' (1993).
27 Thorton, op. cit., 73 et. seq.
28 op. cit., 93 et. seq.
29 op. cit., 96 et. seq.
30 Indeed, Wallington & McBride, op. cit., 11 claim that it is not possible to effectively 
enshrine economic and social rights in a Bill of Rights. M. Loughlin, 'Public Law and Political 
Theory' (1992), 221-4 notes that the Bill of Rights contained in the Charter drafted by Charter
88 (see New Statesman & Society, 2nd Dec. 1988) exhibits a tension between its concentration 
on civil and political liberties and ambiguous references to social and economic rights. The 
Charter can therefore be seen to be indicative of the problems of enacting the latter kinds of 
rights.
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others who might seek to challenge those rights.31 This mistrust is claimed to 
be incompatible with a view that the autonomy and responsibility of the 
individual should be respected, which underpins human rights.32 A second 
argument is that at present there is much disagreement concerning human 
rights, as is instanced by the many rival theories that exist.33 In this context of 
disagreement, decisions as to which human rights deserve protection should 
be subject to change and be democratic.34
His conclusion is that a Bill of Rights would be unsuitable because firstly, it 
would give judges more say in the decisions to be taken as regards human 
rights than the legislature, which despite its imperfections, acts as the 
representative of the people. The result is claimed to be that it would 
significantly disenfranchise ordinary citizens.35 Secondly, a Bill of Rights 
would place the decisions of some beyond the easy challenge of others, even 
though there is intense theoretical and hence political disagreement as to 
these choices.36 This second point links to the first because a Bill of Rights 
would not resolve the conflict of views via democratic procedures that seek to 
involve the whole community but rather by a small, undemocratic elite - the 
judiciary.37 Thus the starting point of Waldron's criticisms can be said to 
democracy.
31 op. tit., 27;
To think that a constitutional immunity is called for is to think oneself justified in disabling 
legislators...(and thus, indirectly, in disabling the citizens whom they represent). It is, I think, 
worth pondering the attitudes that lie behind the enthusiasm for imposing such disabilities. 
To embody a right in an entrenched constitutional document is to adopt a certain attitude 
towards one’s fellow citizens. That attitude is best summed up as a combination of self- 
assurance and mistrust...'.
32 op. at., 27;
This attitude of mistrust of one's fellow citizens does not sit particularly well with the aura of 
respect for their autonomy and responsibility that is conveyed by the substance of the rights 
which are being entrenched in this way.'
33 op. at., 29-31.
34 op. at., 31-9 and at 48;
The idea of a society binding itself against certain legislative acts in the future is particularly 
problematic in cases where the members of that society disagree with one another about the 
need for such bonds, or if they agree abstractly about the need, disagree about their content 
or character. It is particularly problematic where such disagreements can be expected to 
persist and to develop and change in unpredictable ways.'
35 op. tit., 41-6.
36 op. tit., 49-50.
37 op. tit., 42 and at 44;
'It is true that judges are appointed by elected officials. But the courts are not, either in their 
ethos or image, elective institutions, whereas parliament - whatever its imperfections - 
obviously is.'
19
WHY PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS?
If human rights concern political choices, it may be asked why they should be 
protected from revision by other political choices. What, it may be asked, is so 
special about human rights that justifies their being privileged as against 
other political choices?
Before presenting the theoretical response to this question, the way in which 
this issue manifests itself in the Bill of Rights debate will be looked at and it 
will be seen that once again the underlying jurisprudential element is 
commonly ignored.
A Bill of Rights is sometimes objected to on the grounds that it is anti­
democratic,38 in that it would either infringe parliamentary sovereignty or 
would hand over power to the judiciary.39 As a consequence, it has been 
argued that Parliament should remain sovereign because this provides a 
democratic means for achieving change where there is sufficient support for 
it. If there is pressure to change values, this process should not be hampered 
by values that claim to be at worst unchangeable or at best changeable only 
after the most arduous political effort.40 In response, advocates of a Bill assert 
that certain values are beyond change, no matter how democratic. It is 
claimed that these reflect more fundamental choices. A Bill of Rights would 
place certain values in such a position that they could not easily be changed 
by the vicissitudes of opinions of the community. They would be relatively 
fixed against social and political forces that might seek to override them 41
38 For example, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, T)o We Need A Bill of Rights?' M.L.R. [1976] 121 
at 125.
39 This view is expressed by Lord McCluskey in his 1986 Reith lectures; 'Law. lustice and 
Democracy' (1987) in which he, inter alia, argues against the enactment of a Bill of Rights on 
the grounds that
'It turns judges into legislators and gives them a finality which our whole tradition has 
hitherto professed to withhold from them.’ (op. cit., 34).
40 Although a Bill of Rights would not be completely immune to change, Waldron, op. cit., 41 
notes that change would only be effected with some difficulty;
'As a matter of fact, the enactment of a Bill of Rights need not involve the entrenchment of 
one particular view of individual rights beyond the reach of challenge or reform. A Bill of 
Rights can specify procedures for amendment...However, even if the efforts of rights- 
proponents fall short of absolute entrenchment, there is a temptation to make the amendment 
process as difficult as possible, a temptation often motivated by the...self-assured mistrust of 
one's fellow citizens...'
41 Waldron, op. cit., and Lloyd, op. cit., 126.
20
Arguments against enacting a Bill of Rights on the grounds of parliamentary 
sovereignty and democracy are given extra weight by what has been called 
the 'political' nature of the British constitution.42 Although this point will be 
dealt with at greater length in Chapter II when dealing with comparative 
theory, it must be noted that one of the characteristics of the constitution is 
claimed to be the central part played by political processes. Thus, the role and 
functions of Parliament are paramount and limits that are placed on the 
supremacy of Parliament are political; that is via political understandings that 
are referred to as conventions.43 Human rights are therefore primarily 
protected by political processes and pressure.44 In such a system, attempts to 
reduce political change via civil liberties are viewed with suspicion, as the 
statement by Griffiths highlights;
One danger of arguing from rights is that the real issues can be evaded. What are truly 
questions of politics and economics are presented as questions of law.
But paradoxically, arguments advanced avowedly for the protection of human rights are 
often concealed political propaganda. Those for a written constitution, a Bill of Rights, a 
supreme court, and the rest are attempts to resolve political conflicts in our society in a 
particular way, to minimise change, to maintain (so far as possible) the existing distribution 
of political and economic power43
Therefore, the British constitution places a high premium on the political. This 
is manifested in a preference for flexibility46 even in the face of civil liberties.
Behind the practical difficulties of reconciling parliamentary sovereignty and 
the protection of human rights there are therefore two jurisprudential issues. 
Firstly, the relative values of fixing certain choices beyond ready change as 
compared to those of flexibility and change. According to some
42 J.A.G. Griffiths, The Political Constitution' M.L.R. 42 [1979] 1.
43 See G. Marshall, 'Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability' (1984), chps.8, 9 & 11, C. Munroe, 'Studies in Constitutional Law' (1987), 35-60 
and concerning the convention of ministerial responsibility, see C. Turpin, 'Ministerial 
Responsibility: Mvth or Reality?' in ]. Jowell & D. Oliver (eds.) The Changing Constitution' 
(1989), 53.
44 Feldman, op. cit., 62-3 states;
The Constitution has always been predominantly political rather than legal. To restrain 
parliamentary legislation which might interfere unduly with people's rights, the UK has 
generally been content to rely on the good sense of politicians and the conventions and social 
properties which they are expected to observe.’
45 op. cit., 16.
46 See J.B.D. Mitchell, The Flexible Constitution’ [1960] P.L. 332 and A. Lester, T h e  
Constitution: Decline and Renewal' in Jowell & Oliver, op. cit., 345.
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jurisprudential theories, the lack of objective truth and therefore the 
possibility that any one set of choices is better than another, means that the 
choices that are made as regards human rights should be subject to revision; a 
Bill of Rights is therefore criticised as placing serious obstacles in the way of 
such change.47
Secondly, there is disagreement as to what it is that makes human rights such 
special choices. This disagreement is another application of the differences 
that have been pointed Thus, for example, it has been seen that some claim 
that human rights merely reflect the particular choice of particular 
communities, whilst others feel the choices are based on some enduring 
nature or reason that goes beyond a community. If the former is regarded as 
true, it will be difficult to ague that human rights should enjoy a more 
privileged position as compared to other choices. If, on the other hand, the 
latter is chosen, it will be easier to isolate reason or nature as the qualities that 
distinguish these choices from others which are not privileged. Nevertheless, 
what is once again clear is that there is no agreement over these issues.
How, if at all, are these jurisprudential issues adverted to in the debate? A 
brief response can be given to this question; the jurisprudential issues remain 
in large part hidden behind a surface discourse that is overwhelmingly in 
terms of parliamentary sovereignty, democracy and the need to protect 
minorities and individuals from the will of the majority. These arguments are 
routinely marshalled against one another, with the result that there is no sign 
of a resolution to the debate. By having regard to jurisprudential theories of 
dvil liberties, however, it is seen that these positions are backed by powerful 
theoretical positions and that the resolution of what appears to be political 
deadlock can only be achieved by making a choice as between the different 
jurisprudential options. The choices that are made will be at the expense of 
other choices and will be political in the sense that there can be no resort to 
some neutral choice.
Once again, applying theory to the debate reveals the disagreements and 
controversy over rights and then allows questions to be posed as to whether a 
particular choice should override others via a Bill of Rights. Therefore, the
47 See Waldron, supra., n34.
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arguments put forward by Waldron that were outlined above also have force 
here - essentially, should human rights be protected by means that assume 
certainty and infallibility, when in fact human rights prove to be sights of 
fundamental uncertainty?
HOW SHOULD HUMAN RIGHTS BE PROTECTED?
The Bill of Rights debate has also assumed that all human rights should be 
protected by the same mechanisms and procedure; namely a Bill of Rights. It 
should, nevertheless be recalled that what the debate is about is the protection 
of human rights.48
The assumption that appears to made in the debate is that human rights are a 
homogenous category and because of this nature a single homogenous 
solution is required. However, given the jurisprudential disagreements as to 
what human rights are and why they should be protected, that have been 
pointed to above, it is claimed that each right is usually enshrined in very 
general terms in order to minimise the privileging of one conception of 
human rights over another.49 What such a method is claimed to imply is that 
each human right has different problems and needs; thus different laws will 
be needed to protect freedom of the press as opposed to freedom of 
movement, for example. But to enter into this degree of detail a contested 
choice as to a particular conception of civil liberties will need to be made.
Some commentators who advocate a Bill have recognised the differences 
between specific civil liberties and claimed that a Bill of Rights must be 
supplemented by specific statutes.50 However, this point is invariably made 
in passing while the focus of calls for reform in legal protection remains 
squarely on the enactment of a Bill of Rights.51 Furthermore, this approach
48 This is implicit in the remarks made by Lord Boston of Faversham, 'Arguments Against A 
Bill of Rights' in Campbell op. cit., 23;
..none of us, whether we are in favour of a Bill of Rights or whether we are against it, has (or 
has claimed) a monopoly of enthusiasm for promoting human rights. Equally, nobody on the 
one side will say of anybody on the other side that he or she is wanting, when it comes to 
furthering those aims...'
49 As instanced by the provisions in Charter 88, op. cit.,. and those of the draft Bill of Rights 
by the Institute of Public Policy and Research (IPPR), op. cit.
50 For example, D.G.T. Williams, 'Civil Liberties and The Protection of Statute1 (1981) 34 
C.LP. 25, Thorton, op. cit., 96-102 and the IPPR, draft constitution, op. cit., 13;
'Both kinds of changes are needed: they are not mutually exclusive.'
51 See Lloyd, op. cit., 128, Wallington & McBride, op. cit., 39.
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merely postpones the need to decide what specific mechanisms and 
procedures each right needs and how each is to be best protected - once again 
jurisprudential issues concerning the specific nature of each human right will 
have to be addressed. Without adverting to these issues, even those who 
recognise the differences as between different rights and call for specific 
remedies, are left with rather vague suggestions for reform which lack the 
detail to accord adequate protection.
A paradoxical situation reveals itself in many studies according to which 
particular human rights are investigated and analysed, thus providing useful 
details of the way in which rights are exercised and regulated52 but these 
insights are then neglected when at the end of this exercise the Bill of Rights 
issue is discussed and the enactment of such a Bill is claimed to be a reform 
that would enhance the protection of human rights.53 Such a claim patently 
ignores the specificity of the prior analysis in favour of an extremely broad 
response that would not ameliorate the specific and detailed problems that 
have been presented.
The jurisprudential issue that underlies this aspect of the debate is claimed to 
be that of the value of difference and local, as opposed to grand, all- 
encompassing, narratives. The analysis of specific human rights can be said to 
be an exercise in looking at what is different and particular to each liberty, 
whereas the Bill of Rights debate overwhelmingly emphasises generality and 
reduces the differences between different liberties in order to embrace a 
common solution. Therefore, the aspect of the debate concerning how human 
rights should be protected- whether by specific statutes or a Bill of Rights- can 
also be seen to be a debate founded upon a jurisprudential base.
A RETURN TO THE PRACTICAL
A final feature of the debate that is of practical importance concerns what 
strategies reformists should adopt in order to secure the improved protection 
of civil liberties. This is clearly a practical question and it will be claimed that 
a central strategy should be that of compromise.
52 As with for example, Ewing & Gearty, op. dt., Robertson, op. cit., and Bailey et. ai, op. dt.
53 For example, Robertson, op. at., 387 et. seq. and Stevens & Yardley, op. dt., 168. "
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Earlier in the debate compromise solutions were suggested. The logic behind 
these strategies was to seek support from all sides in the debate so that 
human rights could be protected, whilst at the same time not privileging a 
particular conception of rights and allowing for political change and the 
workings of democratic choices. An example of such an attempt at 
compromise was the suggestion that a 'United Kingdom Commission of 
Human Rights' should be established,54 to which UK citizens could report 
violations of human rights protected under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). However, this body would have no power to enforce 
these rights, thus leaving intact the scope for political change and democratic 
processes, whilst at the same time according a value and degree of protection 
to human rights. Alternatively, Lester55 suggested a temporary compromise 
in the form of a 'Constitutional Council' with powers to make 
recommendations to Parliament as far as the conformity of legislative and 
executive measures with an enacted British Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights 
would not, however, have been enforced by the judiciary. The compromise 
here would have been to have left parliamentary sovereignty intact but also to 
have provided political mechanisms by which attention could be drawn to 
the need to protect human rights when legislating.
These earlier attempts at compromise contrast sharply with what is claimed 
to be the present polarised nature of debate. The earlier compromise 
proposals have given way to a debate constituted by diametrically opposed 
positions, in which those advocating a Bill of Rights invariably demand a 
judicially enforceable Bill (usually via incorporation of the Convention) 
against those opposed to any such enactment. The contemporary nature of 
the discussion is one in which arguments for and against are ritually 
marshalled against each other. What results is an arid dichotomy and 
deadlock. There seems little hope of a resolution to the debate in its current 
terms because the available proposals are of an all or nothing nature.
However, a focus on compromise directs efforts towards seeking 
arrangements by which the demands of parliamentary sovereignty and
,54 As proposed by Sam Silkin Q.C. in his 'Protection of Human Rights' Bill 1971 (cf. S. Silkin, 
The Rights of Man and The Rule of Law' (1977) 28 N.I.L.Q. 3, Zander, op. tit., 8, Jaconelli, op. 
at., 32-4 and most recently the IPPR draft constitution, op. at., 5).
55 'Democracy and Individual Rights' (1968) and Zander, op. at., 3.
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human rights can be reconciled. This may not be possible via a Bill of Rights. 
Thus attention is shifted to other mechanisms, instead of being fixed on a Bill 
of Rights, as has been seen to be the case.
A pertinent example of the above tendency can be drawn from the recent 
developments in the debate. This concerns the attempt by Lord Scarman and 
Sir Edward Gardner QC (Con.) to incorporate the European Convention into 
UK law by virtue of the 'Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' Bill. 
After having passed all its legislative stages in the House of Lords, it was 
defeated on a closure motion on 6th Feb. 1987.56 If the parliamentary debate 
on this Bill is analysed, the same arguments for and against a Bill of Rights 
that have been present for the last twenty years can be identified.57
The broad and brief analysis above has shown that the Bill of Rights issue has 
historically been a locus of political struggle. It has also shown that there is no 
apolitical conception of a Bill of Rights,58 it can be a tool or a weapon; a 
political shield, or conversely, a sword.59 The increasingly polarised nature of 
the debate has also been pointed to, notwithstanding earlier attempts to 
formulate compromise solutions.
Therefore, two points can be made from this brief analysis of the Bill of Rights 
debate. Firstly, it takes place against the background of a profound 
disagreement as to human rights, while at the same time it does not advert to 
this theoretical uncertainty. Secondly, by bringing these uncertain 
jurisprudential aspects to the surface, doubts are raised as to the aptness of a 
Bill of Rights.
See Hansard Parliamentary Debates vol. 109, 6th Feb. 1987, cols. 1223-89 and see, The 
Times, Feb. 4th, pg.l, Feb. 5th, pg.13, Feb. 7th, pg.l, Feb. 9th, pg.16 1987 and The Sunday 
Times, 'Freedom Crushed bv Stavawav MPs* Feb. 8th, pg. 30,1987. The Bill fell on a closure 
motion, being six votes short of the required number to pass on to the next legislative stage.
57 These arguments are set out by Zander, op. cit., 27-83, Jaconelli, op. cit.r 155-211 and P. 
Norton, 'The Constitution in Flux' (1982), 244-60 and so will not be presented in detail here
58 Wallington and McBride, op. cit. 7.
59 Norton, op. cit., 246-7 brings the party-political content of the Bill of Rights debate to the 
fore, when he analyses the traditional sources of support and opposition to a Bill of Rights; 
'Constitutional lawyers with their attachment to the rule of law view with increasing horror 
the encroachment of government (via its parliamentary majority) upon rights they consider 
should be protected. Conservatives seek to limit what they perceive to [be] the Socialist 
threat of increasing government encroachment in the lives of citizens; and, from the 
perspective of the House of Lords, a Bill of Rights would serve as a limit upon government 
which the Upper House can no longer effectively provide.'
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SECTION II
INTRODUCING A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Having criticised both the enactment of a Bill of Rights and the way the 
debate concerning it has proceeded, it may then be asked whether by 
introducing jurisprudential theory to this practical legal problem, one set of 
problems is not merely being replaced by another - in this case the practical 
by the theoretical? More to the point, how does such an approach improve the 
chances of formulating reforms that will lead to the better protection of 
human rights in England?
In this section a particular jurisprudential theory will be presented which will 
be used throughout this study and which will provide comparative criteria 
for the comparison of the liberty to assemble between France and England. 
The theory will be boldly stated here in order to more clearly show its 
features and the consequences it has for the Bill of Rights debate, before 
exploring its theoretical basis in the next chapter. It will be seen that it 
supports a particular compromise as a solution to the political and 
jurisprudential differences that were highlighted in the previous section. In 
the next chapter, via the additional use of comparative theory, France will be 
claimed to be a concrete example of some of the proposals that the 
jurisprudential theory will now be shown to suggest. It follows that although 
jurisprudence raises many problems in the area of human rights law, and 
indeed on occasion is actually hostile to human rights, at the same time it can 
point to important means for their protection.
THE THEORY
The best way to explain the features of this theory is to apply them to the 
jurisprudential questions that have been seen to underlie the Bill of Rights 
debate; what are human rights; why should they be protected; and finally, 
how should they be protected?
What?
The theoretical conception of human rights that will be adopted here asserts 
that human rights are the values of political and social communities. They are 
considered in their different ways to constitute activities, actions and interests
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that have such high value that they should be accorded greater protection 
than that accorded to other activities, actions and interests. This conception of 
human rights sees them as social constructs; they are the values that society 
believes are important. As a consequence of this status they can override 
other values and must be privileged before other competing activities and 
considerations. However, limits are invariably placed on them, as when they 
threaten or actually contravene what can be seen as meta-values, such as 
human life or peace. Human rights thus have limits and are not absolute 
because at times they conflict with other values.
This conception is formulated at an abstract level, where human rights are 
seen as the constructed values of communities. All the diverse categories of 
human rights that are normally distinguished are encompassed within this 
conception. Therefore, negative and positive rights, political and civil and 
economic and social rights, political rights and even international human 
rights are all claimed to be socially constructed categories that represent 
values. By reason of this communality, the terms human rights and civil 
liberties are henceforth used interchangeably and previous references to 'civil 
liberties' have also referred to this abstract category. This is not to deny that 
there are differences between them, but rather to make clear that for present 
purposes they are «ill values of a constructed nature, by which human agency 
and socio-political processes play a central role.
In the previous section human rights were seen to be based upon choices. The 
theory that is formulated here is claimed to accommodate these choices and 
does not privilege once choice over others. Therefore, it affirms that at a 
theoretical level there is no agreement as to the nature of human rights by 
claiming that these choices represent the chosen values of particular groups 
and communities. They are no more fundamental than the value they are 
given when they are constructed by these social and political forces.
It is because human rights are socially constructed categories that they are 
contingent (i.e. subject to change) and not universal across different times and 
places. It might be claimed that the existence and expanding scope of a body 
of international human rights across a growing number of countries 
disproves this point. The theory of human rights does not refute the possibility 
that at a particular time the same civil liberties might be commonly 
recognised around the world but rather that this can be attributed to anything
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in the nature of civil liberties. On the contrary, insistence is placed on the fact 
that different countries, when seen as political and social communities have 
generated these rights and that their present universality is due to those same 
social and political forces that today act on a international, rather than a 
national level.
The role of social and political forces leads to a final point: human rights are 
the socially constructed values that are often but not exclusively imposed by 
the dominant group or groups in society. It should be underlined that this 
does not mean that these groups necessarily oppress but rather that they can 
often decide which values are of such importance as to be considered human 
rights. Therefore, those in power may enshrine their own values, those of 
others or even those that they feel benefit the entire community, even where 
they may not share those values. It follows that human rights are intimately 
linked to power. At the same time, less powerful groups often have recourse 
to human rights in order to challenge existing structures of power but in 
using human rights in this way they seek to exercise power. Thus, by making 
arguments in terms of human rights an attempt is being made to alter, 
establish or reinforce values.
By way of summary, it can be stated that civil liberties are socially 
constructed and contingent values that are neither absolute nor universal, and 
are linked to the exercise of power. This response cannot be said to have 
resolved the question that jurisprudence raised as to what are the precise 
human rights in a particular community, such as England but it provides a 
partial response by showing that choices will need to be made: the content of 
the Bill will reflect the choices of the powerful but these choices will in turn be 
subject to challenge from other but weaker groups. Moreover, these choices 
will very much reflect the particular circumstances of the period in which 
they are made. The revealed nature of rights points to legal mechanisms that 
allow for changes in these choices. Therefore, the theory accepts all the 
reasons that are put forward by seeing them all as being claims that human 
rights are values.
Why?
In much the same way, the theory gives a general response to this question by 
accepting (with one exception that will be dealt with presently) the different 
reasons why human rights are seen as values. These reasons have been
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claimed to be political and because of their consequent socially constructed 
nature they can be expected to exhibit similar characteristics to those that 
were seen above as regards the inquiry as to what are human rights; viz. 
contingency and a relation with power.
Human rights should therefore be protected because they are the values of a 
particular community. This will normally be reflected in the reasons that are 
put forward in favour of protection. The theory assumes that the reasons that 
are given are not substantially flawed in the sense of being clearly illogical, or 
insufficient but that they at least present a support for the protection of 
human rights; in other words, that they at least act as reasons. It does not 
deny that often this might not be the case and that there will be intense debate 
and challenges to these reasons but it does assert that the arguments or 
reasons for protecting civil liberties that are accepted in a community are 
those of that community and for these reasons human rights should be 
protected. However, where reasons run out and simply cannot justify a 
choice, it is argued that human rights become accepted by the wider 
community by reason of exercise of ideology backed up ultimately by power. 
Once again these choices are open to challenge by other groups, who will also 
resort to reasons but may also have resort to ideology and power.
There is this one exception to the generality of theory in response to the 
question why human rights should be protected. The theory embraces one 
substantive reason, which follows on from the role that power is claimed to 
play as regards civil liberties. More precisely, this reason is linked to the 
potential of human rights. The theory states that no matter what the 
immediate reason(s) given for protecting human rights, (be it equality, liberty, 
moral autonomy etc.) they can act as a means of challenging power; they can 
challenge the dominant values of the powerful and thus the status quo and as 
a result they can, and have led, to political and social change in communities. 
However, to use them against those in power is as the same time to exercise 
power. A successful challenge involves the replacement of the values of one 
dominant group by those of another. The potential for this kind of change is 
valued by the theory and consequently it is claimed that a fundamental 
reason for protecting human rights is their potential to act as instruments of 
change.
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In the context of the Bill of Rights debate, the theory, prima facie , accepts all 
reasons that seek to justify the protection of human rights but it also claims 
that these reasons should be analysed in order to discover how far they leave 
open the possibilities for social and political change and how far they offer to 
the less powerful in a community an opportunity of having their opinions 
and values adopted by the community. As a consequence, reasons given in 
the debate can be judged according to the degree to which they support the 
potential for human rights to act as the means for social and political change. 
In this sense, the theory presents social and political change as a kind of 
'meta-reason'.
How?
The response to this question has already been hinted at above in the context 
of the Bill of Rights debate. Thus, the theory of human rights that is adopted 
here places emphasis on the specific needs of specific civil liberties. It focuses 
on what theorists term 'local narrative'. This involves looking at the different 
civil liberties in order to tailor methods of protection to their differing and 
particular needs. This approach is claimed to redress the tendency to obscure 
difference which follows from over-generalisation or the preference for the 
'grand narrative'.
Bringing differences to the fore leads to the conclusion that civil liberties can 
best be protected by specific legal frameworks formulated to suit the specific 
contexts of each civil liberty. It therefore grants a less prominent role to a Bill 
of Rights and re-focuses reforming strategies away from the present 
concentration on such a Bill. Essentially, the theory serves as a reminder of 
the importance of legal reform in order to enhance the protection of civil 
liberties and that a Bill of Rights is only one possible way of achieving this. It 
then states that a Bill of Rights on its own is too general a measure to secure 
this objective.
The preferred specific mechanisms for protecting human rights must also 
allow for the political and social change that was stated above to be the 
fundamental reason for protecting human rights. It follows from this that 
methods of protection must as far as possible be open to forces that push for 
change and that measures that seek to place human rights beyond these 
forces or to secure their continued presence in the face of pressure for change 
are at a disadvantage as compared to those which are more responsive to
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change. As far as the Bill of Rights debate is concerned, this requirement 
provides an argument against enacting a Bill because of the greater difficulty 
of altering or repealing it. Clearly, no Bill of Rights can remain immune to all 
forces of change but one of the arguments most often put forward in support 
of the Bill has been seen to be that it would entrench certain rights to a greater 
extent then is presently the case. The challenge that the theory throws out is 
to develop methods of protection that reduce entrenchment to a minimum 
whilst at the same securing the protection of human rights because they 
represent the values of the community.
The jurisprudential theory of human rights that has been formulated here has 
built on the theoretical insights that were revealed to underlie the debate in 
section I. The theory can accommodate all the diverse views as to what 
human rights are because they are seen to assert that they are values. In 
addition, apart from insisting on their being vehicles for social and political 
change, the theory allows for civil liberties to be protected for many different 
reasons. As regards the third issue; that of how human rights should be 
protected, the theory has pointed to certain approaches; namely specific 
mechanisms that are formulated to protect and guarantee specific human 
rights, as well as constituting compromises between parliamentary 
sovereignty and human rights. By employing comparative law in chapter II, 
concrete mechanisms in France that allow for and are suited to these claimed 
characteristics of human rights will be pointed to.
Having presented the main features of the jurisprudential theory of human 
rights that is applied in this study, the next section looks in detail at its origins 
and the theoretical foundations of its claims.
SECTION III 
EXPLORING ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
As was earlier stated, the theory is claimed to be derived from the theories of 
both advocates and critics of human rights. Its theoretical foundations are 
eclectic because they draw on the views of these two broad groups. The 
theory therefore claims that human rights are commonly viewed as values, 
even though advocates and critics of human rights conceive of those values in 
fundamentally different ways. Human rights are seen as very different values
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but a consensus is argued to exist that they are seen as values. On the basis of 
this consensus view, it is argued that important guidelines can be laid down 
as to the legal protection of human rights, such as were just outlined above in 
section II.
The specific features of the theory will be more clearly understood once the 
theories of supporters and critics are set out. These two groups will be taken 
to be broadly represented respectively by liberals and critical scholars. 
Although their theoretical positions are familiar, they will be recounted here 
so as to point to the gradual development of common elements and the 
gradual dimunition of points of difference that it is claimed has led to a 
convergence of views and upon which the theory is based. Therefore, what 
follows is the presentation of well known narratives but with the stress on 
elements that are claimed to be of great importance to the jurisprudential 
theory of human rights that is formulated in this study.
This section also aims to show that both supporters and critics of rights have 
sought to reformulate them in order to harness their potential to challenge the 
status quo, despite their observed jurisprudential weakenesses. Therefore, 
although adverting to jurisprudence may initially seem to weaken human 
rights, it can alter them in order to present a strong and radicalised 
conception, as was seen in the above section.
THE LIBERALS’ NARRATIVE
Although today contemporary liberal theorists60 support human rights, this 
has not always been the case. Liberals have in the past been sceptical as to the 
existence of human rights and have attacked them. This can be seen as part of 
a more general attack that sought to expose the theoretical weaknesses of
60 It is not possible to define what is meant by liberalism, given the constraints of space and 
although this section does not touch on all the features of what is an extremely broad 
movement, it is hoped that the main theoretical orientation of this group will grasped from 
the account of the development of their theories of rights and the attacks of their critics. 
However, for an introduction to liberal thought, and its numerous and often conflicting 
features, see Arblaster, op. cit., especially, 55-91. It is claimed that liberalism, like any 
movement can only be understood across a historical perspective (i.e. in action) and this will 
be one of the functions of this section. This claim is supported by Arblaster, op. cit., 91; 
'...liberalism is not reducible to a set of general and abstract propositions. It is a historical 
movement of ideas and a political and social practice.' (c.f. M. Loughlin, op. cit., 84-101).
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natural law. However, two developments eventually led liberals to support 
human rights.
Firstly, liberal theorists altered the jurisprudential nature of human rights by 
placing them on a humanistic footing. Secondly, they came to see them as an 
instrument of progressive reform and as providing a means by which each 
individual could make his or her own moral choices in circumstances of 
moral uncertainty. Having adopted this position, liberals then had to defend 
human rights against philosophical attack. It will be claimed that as part of an 
attempt to meet these theoretical difficulties, liberal theorists have founded 
rights upon consensus. It is the belief in their capacity to effect change and 
that they are products of consensus, as well as their belief in moral 
uncertainty that will be seen to have in turn provided a point of possible 
convergence between liberals and certain critical scholars.
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Initial hostility
It is within natural law that the modem conceptions of human rights first 
developed.61 Natural rights were theocratic and derived their claim to truth 
from God and a divinely inspired natural order. They developed from the 
Middle Ages through to the eighteenth century. However, in the seventeenth- 
century, this theocratic theory was modified into a theory of natural 
limitations on government authority.62 Locke, in his 'Two Treatises of 
Government'63 asserted that government authority was not naturally 
ordained, rather it was as a result of human choice that persons had agreed to 
submit themselves to this form of authority. Humans created civil society 
upon the basis of an agreement that imposed duties on both authority and 
citizens. Citizens maintained certain natural rights and could revoke their 
support for government if the latter failed in its duty to secure liberty and the 
other benefits of civil society. Essentially, Locke claimed civil society was a 
contingent set of arrangements; power held on trust. It was a trust that could 
be revoked by the people, who were bom free and bearing natural rights, 
which they had temporarily and conditionally agreed to limit for the 
purposes of achieving a more peaceful and co-operative existence. The 
presence of God has historically been central to natural law theory,64 since 
man is subject to a nature which is fashioned by God and so even in civil 
society ultimate subjection to the divine will continues. Therefore, natural 
rights were derived from God, as were the liberties and rights of the citizen - 
civil liberties were concepts with divine foundations.65
61 A comprehensive history of the developments of natural rights can be found in R. Tuck, 
Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development' (1979), A.P. d'Entreves, 'Natural 
Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy' (1970) and Palley, op. cit., 14-24.
62 Waldron sums up the theory of natural rights during this period as follows;
'In its classic form the theory of natural rights may be seen as an attack on two quite different 
approaches to the defence of political absolutism: it is a response to the theory of natural 
hierarchy, and it is a response to theories of contractual subjection to absolute authority.'
0- Waldron (ed.), ’Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man', 
(1987), 7) and c i . Palley, op. at., 21.
63 (1689), P. Laslett (ed.) (1960).
64 However, for a modem reformulation that does not claim to be founded on the existence of 
God, see Finnis, (1980), op. dt.
65 See, M. MacDonald, 'Natural Rights' in J. Waldron (ed.), 'Theories of Rights' (1984), op. dt.,
26 and Waldron (1987), op. dt., 18-19;
The claim was not only that humans had certain rights which could not be alienated in 
society, but also that existing political relationships were in fact founded on an original 
agreement among the people in a given territory to establish institutions and procedures for 
the better preservation of these rights. People were supposed to have met together and 
agreed to pool their resources and entrust their common power to specialised agencies - 
princes, magistrates and legislators.'
(Footnote continues on next page)
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It was with the secularisation of natural law theory in the eighteenth century 
that modern human rights developed. It was the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, with its stress on rationalism and humanism that exposed the 
weakness in the philosophical foundations of theocratic natural rights. At the 
same time, the philosophical scepticism of the eighteenth century encouraged 
the development of secular conceptions of rights - human rights. Henkin,66 
for example, has described how the revolutions in the United States of 
America and France secularised natural rights by declaring rights to be 
rational, universal and attached to the individual. The divine origins of 
natural rights were, inter alia, replaced by Rousseau's secular social contract.67 
These human rights were asserted by the bourgeoisie in their political 
struggles with monarchical authority.
However, it should be noted that despite the fundamental role accorded to God in Locke's 
conception of natural law, he also conceived a key role for humans. Thus, it was envisaged 
that certain principles were self-evident to people of reason and that reason was a gift from 
God. For an explanation and criticism of Lockean intuitive reason, see M. White, 'The 
Philosophy of the American Revolution' (1978). This duality of a divinely created general 
framework in which mortals must exercise their moral reason occurred prior to the 
humanism of the Enlightenment and can be traced as far back as Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa 
Theologicae' (1267-1273);
'...of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a very special way; being 
themselves made participators in providence itself, in that they control their own actions and 
the actions of others. So they have a certain share in the divine reason itself, deriving 
therefrom a natural inclination to such actions and ends as are fitting. This participation in 
the eternal law by rational creatures is called the natural law.'
(s5  The Various Types of Law' (Qu.91), art.2, concl.) 
and concerning human law;
'...human reason has to proceed from the precepts of natural law, as though from certain 
common and indemonstrable principles, to other more particular dispositions. And such 
particular dispositions, arrived at by an effort of reason, are called human laws...'
(s.5 The Various Types of Laws' (Qu.91), art.3, concl.).
This tradition in Natural law reasoning continues today in, for example, the work of J. Finnis, 
(1980), op. cit. The main attack on this form of reasoning was made by D. Hume, 'A Treatise of 
Human Nature* L.A. Selby Bigge (ed.), vol. Ill, i, 1-2 (1978), who asserted that reason could 
not resolve moral choices. Reason could merely reveal the choices available but could not be 
used in the actual process of choosing between various moral possibilities. In making moral 
choices people were stated to be exercising perceptions and sentiments (qualities in the mind, 
not in reality but which are taken to be real) which are apart from reason. Essentially, the 
Humean attack on natural law and its account of reason, which has been claimed to be one of 
the important antecedents of positivism (see, for example, N. MacCormick, 'Natural Law 
Reconsidered' (1981), Ox.J.L.S. 9), is that the 'is' revealed by reason cannot be used to derive 
'ought' which is the subject of morality and human rights.
66 L. Henkin, 'The Rights of Man Today' (1979), 5-13 and Waldron (1987), op. cit., 13-18, also 
describes the process and effect of moral scepticism on natural rights.
67 J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract' (1762), Books I & II.
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This adoption by the bourgeoisie may be seen as one of the factors that is 
responsible for the decline in human rights in the nineteenth century. As the 
bourgeoisie moved out of opposition and into control the radical potential of 
human rights was dulled as the ruling bourgeois class sought to secure its 
power and dominance and consequently, human rights came to be seen as 
instruments of domination. However, more radical elements within society 
continued to challenge authority. The attacks on human rights that followed 
were from diverse directions; some highlighted their bourgeois nature68 and 
others, their enduring philosophical weakness. Liberal attacks can generally 
be placed in the latter category.
One of the most celebrated of liberal attacks on human rights comes from 
Bentham. His criticisms are levelled at the claimed philosophical weaknesses 
of human rights.69 He saw human rights as based on erroneous philosophical 
foundations whose endurance was an obstacle to what he saw as the 
theoretical veracity and reforming potential of utilitarianism.70 As a liberal 
reformer, Bentham believed that people were governed by the principle of the 
maximisation of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. From this 'felicific' 
principle, he formulated a theory of individual, institutional and 
governmental action, that resulted in the general principle that a policy or 
action was good (and should be carried out) if it maximised the total sum of 
pleasure in society. The principle directs that the pleasure caused to the many 
by a policy or decision outweighs the pain or harm that may be caused to the 
few. Human rights, however, make claims to certain enduring principles that
68 See K. Marx, 'On The lewish Question' (1844) in D. McLelland (ed.) 'K. Marx: Selected 
Writings' (1977) 39. According to this critique, civil liberties prevented people from achieving 
a consciousness of their economic conditions; they encouraged them to focus on individual 
self-interest, instead of the inequalities that existed in society. As a result Marx claimed, at op. 
at. 54;
’...none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, 
namely an individual separated from the community.’
69 'Anarchical Fallacies; Being An Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During the 
French Revolution' (1843) in J. Bowring (ed.),' The Works of I. Bentham' (1843), vol.111., 491 
For another example of Bentham's attack on natural rights, see the extract from 'Pannominal 
Fragments', op. cit., 217.
70 For Bentham's utilitarian philosophy, see J. Bentham, ’An Introduction to the Principles 
and Morals of Legislation' Chps.1-5, (1789), in J.H. Bums & H.LA. Hart (eds.), The Collected 
Works of leremv Bentham' (1970).
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are stated not to be subject to this calculation. Bentham therefore saw them as 
obstacles to utilitarian reforming policies.71
The emergence of utilitarianism can be seen as part of the development of 
legal positivism, which claimed a clear separation between law and morality 
and factual and normative spheres. Philosophically, it was not seen as 
possible to derive norms from descriptive facts concerning human nature, 
which was precisely the claim of civil liberties.72. It is suggested that these 
attacks on human rights by liberal theorists in the nineteenth-century are 
strongly linked to how those groups which advocated human rights were 
perceived. As was observed above, human rights were asserted by the 
dominant social group and as a consequence they were no longer seen as 
tools and justifications for radical social change and claims for social justice, 
instead they were perceived as actually impeding social reform. Originally 
they had been used to justify the usurpation of government power from the 
monarchy by the bourgeoisie but bourgeois interests had a limited radical 
content, especially when faced with a growing and increasingly more 
articulate and organised labour movement. In this context human rights were 
viewed as mechanisms that maintained an unjust status quo.
What can therefore be identified here is a liberal interest in mechanisms for 
achieving political and social change, as well as a hostility towards what were 
seen to be obstacles that frustrated change. If follows that liberals were hostile 
towards human rights.
71 The incompatibility of utilitarianism and non-goal based human rights has been much 
discussed, see for example, H.L.A. Hart, 'Essays on Bentham: jurisprudence and Political 
Theory'. (1982) and D. Lyons, 'Utility and Rights' in J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman (eds.), 
'Ethics Economics and the Law: Nomos XXIV' (1982), 107. Utilitarians have attempted to 
accommodate human rights and this has produced a vast body of literature. The issues are 
discussed and summarised in D. Lyons, op. cit., and J.J.C. Smart & B. Williams, 
'Utilitarianism: For and Against' (1973). One of the most famous attempts to reconcile 
utilitarianism and human rights was made by J.S. Mil! in 'On Liberty' (1859). An interesting 
discussion of the Millian attempt at accommodation can be found in W.E. Conklin, 'In 
Defence of Fundamental Rights' (1979), 125-59.
72 For an example of a general positive law theory, see J. Austin, 'The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined' (1832), H.L.A. Hart (ed.) (1954), c.f. the Hart-Fuller debate; H.L.A. 
Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 Harv.L.Rev. 593 and L. 
Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart' (1959) Harv.L.Rev. 630.
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Adopting human rights
Given this hostility, how is it that today liberal theorists can be found 
supporting human rights? The answer lies in the so-called ’revival of natural 
law', although this is a humanistic conception that will presently be 
explained. It is this that has lead to the contemporary popularity of human 
rights. The natural law revival is stated to be manifested in the ECHR and the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UNDHR).73 The Second 
World War, the expansion of government activity and the increase in 
economic and social instability have been pointed to as crucial factors in the 
resurgence of human rights.74 Human rights discourse has become pervasive 
and has expanded its scope to include the actions of states (thus it now 
appears as an integral part of international law).75 However, between the 
terms 'natural law', 'natural rights' and 'human rights' there is contended to 
be a considerable amount of slippage in terms of meaning. For Pennock, the 
three terms are distinct and the distinctions between them are of crucial 
historical import;
The phrase 'human rights' or 'rights of man* seems to go back no more than two centuries and 
has come into common parlance only since World War II. It has, however, obvious affinities 
to the older expression, 'natural rights'. In fact, some writers treat them as 
synonymous....Although the term 'natural rights' has a close blood relationship with 'natural 
law', it is generally held that the distinction between the two marks a major turning point in 
the history of western political thought.7^
For this writer, the crucial historical change is the shift from law to rights; 
from duties owed by the citizen to obligations imposed upon the state in 
favour of the citizen. What is meant by the claim that the twentieth-century 
has a witnessed a 'revival in natural law'? It is claimed that it is secular natural
73 See for example, S. Davidson, 'Human Rights' (1993), 29.
74 For example. Lord D. Lloyd of Hampstead & M.D.A. Freeman, 'Introduction to 
jurisprudence' (1985), 127 state that;
'..the idea of an overriding law expressing a higher truth and a higher justice than that 
embodied in man-made law is not easily extinguished. The decline in social and economic 
stability in the present century, the expansion in government activity, as well as the growth of 
weapons of destruction and policies of genocide coupled with reviving doubts as to the 
method of empirical sciences affording the sole avenue of truth, have led to a resurgence in 
favour of natural law thinking.’
75 See for example, A. Cassese, 'International Law in A Divided World’ (1986), 287-316, 
'Human Rights in a Changing World' (1990), 29-32 and c.f. J.J. Shestack, The lurisprudence of 
Human Rights’ in T. Meron (ed.), 'Human Rights in International Law' (1984) vol.85-8.
76 J.R. Pennock, ’Rights. Natural Rights and Human Rights - A General View' in J.R. Pennock
& J.W. Chapman (eds.) ’Human Rights’ (1981), 1.
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law that has enjoyed a revival, therefore natural rights have come to be 
spoken of as being based on some enduring feature or features of the human 
condition. As a result, human rights have become a humanistic concept.77 
Nature is considered to be human and not divine and the revival in natural 
law can be seen as a move by liberal theorists to embrace human rights but in 
the process to also change the theoretical foundations upon which they are 
based.
However, this shift to the secular has already been seen to have occurred as 
part of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and so it cannot be the only 
factor that explains the adoption of human rights by liberals. Therefore, this 
change of view was also greatly supported by a perception that human rights 
could be used to effect reform and change, as opposed to merely maintaining 
the status quo. However, the resolution that grounding human rights in 
human nature seemed to provide was only temporary as liberal thought 
continued to discover theoretical problems with human rights. While 
disagreements flared as to the functions of human rights,78 the relationship 
between rights, duties and rights-bearers79 and the enforcement of rights,80 
the major issue became that of the foundation or ontology of human rights.81
The ontological attack
While some liberal theorists remain attached to the notion that human rights 
are embedded in some innate natural quality in human beings,82 others have
77 See, once again, L. Henkin, op. cit., 5-13 and Waldron op. cit., (1987), 13-18.
78 See, for examples of different functions, J. Donnelly, 'Universal Human Rights in Theory 
and Practice’ (1989), 36, R. Nozick, 'Anarchy. State and Utopia' (1971), Conklin, op. cit., 149, 
and see also, H.L.A. Hart, op. cit., (1982), Essay 4 and Lyons, op. cit.
79 See H.L.A. Hart, (1982), op. cit., Essay 7, where Bentham's theory is also analysed and c.f. 
N. MacCormick, 'Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Leeal and Political 
Philosophy’. (1982), chp.8 and J. Raz, 'Right-Based Moralities’ in Waldron, op. cit., (1984), 182.
80 See, T. Campbell, D. Goldberg, S. McLean & T. Mullen (eds.), 'Human Rights: From 
Rhetoric to Reality' (1986), especially chps.1-5 and T.R.S. Allan, 'Constitutional Rights and 
Common Law' Ox.J.L.S. 11 [1991] 453.
81 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously' (1978), 171-2 and Conklin, op. cit., 4 & 13-116 for 
examples of different foundations.
82 Donnelly, op. cit., 17 provides a contemporary example;
The source of human rights is man's moral nature, which is only loosely linked to the 
"human nature” defined by scientifically ascertainable needs. Human rights are "needed" not 
for a life but for a life of dignity; as the International Human Rights Covenants put it, human 
rights form "the inherent dignity of the human person." Violations of human rights deny 
one's humanity; they do not necessarily keep one from satisfying one's needs. We have
(Footnote continues on next page)
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doubted the existence of an unchanging and universal human nature and 
consequently preferred to found human rights on various forms of consensus. 
In order to understand these arguments based upon consensus, the 
ontological attacks upon human rights must be explored.
The ontological nature of human rights has been frequently investigated and 
it has often been claimed on the basis of these inquiries that human rights do 
not exist, in the sense of being a part of any verifiable, empirical reality. As a 
result, it is said that human rights are merely illusions, metaphysical 
nonsense and subjective constructs. Claims to self-evidence and universal 
applicability are therefore stated to be false. Two examples of the attacks on 
the foundations of human rights, which proceed by a rejection of empirical 
reality are moral scepticism and Scandinavian Realism.
The theory of J.L. Mackie83 provides an example of moral scepticism. Moral 
scepticism is generally the claim that there are no objective values, whereas 
ethical realists claim that there are no necessarily universal values, instead 
there are differences between communities and persons as to values. Mackie 
sees the latter as being an example of the former. He asserts that the argument 
that there are no absolute truths or values can be manifested in the further 
claim that claims to objective truth and value are really subjective and 
therefore relative as between persons. He, however, concedes that the concept 
of objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language (which 
he takes for his purposes to be constituted by the European tradition of moral 
philosophy) but that this ingrained belief is an error.
human rights not to the requisites for health but to those things "needed" for a life of dignity, 
for a life worthy of a human being, a life that cannot be enjoyed without these rights.
The human "nature" that grounds human rights is a moral posit, a moral account of human 
possibility. The scientist's human nature sets the "natural" outer limits of human possibility. 
The moral nature that grounds human rights says that beneath this we may not permit 
ourselves to fall.'
(c.f. L.J. MacFarlane, 'The Theory and Practice of Human Rights' (1985), 3.).
A. Gewirth, 'Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications' (1982), 3 ,15, 21,41-66 
provides a complex theory of the foundation of human rights. Space precludes a detailed 
analysis but essentially, he asserts that human rights function to secure the necessary 
conditions of human action - they are generic conditions. The foundation of human rights, 
according to this theory, lies in their function.
83 'Ethics: inventing Right and Wrong* (1977), chp.l.
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He attempts to expose the error by virtue of two arguments. The first is the 
argument from relativity - this is a factual claim that points to the fact that 
different societies have different moral codes, which reflect their adherence to 
and participation in different ways of life. The second argument is made from 
'queemess1: if dvil liberties, as objective moral values existed, their existence 
would be quite simply ’queer’. This second claim breaks down into two 
points; firstly, that the metaphysical nature of objective human rights would 
make them entities that would be very much different from anything else in 
the universe; they would somehow have a 'not-to-be-doneness' built into 
them which could be perceived by everyone. Put more precisely, a 
consequential link would need to exist between the fact that an act has a 
certain effect (i.e. it causes pleasure or pain) and the consequence that this act 
is therefore right or wrong. For Mackie, the causal link comes from different 
and particular social environments and not from any metaphysical qualities 
of a claimed objective value.
The second point is epistemological. Mackie poses the question of how we 
would be aware of entities of objective value. He claims that to perceive these 
objects a special faculty, moral perception or intuition would need to be 
possessed that would be markedly different from ordinary ways of cognising 
objects. Behind this claim is the belief that objects are normally perceived 
using empirical methods. Given that civil liberties cannot be said to exist 
empirically, they must be perceived by virtue of an extraordinary sense. He 
concludes that to perceive objective values/truths would require a special 
intuition but that this intuition is subjective.84
According to Mackie, objectivisation, as the error of western thought can be 
understood as part of what Hume called the mind's 'propensity to spread 
itself on external objects'.85 When this process is aggregated across a 
community, it is seen that what is objectified is determined by society; moral 
judgements are sought to be made authoritative for the entire community by 
making claims to their objective validity. In short, human rights lack any 
objective foundation.
84 For the problems of intuitionism and self-evidence, see M. White, op. tit.
85 op. cit., 42.
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Another source of attack on the existence of civil liberties is that of 
empiricism. Mackie's version of moral scepticism is based upon empiricist 
cognitive assumptions but the belief that the only reality that exists is that 
which can be empirically verified, manifests itself in other schools of thought 
that deny the existence of human rights.
Human rights were also criticised by the Scandinavian Realists. This school of 
thought can be seen as a fusion of behaviourist and verificationist linguistic 
theories86 with realist legal philosophy. Once again there was an insistence on 
the existence of an empirical world. It was felt that the only linguistic entities 
that had meaning were descriptions; descriptions of empirical facts. This 
belief can be seen as the continuing referential and realist element but 
Scandinavian Realists went on to assert that meaning was also causal. The 
possibility that events in the legal world could have effects in the real world 
could be verified empirically because since it was a real world (and 
necessarily, empirical), real changes were manifested by an alteration in the 
state of affairs in this empirically verifiable sphere.
The acknowledged father of this movement, Axel Hagerstrom,87 criticised 
legal rights as being sham concepts, since they had no correspondence to 
reality. He went on to add that there was a psychological explanation for the 
belief that legal rights existed. This resulted from the feelings of strength, 
power and security that a right holder had as a result of his/her beliefs about 
what it meant to possess a right. A notion like that of human rights would 
therefore have been seen as merely another sham concept behind which lay 
an empirical reality.
In the work of later Scandinavian Realists, the importance that Hagerstrom 
accorded to psychology remains but more attention is given to what the 
actual empirical facts behind the stated illusionary legal entities actually are. 
For Olivecrona, legal words, such as contract and rights can be seen as 
'imperative performatives'; they bring about changes in the empirical sphere 
not because they exist (in the sense of having an empirical referent) but 
because of a continued belief in their existence, feelings of obligation,
86 See C. Morris, 'Signs. Language and Behaviour' (1946), A.J. Ayer, 'Language, Truth. Logic 
(1936) and I. Berlin, 'Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Fa m w ' (1980), 12-31.
87 'Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals' (1953), chp.l & 315-24.
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coercion, in other words, by virtue of psychological factors. This psychological 
belief results in otherwise mystical and illusory linguistic entities, such as 
human rights, appearing as real. In fact, human rights can have no affect in 
the real world, what lies behind them is the fact of psychological and social 
indoctrination. Behind law and therefore civil liberties is the fact of coercive 
power: human rights do not exist and are merely instruments of social control 
backed up by force. The key element to note about Scandinavian Realism is 
the reduction of linguistic meaning to facts; the only words that have 
meaning are those that describe an existing empirical state of affairs. Human 
rights fail to meet such requirements. Therefore, in exercising human rights, 
people are in reality making use of the social force and coercion that backs up 
the law.88
Responding with consensus
In the face of these attacks on the existence of truth and objectivity, liberal 
theorists sought to place human rights on firmer ground. But where could 
such ground be found? The answer was to located in the moral agreements 
within communities - social consensus.89 This approach will be shown by 
taking as examples the work of three major liberal theorists; Jeremy Waldron, 
Ronald Dworkin and Alan Gewirth.
According to Jeremy Waldron, the fundamental element of contemporary 
liberal philosophising about civil liberties is that it is carried out despite the 
doubts that surround the existence of a meta-ethics and objectivity;
To that extent the theory of rights is participating fully in what is undoubtedly the great 
achievement of modem moral philosophy - to show how argument and justification are 
possible and may proceed, even while the meta-ethics of realism and objectivity remain 
controversial, problematic and unclear.^
88 See, K. Olivecrona, 'Law as Fact’ (1939), Introduction & chp.l and 'Legal Language and 
Reality' (1962), 177-181. The performative linguistic theory was first systematically elaborated 
by J.L. Austin, see 'Philosophical Papers' (1970), 233-52. For further examples of 
Scandinavian Realist thought, see A.V. Lundstedt, 'Legal Thinking Revised' (1956) and A. 
Ross, 'Tû-tû' (1957) 70 Harv.L.Rev. 812, 'On Law and Tustice' (1958) and T)irectives and 
Norms' (1968).
89 See Palley, op. cit., 12 and D. Gauthier, 'Morals by Agreement’ (1986).
90 (1987), op. cit., 165-66.
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He characterises contemporary theories of rights as no longer seeking to claim 
that human rights exist empirically. Rather, he feels that debate as to the 
ontology of human rights, and moral foundations in general, has shifted;
Moral justification is no longer the search for knock-down arguments, irresistible to human 
reason: it is a quest for shared foundations, and so it becomes important to find out what the 
foundations of our rights-daims really are.91 (emphasis added).
Waldron can be seen to be stating that the existence or foundation of human 
rights is no longer sought in some realm of truth/falsity. Instead, the 
contemporary shift in the direction of human rights theorising is towards a 
search for foundations around which a consensus may be achieved, 
irrespective of whether or not civil liberties are grounded in empirical reality. 
If there is agreement as to the ontological nature of human rights, then this 
constitutes a sufficient foundation. Essentially, Waldron asserts that human 
rights exist because they are founded on consensus.92
Dworkin's theory of rights also provides a good example of this approach. In 
'Law's Empire1.93 he claims that civil liberties are part of an interpretative 
concept of law.94 Dworkin agues that a concept of law must justify, on the 
basis of the requirements of human rights, the use of collective force and 
coercion.95 He then claims that there are rival conceptions of law; 
conventionalism, pragmatism and integrity.96 Dworkin critically analyses 
each of these rival conceptions and finally adopts integrity as the best 
conception of law. His reasons for such a decision are not of relevance here 
but rather what is of interest is his concept of law. This, he claims, is taken 
from existing and common assumptions of a particular interpretative
91 (1987), op. tit., 165.
92 Waldron, (1984), op. tit., 3;
'Even if it is true....that moral judgements are nothing but expressions of attitudes, it does not 
follow that it is mistaken or fallacious to express the attitudes we have, nor does it follow that 
it is wrong to give vent to an attitude which is categorical and implicitly universal in the 
scope of its application....If meta-ethical realism is untenable, then rationally resolvable 
disputes in ethics become possible only between those who share certain fundamental values 
or principles in common.'
93 (1985) op. tit.
94 op. tit., 45-86.
95 op. tit., 93;
'Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how beneficial or noble the ends, 
except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past 
political decisions about when collective force is justified.
96 op. tit., chps.4,5 & 6 deal respectively with each of these rival conceptions.
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community97 - it is suggested that this community can be equated with 
modem liberal society.
The criteria for judging which is the best conception of the concept of law are 
two-fold; first, the conception must be the best fit and secondly, the best 
justification of existing practices and arrangements. Dworkin, therefore takes 
existing practice and a consensus as to the ideals and goals that law sets out to 
achieve as his starting point or the foundation of law.98 It is within this area of 
consensus that rival conceptions «ire debated. It is contended that human 
rights, within such a scheme of law are treated as creatures of social and 
political consensus and that they are made more precise by interpretations as 
to their 'weight' (and consequent applicability) to different factual 
circumstances. Dworkin's theory of rights as acting as trumps over policy and 
utility considerations, and as formulated in 'Taking Rights Seriously'.99 is 
therefore claimed to be the best interpretation (according to the criteria of best 
fit and justification) of human rights in contemporary liberal societies.
97 Dworkin claims that an interpretative concept goes through three stages. It is at the first 
'pre-interpretative' stage that an interpretative community formulates a commonly accepted 
concept of law; (1986) op. cit., 70-6 and at 90-1 the idea of consensus is made more explicit; 
'Law cannot flourish as an interpretative enterprise in any community unless there is enough 
initial agreement about what practices are legal practices so that lawyers argue about the best 
interpretation of roughly the same data. That is a practical requirement of any interpretative 
enterprise...I do not mean that all lawyers everywhere and always must agree on exactly 
which practices should count as practices of law, but only that the lawyers of any culture 
where the interpretative attitude succeeds must largely agree at any time. We all enter the 
history of an interpretative practice at a particular point; the necessary preinterpretative 
agreement is in that way contingent and local.'
98 (1986) op. cit., 164;
The great classics of political philosophy are utopian. They study social justice from the point 
of view of people committed in advance to no government or constitution, who are free to 
create the ideal state from first principles. So they imagine people living in a pre-political 
state of ’’nature’’ writing social contracts on blank slates. But real people in ordinary politics 
act within a political structure as well as on it. Politics, for us, is evolutionary rather than 
axiomatic; we recognise, in working toward a perfectly just state, that we already belong to a 
different one.
Ordinary politics shares with utopian political theory certain political ideals of a fair political 
structure, a just distribution of resources and opportunities, and an equitable process of 
enforcing the rules and regulations that establish these. I shall call those for brevity, the 
virtues of fairness, justice, and procedural due process.'
This long quotation is claimed to highlight Dworkin's claim that practices and institutions 




The social consensus foundation can also be located in Dworkin's ’one-right 
answer' thesis. The one-right answer or best interpretation is claimed to exist 
within each conception of law; he does not claim that there is one right 
answer that will unite all conceptions. Essentially, Dworkin can be seen as 
advocating different right answers according to different starting points or 
background facts. Seen from another viewpoint, the best interpretation/one 
right answer is not a claim to an objective truth but rather to an interpretation 
that best fits and justifies existing and commonly accepted social practices 
and arrangements. What results are controversial answers or interpretations 
that will always be open to challenge and must be seen as specific and 
particular to different communities.
For Dworkin, human rights are seen as part of the existing consensus of 
politico-legal practices within Western liberal society. They exist insofar as 
these practices exist. Gewirth's theory of rights can also be interpreted as 
proceeding from consensus assumptions. On a prima facie reading, this 
assumption is less easy to identify but is nevertheless fundamental to his 
logical reasoning, which is based upon persons treating others consistently 
(the 'principle of generic consistency').100
Gewirth asserts that human rights are moral but he assumes that there is a 
rational consensus as to the nature of morality. In this way he seeks to 
overcome the problems raised by ethical relativity and moral scepticism. 
Accordingly, he formulates a certain 'core' or consensus concerning morality;
Amid the various divergent moralities with their conflicting substantive and distributive 
criteria, a certain core meaning may be elicited. According to this, a morality is a set of 
categorically obligatory requirements for action that are addressed at least in part to every 
actual or prospective agent, and that are intended to further the interests, especially the most 
important interests, of persons or recipients other than or in addition to the agent or the 
speakers.
...moralities differ with regard to what interests of which persons they view as important and 
deserving of support. But amid these differences, all moralities have it in common that they 
are concerned with actions. For all moral judgements, including rights-claims, consist directly 
or indirectly in precepts about how persons ought to act toward one a n o th e r.^
Gewirth claims that human rights are justified because their objects are the 
generic necessary goods of human action and activity, including morality;
100 op. cit., 3.
101 op. cit., 45-6.
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Human rights...are normative relations to Objects which one must have in order to be an 
agent. It is for this reason that human rights are uniquely and centrally important among 
moral concepts: they are the necessary basis and focal point of all morality, since no morality, 
together with the goods, virtues, and rules emphasised in diverse moralities, is possible 
without the necessary goods of action which are the Objects of human rights.102
Using what is termed the 'dialectically necessary method', he demonstrates 
that all persons, must logically hold or be committed to human rights, if this 
were not the case that person would be denying his or her capacity to act as a 
'prospective purposive agent'.103 Human rights are therefore a rational 
necessity and the consensus is consequently a rational one.104 Having 
founded morality upon a consensus, in which it is agreed what are the basic 
conditions for human action, and thus morality, these basic conditions are 
then said to be guaranteed by two human rights; freedom and well-being;
where freedom consists in controlling one's behaviour by one's unenforced choice while 
having knowledge of relevant circumstances, and well-being consists in having the other 
general abilities and conditions required for a g e n c y .^
The human rights that, according to Gewirth, exist as a result of a consensus 
as to what is required for human action are less contingent than Dworkinian 
human rights. For Gewirth, the scope of the consensus stretches beyond a 
particular political community, it covers the whole of humanity. Gewirth 
asserts that it is this basic agreement as to the concept and ontology of 
morality that makes rival conceptions of morality possible.106 At this level, 
human rights can be claimed to be universal. However, this is a claim to a 
weak form of universality; it is claimed that morality has the same foundation 
everywhere and thus human rights/ as a means to secure particular 
conceptions of morality are found everywhere but Gewirth should not be 
seen to be stating that specific human rights, nor indeed a specific morality, 
are universal. On the contrary, the two rights he proffers are so general that 
they encompass a wide range of possible human rights and for this reason
102 op. tit., 6.
103 op. tit., 20.
104 op. tit., 21 et. seq. and at 25;
The method achieves a kind of rational necessity in the form of truths relevant to agency, 
including affirmations of rights, which no agent can deny without self-contradiction. Thus 
the initial moral dissensus is brought to a halt by truths that every agent logically must 
accept.'(ci. M. Moore, 'Foundations of liberalism' (1993), 11-32).
105 op. at., 47.
106 op. at., 6.
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they may be more fruitfully seen as constituent elements of a morality arrived 
at via rational consensus.107
Therefore, it is claimed that contemporary liberal theories of rights are 
characteristically consensus based, despite variations in how this consensus is 
claimed to be constituted. Waldron, Dworkin and Gewirth present but three 
examples of this approach.108 However, they highlight a common feature of 
liberal consensus theories, which is that consensus is usually implicit. The 
reason for this would seem to lie in the fact that the dominant view of human 
rights remains that which sees them as universal natural rights which persons 
hold by virtue of some quality that is innate to their human condition109 and 
not this jurisprudential view as to consensus. This view is therefore made 
rather implicitly in the face of the dominant view. Paradoxically human rights 
have been universally accepted in the fora of national and international 
politics, whilst their jurisprudential weaknesses continue to be exposed.110 It 
is claimed that liberal theorists are caught on the one hand between exposing 
these weaknesses and denying the progressive reforms that can be effected
107 Although, in Chapter 13 Gewirth makes the argument for specific civil liberties, it is 
suggested that from the same starting point, arguments can also be made in favour of other 
liberties.
108 For another example, see T. Mullen, 'Constitutional Protection of Human Rights' in T. 
Campbell et. al., op. cit., 29. Mullen asserts that civil liberties are based upon consensus. This 
consensus is stated to be objective but the form of objectivity is a 'weakened' one, since it is 
based on a rationally informed consensus, which he sees as approximating to the weak 
objectivity that in contemporary times is perceived to exist in the philosophy of science; 
’Objectivity resides in the procedures and the methods adopted and their consensual 
acceptance by the scientific community rather than in a direct correspondence to independent 
reality. Given that the objectivity of science is being viewed in a less transcendental or 
absolute sense, it seems reasonable to apply a similarly qualified standard to moral 
reasoning.' (pg.29).
This concept of weak objectivity has already been encountered in the context of Gewirth's 
theory but it is formulated here using arguments from Rawlsian 'wide reflective equilibrium' 
and the Habermasian concept of an 'ideal speech situation' (see, pgs.23-9).
109 See Donnelly, op. cit., 17, Conklin, op. cit., 189-211 and MacFarlane, op. cit.
110 Tuck, op. cit., 1 makes this point;
The thirty years since the war have witnessed a curious phenomenon: the language of 
human rights plays an increasingly important part in normal political debate, while academic 
political philosophers find it on the whole an elusive and unnecessary mode of discourse.'
The same observation is made by many commentators, see, for example, T. Campbell, 
Realising Human Rights' in T. Campbell, et. al., op. cit., 13;
'Human rights have emerged since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as a central rallying point for many who seek to champion morality in politics. This 
has occurred despite the absence of any adequate philosophical vindication of the idea of 
universal rights '
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via human rights and on the other, minimising these theoretical difficulties 
and lending their voices to calls to protect human rights.
Nevertheless, implicit as it may be, what has been seen is that contemporary 
liberal theorists now support human rights and ground them in consensus. It 
will be argued that as a consequence, liberals can support the position taken 
up by the theory that is adopted here but this claim will be developed as part 
of the narrative of the approach to human rights by the critical school of law.
THE NARRATIVE OF THE CRITICAL SCHOOL
What will be attempted to be shown here is that an important element within 
the critical legal school has moved away from attacking human rights in 
order to support them. In making such a move, however, they have insisted 
upon seeing human rights as social constructs and whilst accepting their 
potential to improve the position of the weak and oppressed, they have also 
placed strong emphasis on the use of power and dominance that lies behind 
consensus and which thus involves human rights.
If liberalism is an extremely broad movement, the same can certainly be said 
of the critical legal school and, as will be seen, the diversity of approaches 
may put into question attempts to characterise them as a single movement. 
Given these factors and the less well known history, aims and jurisprudential 
beliefs of critical thinkers, their narrative will be somewhat more detailed 
than that of the liberal theorists.111
111 The claims of K. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism' (1931) 44 Harv.L.Rev. 122, as to 




Critical legal theorists attack liberal legality using a number of different 
strategies and draw inspiration from diverse schools of thought.112 There is a 
claimed communality of purpose which roughly unites these disparate 
approaches;
Advocates of critical legal studies may not all share the same rank ordering of dissatisfactions 
but all are reacting against features of the prevailing orthodoxies in legal scholarship, against 
the conservatism of the law schools and against many features of the role played by law and 
legal institutions in modem society.1 ^
Critical legal theory claims to be politically committed, it rejects the view that 
legal scholarship is value neutral and this therefore affirms its commitment to 
activism.114 This political commitment is fleshed out by Grigg-Spail and 
Ireland,115 who claim that the central focus of critical legal scholarship is to 
explore how law supports a pervasive system of oppressive, non-egalitarian 
relations, which lies behind the claim on the part of liberal legalism to value 
neutrality. Goodrich sees the present movement as the latest example in a 
series of theoretical challenges to the claimed value and objectivity of the law. 
He claims that theories of modernity, postmodernity, discourse, 
deconstruction, difference and decay (which are here, as far as their 
application to theories of law, subsumed under the heading of 'critical legal 
theory' or 'scholarship') are reactions against modernity. These reactions 
produce particular experiences or powerlessness, irrationality and loss of 
faith;116
It is a century later, towards the close of the twentieth century and in the context of renewed 
pessimism most obviously associated with the various forms of nuclear power and pollution, 
with the renewed intensity of the technological revolution and with the perceived failure of 
reformist and revolutionary movements in the western industrialised economies, that the 
legal institution is most likely to be affected by a general tide of cultural d e f e a t . 1 1 ^
112 The are a large number of perspectives which have been grouped under this umbrella 
heading, including modem pragmatist philosophy, deconstruction and post-structuralism (A. 
Hunt, The Critique of Law: What is "Critical" About Critical Legal Theory’ in P. Fitzpatrick & 
A. Hunt (eds.), 'Critical Legal Studies' (1987), 6) and critical theory, feminism and post­
modernism are added by I. Grigg-Spall & P. Ireland (eds.). The Critical Lawyers' Handbook' 
(1992), x.
113 Hunt, op. at., 5.
114 op. at., 6.
115 op. at., ix.
116 See P. Goodrich, 'Law and Modernity' [1988] M.L.R. 545 at 548.
117 op. at., 547.
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For Goodrich modernity is about the experience of a broad and pervasive 
nihilism; a nihilism which rejects the nineteenth century rationalist tradition 
and Christian moral culture. Essentially, critical legal theory is informed by a 
disbelief in rationality and objectivity.118 Hutchinson119 sees this disbelief in 
rationality and objectivity as an attack on legal formalism, which is claimed to 
have put forward a natural and true view of the condition of human 
existence. This in turn is claimed to be part of the universalism, humanism 
and foundationalism of the Enlightenment Project. This mode of thought is 
stated to be centrally concerned with a search for a foundational and rational 
mode of theorising and this process has continued in contemporary liberal 
thought. He criticises the Enlightenment Project because contrary to its 
claims, it has no position of theoretical innocence or political neutrality. 
Instead, it is a theory produced in specific historical circumstances, thus it is 
neither universal, nor neutral.120
The diverse influences and variations in methodology have been seen as a 
liberating aspect of critical legal scholarship, in that there is a refusal to put 
forward one common truth or theory, which in turn has been one of the 
criticisms levelled at the rationalist /Enlightenment/ liberal legal system and
118 op. at., 549;
'Nihilism may be provisionally defined as a combination of elements, as a sense of the 
absurdity of existence and of the unwarranted pretension of social life, as a perception of the 
nothingness to which all things lead and as a consequent realisation of the contingency of all 
values and the fragility of all claims to objectivity.'
The incorporation into law of insights from other disciplines is noted in a series of essays 
edited by P. Fitzpatrick ("Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in lurisprudence' 
(1991)), who himself criticises the partial application of these insights by legal scholars in 
order to bolster, instead of to challenge the status quo, op. at., 1-33. He asserts that once these 
developments have been even partially allowed to enter the sphere of law they become 
dangerous supplements, which threaten to subvert the claim of legal jurisprudence to being 
real, true, posited, rational and universal. His essay mainly consists of an exploitation of the 
linguistic philosophy contained in the Haitian concept of law, by treating and exposing 
linguistic philosophy as a dangerous supplement. Goodrich's claim cannot be explored here 
but what should be noted is the influence of critical social theories on critical legal theorists. 
Perhaps Goodrich's point may be seen as a criticism that despite their radicalness, critical 
legal theorists have once again only partially and selectively incorporated these 
developments into legal theory.
119 A. C. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays on Modem Legal Thought' 
(1988).
120 op. at., 32;
The great systems of philosophy and styles of theorising about the human condition are not 
fixed nor immutable. The Enlightenment is a phase, albeit an extended and durable one.'
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society.121 However, as a result, of these various inspirations and approaches 
there are tensions between different schools of thought. The diverse 
approaches to civil liberties explain the tensions that will be observed 
between the different philosophies, as well as the disagreement as to whether 
human rights should be rejected outright or if they can be of use, once re­
formulated.
Approaches to human rights
As part of the bicentennial celebrations of the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, a collection of essays entitled 'Post-Modern Law: Enlightenment. 
Revolution and the Death of Man'122 was published. As the title suggests, 
these essays were inspired by post-modern thought, which was stated to be 
directed
against the most complete modem legal project, that produced by the French R e v o l u t i o n . 1 ^
As regards human rights, the central claim of postmodernism,124 is that they 
are aspects of a false secular rationalism. The Enlightenment Project is said to 
have failed in its own terms because it claims to have dispensed with the 
mysterious, irrational and superstitious but instead it is alleged that the 
religious/metaphysical are incorporated into modern thought.125 Despite 
chaos, diversity and ambiguity, modernity (Enlightenment thought) puts its 
faith in an enduring reason and rationality. In deconstructing this secular 
rationalism,126 the starting point is the death of 'Man'. By this is meant the 
centring and fundamental role of the individual and rational subject in 
contemporary thought. It is then claimed that with the death of the subject, 
the Rights of Man must also fall.127 The de-centring of the subject/individual
121 A. Thomson, 'Foreword: Critical Approaches to Law: Who Needs Legal Theory?’, in 
Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit. 3-4.
122 A. Carty (ed.) (1990).
123 op. cit., viii.
124 For a general introduction to legal postmodernism, see C. Douzinas, R. Warrington & S. 
McVeigh, 'Postmodern lurisprudence: The Law of Text in The Texts of Law' (1991), 
Introduction & chp.l and C. Douzinas & R. Warrington, 'The (Im)possible Pedagogical 
Politic  Qf (thy U w  pf) Pp?tm<?dm»aaQ' in Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit., 31.
125 op. cit., 18.
126 op. cit., 5.
127 op. cit., 4;
'It is not necessary to deconstruct or ridicule the Rights of Man. They will fall apart of their 
own accord, because death is at the heart of them. "Modem" thought seems to suppose itself 
infinite. This is not simply wrong. It is silly - hence the derision.'
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and the claim that the individual subject is not real but rather a social 
construct is one of the main features of postmodernism.128
Furthermore, the rationality of Enlightenment law is attacked and as a 
consequence so are human rights. Goodrich129 critically analyses Rousseau's 
social contract, seeing it as an attempt to challenge the finitude of the human 
condition by presenting it as an object that endures beyond and defers the 
death of any human being.130 He shows how Rousseau presents the social 
contract as a rational foundation for modem society but also how his theory 
fails to address the way in which the individual subject is constructed by the 
contract (the enjoyment of freedom, rationality and choice is as a result of the 
social contract; these being qualities that constitute the Enlightenment concept 
of individuality), whilst at the same time being repressed (those who refuse to 
obey the general will, as manifested by the contract, are either compelled to 
do so, or punished).131 The social contract constructs the individual, there is 
no prior or real individual subject that enters into the contract because the 
contract, like society, creates and communicates to itself. There is no real 
world or real individuals outside it. Essentially, law is its own creation and it 
excludes other ways of thinking and conceiving of law.132 Carty comes to the 
conclusion that law does not communicate or relate to a real world; 
everything has been constructed and invented. However, the aim of the claim 
to objectivity, truth and the real is to ward off death - to achieve immortality. 
He celebrates the return of postmodernist theory to the finite circumstances of 
the individual subject which modernist thinkers (he cites Rousseau and 
Durkheim) sought to deny.133 What is revealed to lie behind the claim to 
rationality is irrationality.
128 See R. Gaete, Postmodernism and Human rights: Some Insidious Questions' Law & 
Critique 2 [1991] 149 at 153.
129 'Contractarians: Rousseau in the Year Two Thousand' in Carty, op. cit., 40.
130 op. cit., 44.
131 op. cit., 58.
132 op. cit., 61.
'Such is the nature of our contract, it is that which binds us to discourse and des us to the 
institution and to law. Equally, the contract is that which excludes, it is that which immunises 
us against other discourses and precludes that we even think of any other law.'
133 'Post-Modernism in the Theory and Sociology of Law, or Rousseau and Durkheim as read 
bv Baudrillard' in Carty, op. cit., 71 and at 87;
In order to be assured of his identity [that of the individual], the latter has need of a myth of 
origins and of destiny. Nevertheless, reality is pure panic. The subject is never there.'
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Therefore, critical theorists claim to identify a tendency to attempt to give 
meaning and authority to human existence by looking beyond the human 
condition and its irrational and finite context.134 As a result of a fear 
concerning the nature of this condition, there has been a continued 
attachment to the infinite and immortal; in the form of constructed, rational 
structures that endure beyond the existence of individuals. It is these qualities 
that are absorbed and are central to the law. These criticisms will be further 
illustrated by briefly looking at the work of two theorists whose work has 
inspired critical legal scholars: Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, before 
then showing the consequences these theories have had for human rights.
Carty135 presents Derrida and Foucault as key thinkers whose theories have 
de-centered the subject. Foucault is seen as showing how 'Man', contrary to 
what is claimed, is not an autonomous, self-determining agent. According to 
Foucault, 'Man' is once again the subject of forces which he no longer controls 
nor understands; 'Man' is merely a part of the pervasive production process 
in modem capitalist society and is constructed by pervasive power relations 
in society. Derrida is seen as presenting law as a metaphor for an absence of 
direction. 'Man' is seen as once again spellbound by myth even in his 
intellectual endeavours and is subject to a 'white mythology' which the 
Enlightenment had claimed to have exorcised.136
Both theorists can be characterised as attacking modernist/Enlightenment 
claims to objective foundations/truth/reality. For Derrida, there is no 
presence, no real, or at least, perfect way to communicate with a supposed 
reality. Derrida asserts that the cognition of the objectively real is never 
achieved, it is indefinitely postponed, indefinitely deferred and perpetually 
delayed because it must always be approached or mediated using the 
subjective viewpoints of each person. It is a myth to therefore suppose that 
there is a prior presence or foundation of meaning before other corrupting 
mediations, such as language, are applied. There can therefore be no objective 
truth because in order to approach it, substitutes for it must and always are 
employed, which are referred to as ’dangerous supplements'.137 Within texts
134 Hutchinson, op. tit., 4.
135 op. at. A-
136 The study by P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modem Law' (1992), is an example of the 
application of this approach to law.
137 R. Boyne, 'Foucault and Derrida; The Other Side of Reason' (1990), 94 and at 97;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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and, ultimately, within Western thought, the claim to a foundation, to 
presence, is stated to be the privileging of a particular and logocentric 
conception. Derrida's work has shown that such privileging is always 
dependant on what it purports to exclude.138 The prioritising is revealed and 
that which has been excluded but never entirely destroyed is brought to the 
surface. An important aim of this approach is to re-centre, or re-emphasise the 
excluded or marginalised.
Foucault's approach, on the other hand, does not work with texts. He sees 
society as consisting of relations of power and knowledge. These relations are 
not dominated by one particular group but are instead pervasive throughout 
society. He illustrates these relations in areas such as mental illness, 
punishment and sexuality. Human existence is shaped by these power- 
knowledge relations; the individual subject is itself a construct of such 
relations and as a result, the individual, as both the subject and object of 
knowledge, is investigated. Structures, institutions, beliefs, truths and reality 
are revealed to be historically specific and contingent. Foucault also stresses 
the importance of local knowledge; an emphasis on that which is different, 
specific and particular and on what can be termed the micro-level of analysis. 
He eschews grand theories and narratives that claim to expound truth or 
reality. In this connection, he observes that a consequence of power is 
resistance and he asserts that this should be carried out on the local level. 
Another crucial aspect of Foucaultian thought is that by virtue of resistance, 
marginalised and excluded groups and beliefs can be revealed.139
Within the main tradition of Western metaphysics, what is important is the original presence. 
The original presence is held to determine its empirical manifestations, its signs, marks, 
language, writing. The philosophical prejudice has been continually to disparage the 
phenomena subsequent or supplemental to that presence.'
(c.f. M. H. Kramer, ’Legal Theory. Political Theory and Deconstruction: Against 
Rhadamanthus' (1991), 1-35).
138 This approach is echoed in the context of legal deconstruction; J.M. Galkin 'Deconstructive 
Practice and Theory' (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 743,763 states;
'...the goal of deconstruction is not the destruction of all possible social visions. By revealing 
the elements of human life relegated to the margin in a given social theory, deconstructive 
readings challenge us to remake the dominant conceptions of our society.'
139 See B. Smart, 'Michel Foucault' (1985), G. Turkel, 'Michel Foucault: Law. Power, and 




The consequences of these approaches to human rights is a dilemma. Perhaps 
human rights could be used as means to secure resistance but this would 
involve an acceptance of their role in the continuing fiction and domination of 
the Enlightenment. This point can essentially be seen as the tension and 
disagreement between critical scholars as regards human rights: should they 
be rejected or utilised? This dilemma will now be more closely examined, as 
well as the responses by theorists.
From a structuralist-inspired standpoint, Hunt140 claims that human rights 
may be used positively in progressive politics, without succumbing to the 
'myth of rights'. He advocates their use by disadvantaged groups on the basis 
that these groups must exercise and seek to defend civil liberties as part of a 
Gramscian counter-hegemonic struggle. It is claimed that human rights allow 
the interests and ideologies of other subordinate groups to be incorporated 
into a political struggle to challenge those in power. He asserts that it is only 
by incorporating these other interests that hegemony can be challenged. 
Human rights allow groups to move away from particular to universal 
interests that unite others in the struggle for change. However, Hunt in no 
way asserts that for this reason they are universal, merely that their 
universalist claims can secure beneficial effects for political movements.141 
What Hunt suggests is effectively the pragmatic utilisation of the mythical 
claims of human rights in order to secure political and social change and 
reforms.
Hunt's structuralist assumptions are clear and they provide the context which 
explains his views. He views society as constituted by structures of power- 
relations and he adopts a Gramscian theory of power relations. According to 
Thomson,142 theorists that utilise structuralist approaches within the critical 
legal theory movement, inter alia, highlight how dominant groups use the 
legal system to further their own interests. More importantly, another 
important feature of structuralist approaches is said to be the dilemma of
140 ’Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies' J.L.& Soc. 17 [1990] 309.
141 op. cit., 321;
The discourse of rights provides a key exemplification of the movement to the plane of the 
universal; rights are contestable and comparable, and they are capable of articulating social 
norms that are general and capable of sustaining legitimation.'
142 Grigg-Spall & Ireland (eds.), op. cit., 5.
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using law to secure reform or even the downfall of the present system 
because it is commonly held that it is the very use of law that maintains the 
status quo.143 It can be seen that Hunt's strategy is proffered in the context of 
scepticism about the use of rights144 and is therefore an attempt to argue for 
the pragmatic use of human rights by making use of the very qualities for 
which they have been criticised.145
The dilemma as to the use of human rights can also be located in 
postmodernist approaches. While legal structuralists tend to begin with the 
affirmation of a deep and dominant structural hegemony so that any 
approach that advocates operating within that structure must justify itself 
from this starting point,146 postmodernists approach this question from a 
different starting point.
143 From a particular structuralist perspective, that of Marxism, H. Collins, 'Marxism and 
Law'. (1982) at 125 discusses this predicament at length;
'An erroneous interpretation of the legal form, a false perception of the function of the law, a 
mistaken challenge or acceptance of the legal system could cost the revolutionary movement 
many years delay. If a law is obeyed when it should be openly flouted in order to increase 
class consciousness, the progress towards a revolution will be retarded. Conversely, if it is 
demonstrated that obedience to the established legal order and pursuit of reforms in the law 
favouring the working class will bring a revolutionary situation closer, then unlawfulness 
will be counterproductive. It is therefore essential for Marxism to develop a precise 
understanding of the correct response to the legal system as part of the strategy of 
revolutionary politics.'
He advocates (at pg.142) that those human rights that increase class-consciousness should be 
supported, defended and utilised;
'In certain cases...there will be a relatively clear choice for the radical. Taking the touchstone 
of Marxist strategy to be the heightening of class-consciousness, it is evident that certain legal 
conditions increase the opportunities for a working-class movement to gain cohesion. The 
kinds of rights which will be useful are freedoms to join political associations, to hold 
meetings and demonstrations, and to disseminate literature.'
144 Hunt, op. cit., 309;
'In their most general form the core of these criticisms consist of a warning against the 
illusions generated by the liberal faith in rights. The liberal "myth of rights" is the view that 
those suffering disadvantage should seek redress by striving to have their grievances 
protected by securing legal recognition of their claim as a right. Once a right is recognised, 
whether by constitutions, legislation, or judicial decision, all those whose rights are 
threatened or denied may approach the relevant court and have their rights enforced...'
145 For a recent trenchant defence of the use of human rights in order to achieve 
improvements in American race-relations, see P.J. Williams, 'Alchemical Notes: Restructuring 
Ideals From Deconstructed Rights' in M.V. Tushnet, (ed.) 'Constitutional Law' (1992).
146 I. Grigg-Spall & P. Ireland, 'A fterword: Law's (U nsp oken (Pre)sum ptuous 
(Presuppositions' in Grigg-Spall & Ireland (eds.), op. cit., 126 at 127 clearly state that they are 
putting forward a structuralist account of law which seeks to defend itself against 
postmodernist and anti-structuralist attacks. They criticise post-structuralist accounts on the 
grounds that the appearance of freedom, choice and diversity that results from their analysis, 
is really the surface appearance of the dominant social hegemony (in their case, capitalism). 
They further argue that society is constituted by domination and hierarchy and given that
(Footnote continues on next page)
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It will be recalled that the central features of postmodernism are a belief that 
power and resistance are ubiquitous and that power is not in the sole 
possession of dominant groups, to be utilised solely against subordinate 
groups.147 Their starting point is that power is pervasive and not merely a 
top-down relation. This is combined with a strong criticism of modernist 
characteristics such as rationality, truth claims, progress, the individual 
subject, autonomy and grand narrative theories because of the exclusion and 
subordination they are claimed to cause.148
The dilemma as to whether and how to use human rights can be seen as part 
of a general disagreement as to how to treat and use law. This has been 
claimed by Boyne to have been reflected in a debate between two of the 
leading exponents of postmodernism; Derrida and Foucault. He sees 
Foucault's early studies, more precisely, his analysis of madness, as entailing
their approach is Marxist, they claim this to be a capitalist underlying structure. It is 
submitted that the majority of American critical legal scholars work from a structuralist 
perspective; Fitzpatrick, 'Law as Resistance1 in Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit., 44 notes how 
critical legal scholars in the US view law as manipulable and indeterminate and thus tending 
to favour the dominant interests in society. As examples of structuralist approaches within 
CLS, see A.D. Freeman, 'Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review'. K.E. Klare, 'Critical 
Theory and Labor Relations Law’ in D. Kairys (ed.), 'The Politics of Law' (1982), %  & 65 
respectively and M.J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Good1 (1977) 86 Yale L.J. 
561.
147 Thomson in Grigg-Spall, op. cit., 6 stresses the postmodernist belief in relational power; 
'...to conceive power as something which some possess and use to repress others is to fail to 
see that power is not just the localised possession of a few, but a ubiquitous feature of social 
life which it positively constitutes, including for example, us as individuals.'
148 Douzinas et. al., op. dt„ 28 equate poststructuralism and postmodernism and assert; 
'Poststructuralism has pronounced the end of all grand narratives and references, whether of 
God, truth or form, and has insisted on the death of man as a creative author and centred 
subject of history and representation. The task of postmodern jurisprudence is to bring out 
the consequences of this for the legal subject, possessor of abstract rights and duties, and for 
the legal system of principles, forms and reason. Jurisprudence goes postmodern in order to 
retain and redraw its old commitment to plural and open forms of reason(s) and 
communities.'
and at pg.15;
'If modernity is viewed with Weberian optimism as the project of rationalisation of the life- 
world, an era of material progress, social emancipation and scientific innovation, the 
postmodern is derided as chaotic, catastrophic, nihilistic, the end of good order... When, on 
the contrary, with Weberian pessimism, its Frankfurt descendants and Foucault, we view 
modernity as an iron cage of bureaucratisation, centralisation and infinite manipulation of the 
psyche by the 'culture industry' and the disciplinary regimes or power and knowledge, 
postmodemity is celebrated as an exhilarating moment of rapture. It defies the system, 
suspects all totalising thought and homogeneity and opens spaces for the marginal, the 
different and the 'Other'. Postmodernism is here presented as the celebration of flux, 
dispersal, plurality and localism.'
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the claim that it was possible to go beyond the present liberal form of 
reasoning and return to a form of reason that was less exclusionary of other 
discourses and differences, such as madness. Foucault criticised 
contemporary Western thought for marginalising and denying the validity of 
these other discourses.149 As an example, he critically analysed Descartes. 
Foucault demonstrated that although Descartes had subjected everything to 
doubt, he had not doubted that he was capable of reasoning (i.e. that he was 
not insane).150
Derrida's response focused on Foucault's reading of Descartes and claimed 
that Descartes had in fact considered the possibility of being insane as part of 
his reasoning.151 More importantly, he denied there was a possibility of 
escaping the current form of thought and reasoning and its repressive effects. 
To assert such a position, he claimed, was to commit the very error of 
asserting presence, privileged position and an objective truth that was being 
criticised.152
Boyne claims that Foucault tacitly accepted the force of Derrida's criticisms 
and that in his subsequent work, which shifted its focus from discourse to 
power-knowledge relations, he investigated strategies of resistance within 
existing arrangements and forms of thought. Difference and the excluded 
'other' within society become the focus of Foucault's subsequent work, while 
Derrida attempts a similar process by virtue of textual interpretation. Both 
accept there is no going beyond existing practices and modes of reasoning, 
instead there can only be resistance, and irritation from within.
This approach, indeed the inevitability of working from within lends support 
to those who claim that the purposes of the Enlightenment Project should be
149 Boyne, op. cit., 33-4 notes of Foucault;
'From the beginning, his work has been a protest against the violence that is levelled against 
others so as to force them to become the same as us. The fact that such forced assimilation is 
in all probability a basic aspect of our reason, of our form of being, provides more than 
sufficient justification for trying to push beyond our form of reason, our form of being in the 
hope that difference will be allowed to be what it is on the other side.'
150 op. cit., chp.2.
151 op. cit., 69-71.
152 op. cit., 67;
'...Derrida sought to show that there can be no privileged space outside of reason, no higher 
reason, no other reason, no unreasonable reason outside of the confines of reason itself. To 
think of escape is impossible.'
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continued by critical theorists. This approach views the Enlightenment as 
being centrally concerned with de-mystification, the removal and continual 
questioning of claimed certainties and dogmas and the revealing of 
uncertainty and contingency.153 The task then becomes one of continuing the 
Project by putting forward alternative strategies to achieve the above stated 
goals and therefore working within the present arrangements, which cannot 
in any case be escaped.154
Legal postmodernism, has like legal structuralism, and indeed liberalism, 
faced a dilemma concerning human rights. Some postmodernists have thus 
felt that rights should be used pragmatically because there is no complete 
escape from them and the liberal legalism of which they form a part.155 On 
the other hand, others have felt that they must be rejected.156 The former 
approach will be followed up here, along with similar approaches by other 
critical theorists. It will be seen that even if human rights are adopted, this 
involves their being radically reformulated.
A resolution
Those critical theorists that support human rights, lend their support to a 
radically different conception to that of liberal theorists. Firstly, they place 
emphasis on 'small scale, provisional, open stories’157 and therefore reject 
grand theories/narratives which claim truth. Human rights are consequently 
not founded upon some truth, be it nature or reason. The result is that rights 
are to be used pragmatically in order to allow the weaknesses and oppression 
of the existing arrangements, and thus the reforms that need to be made, to be 
exposed; this is part of a strategy of 'critique'.158
153 Gaete, op. cit., 170.
154 Hunt in Fitzpatrick & Hunt, op. cit., 5 & 10, Fitzpatrick in Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit., 44
& 48 and Hutchinson, op. cit., 38-9 & 268-71
155 Douzinas 6t Warrington in Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit. 30.
156 Carty in Carty (ed.), op. cit.
157 Douzinas & Warrington in Grigg-Spall & Ireland, op. cit. 31.
158 Hunt in Fitzpatrick & Hunt, op. cit., 14;
TBy 'critique' I understand an approach which starts with internal criticism of existing theories 
in terms of their own criteria and then proceeds to generate the conceptual equipment 
necessary to overcome the deficiencies and closures discovered in the theories examined, and 
at the same time to understand the social origins of the influence wielded by the theories 
criticised.'
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Secondly, rights secure freedom, but not for the autonomous individual, as 
liberals generally claim but rather they allow the previously powerless to 
exercise power in order to establish alternative truths.159
Thirdly, human rights are social constructs. This process of construction is 
brought about by power; any consensus as to the exercise of human rights or 
their foundation may be built on consensus but critical theorists insist that in 
the background there is the ubiquitous play of power, domination and 
counter-struggle.
A SYNTHESIS AND PERHAPS A CONSENSUS
The jurisprudential theory that will be used in this study and which was set 
out in the previous section, can be seen as a synthesis of liberal and critical 
theories of human rights. Thus, from liberalism the theory draws its belief in 
the reformative potential of rights and this is a feature which, as has been 
seen, some critical theorists agree with. The theory also embraces the view 
that human rights are social constructs. Liberalism provides for this view but 
a powerful corrective that is adopted in the theory is that of the role of power, 
domination and counter-struggle behind consensus. This corrective originates 
in critical theories. Critical theories also deny a separation between rationality 
and subjective value judgements. In this way, the theory sees human rights as 
intimately linked to political and social forces. Therefore human rights are not 
objective categories, they are based upon social agreement but this is often 
constituted by the values of the powerful. It follows that when they are 
exercised, violated or challenged, social and political power is at play. These 
two views of consensus are combined in the theory formulated in this study 
because they each provide reasons to support human rights by seeing them as 
values. However, the value that is seen by the critical theorists tends to be 
instrumental, whereas for liberals, it tends to be an intrinsic value.
Liberals have generally spent time dealing with the capacity of human rights 
to act as 'trumps'160 and the theory values rights because of this potential. 
However, there is an emphasis in the theory on the different needs and 
problems that each human right faces in achieving this priority over other
159 Hutchinson, op. at., 246.
160 See Dworkin, op. cit., (1978), particularly ix, 232-38,272-8 & 357-8 and as an example of an 
exception to his tendency, see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom'. (1986), 186-8.
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considerations. This is inspired by an emphasis on difference and local 
narratives that is asserted by critical theorists. This emphasis leads in turn to a 
concentration on the particular and specific means by which human rights 
can be protected. The theory accepts that because of the role of power and 
social construction, human rights can serve a number of purposes but it does 
insist that a primary purpose is to 'trump' other considerations and values in 
order to provide a means of challenging existing configurations of power and 
domination and that the formulation of specific mechanisms to protect each 
right will be judged first and foremost on the basis and the degree to which 
this is achieved. Therefore, the achievement of political and social change is 
viewed as a paramount function of human rights. This view is particularly 
suited to a system, such as that in England, where human rights are rendered 
more contingent because of the dominant role played by political forces in 
their regulation but the aim has not been to justify English theories of human 
rights. On the contrary, it has been to criticise them, therefore while the 
theory that is formulated here exhibits great affinity with the English 
concqjtion of civil liberties, as will be seen, it more importantly provides a 
basis upon which to criticise their legal protection in England and also 
general guidelines for improvement.
The theory and the positions of both liberals and some critical theorists have 
shown that theoretical inquiries into the nature of human rights do not 
necessarily need to be avoided because of the theoretical problems that they 
reveal. It was seen that by confronting these difficulties and applying the 
insights of theorists, a jurisprudential theory was formulated that provides 
for and supports human rights, whilst at the same time radically 
reformulating the way they are conceived. Both groups of theorists have 
sought ways in which they can tap the rich potential of human rights despite 
their traditional hostility.
The study of the liberty to assemble can be seen as partially justified by the 
theory because it supports an analysis of particular human rights in order to 
elucidate legal methods of protection that are best suited to the specific and 
different needs of each human right.
Having presented the theory of human rights that underpins this study and 
explained its relevance to the protection of human rights, it will be seen in the 
next chapter that the jurisprudential theory and comparative theory point to
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the France, as a legal system that can take account of the claimed 
jurisprudential nature of human rights. Consequently, the next chapter also 
concentrates on comparative theory and on a second practical issue to which 




COMPARATIVE THEORY AND THE LAW RELATING TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
INTRODUCTION
Having thus set out this jurisprudential theory of human rights, which 
informs the legal methods for their protection, this chapter examines and 
employs comparative theory1 in order to suggest that possible reforms of the 
English system in this area can be gained from the example of France. This is 
because the French legal system seems to have a jurisprudential conception of 
civil liberties that is very close to that adopted in this study and furthermore, 
it has a very similar notion of parliamentary sovereignty to that of England, 
which strongly conditions the legal methods by which human rights are 
protected. The choice of France is one based upon jurisprudential theory but 
also upon comparative theory, which reveals similarities that are hidden 
behind the differences that are normally claimed to exist between common 
law and civil law legal families, to which England and France respectively 
belong. Accordingly, the French tradition of civil liberties and the general 
mechanisms of protection will be described to see how they seek to resolve 
the problem of according importance to human rights on the one hand, whilst 
having a sovereign legislature, on the other. In short, this chapter provides 
the second  justification for this study, by justifying comparison with France.
1 The terms 'comparative method', 'comparative law' and comparative theory' will be used 
interchangeably. This is in recognition of the debate that continues as to its nature. Therefore, 
the term 'comparative law' is widely seen as problematic because it connotes a body of rules, 
or even a separate branch of law, when in fact nothing of this nature can be pointed to (see, 
A. Watson, 'Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law' (1974), 1 and M.A. 
Glendon, M. W. Gordon and C. Osake, 'Comparative Legal Traditions: Text. Materials and 
Cases on Civil Law. Common Law and Socialist Law Traditions, with special reference to 
French, West German, English and Soviet Law' (1985), 1).
At the same time, the term 'comparative method' (or methods, in order to accommodate O. 
Khan-Freund's view; 'Comparative law - this has almost become a common place - is not a 
topic, but a method. Or better: it is the common name for a variety of methods of looking at 
law, and especially of looking at one's own law.' - 'Comparative Law as an Academic Subject' 
(1966] L.Q.R. 40 at 41) would not be accepted by those who support the comparative theory 
view (this group includes R. David & J.E.C. Brierley, 'Major World Legal Systems in the 
World Today' (1985), 5 and K. Zweigert and H. K6tz (trans. T. Weir), 'An Introduction to 
Comparative Law' (Vol. I) (1987), 14). H.C. Gutteridge, 'Comparative Law: An Introduction to 
the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research' (1971), 1-5, notes that the question of 
whether there is a method or theory is linked to the issue of function. The issue of function is 
in turn related to the question of the value of comparative law.
The view that the debate concerning science versus methodology is really a question of 
philology, is endorsed here (Gutteridge, op. tit. 5 and Watson op. at. 2).
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However, it will be claimed that relatively few comparisons between France 
and England as regards public law subjects, such as human rights, have been 
undertaken based on the view that useful comparisons can usually only be 
made between legal jurisdictions from the same legal family. This view will 
be challenged by looking more closely at comparative theory. This 'defence' of 
comparative theory is undertaken first (section I), followed by an examination 
of the main legal methods of protecting human rights in France (section II).
This chapter also introduces the second practical area concerning the 
protection of human rights and to which comparative theory, and thus the 
kind of comparison undertaken here, are claimed to be of use. This is the 
protection of human rights is the EU. It will be suggested that the approach 
adopted by the European Court of Justice to the protection of civil liberties 
requires an interpretative comparison of the traditions of Member States. 
Consequently, by concentrating on France and England, as two important 
Member States, it will be attempted to elaborate the content of a common 
tradition of the liberty to assemble, as an example of the kind of analysis that 
is required in order to take seriously the claim to protect human rights in the 
EU (section III).
SECTION I 
COMPARATIVE THEORY AND METHOD
The previous chapter argued that specific civil liberties should be focused on 
and that they are protected because they represent the values upon which 
there is a consensus in the community. It was argued that the particular 
values might differ as between communities and different groups within 
these communities. However, a jurisprudential question was not given a 
detailed response by the theory: how should human rights be protected. The 
general response to this question was that this should be achieved via 
mechanisms that were tailored to meet the needs of specific civil liberties and 
which did not immunise human rights from social and political change. It is 
suggested that by using comparative theory, such mechanisms can be found 
in French law.
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However, it will be seen here that comparisons between England and France 
in the area of public law are often not seen as useful by some because of their 
different legal traditions. It will be argued in response that this view cannot 
prevail if attention is paid to what the comparative method entails and so 
with this in mind, the theory and method is investigated.
A comparative method
As was noted above,2 this structure of this study adopts a particular 
comparative method as well as arguing that this method should be applied to 
dvil liberties law. The structure of the study therefore concerns and is a 
product of comparative theory. Hence the three parts of the thesis each have a 
grounding in this method. It will be recalled that the comparative theory that 
underpins this study closely resembles that put forward by Zweigert and 
Kotz.3 Whilst noting that little time is spent on analysing comparative 
methodology,4 they present a method that begins by stating the problem to 
which a response is sought.5 This can be seen to the purpose of Part I of this 
study. Next, a description should be made of the different laws that are to be 
compared,6 this is carried out in Part II. Finally, a description of similarities 
and differences should be undertaken before making an evaluation. This is 
partly the aim of Part III, where an evaluation of the legal regulation is carried 
out and will also constitute the conclusions that are made there, along with 
more general conclusions as to the benefits that have sought to be argued for 
in applying theory to practice.
The purpose value and limits of the comparative method
David and Brierley7 suggest that the comparative method has three 
values/purposes and these are claimed to be applied in this study. The first
2 See Introduction.
3 op. cit., chap.ID.
4 op. cit., 29;
'..there has been very little systematic writing about the methods of comparative law.'
5 op. cit., 31. This strategy is also supported by H. W. Erhmann, 'Comparative Legal Cultures' 
(1976), 11-12, as part of the strategy of comparativists;
'What he needs to study instead are the functional equivalents in various cultures. He must 
start with a legal problem of social significance...and seek to discover the rules or institutions 
by which these problems are resolved from one system to another.'
6 op. cit., 41;
'for all individual legal problems the researcher should first produce an objective statement of 
the law of each jurisdiction.'
7 op. cit., 4.
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relates to the benefits to historical, philosophical and legal knowledge. This 
could be said to be a purely scientific or epistemological purpose. It is hoped 
that the conclusions of this study will add to the body of legal knowledge. 
Secondly, there is the value gained in understanding and improving a legal 
system. This purpose is reflected in the aim of contributing to the Bill of 
Rights debate in order to suggest mechanisms for improving the protection of 
human rights in England and also, as will be seen below, that in the EU.8 By 
so doing, it is also hoped to elucidate particular means of protection that will 
lead to a better understanding of not only French law but also the relationship 
between French and English constitutional law. The third value is that of 
fostering the greater understanding of other peoples, which in turn fosters 
international relations. This purpose will be most clearly seen in the context of 
the protection of human rights in the EU case-law, which seeks an 
understanding of the constitutional traditions of Member States. More 
particularly, any attempt to ensure that Member States accept the supremacy 
of EU law is now dependant on the Union being seen to be adopting and 
applying commonly recognised standards of human rights protection. The 
elucidation of these standards, using comparative theory, therefore facilitates 
relations between Member States and the EU institutions. The purpose of this 
study can therefore be said to incorporate this third value.
However, comparative theory has been stated to have a limitation that would 
seem to present problems for this study.9 It has been claimed, as was touched 
on earlier, that comparison can only be undertaken where a relationship 
exists between the legal systems in question, thus Watson has stated;
® The belief that comparative law can be used to improve law (i.e. law reform) is often seen as 
one of the causes for the development of comparative law. As such it is linked to the 
unification of law movement, which was stimulated by ideas of an inevitable evolution and 
progress, that were current at the turn of the nineteenth-century, see Gutteridge, op. cit., 
chap.2, particularly 13-20, Zweigert & Kdtz, op. cit., chp.2. David & Brierley, op. cit., 4 note 
how
'...it became fashionable in the nineteenth-century in the light of Darwinian theory and the 
ideas of progress then current, to trace vast historico-philosophical tableaux of the evolution 
of law. The legal systems of various peoples were studied in order to demonstrate, in an 
historical perspective, the progress of humanity.’
9 For other criticisms of the comparative method that are however not of relevance here, see 
Watson, op. cit., chp.2, Gutteridge, op. cit., 29 and B. Grossfeld, The Strength and Weakness of 
Comparative Law' (trans. T. Weir) (1990), 39.
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except where the systems are closely related the differences in legal values may be so extreme 
as to render virtually meaningless the discovery that systems have the same or a different 
rule.10
This would seem to therefore present a problem in that France and England 
are commonly classified as being members of two different legal families; 
civil law and common law. What appears to be lacking is a relationship as 
between France and England. This section will next be concerned to reveal the 
existence of a relationship upon which comparison can be made but first the 
theory of legal families will be shown to be open to the criticism that it is too 
narrowly drawn.
At the heart of this classification is the assumption that there exist certain 
recurrent themes and styles between legal systems and these are employed in 
order to place a legal system within a particular legal family. It is these 
criteria that are therefore crucial in determining the constituents of each of the 
legal families and which have traditionally been adopted. Notwithstanding, 
they have been criticised as being 'one-dimensional' by Zweigert & Kotz, who 
state;
The theory of legal families has so far proceeded as if the only law worth taking into account 
were what European lawyers call private law. This is partly because comparatists have 
hitherto concentrated on private law, and partly because it is only private lawyers, so far as 
one can see, who have been interested in the theory.11
They continue by asserting that the classification of legal systems should not 
be carried out using one criterion but rather a number of criteria that can be 
seen as representing the style of a legal system.12 However, it should be 
underlined that Zweigert & Kotz do not propose the abandonment of the 
classification of legal systems but simply a change in the classificatory 
method;
The following factors seem to us to be those which are crucial for the style of a legal system or 
a legal family; (1) its historical background and development, (2) its predominant and 
characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3) especially distinctive institutions, (4) the 
kind of legal sources it acknowledges and the way it handles them, (5) its ideology.'13
op. tit., 5.
^  op. cit., 66.
*2 op, dt„ 68.
13 op. a t ,  69.
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It is submitted that the above broader criteria should be used to group legal 
systems, rather than those concentrating on private law characteristics. This 
will be the strategy that is adopted here as regards what is a comparison of 
public law subjects. Furthermore, it is in these areas mentioned above that, as 
regards human rights, a relationship is claimed to exist.
It is argued that comparative theory has not been applied to its full potential 
in the Bill of Rights debate. This is because comparisons have 
overwhelmingly been made between England and other common law 
jurisdictions, especially that of the United States of America.14 This can be 
seen to have been justified by the theory of legal families, which points to a 
relationship between common law jurisdictions. However, as Waldron has 
pointed out, there are specially serious problems with the manner in which 
human rights are regulated in the US. He criticises the way in which the 
judiciary are permitted to override democratic choices, the attempt to fix 
certain liberties beyond easy democratic change, despite their jurisprudential 
uncertainty and the large degree of disagreement that they engender.15 
Another problem with looking to the US for possible legal reforms is that it 
may be doubted whether these arrangements fit the emphasis on political 
procedures in England's political constitution.16 The US system on the other
14 A. Ryan, The British, the Americans, and Rights' in 'A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights 
in philosophy, politics and law -1791-1991' (M.J. Lacey & K. Haakonssen (eds.)) (1991), 366 
observes as regards the Bill of Rights debate that
'Comparisons with the theory and practice of American politics have been deployed as 
weapons on both sides of the contest..'.
J.S. Wright, 'The Bill of Rights in Britain and America: A Not Quite full Circle' Tul.L.Rev. 55 
(1981) 291 at 293 concurs that American experience is being drawn upon 'as an example to 
follow' but in a comic aside, he sees this influence as having a less well known basis;
'It is probably no accident that some of the principals in the debate have an American 
connection: Anthony Lester, an American law school education; Lord Hailsham, an American 
mother; Michael Zander, an American wife. No doubt, the last mentioned women deserve 
much credit.' (pg.325).
For examples of comparisons made with the US, see Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., particularly, 263 
& 269 -70, Bailey et. al., op. cit., 14 , (and for Canada, pgs.23-7), Roberéton, op. cit., particularly, 
38,144,259, 264,271 and Dworkin (1990), op. cit., 46,48-50, 52-55.
15 See generally Waldron(1993), op. cit., and at 44;
'On any account of the activity of the US Supreme Court over the past century or so, the 
inescapable duty to interpret the law has been taken as the occasion for serious and radical 
revision. There may not be anything wrong with that, but there is something wrong in 
conjoining it with an insistence that the very rights which the judges are interpreting and 
revising are to be put beyond the reach of democratic revision and reinterpretion.'
As has been recently noted by S. Dubourg-Lavroff, 'Pour une constitutionnalisation des 
droits et libertés en Grande-Bretagne?' R.F.D.C. 15 [1993] 479 at 480;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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hand appears to emphasise legal procedures, in that the judiciary play the 
predominant role in the protection of human rights. Useful comparison 
between the two jurisdictions may consequently be doubted;
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from the American Supreme Court. Its impact has been 
tremendous; there can hardly be another country where judges can so profoundly affect the 
fabric of society or the pattern of human relationships. It gives us a glimpse of just how 
powerful a tool a Bill of Rights, widely drawn, constitutionally entrenched and operating in a 
federal state, can be. Yet the differences in almost every aspect of the legal, constitutional and 
social background between Britain and the United States make it really of limited value to 
pursue the comparison any further.17
This is not to suggest that the North American experience is totally irrelevant 
to human rights law in England. On the contrary, US law will be used as a 
criterion for comparative evaluation in Part III of this study, but it is 
suggested that the tendency to make comparisons with America is at the 
expense of other jurisdictions, that while not belonging to the same legal 
family, share similar traditions and approaches to human rights. This is 
claimed to be the case with France, whose relevance is sometimes noted in 
passing18 but is normally subordinated to a comparison of US law. By
'..la nature du régime politique britannique dresse à l'encontre d'un tel projet de nombreux 
obstacles juridiques, politiques et culturels. Dans cette situation délicate, aucune réforme 
n'aboutira si elle n'est pas soudeuse de respecter la tradition et la Constitution britanniques 
dont surtout le principe de souveraineté de la loi.' 
and Feldman, op. cit., 86;
'Any constitutional arrangement regarding rights must be reasonably well in tune with the 
prevailing dominant ethos as it defines the legitimate expectations of citizens, since it will 
depend on that ethos to sustain it and will, in turn, be expected to make it possible for those 
who wish to organise their lives according to that ethos to do so.'
17 Wallington & McBride, op. cit., 32.
Feldman, op. cit., 59-60. The relevance of French constitutional law to the British context, 
has also been noted by J.S. Bell, 'French Constitutional Law’. (1992), 1; he observes how 
'...United Kingdom lawyers have tended to look to other common law jurisdictions for 
examples of the ways in which our constitutional system might be changed and what the 
potential consequences of this might be.'
However, he sets out to offer
'...an exposition of an alternative model that is, in many ways, far closer to the United 
Kingdom than many common law jurisdictions, particularly those of federal countries. 
France is a unitary State that, until recently, was a fervent believer in parliamentary 
sovereignty and the unacceptability of judicial review of legislation. Protection of 
fundamental rights and principles of good government were matters of political obligation 
and could not be legally enforced against Parliament. The rule of law involved simply the 
subjection erf the executive and citizens to the laws made by Parliament, and did not involve 
legally enforceable limits on Parliament's powers.' (pg.l).
Bell appears acutely aware of the element of compromise in contemporary French 
arrangements and their consequent relevance for the UK;
'Such developments in very recent years demonstrate the way in which a country wedded to 
many of the fundamental constitutional principles that currently prevail in the United
(Footnote continues on next page)
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revealing the relationship between France and England it will be seen that 
perhaps greater attention ought to be paid to France, despite the fact that it is 
a civil law jurisdiction.
SECTION II
A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE
It is contended that a relationship between England and France can be found 
on two levels. At one level, there is a common tradition that results from the 
fact that they are both part of the Western legal tradition.19 The second level 
concerns constitutional traditions regarding the protection of human rights. 
The first level is more general than the second which is more pointed to the 
subject of study and justifies the application of comparative theory. For these 
reasons attention will be devoted to the relationship on this level.
This relationship will be most clearly seen when the tradition and protection 
of civil liberties is presented. It will then be seen that both jurisdictions have 
similar approaches to human rights that not only make comparison possible 
but also justify looking to France for possible solutions as far as the protection 
of civil liberties in England. This section will concentrate on the general 
context of human rights regulation in France in order to provide the context 
in which the regulation of the liberty to assemble exists and to introduce 
themes that will be seen to have affected its legal environment.
Kingdom can move in new directions. To some extent, this was the result of a break with the 
past, marked by the adoption of the Constitution of the new Fifth Republic in 1958. But many 
of the changes have really come about as a result of new attitudes and new interpretations of 
the French Republican tradition.' (pgs.1-2).
19 As regards the Western legal tradition, see H.J. Berman, 'Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition' (1983), 7-10, D.R. Kelly, 'The Human Measure: 
Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition' (1990), Fitzpatrick, (1992), op. tit. For the 
history of the development of civil law, see A. Watson, The Making of the Civil Law' (1981), 
8, J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America' (1985) and A.T. von Mehren & J.R. Gordley, The Civil Law 
System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law' (1977). For a comparative history 
of the history of the common law, see R. C. van Caenegum, 'Judges. Legislators and 
Professors: Chapters in European Legal History' (1987).
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THE TRADITION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN FRANCE
Civil liberties20 are situated within French public law 21 and therefore, any 
investigation of civil liberty will touch upon this area. It is submitted that the 
presentation of French human rights can be more clearly made by 
concentrating on two themes or aspects of French public law. Although the 
two overlap, they may be separated, somewhat artificially, into (i) a tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty and, consequently, no judicial review of laws 
(and certainly not according to a body of supra-legal standards) and (ii) a 
traditional uncertainty as regards the legal status of human rights. These two 
themes condition how human rights are conceived, defined and regulated 
and bear a close resemblance to the political conception of civil liberties in 
England.
The tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty
This tradition, dating from the Revolution, is widely stated to have been 
inspired by Rousseau and, more particularly, his claim that the general will 
was politically supreme.22 The general will was seen to be manifested by 'loi': 
parliamentary legislation (statute). Therefore, it might be more accurately 
claimed that it was the norms issuing from parliament, and not parliament
2° The term 'civil liberties' will here be used to refer to the French term 'libertés publiques'. It 
will be seen below that occasionally the term 'libertés publiques' is used interchangeably with 
the term Droits de l'Homme' (the Rights of Man). However, given that the two are sometimes 
distinguished and that 'libertés publiques' are treated as legal entities, it is this term that will 
be retained here. For example, J-P. Costa ('Libertés publiques en France et dans le monde' 
(1986), 16), has claimed that the Rights of Man are creatures of natural law, whereas libertés 
publiques are positive law categories. Much the same point is made by J. Morange, T>roits de 
l'Homme et Libertés Publiques' (1989), 10;
"A certains égards, les deux expressions apparaissent comme synonymes! Tout dépend 
d'ailleurs de la définition que chaque auteur donne des termes employés. Ce n'est cependant 
peut-être pas par hasard si l'expression "Droits de l'Homme" attire les préférences de non- 
juristes. Son actualité, qui n'enlève rien à sa valeur, tient à son caractère plus subjectif, et, par 
voie de conséquence, plus flou. Plus mobilisatrice, la défense des droits de l'homme est aussi 
plus incertaine. Plus ternes, les libertés publiques sont en revanche, plus réelles. Leur étude 
consiste à préciser le régime juridique des droits et libertés dont disposent les ressortissants 
d'un Etat donné à un moment donné de son histoire.'
C-A. Colliard 'Libertés Publiques' (1989), 19, observes that the term libertés publiques was 
slow to appear in French law; he claims that it was first heard in the demands of the people 
on the walls of Paris in the coup d'état of 1851 and then first appeared in a legal sense in 
art.25 of the Constitution of 14th January 1852.
21 This may be instanced by the fact that Libertés Publiques have been taught as part of the 
French university Law degree since 1954. They became a core subject in 1962, as part of 
F*ublic Law (see Colliard, op. cit., 1).
22 Rousseau's influence has been noted by, for example, P. Braud, 'La notion de liberté 
publique en droit français et ses implications en droit français' (1967), 279-81 and Morange, 
op. cit., 76.
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itself, that were traditionally sovereign. This position of supremacy justified 
the decision by the revolutionaries to prohibit the judiciary from reviewing 
statutes.23 At the same time, the exclusion of the judiciary was also supported 
by Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers.24 This was interpreted 
by the revolutionaries as requiring that the law-making power (Parliament) 
should be free from interference from the judicial, hence the latter were 
forbidden to review the legislation of the former. In short, Rousseau and 
Montesquieu inspired the subordination of the judiciary to statute and to 
Parliament, seen as the sole institution that could legitimately express the will 
of the people and exercise law-making power.25
Of the consequences that flow from this tradition, two are crucial for human 
rights. Firstly, the judiciary are traditionally seen as merely applying the law. 
They are seen as civil servants, carrying out the will of Parliament.26
23 See, for example, Braud, op. cit., 280, concerning the general will;
'Elle est la volonté du peuple s'appliquant à tout le peuple et non à des objets particuliers. 
Dans cette mesure, elle acquiert les mêmes caractères que la volonté générale dont elle 
consiste en la formulation juridique. La loi est toujours droite et tend nécessairement à 
l'utilité publique. Elle ne peut être inéquitable ni empieter inutilement sur la liberté 
individuelle.'
See also, A. Stone, 'The Birth of ludicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in 
Comparative Perspective' (1992), 24;
'From the first moments of the Revolution, the Rousseauian identification of legislation with 
the general will, and the legislators with popular sovereignty, were constitutionally 
enshrined, producing a separation of powers doctrine which rigidly circumscribed judicial 
authority.
The Rousseauian principle was constitutionally enshrined in arts3 & 6 of the Declaration des 
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen 1789 (herein referred to as the 1789 Declaration), which 
reflected a general trust in parliament, as G. Burdeau 'Les Libertés Publiques' (1972), 262 
notes;
"Du législateur, on croyait ne rien avoir à redouter puisqu'il exprimait la volonté générale et 
bénéficiait de l'infallibilité de la souveraineté du peuple.'
24For an explanation of the role of Montesquieu's theory in the Revolution, see M. 
Cappelletti, The ludicial Process in Comparative Perspective' (1989), 190-4.
25 This principle was enshrined in the Law of 16-24 August 1790. Title II, art.10;
The judicial tribunals shall not take part, either directly or indirectly, in the exercise of the 
legislative power, nor impede or suspend the execution of the enactments of the legislative 
body...'.
(translation taken from Cappelletti, op. cit., 194).
It became a constitutionally enshrined principle beginning with the 1791 Constitution, chp. V, 
art.l57(3) and its violation became a crime by virtue of art.127 of the 1810 Penal Code. This 
article, although in somewhat modified form, still exists today.
2^The severity of this principle is instanced by the way that the revolutionaries even 
prohibited judges from interpreting the law; Title H, art.12 of the 1790 Law;
'[The judicial tribunals] shall refer to the legislative body whenever they find it necessary 
either to have a statute interpreted or to have a new statute.'
(translation taken from Cappelletti, op. cit., 195).
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Secondly, parliamentary legislation is traditionally viewed as securing the 
public interest or acting for the common good.27 Accordingly, to allow the 
judges to review statutes would be seen as a return to the practices of the 
Anden Régime, in which the judiciary were widely seen as obstructing the 
reforms that it was attempted to introduce.28 Within this tradition, civil 
liberties are subordinate to the law, they cannot be used to review, and 
ultimately, strike down statute. The status of civil liberties therefore becomes 
uncertain and it will be seen below that this is a traditional feature of public 
íaw in France.
Although parliamentary sovereignty is the dominant tradition in French 
constitutional law, there is a subordinate tradition that claims that statute is 
subordinate to higher principles that can be found in the Constitution. It has 
been claimed that France's present constitution represents a significant 
victory for this subordinate tradition. This point will be elaborated when the 
existing protections of human rights are presented below.29 Suffice it to say
Stone, op. cii., 25 puts the position of the judiciary in its wider Revolutionary context;
The modem French judicial system (which would fully emerge by 1804) was constructed on 
the principle - itself a virtual corollary of popular sovereignty - that judges must not directly, 
or indirectly through interpretation, make law....The law was, following Rousseau, to be 
codified in "simple, non-technical, and straightforward" language. As a consequence, politics 
would be made transparent, the legitimacy of the new social compact assured, and the 
multitude of intermediate institutions and social practices separating the people from the 
State, and obscuring that fundamental relationship, could be cleared away or fatally 
undermined. Le droit was thought to be one of the more mystifying of these institutions, and 
it was hoped and expected that lawyers, and their penchant for doctrinal commentaries and 
formalist discourse, would gradually obsolesce. Judges could then proceed in a 
straightforward manner, as civil servants applying the codes.'
(c.f. Capelletti, op. cit., 193-4).
The principle was upheld in the decision of the Tribunal de Cassation, Decision 18 Fructidor. 
an V (4th Sept. 1797).
27 See, Braud, op. at., supra.
For details of the role of the judiciary in the Anden Régime, see P-C. Timbal & A. Castaldo, 
'Histoire des institutions publiques et des faits sodaux' (1990), 404-8 & 522-6 and J. Gicquel, 
Droit constitutional et institutions politiques' (1991), 483-4.
few points by way of introduction may be made here; Stone, op. dt., makes explicit 
reference to the existence of a dominant and subordinate tradition in French public law. He 
isolates a dominant ideology of 'la lot and a subordinate ideology of 'le droit';
’....la loi ("statute" or "legislation") - the product of public politics - is a concrete expression of 
sovereignty, sovereignty to which le droit (a "subject matter", things "judicial") - the work of 
the judiciary and of legal science - is an obedient, if at times creative servant.' (pg.23).
The ideology of la loi, or the general will dominated from the Revolution up until around 
1890, when French law professors, as part of a movement to secure a body of autonomous 
public law, began to assert le droit, or constitutionalism. This ideology is constituted by;
'....the belief that statutes must conform to a judicially elaborated higher law if they are to be 
valid and therefore legally binding.' (pg.17).
(Footnote continues on next page)
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here that although the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was and is 
without serious challenge, contemporary arrangements can be seen as placing 
limits on the sovereignty of statute. However, the existence of these limits are 
themselves conditioned by the continued influence of the dominant tradition. 
The peculiarities and compromises of the contemporary arrangements may 
therefore be explained by the need to reconcile the tensions caused by these 
dominant and subordinate traditions and achieve a compromise between 
these conflicting traditions. It is here that a relationship can be seen to the 
problems faced in England. It can be seen that both France and England share 
a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, an investigation of the 
means by which France has come to terms with the problems caused by such 
a doctrinal tradition would appear to be a fruitful exercise. French practice 
can be looked at in order to isolate viable methods of protecting civil liberties 
in an environment dominated by parliamentary sovereignty.
However, there is a slight difference between the French doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and that of the England30 which has become more
The resurgence of the le droit in the late nineteenth century is described as a "renaissance" 
(pg.32) because, Stone asserts, the ideology of constitutionlism also dates from the 
Revolution;
'According to this tradition, which dates from before the Revolution, legislation must either 
conform to legal norms which are superior to it, or be judicially invalid. The great problem of 
public law has long been how best to develop and enforce what was argued to the essential 
"sovereignty of the le droit" in a political system manifestly hostile to constitutional review.' 
(pgs.23-4).
The advantage of Stone's study is that he moves outwards from a perspective that is external 
to France. French legal theorists are, therefore, seen to be central actors in the tradition of 
public law and civil liberties. However, given their internal perspectives, the views of 
theorists often only implicitly advert to the existence of a subordinate tradition in which they 
play the central part. For example, the ideology of le droit can be seen to be implicit in the 
increasing popularity of the 'l'état de droit', as a tradition in which the State is limited by 
higher laws and which dates from the Revolution, as observed by O. Duhamel 'Le pouvoir 
politique en France, droit constitutionnel. I' (1991), 51-4.
30 The point being made here goes further than the claim that France and the England enjoy 
different 'histories of parliamentary supremacy', as is claimed by Cappelletti, op. cit. 191. He, 
however, rightly draws attention to these differences;
'England, of course, presents us with a much different story. On the one hand, in contrast to 
ancien régime France, there have been no deep popular feelings in England against the 
judiciary, whose historical role in protecting individual liberties has generally enjoyed 
widespread respect...The doctrine of the separation of powers was never fully adopted in 
England in its French version...On the one hand, the English Revolution of 1688 did affirm, 
and very strongly so, the absolute supremacy of Parliament...' (pg.198).
It is unclear to what extent these factors constitute 'history', as opposed to being elements that 
constitute a different notion of parliamentary sovereignty, or perhaps both. Nevertheless, the 
point being made here is that England adheres to a different notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty that the use of the same term should not be permitted to camouflage.
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explicit under the current constitution of the Fifth Republic. At the same time, 
it is submitted that this difference does not negate the relevance of French 
arrangements and a sufficient relationship upon which to base comparison. 
Nevertheless, the difference should be made clear and so it will now be 
presented.
It has been seen that the Revolution granted a sovereign position to loi 
(statute).31 At that time parliament (l'Assemblée Nationale) was granted the 
power to make statutes but, as many commentators have noted, subsequent 
French history can be seen as a continuing struggle between the executive and 
parliament over which organ should exercise this power.32 Therefore,
31 See, art.6 of the 1789 Declaration;
'Loi is the expression of the general will...' (translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 262).
32 The struggle between parliament and the executive was used by M. Hauriou f'Précis de 
droit constitutionne!' (1929), 294) to divide French constitutional history into two cycles. Each 
cycle consisted of the same series of constitutional arrangements; firstly, a revolutionary 
period of assembly control of the legislative function. Secondly, there was a consular or 
imperial period of executive control and thirdly, a parliamentary period, in which there was 
an equilibrium between parliament and executive. The two countervailing forces were 
claimed to have been unleashed by the Revolution. Hauriou considered that the most 
revolutionary arrangement was assembly control, the other, being directorial, consular, 
imperial or presidential, aimed to enforce the power of the executive that had to a large 
extent been inherited from the Anden Régime monarchy. Hauriou's historical cycles have 
been set out by Duhamel, op. cit., 10 as follows;
1st Cycle 1789-1848 A Gouvemement d'assemblée 1789-1799
B Gouvemement présidentiel 1800-1814 
C Equilibre parlementaire 1814-1848
Ilnd Cycle 1848 - A Gouvemement d'assemblée 1848-1850
B Gouvemement présidentiel 1851-1870
C Equilibre 1870....
Duhamel, op. cit., 11 offers an alternative scheme. This aims to take account of the advent of 
the 4th Republic, problems of incorporating the rupture that was caused by the Vichy regime 
and the controversial distinction between the equilibrium of the Third Republic (1870-1944) 
and the assembly regime inaugurated in 1946 - the contention being that at the end of the 
Third Republic, parliament dominated, so there can be no distinction between the Third and 
Fourth Republics;
ler Cycle 1789-1848
Gouvemement d'Assemblée 1789-1799. Gouvemement Présidentiel 1800-1814. Equilibrel814- 
1848.
Heme Cycle 1848-1877
Gouvemement d'Assemblée 1848-1851. Gouvemement Présidentiel 1851-1870. Equilibre 
1870-1877.
nieme Cycle 1877-1940 
(Footnote continues on next page)
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although Rousseau had inspired the idea that it was for parliament to make 
loi, law-making was actually carried out by executive organs under certain 
subsequent French constitutions.33 Nevertheless, parliament could always 
argue that it had the most legitimate claim to the law-making function 
because it reflected the will of the people by reason of being elected by 
them.34 It was by virtue of the influence of this political philosophy that 
under the Third Republic the legal doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was 
formulated.35
However, under the present constitution of the Fifth Republic, parliament is 
no longer the only directly elected state organ.36 Secondly, the will of the 
people can be manifested by referendum37 and thirdly, parliament's law­
Gouvemement d'Assemblée 1877-1940. Gouvernement Présidentiel 1940-1944. Equilibre 
1944-1946.
rVeme Cycle 1946—
Gouvernement d'Assemblée 1946-1948. Gouvernement Présidentiel 1958.....
For an essentially identical analytical approach (despite some variations in detail, see 
Gicquel, op. cit., 496-8). These schemes highlight the struggle between the different state 
organs over the power to make laws.
33 For example, the executive arrangement constituted by the Napoleonic Consulate 
established by the Constitution of 22 Frimaire an VIII (13th Dec. 1799) (c.f. J. Godechot, 'Les 
constitutions de la France depuis 1789' (1979), 151-62 and Gicquel, op. cit., 505-6).
34 This claim can be inferred from art.3 of the 1789 Declaration;
The source of all sovereignty lies ultimately in the nation. No body or individual can exercise 
any authority that is not expressly derived from it.'
(translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 261).
35 See R. Carré de Malberg, 'Contribution à la théorie générale de l'état' (1920-22), vol.I, 691- 
816 and 'La loi, expression de la volonté générale' (1931), 110-3.
36 By virtue of the referendum of 28th October 1962, the 1958 Constitution was amended to 
provide for the direct election of the President of the Republic. The Referendum Law of the 
6th November 1962 effected this change by virtue of a new art.6 (c.f. Duhamel, op. cit., 35-45).
37 See arts.3 & 11 of the constitution. Art.3 states, inter alia;
'Natural sovereignty belongs to the people, which shall exercise it by its representatives and 
by means of referendum.'
(translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 265).
Art.11 provides that the following may be submitted to a referendum;
'...any bill concerning the organisation of public authorities, or requiring the approval of a 
Community agreement, or providing for authorisation to ratify a treaty that, without being 
contrary to the Constitution, would affect the function of institutions.'
(translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 261).
The referendum can be seen as the ultimate expression of the general will, as is instanced by 
art.89, which, inter alia, lays down that a revision of the constitution must be approved by this 
mechanism and also that the sovereignty of the people cannot be destroyed, since no revision 
may put in question the republican form of government.
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making function is now shared with the executive.38 A fourth point is 
fundamental for civil liberties. Traditionally, parliamentary sovereignty had 
meant that civil liberties were to be regulated and guaranteed by parliament, 
via statute. Under present arrangements, art.34 only grants parliament 
legislative competence in a limited number of areas (this is referred to as 
specific competence). In contrast, by virtue of art.37, the executive is 
competent to issue legal measures, in the form of regulations, as regards all 
matters outside of parliament's competencies, as set out in art.34 (this is 
referred to as general competence). One consequence has been that civil 
liberties, once the sole prerogative of parliament and statute are, according to 
art.34, now only to be guaranteed by parliament. Their exercise and regulation 
is now to be secured by the executive, by virtue of art.37. Thus, parliament is 
prevented from laying down detailed statutory rules concerning the exercise 
of human rights, whereas the executive has now been granted a wider scope 
of action in this field.39 However, parliament may still be able to justify 
detailed legal regulation by claiming that it is via this means that human 
rights are guaranteed.
This change has been accomplished in the constitution by making explicit the 
tradition of the sovereignty of loi but not necessarily that of parliament.40
^®See art.38, which lays down the conditions under which the executive may issue 
or dormancies. The executive can therefore legislate on matters that are normally reserved to the 
competence of parliament and what is more, ordonnances are subject to less parliamentary 
scrutiny.
39 See, Braud, op. at., 291-304 & 389-397.
40 It may be argued that in stating that lots are to be passed by parliament, art.34 maintains 
parliament’s position as the sole state organ that can issue statutes and fuses parliamentary 
sovereignty and loi. However, it should be recalled that art.38 effects a sharing of law-making 
functions, whereby the executive can ’legislate' via ordonnances which have the force of 
statute. The constitution, therefore effects a shift, as Stone (op. cit., 47) has noted, from form to 
content;
'In sum, la loi was no longer to be defined by its form, an act of parliament, but by its content, 
the matter to be regulated.'
Consequently, ordonnances can be said to be loi because of their content, i.e. they can regulate 
matters normally reserved to la loi. Parliament and loi are not fused and the distinction that 
exists between them can be seen in art.40;
'Private members' bills [propositions de loi] and amendments drafted by Members of 
Parliament are not admissible if their adoption would have the consequence of reducing 
public resources or creating or increasing a public charge.'
(translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 253).
This article limits die law-making role of parliament (private members' bills) by excluding it 
from certain subjects but it does not touch the sovereignty of loi.
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Therefore, the French tradition, despite its terms, makes statutes supreme, not 
the organs (be they executive or parliamentary) that pass them.41
Nevertheless, despite the difference in the French notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty, it is still submitted that French arrangements merit closer 
analysis because they reflect an attempt to come to terms with the supremacy 
of loi and the often pernicious consequences that this has for human rights. In 
addition, it will be noted that one of the criticisms in England has been that it 
is increasingly the executive that is sovereign because it enjoys effective 
control over parliament's law-making functions.42 Thus, the differences 
between French and English notions may not, after all, be so great. In 
England, it is the executive's effective control over statutes that has made 
traditional controls, designed to scrutinise parliament (as the organ that has 
traditionally legislated), increasingly ineffective. Essentially, in France, statute 
(loi) is sovereign, whereas in England this position is accorded to parliament 
Therefore, in France, a 'Bonapartist tradition' has been identified,43 according 
to which the ideal is to bring parliament under executive control (this, for 
example, occurred in the periods 1799-1814 and 1852-1875). It is widely stated 
that the present constitution was drafted with this aim in mind.44 As a result, 
executive control of parliament is less problematic than it is in England 
because such control is not seen as challenging the traditional sovereignty 
enjoyed by statute.
Having dealt with the differences in the French notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty, it should be noted that this tradition had also resulted in a 
hierarchy of powers, that closely resembles the subordinate position
41 The nature of French parliamentary sovereignty can be clearly seen in the executive's 
practice of issuing decrét-lois under the Third Republic. These often concerned matters on 
which only parliament was competent to legislate. Therefore, the executive effectively acted 
as the legislature; this legislation was supreme, although parliament was not (c.f. for a brief, 
historical overview of the Third Republic, G. Burdeau, F. Haman & M. Troper, 'Droit 
constitutionnel' (1991), 345-64 and Gicquel, op. cit., 524-39 and for comments on the 
weakening of parliament's role, see Bell, op. cit., 81-6). It will be seen that parliament 
increasingly came to be seen to an inefficient and unstable legislative organ. It was this view 
that was one of the causes of the 'rationalisation' of parliament under the present constitution.
42 See for example, C. Graham & T. Prosser, 'Waiving the Rules: The Constitution Under 
Thatcherism' (1988) and Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 255-6.
43 This phrase is used by Stone, op. cit., 30-1 (c.f. D. Rousseau, 'Droit de contentieux 
constitutionnel' (1990), 12).
44 Stone, op. cit., 46-7, Bell, op. cit., 14-19, Duhamel, op. cit., chp.III and Gicquel, op. cit., 559- 
571).
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traditionally accorded to human rights in England. Situated at the top of this 
hierarchy was statute and at the bottom judicial decisions. In between were 
rules issued by the executive. It followed from this hierarchy that the 
judiciary was positively prohibited from reviewing administrative acts. As a 
consequence, administrative acts could not be struck down by the judiciary 
on the grounds that they violated civil liberties. In short, the tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty granted a pre-eminent position to loi and a 
superior position to the executive vis a vis the judiciary. The result of this 
tradition today is that civil liberties do not enjoy the requisite higher status in 
order to prevail against legislative acts.
To conclude, the tradition of civil liberties is one in which they have had to 
exist in an environment in which they are subordinate to the dictates of 
statute. This tradition has conditioned the way in which civil liberties are 
treated.
A tradition of uncertainty as regards the legal status of civil liberties:
A corollary of the traditionally strong affirmation of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in France is the uncertainty as to whether civil 
liberties have the status of positive law and, if so, what exactly this status is. 
This traditional uncertainty is submitted to flow from the superior position of 
statute. In such an hierarchy, those who seek to claim that the legislature and 
the administration are constrained by the need to respect human rights must 
firstly accord a legal status to these rights and secondly, grant these rights a 
higher status than that enjoyed by statute and administrative regulation.45 
The first has proved difficult to achieve, not directly because of the 
sovereignty of parliament, but because of the strong positivistic tradition in 
French public law. The second, however, results directly from the sovereignty 
of loi, in that even granted a legal status for civil liberties, the French tradition 
does not envisage any higher legal value than that enjoyed by statute. These 
two aspects of what is submitted to be the tradition of uncertainty will be set 
out here in order to complete this outline of tradition within which the
45 As stated by Braud, op. cit., 273;
'Obligations étatiques, elles ne peuvent l'être vraiment que si elles émanent de sources supra- 
étatiques, c'est-à-dire à la fois supra-législatives et supra-réglementaires; sinon l'Etat ne serait 
pas authentiquement lié puisqu'un organe disposerait de la faculté de modifier le principe de 
l'obligation, voire de la nier.'
(c.f. Costa, op. cit., 44).
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current arrangements for the protection of human rights that will next be 
looked at are to be found.46
Irrespective of the different political structures and constitutions that have 
been applied in France since the Revolution,47 it has been traditionally 
claimed that human rights do not have a legal status. 48 Instead, they are 
stated to be merely moral aspirations which have no binding legal effect. 49 
Support for this view is sometimes drawn from the fact that the Declaration 
of 1789 was not placed within the Constitution but rather at it's head. 50 This 
claim is lent further support when constitutional history is examined. This 
reveals that civil liberties were often declared in texts that were set apart from 
the actual constitution and indeed, sometimes a charter of rights was even
^These two aspects are noted by Colliard, op. cit., 18;
'La théorie des libertés publiques, c'est-à-dire la reconnaissance à l'individu de certains droits, 
relève du droit positif et non du droit naturel: il n'y a pas de droit supérieur à la législation 
positive. Évidemment il y a des législations positives plus ou moins libérales, plus ou moins 
individualistes, et plus ou moins conformes à un ideal, mais c'est là une toute autre question.' 
and see also Costa, op. cit., 16.
Therefore, it can be seen that in the French tradition, positivism and parliamentary 
sovereignty are connected but it is submitted that this is not a logically necessary connection. 
However, the tradition can be explained here more clearly by separating the two points.
47See, Godechot, op. cit.
This claim was generally accepted from the Revolution onwards, see, F. Grazier, M. Gentot 
and B. Genevois, ’La marque des idées et des principes de 1789 dans la jurisprudence du 
Conseil d'Etat et du Conseil constitutionnel' 40 E.D.C.E. [1989] 151,172-3;
Dès l'origine la portée juridique de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen a été 
l'objet d'interrogations et de discussions. Mais après l'abolition de la Constitution de 1791 et 
surtout sous le régime des lois constitutionnelles de 1875, lui reconnaître de valeur droit 
positif fut, pour la quasi unanimité des juristes, totalement exclu.'
Duhamel, op. dt., 110, neatly sums up the traditional position;
'Mais alors, elle n'avait plus que la portée dogmatique d'une déclaration de vérités 
philosophiques,...ou plutôt, elle se ramènerait à l'énoncé de concepts de droit naturel, qui ont 
bien pu inspirer la Constitution de 1791 et dont la grande influence sur la formation du droit 
public française est, à cet égard, indéniable, mais qui ne sauraient être considères comme des 
prescriptions juridiques ayant l'efficacité de règles de droit positif.’
(c.f. Duhamel, op. cit,. I l l  and J. Robert & Duffar, 'Les Libertés Publiques et Droits de 
l'Homme'. (1988), 85-7).
49 This point is clear from Bell's (op. dt., 138) quotation of Barthélémy;
The classical attitude was well expressed by Barthélémy in his thesis of 1899, where he said 
that: "most often, declarations of rights are no more than solemn proclamations of principles, 
rules for the conduct of the State, pure maxims of political morality, promises whose force 
lies solely in public opinion and whose solemn inscription alone is made by the Constitution, 
without the possibility for individuals to enforce their observations or practical realisation."’ 
Duhamel, op. dt., 120 asserts that if the claim made by Duguit is conceded that the 1789 
Declaration still has legal force, despite the abolition of the 1791 Constitution, by reason of 
the fact that it was not part of the Constitution, it means that it merely expresses future moral 
and philosophical principles that are at most of guidance for future constitutions. In other 
words, it has no positive law value.
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omitted.51 On other occasions the traditional view is supported by reference 
to the vague terms in which rights are couched.52 They are stated to lack both 
precision and the mechanisms by which they can be applied.53 A distinction is 
therefore often drawn between declarations of rights and guarantees of rights, 
a distinction which has its origins in the Revolution.54 In contrast to the 1789 
Declaration, the guarantee is claimed to have constitutional status, not only 
because they are found in the body of the constitution, but also because they 
have sufficient precision to be applied.55
In turn, this distinction reveals the strong element of positivism in the French 
legal tradition. This manifests itself in the claim that civil liberties have no 
legal status unless so granted by positive law; traditionally via statutory
5 ! See, Godechot, op. cit.
52 This was one of the arguments put forward by Esmein and Carré de Malberg, see Robert & 
Duffar, op. cit., 86-7;
'Les déclarations ne sont que des énoncés très généraux de principes assez vagues. "Ce ne 
sont pas", estime Esmein, "des articles de lois précis et exécutoires. Ce sont purement et 
simplement des déclarations de principes." De son côté, Carré de Malberg écrit: "La 
Déclaration des droits de 1789 n'avait que la portée dogmatique d'une déclaration de vérité 
philosophique. Elle se ramenait à l'énoncé de concepts du droit naturel qui ont bien pu 
inspirer la Déclaration de 1791, mais qui ne sauraient être considérés comme des 
prescriptions juridiques ayant l'efficacité de régler le droit positif."'
53 Morange, op. cit., 30 essentially makes this point;
'Par ailleurs, ce sont les principes qui sont reconnus et non les moyens ou procédures qui 
permettraient de les mettre en œuvre.'
(c.f., T. Marshall, 'Les droits de l'homme et l'art politique à l'époque révolutionnaire: la France 
et les Etats-Unis' in C-A. Colliard, G. Gonac, J. Beer-Gabel & S. Froge, (eds.) 'La Déclaration 
des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789. ses origines - sa pérennité' (1990), 36).
54 Thus, for example, the first constitution of 1791, Title I, mentioned fundamental provisions 
(including some human rights) that were guaranteed by the Constitution.
55 Guarantees of rights, as found in French constitutional texts have been defined by Gicquel, 
op. cit., 100, as follows;
'Cette notion provient de ce que, dans les déclarations, on trouve des principes autres que 
ceux se rapportant aux droits individuels: souveraineté nationale, séparation des pouvoirs, 
responsibilité des fonctionnaires, etc. Ce mélange de principes d'organisation politique et 
même administrative avec l'affirmation des droits fondamentaux de l'individu, pouvait faire 
douter de la valeur juridique pour le législateur des droits individuels proclamés dans cet 
ensemble.'
According to Braud, op. cit., 379 et. seq., these guarantees can be constitutional, statutory or 
regulatory. The main point of importance here is that guarantees exist via positive law 
provisions. As such, they are capable of being applied. It is this characteristic that is 
traditionally contrasted with declarations of rights; see Colliard, op. cit., 56-7 and at 57;
'La distinction entre déclaration des droits et garantie des droits ainsi marquée est capitale. La 
déclaration des droits s'oppose à la garantie en ce sens que seule la garantie est un texte 
constitutionnel à portée positive. La déclaration n'est qu'un énoncé de principes devant 
guider le législateur, mais elle ne constitute pas le droit positif. Ce divorce entre droit positif 
et déclaration des droits se marque dès le début de l’histoire constitutionnel (sic) française, il 
importe de l'avoir présent à l'esprit.'
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enactment.56 Without the intervention of positive law, civil liberties remain 
creatures of natural law.57 As such, they may have a moral weight but they 
have no legal significance - in other words, they are situated outside the legal 
domain.
As part of their attack on this dominant tradition, French theorists have 
asserted that the human rights found in the successive declarations enjoy a 
legal status.58 In the Third Republic, government practice and judicial 
decisions encouraged these claims.59 However, the fact that successive 
governments during this Republic passed statutes to protect civil liberties
S6 See, Colliard, op. cit., supra.
See, P. Lemire, 'La protection constitutionelle des libertés en droit public français' (1975),
23;
'Les libertés sont donc en droit français le resultant de l'organisation et de l'inseration dans le 
droit positif national des principes qui forment ce que l'on appelle les "Droits de L'Homme".'
For details of these arguments, see Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 85-6, Stone, op. cit., 33-8, Bell, 
op. cit., 23-7, Colliard, op. cit., 107-8, Gicquel, op. cit., 111 and Duhamel, op. cit., 119-124.
There was a liberal consensus in the Third Republic which resulted in a series of statutes 
that guaranteed and regulated the exercise of certain human rights. For a list of the civil 
liberties that were so enacted, see J.E.S. Hayward, 'Governing France: The One and 
Indivisible Republic' (1983), 135 and Colliard, op. cit., 90. Morange, op. cit., 13 characterises the 
practice of Third Republic governments as an application of the positivistic tradition. As a 
result, he claims that the proclamation of the Rights of Man was abandoned during this period 
and that instead a system of civil liberties was put in its place. Thus, the Third Republic can be 
seen as reaffirming the requirement that civil liberties must be positivised in order to enjoy 
legal status;
'Les libertés publiques traduisent juridiquement, plus ou moins fidèlement, une philosophie 
des droits de l'homme.'
(Morange, op. dt., 15).
Although the case law of this period generally denied that bills of rights were legally binding 
in themselves, the Conseil d'État confirmed, in a series of cases, that non-written general 
principles of law could be derived from them. Generally, these principles had statutory force; 
see, Robert & Duffar, op. dt., 87;
'Le Conseil d'État considère par là même - que les Déclarations de droits, en général, n'ont 
pas de valeur juridique par elles-mêmes, mais seulement que les principes qu'elles 
contiennent peuvent être retenus comme règles coutumières ou principes généraux du droit 
avec une valeur juridique au maximum égale à celle des lois ordinaires.'
(c.f. Grazier, et.al, op. dt., 157, the general principles of law were also derived from sources 
other than the Declaration; see Aramu et autres C.E. 26th Oct. 1945, Rec.213, S.1946.33.1., 
Dame veuve Trompier-Gravier C.E. sect. 5th May 1944, Rec.133 and R.J. Cummins, The 
Genera] Principles of Law. Separation of Powers and Theories of ludicial Decision in France' 
I.C.L.Q. 35 [1986] 594, 603).
The Conseil d'État also confirmed the earlier judgment of the ordinary courts (Cass. crim. 
11th May 1833 Paulin S.1833.1357) that statutes could not be constitutionally reviewed (C.E. 
6th Nov. 1936 Arrighi Rec.1936.966. c.f. Rousseau, op. dt., 182). Consequently, the courts 
continued to recognise the supremacy of law but at least as far as the administration was 
concerned, they developed the competence to review their regulatory measures as against 
standards derived from declarations of rights.
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may be interpreted as continuation, rather than a break with positivism.60 In 
addition, the Conseil d'Etat was scrupulous in not directly granting legal 
status to civil liberties, preferring instead to employ human rights as sources 
of inspiration for the 'general principles of law',61 which were granted legal 
status. Therefore, this uncertainty may be seen to have been conditioned by a 
tradition which asserted that human rights, and the bills of rights in which 
they were placed, were not legally binding.62
Consequently, the current mechanisms for protecting of human rights, which 
will be dealt with next, must be seen against the backdrop of this traditional 
uncertainty as to whether human rights have a legal status. The same picture
Braud, op. cit., 282 sees the Third Republic as continuing the Revolutionary tradition by 
which statutes regulated the exercise of civil liberties. However, he also sees this period as being 
one in which the 'Republican tradition' was established, by which statute also introduced 
human rights into positive law;
'Grâce à l'influence combinée de Rousseau et de Montesquieu, un climat très favorable à la loi 
s'est constitué pendant la période révolutionnaire. La République de Jules Ferry et de Léon 
Gambetta, se veut son héritière sur ce point comme sur beaucoup d'autres.'
This principle would be later confirmed in the Fourth Republic by the Conseil d'État in its 
advice of 1953 (see infra.).
61 See Cummins, op. cit., 612-18.
62 The Fourth Republic essentially continued the tradition of the non-positive law status of 
civil liberties. However, at the same time, theorists asserted growing pressure to have civil 
liberties granted legal status; see, for example, Stone, op. cit., 40-5 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 
90.
Their claims were greatly assisted by the decision of the ordinary courts to the effect that the 
provisions of the Preamble in the 1946 Constitution (which contained a series of human 
rights) could be invoked before them and had the force of law (Trib.civ. de la Seine 22nd Jan. 
1947; Gaz.Pal. 1947.1.67 and c.f. Gicquel, op. cit., 112 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 90). 
Although the Conseil d'État continued to expand its case law on the general principles of law 
(c.f. J. Rivero, 'Le lupe administratif: un iuee qui gouverne?' D.1951 chr.21), it was still 
unwilling to clearly state that human rights had positive law status. Therefore, in Dehaene 
(C.E. 7th July 1950; Rec.426), the Conseil d'État applied the right to strike, as found in the 1946 
Preamble but did not go on to state what legal status, if any, the Preamble had (although the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement Foumier suggested that general principles of law derived 
from the Preamble might have constitutional status). Despite this omission, the case is 
generally seen by theorists as laying down that the right to strike is a general principle of law 
and that this principle has constitutional value (see, Braud, op. cit., 312 and Colliard, op. cit., 
111). In other cases, the Conseil d'État only derived general principles of statutory force (for 
example, C.E. 25th Jan. 1957 Syndicat fédéral des fonctionnaires malgaches et assimilés 
Rec.65). In an earlier advice to government, the Conseil d'État had stated that the Preamble 
had no constitutional value (C.E. 23rd April 1947).
In summary, despite some new developments, the Fourth Republic maintained the 
traditional sovereignty of parliament (neither the administrative or ordinary courts reviewed 
statutes according to human rights, or even those principles that were derived from them) 
and generally, no higher legal status than statute was admitted (the general principles of law 
being generally granted only a statutory value).
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can be discerned as regards the position of civil liberties in the French legal 
hierarchy, assuming that their legal status has been established.
Before the Third Republic, the question does not seem to have been raised; 
the traditional position being that declarations of rights had no status 
whatsoever.63 However, as part of their attempts to have the human rights in 
the declarations accorded positive law value, theorists asserted that they had 
either constitutional or supra-constitutional status.
In support of the former claim, Hauriou asserted that a state was governed by 
two constitutions; one political and the other social. The second, laid down 
the foundations of social order and in liberal societies it contained the civil 
liberties of citizens, as part of the relations between citizens and the state. If 
constitutional value was accorded to the political constitution (which 
regulated the functions and organisation of state powers), the same had to be 
accorded to the social constitution and, therefore the declarations of rights 
contained therein.64
The claim to constitutional status was necessary because of the practice at that 
time of protecting civil liberties via the enactment of statutes. This practice 
reinforced the sovereignty of parliament. Therefore, this claim sought to place 
constitutional norms at the summit of a legal hierarchy that was traditionally 
dominated by statute.65 In such a way, statutes, despite their being used to
63 As was previously noted Grazier, et. al., op. cit., 172-3 supra.
64 Hauriou, op. cit., 297-300. Gicquel, op. cit.. I l l ,  summarises Hauriou's theory in the 
following manner;
'Maurice Hauriou à résumé sa pensée à travers la théorie dite des deux constitutions. Tout 
État dispose simultanément, estime-t-il, d'une constitution politique et d'une constitution sociale. 
La première règle l'organisation et le fonctionnement des pouvoirs d'État; la seconde est celle 
qui pose les bases de l'ordre social, selon lequel vit la communauté étatique et qui prévoit, en 
particulier, la nature des rapports entre les citoyens de l'État, c'est-à-dire, dans le cas d’un 
ordre social individualiste, les droits individuels des citoyens.
Dès lors, si on admet que la constitution politique est un texte ayant valeur de super-légalité, il 
doit en être de même pour la constitution sociale, dont le noyau dur est la déclaration des 
droits. Car la seconde est, au moins, aussi importante que la première.'
65 See, Stone, op. cit., 34-9 and Duhamel, op. cit., 54. Lemire, op. cit., 8 underlines that in order 
to secure an efficient protection of civil liberties, they must be placed at the top of the legal 
hierarchy but that such a position would contradict tradition;
'Il est évident qu'une telle affirmation heurte la tradition française qui, en pratique, de 1789 à 
nos jours, n'a cessé de fonder l'ensemble de notre système sur l'omnipotence et la 
souveraineté de la loi, considérée comme la norme la plus apte à garantir efficacement la 
protection, voire la promotion, des libertés.'
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effect important human rights reforms during this time, could be 
subordinated to human rights. It should be noted that in spite of the claimed 
inadequacies of statutory protection, the statutory enactment of civil liberties 
was one important factor in the Third Republic's so-called 'golden age' of 
public law.66
Moving to a consideration of the supra-constitutional claim, it should be 
noted that this was sometimes founded upon natural law. Here, the claim 
was that a higher law existed above positive law, however, this view was not 
accepted by a growing number of theorists who refuted the existence of 
natural law.67 Moving from a secular foundation, Duguit asserted the supra- 
constitutionality of the 1789 Declaration by claiming that it constituted an 
implicit principle that bound the constituent power. The fact that the 
revolutionaries preceded the 1791 Constitution with the 1789 Declaration, 
was claimed to be evidence that it was not part of the Constitution and thus, 
had no constitutional value. Rather, it constituted the prior condition of the 
Constitution and for this reason had supra-constitutional value.68
Under the Third Republic, it has been seen that this assertion was rejected by 
according the 1789 Declaration purely moral or philosophical status. 
Therefore human rights, it was objected, could hardly be said to enjoy a 
supra-constitutional value. This view was affirmed in two cases, which 
denied that human rights had constitutional value (and by implication, supra- 
constitutional value), whilst holding that the general principles of law that 
were derived from them were of legislative (statutory) value.69
66 Both Stone, op. cit., 32 and Grazier et. al., op. cit., 156, speak of a 'golden age' or 'time'. Stone, 
op. cit., 32 also notes the importance of the enactment of civil liberties;
'...an extraordinary renaissance of public law occurred during the second decade of the Third 
Republic, and the discipline subsequently entered a golden age. I can only offer some 
tentative explanations for the causes of this renaissance...a series of laws which sought to 
guarantee what in France are public liberties were passed - on free association, union 
membership, freedom of the press, and so on - and these came to be seen as performing the 
function of a judicially applicable bill of rights.'
67 See Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 85-6.
6® See, L. Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel' (1921-29) VolJII, 560 and Duhamel, op. cit., 
125, Burdeau, op. cit., (1972), 64-5, Bell, op. cit., 24 and Stone, op. cit., 34-40. Indeed the 1789 
Declaration can be seen as constituting the conditions for a social contract.
69 C.E. 9th May 1913 Roubeau Rec.521 and C.E. 4th Feb. 1944 Guieysse R.D.P. 1944.166 (cf.
Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 87).
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The Conseil d'État accordingly took great care not to declare that human 
rights had legislative value in themselves. The 1789 Declaration, therefore, 
remained a non-positive law text; a natural law source of inspiration from 
which positive law principles could be drawn.70 It should be noted that even 
if the 1789 Declaration had been granted constitutional or supra- 
constitutional status, the practical effects would have been largely negated by 
the decision of the Conseil d'État that it lacked the competence to review 
statutes as against the constitution.71 This would have meant that the human 
rights, even those of a constitutional value, would have remained subordinate 
to statute because the judiciary would continue to uphold statute in cases of 
conflict between statutes and constitutionally valued human rights. 
Furthermore, even given a supra-constitutional status, this strong affirmation 
of parliamentary sovereignty would have meant that statutes could not have 
been struck down because no higher status was recognised above that of 
statute.
The uncertainty as to what value human rights enjoyed was also raised in the 
Fourth Republic. During this period civil liberties were set out in the 
Preamble to the Constitution.72 However, uncertainty resulted as a tension 
manifested itself between the dominant tradition and the continued assertions 
of public law theorists. Despite the creation of the Comité constitutional, 
charged with limited powers of constitutional review, it was clearly stated 
that review could only take place before a statute was promulgated and 
statutes were not to be reviewed as against the Preamble.73 At the same time,
7® See Braud, op. cit., 312.
^  See, Arrighi. op. cit., and cf. Rousseau, op. cit., 82-3.
72 For the differences between declarations and a preambles, see Gicquel, op. cit., 98. It is 
submitted that these differences are of little relevance for present purposes, given that both 
types of texts act as the repositories of human rights.
The Preamble to the Fourth Republic Constitution (27th Oct. 1946) reaffirmed the rights and 
liberties contained in the 1789 Declaration, the fundamental principles recognised by the laws 
of the Republic and certain political, economic and social principles, considered to be 
particularly necessary for the time (c.f. Gicquel, op. cit., 106-10 and for an English translation, 
Bell, op. cit., 263). The Constitution was a product of a compromise between the Right and the 
Left (c.f. Stone, op. cit., 41-3) after the rejection, by referendum, of an earlier constitutional 
project (Gicquel, op. cit., 545-6).
73 Art.92, inter alia, stated,
T>ans le délai de promulgation de la loi, le Comité est saisi par une demande émanant 
conjointement du président..
Le Comité examine la loi, s'efforce de provoquer un accord entre l'Assemblée nationale et le 
Conseil de la République...
(Footnote continues on next page)
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the travaux préparatoires clearly showed that the drafters had no intention of 
granting legal value to the Preamble, let alone according it a legislative, or 
even constitutional status.74
This uncertainty regarding human rights is nowhere more manifest than in 
the divergent case law of the ordinary and administrative courts. As regards 
the former, it was decided that the 1946 Preamble had statutory force as long 
ago as 1947.75 On the other hand, the Conseil d'État's position was less clear 
but tended to err on the side of not granting the Preamble legal value in itself 
but rather, in accordance with its previous jurisprudence, the general 
principles of law that were derived from it.76
Once again, no court struck down a statute on the grounds that it violated 
human rights. This fact therefore indicates that despite the continued pressure 
that was asserted by public law theorists, the traditional view remained 
dominant. However, the uncertainties and divergences in the case law can be 
seen to reveal a tension. The current arrangements regarding human rights 
also reflect this tension; the 1958 Constitution represents a new departure 
from tradition but as has earlier been claimed, this same change will be seen 
to have been conditioned by that tradition.
Il n'est competent que pour statuer sur la possibilité de révision des dispositions des Titres 1er 
à X de la présente Constitution.'
By reason of the Preamble being outside the titles mentioned in art.92, it could not be used as a 
basis on which to review statutes. Therefore, a limited review was envisaged, to the extent 
that in the event of a contradiction between the Constitution and an as yet unpromulgated 
law, it was the Constitution that could be revised, not the statute. This limited review has 
been seen to be the result of trying to accommodate the dominant tradition; see, Burdeau, op. 
at., 426;
'La Constitution organise un semblant de contrôle de constitutionnalité par l'intermédiaire 
d'un Comité constitutionnel. Pour éviter de présenter ce contrôle comme un obstacle à 
l’expression de la volonté générale, le Comité ne doit pas examiner si les lois sont contraires à 
la constitution, mais si elles "supposent une révision de la constitution". Le Constituant se 
rattachait ainsi à la justification procédurale du contrôle.'
Therefore, even if the Preamble had been included in one of the texts over which the Comité 
had competence by virtue of art.92, it could have been revised in the event of it being in 
contradiction with a statute (c.f. Bell, op. cit., 22 and Rousseau, op. cit., 13).
74 See Stone, op. at., 41-4.
75 Trib.dv. de la Seine, supra.
76 See, for example, Dehaene. supra., C.E. 11th July 1956 Amicale des Annamites de Paris 
Rec3l7, C E. 25th Jan. 1957 Syndicat fédéral des fonctionnaires malgaches Rec.65 and C.E. 7th 
June 1957 Condamine R.D.P. 1958.98. These principles are not always expressly derived from 
the Preamble, see, for example, C.E. sect. 9th March 1951 Société des concerts du 
conservatoire Rec.151 and C.E. Ass. 25th May 1954 Barel Rec.308 and they do not necessarily 
concern human rights; see, Rivero, (1951), op. cii., 22.
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The construction of human rights is an example of this conditioning. 
Consequently, human rights are usually claimed to be laid down and 
regulated by positive law norms.77 In common with contemporary, liberal 
human rights theorists, French commentators claim that human rights are 
founded upon social consensus. In this sense, the decision as to which actions 
and activities are sufficiently important to be classed as civil liberties (a 
decision that is traditionally effected by the enactment of a statute), is a 
product of social agreement and not because it is dictated by natural law 
postulates.78 This consensus may, however, change and this possibility, 
makes civil liberties contingent and not universal across time.79
One result of the nature of human rights is that French theorists differ as to 
whether human rights are purely negative, or also positive,80 This is but one
77 Therefore, Colliard, op. cit., 2 states;
'Certains systèmes de civilisation admettent l'existence au profit des individus de certains 
droits reconnus, organisés et protégés par l'État. Ce sont ces droits qu'on appelle les libertés 
publiques.'
and in defining civil liberties, the requirement of positive law regulation is emphasised, op. 
cit., 28;
'On désigne sous le non de libertés publiques des situations juridiques légales et 
réglementaires dans lesquelles l'individu se voit reconnu le droit d'agir sans constrainte dans 
le cadre des limites fixées par le droit positif en vigeur et éventuellement déterminées, sous le 
contrôle du juge, par l'autorité de police chargée du maintien de l'ordre public. Ce droit est 
protégé par action en justice, essentiellement par la mise en œuvre du contrôle de légalité.' 
(c.f. Braud, op. cit., 271-2 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 12).
7® See, for example, Morange, op. cit., 74;
'Ce sont des principes sur lesquels, pour des raisons variables, s'est établi un large consensus. 
Ils feraient partie de la règle du jeu que doivent respecter les acteurs politiques, un peu au 
même degré que la règle démocratique elle-même.'
(emphasis added).
79 Costa, op. cit., 16;
'...les libertés publiques n'existent que dans et par le droit positif; elles ont par conséquent un 
contenu plus précis, mais plus contingent aussi, puisqu'elles dépendent de la liste qu'en fixe 
le législateur, et qui varie dans le temps comme dans l'espace.'
80 Colliard, op. cit., 25-8, excepts that not all civil liberties are negative. However, he claims 
that certain positive rights are not human rights. These are those that seek to secure the 
necessary material conditions for the exercise of classic civil liberties (negative rights). These 
positive rights are merely linked to human rights; op. cit., 27;
’Les démocraties libérales connaissent d'ailleurs de semblables liasons. La liberté de parole, 
en matière électorale, n'est-elle pas assurée par une prestation positive de l'État accordant la 
possibilité aux formations politiques d'utiliser le sérvice public de la radiodiffusion ou de la 
télévision.'
He contrasts these with other positive rights which, because they lack regulation by positive 
norms, remain mere ideals. Here, the positivistic tradition can be seen to be strongly 
determinative of Colliard's views (c.f. Costa, op. cit., 16, who on the same basis distinguishes
(Footnote continues on next page)
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among many other areas of difference concerning human rights81 but such 
uncertainty and disagreement was also found to exist in England and it this 
pervasive uncertainty that once again justifies the theoretical position that 
was formulated and adopted in chapter I. More importantly, France and 
England also have in common a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty that 
constitutes a relationship upon which useful comparisons can be made as 
regards the protection of human rights. The usefulness of French practice will 
be seen next when the current French arrangements are presented. These 
arrangements will also later serve to illustrate the general context of the 
specific legal protection of the liberty to assemble.
THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN FRANCE
It will be seen that current arrangements for protecting human rights are 
strongly affected by the tradition that was presented above. The present 
arrangements of the Fifth Republic, to a great extent represent a victory for 
French public law theorists in their attempt to secure the position of human 
rights at the top of the legal hierarchy.
The protection of civil liberties will be presented using the method commonly 
adopted by French theorists. This consists of looking at the mechanisms of 
protection that exist at each level of the legal hierarchy.82
Protection by virtue of international treaties:
Civil liberties are protected by international treaties, most commonly by the 
ECHR.83 By virtue of art.55 of the Constitution, international treaties, once
between civil liberties and the Rights of Man; the former concern facultés and the latter, 
créances).
On the other hand, some theorists claim that human rights encompass both negative and 
positive conceptions. It is this sense that Braud, op. cit., 271 & 275 et. seq. speaks of the rights 
of individuals and state obligations (c.f. Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 13).
81 To take but one other example, theorists disagree as to which civil liberty is the most 
important; Colliard, op. cit., 234 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 18, claim that personal freedoms 
are the most fundamental human rights, whereas, Gicquel, op. cit., 97, accords this to the 
liberty of expression/communication and Duhamel, op. cit., 329, to equality.
82 For examples of the application of this method, see Robert & Duffar, op. cit. 84, C. Leclercq, 
'Libertés Publiques' (1991), 143-59 and Morange, op. cit.,88.
83 France did not ratify the ECHR until 3rd May 1974 and granted the right of individual 
petition to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on 9th October 1981 (ci. Leclercq, op. dt., 
89-91). Currently, France has the second largest number of complaints lodged by individuals 
to the Commission of the ECHR and actually surpassed the UK for the first nine months of 
1990 (c.f. Leclercq, op. cit., 97-101 and Gicquel, op. cit., 114-5).
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ratified, enjoy a superior legal status to that of statute.84 Thus in domestic law, 
the ECHR is recognised as higher law. This status has been generally 
recognised in the case-law of the various jurisdictions. Therefore, although 
the Conseil constitutionnel (Cc) has declared that it does not have the 
jurisdiction to investigate whether statutes are compatible with the ECHR 
under art.61, which lays down the conditions under which it may review 
statutes and other legislative measures,85 it has nevertheless indicated that it 
could, by virtue of art.61, review laws in order to ascertain whether they are 
in accordance with the constitution, which includes art.55.86 This possibility 
has been confirmed in two cases concerning immigration and elections.87
The administrative and ordinary courts have declared themselves competent 
to strike down legislation on the grounds that it is not in conformity with 
international treaties ratified by France. The ordinary courts were first to do 
so and decided as early as 1975 that parties could raise the ECHR in 
proceedings before them.88 On the other hand, the Conseil d'État affirmed the 
supremacy of the ECHR over statute in a case in 198989 and did the same as 
regards European Union legislation.90 The limitations of the Cc's jurisdiction 
are therefore offset by the protection afforded by the ordinary and 
administrative courts. The result is that civil liberties, found in international 
treaties will prevail over statute and administrative regulations.
84 Art.55 reads as follows;
'From their publication, duly ratified or approved treaties or agreements have a higher 
authority than lois, subject, for each treaty or agreement, to its implementation by the other 
party.'
(translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 257).
85 Dec. No.74-54DC 15th Jan. 1975, Rec.19 Abortion Law, consideration 7 and Dec. No.89-268 
DC 29th Dec. 1989, Rec.110 Loi de finances pour 1990. considerations 79-85.
See, D. Rousseau, 'L'intéyration de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme au 
bloc de constitutionnalité' in D. Rousseau & F. Sudre (eds.) 'Conseil constituionnel et Cour 
européenne des Droits de L'Homme; droits et libertés en Europe' (1990), 119-121.
87 Respectively, Dec. No.86-216 DC 3rd Sept. 1986, Rec.135 Loi relative aux conditions 
d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers en France, considération 6 and Nos.88-1082,1117 21st Oct. 
1988, considerations 4 & 5.
88 See, Ch. crim. 3rd June 1975 Respino. Bull.crim. no.141, 382 (for examples of other cases, 
see Leclercq, op. cit., 95). In Cass. ch. mixte 24th May 1975 Société Jacques Vabre D.1775.497, 
the ECHR was held to prevail over laws passed prior, or subsequent, to the ratification of the 
Treaty (c.f. Leclercq, op. cit., 122-3).
89 C.E. Ass. 20th Oct. 1989 Nicolo. Rec.190.
90 C.E. 24th Sept. 1990 M. Boisdet. A.J.D.A. 1990.906.
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This position reflects the application of a new hierarchy of laws.91 Respect for 
this hierarchy is required by reason of it now being constituted as a 
constitutional norm, viz. art.55. As a result, statutes are subordinate to 
international treaties. This in turn provides an example of how the tradition 
of parliamentary sovereignty has been challenged under the Fifth Republic.
The Conseil constitutionnel:
The strongest challenge to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty appears 
to be the constitutional review of laws that is carried out by the Cc. As a result 
of this review power, the Cc has been able to protect civil liberties from 
statutory infringement. However, upon closer inspection, it will be seen that 
the Cc constitutes a compromise and, in many respects, even a continuation 
with the French public law tradition.
The Cc may review the constitutionality of statutes via four methods. These 
are divided into external and internal controls and it is one of the latter forms, 
called the 'violation de la Constitution', by which human rights are generally 
protected.92 Under this head, the Cc reviews statutory legislation in order to 
check that it does not violate the human rights set out in texts to which 
constitutional value has been attributed. These texts have come to be known 
as the 'bloc de constitutionnalite'93 and they consist of the texts referred to in 
the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution;
The French people solemnly proclaims its attachment to the rights of man and to the 
principles of national sovereignty such as are defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed 
and completed by the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution.94
Therefore, the Cc generally reviews statutes against the 1958 Constitution, the 
1789 Declaration, the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the 
Republic (usually abbreviated to PFRLR and henceforth adopted here), the
91 This hierarchy is generally welcomed by theorists, for example, Costa, op. cit., 44;
'A défaut de garantie constitutionnelle, celle du traité est importante, car, en vertu de l'article
55 de la Constitution de 1958, les traités régulièrement ratifiés ont, dès leur publication, une 
autorité supérieure à celle des lois. D’ou l'importance de textes tels que la Convention 
Européenne de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales...'.
92 These different forms are set out by Rousseau, op. cit., 118-24 and as regards review for 
violation of the constitution, see pgs.121-2.
93 This phrase is used by, amongst others, Rousseau, op. cit., 91, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 92 
and Grazier et. al., op. cit., 175.
94 Translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 245.
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principles particularly necessary to our time and principles of constitutional 
value. Although the Constitution was silent as to the legal value of the 
Preamble and despite the clear evidence that its drafters did not intend it to 
have binding force, the Cc has granted it constitutional value, thus resolving 
the traditional uncertainty that was noted above. This activism has been 
defended and supported by theorists.95
The Cc is granted the jurisdiction to review statutes by reason of art.61(2) of 
the Constitution. It may only be seized under certain conditions. Essentially, 
only the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the 
National Assembly and the Senate, or sixty deputies or senators can ask the 
Cc to review a lo i. Such review can also only be requested before 
promulgation.96 Constitutional review is therefore a priori and is initiated by 
highly political actors. It is generally seen as part of the législatif process.97 The
95 Gicquel, op. cit., 112, stresses that given the silence of the Preamble, the Cc's decision was 
activist;
'Il n'est pas indifférent, à ce propos d'indiquer que si, à la différence de la constitution de 1946 
(art.92), celle de 1958 n'excluait pas le préambule du champ d'intervention du contrôle de 
constitutionnalité, elle ne le proclamait pas, pour autant. Ce n'est qu'au terme d'une autre 
démarche volontariste que le Conseil parviendra à ce résultat...'.
The extent of this activism becomes clear when reference is made to the traveaux préparatoires 
of the constitution, in which the Cc was intended to protect the executive's regulatory power 
from being encroached upon by parliament and where it is made clear that the Preamble did 
not have constitutional value (c.f. Stone, op. cit., 49 and Bell, op. cit., 64).
The Fifth Republic had seen the continuation of the debate as to the legal value, if any, of 
human rights (see, Robert & Duffar, op. it., 90-2 & 113-4) but with the Cc's 1971 decision (see, 
infra.), theorists were quick to support the Cc's activism (see Stone, op. cit., 95 & 103-4). 
Rousseau, op. cit., 29 provides a typical example of the way theorists have justified the Cc's 
activism;
'...la Constitution de 1958 n'interdit à aucun moment la possibilité pour le Conseil de se 
référer au préamble et la déclaration de 1789, à la différence de la Constitution de 1946 qui, 
elle, excluait expressément, au dernier alinéa de l'article 92, tout contrôle de la loi au regard 
du préambule. De cette non-interdiction et de cette différence, il est donc permis de déduire, 
sans forcer le trait, que le texte ne condamnait pas la possibilité d'un contrôle de la loi au-delà 
des seules règles de compétence et de procédure...'
(c.f. Grazier et. ai, op. dt„ 175).
96 Art.61 (2), states;
’..lois may be referred to the Conseil constitutionnel, before they are promulgated, by the 
President of the Republic....' etc.
(translation taken from Bell, op. dt., 258).
97 Stone, op. at., 8, states;
’...the Council rules only on the constitutionality of bills which have been definitively adopted 
by parliament but not yet promulgated by the executive. Legislation may not be challenged 
by private citizens, nor can legal controversies percolate up to the Council through the 
judicial system. The control is thus a priori and abstract...' 
and
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Cc cannot review statutes of its own volition, neither can it generally review 
existing laws.98 At the same time, because an entire statute is referred, the Cc 
may review other aspects of the proposed statute that have not been 
referred.99 If a loi is declared to be in violation of the human rights protected 
in the bloc de constitutionnalité, it may neither be promulgated nor applied 
by any administrative or judicial authorities.100 Thus, human rights must be 
respected by all state organs and the Conseil d'État and the Cour de Cassation 
must follow the Cc's decisions.101
The first occasion upon which the Cc struck down a statute because it 
violated a civil liberty was in its 1971 decision concerning the liberty of 
association. In this case, it struck down a loi on the ground that it violated the 
PFRLR.102 It has subsequently upheld a wide variety of human rights by
'As a matter of from, each Council decision necessarily constitutes the final, substantive stage 
of the policy-making process, and is itself an integral part of a referred bill's legislative 
history.'
(c.f. pgs.108-9 and Rousseau, op. cit., 65 et. seq., & 69-71).
98 Art.61 clearly states that review can only occur before promulgation. This position was 
upheld by the Cc in its 1978 decision concerning radio and television monopolies (No.78-96 
DC 27th July, Rec.29). However, as a result of an obiter dictum in a case concerning the state 
of emergency in New Caledonia (No.85-187 DC, Rec.43 at 45), the Cc claimed that it had 
jurisdiction to review the constitutional conformity of an existing (i.e. already promulgated) 
statute in three different situations. Firstly, when the statute, for which it had been seized, 
modifies a previous statute. Secondly, when it affects or thirdly, completes the scope of 
application (the domain) of a prior statute.
Nevertheless, such review is excluded if the statute to be reviewed merely applies an existing 
loi (c.f. Rousseau, op. cit., 176 et. seq. & Bell, op. dt., 33).
99 See, Duhamel, op. cit., 320 and Bell, op. dt., 53.
*0° Art.62 states;
'A provision that has been declared unconstitutional may neither be promulgated nor 
applied. Decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel bind public powers and all administrative 
and judicial authorities.'
(Translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 258).
101 For the case law of the Conseil d'État and Cour de Cassation on this subject, see Ledercq,
op. dt., 154, Robert & Duffar, op. dt., 119 and see C.E. 12th Dec. 1969 Conseil national de
l'ordre des pharmaciens. Rec.436. However, Stone, op. dt., 99, notes;
"By most accounts, the traditional rule according to which the Conseil d'État is bound by the 
effects of a Council decision but not by its argumentation, has not broken down. The cases 
cited in support of the contrary conclusion, however, show (to my reading at least) only that 
the Conseil d'État agrees with the Council's interpretation, not that it feels obliged to agree...'.
102 No.71-44 DC 16th July 1971, Rec.29 (the background to the case can be found in J. Rivero, 
'Le Conseil constitutionnel et les libertés' (1984), 9-24, Rousseau, op. dt., 58-61, Bell, op. dt., 
149-151 and Hayward, op. cit., 139-41). The Cc stated, inter alia;
'Considering that, among the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic 
and solemnly reaffirmed by the Constitution, is to be found the freedom of association; that 
this principle underlies the general provisions of the loi of 1 July 1901; that, by virtue of this 
principle, associations may be formed freely and can be registered simply on the condition of
(Footnote continues on next page)
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reference to other texts in the bloc de constitutionnalite103 and it has been 
noted that the Cc has even expanded the bloc, principally by reference to 
constitutional principles.104 Despite severe criticisms from politicians in 
response to certain decisions concerning highly politically charged legislation, 
the Cc has generally become accepted by the academic community and the 
general public.105
At first glance, the Cc's method of protection appears as a direct challenge to 
the tradition of the sovereignty of law. However, there are important 
continuities as regards tradition. The original role that was accorded to the Cc 
can be seen as continuing the 'Bonapartist'106 tradition within the dominant 
tradition of public law, which emphasises the role of the executive branch. 
According to this tradition, parliament is seen as a source of instability which 
must be rationalised' by being brought under the control of the executive.
the deposition of a prior declaration; that, thus with the exception of measures that may be 
taken against certain types of association, the validity of the creation of an association cannot 
be subordinated to the prior intervention of an administrative or judicial authority, even 
where the association appears to be invalid or to have an illegal purpose.’
The Conseil d'État had previously declared the liberty to associate a general principle of law 
under the Fourth Republic (Amicale des Annamites de Paris, supra., and c.f. Stone, op. cit., 69) 
and the Cc is widely seen to have been inspired by the Conseil d'État's jurisprudence (c.f. 
Rousseau, op. cit., 59-60). However, the importance of the Cc's decision was that it 
subordinated prospective legislation to a requirement that civil liberties must be protected; 
'...pour la première fois en France, le principe de la suprématie de la Constitution par rapport 
à la loi trouve la sanction juridictionnelle qui le fait passer de la théorie à la réalité. Pour la 
première fois en France, un acte voté par le Parlement se voit privé de sa force par une 
juridiction. Pour la première fois en France, la nécessité de protéger les libertés contre la loi 
est reconnue, et se traduit en acte.'
(Rivero, (1984), op. cit., 13-4).
103 por an analysis of this case law, see Rivero, (1984), op. cit., Bell, op. cit., 138-98 and L. 
Favoreu, 'Les libertés protégées par le Conseil constitutionnel1 in Rousseau & Sudre, op. cit.,
33 and for lists of the protected liberties, see Gicquel, op. cit., 113-4, Leclercq, op. cit., 145-7 and 
Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 117-8.
104 The Cc has had recourse, variously, to 'principes, dispositions ou règles à valeur 
constitutionnelle’, 'objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle' and 'd'exigence constitutionelle', 
Rousseau, op. cit., 97 daims;
'Ces différentes expressions soulèvent un problème autrement plus difficile que celui posé 
par les P.F.R.L.R. Elles permettent en effet au Conseil d'opposer au législateur des principes 
qui n'ont pas été, en tant que tels, affirmés par le Constituant, s'octroyant ainsi un pouvoir de 
création de textes constitutionnels.'
105 See, Stone, op. cit., 53 & 80-91. He also notes in chapter 4, how theorists, whilst initially
hostile towards the Cc, have, since the 1971 decision, rallied to its support. Duhamel, op. cit., 
310, quotes a SOFRES opinion poll from 1983, in which 80% of the French population 
supported the Cc's role of ensuring the constitutional regularity of statutes.
106 It will be recalled that this term is adopted by Stone, op. cit., supra.
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Constitutional review under this tradition is carried out by a political organ 
that is under the executive's control.107
The Cc, and indeed the 1958 Constitution, were a response to the problem of 
parliamentary instability that had dominated and eventually led to the fall of 
the Third and Fourth Republics. By the end of the Fourth Republic, 
parliamentarianism had fallen into disrepute.108 Thus, the Fifth Republic's 
constitution sought to 'rationalise' parliament by shifting the balance of power 
towards the executive. It was noted above, how, by virtue of arts.34 and 37,109 
the constituents introduced the novel feature of attributing specific legislative
In two periods of French post-Revolutionary history, such control was attempted but 
these bodies had little or no independence from the dictates of the executive; constitutional 
review thus fell into disrepute (Rousseau, op. cit., 12 and Bell, op. cit., 21; as already noted, 
these t\yo occasions were 1799-1814 and 1852-75). The political institutions that were set up 
during these periods form part of what Stone (op. cit., 30-1) terms the Tkmapartist' tradition. 
That the Cc was seen as continuing this tradition has been noted by Rousseau, op. cit., 12; 
'Chaque fois qu'un mécanisme quelconque de contrôle était proposé, le souvenir de la faillite 
des Sénats impériaux était invoqué pour faire condamner l'initiative.'
Before 1971, theorists were overwhelmingly critical of the Cc. They dismissed it as a largely 
partisan, executive-dominated institution. It was compared unfavourably with the ideal of 
independent judicial review on the United States model (Stone, op. cit., chp.4). These 
criticisms were supported by an analysis of the case law between 1958-71, in which the Cc 
was more concerned with policing the boundaries between the legislature and the executive 
and invariably decided in favour of the latter (Stone, op. cit., 60-6 and Rousseau, op. cit., 57-8
& 60).
!08 Beii( op àt., 11, observes;
'Like the Third Republic, the Fourth was a parliamentary regime, with real power lying in the 
Assemblies, which chose the President, and to whom the Government was responsible, and 
upon whose support it relied. Again like the Third Republic, the institutions chosen 
produced a significant degree of governmental instability, which brought the politicians into 
disrepute and failed to create the consensus necessary to maintain the system in crisis.’
109 yhe reduced competence of parliament to that of guaranteeing civil liberties, leaves intact 
a choice which theorists traditionally claim is open to parliament. Accordingly, parliament is 
free to decide to place a civil liberty in either a repressive or preventative statutory 
framework (Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 95 et. seq. and Colliard, op. cit., 120 et. seq.). Robert & 
Duffar, op. cit., 96 have described the repressive regime as being;
'...quand le législateur laisse le citoyen libre d'agir selon ses propres désirs, quitte à l’obliger à 
subir les conséquences de ses actes s'ils s'avèrent contraires au droit. L'individu n'a point à 
demander à quiconque l'autorisation d'exercer sa propre liberté mais le mauvais usage qu’il 
peut en faire l’expose à des sanctions ou à l'obligation de réparer les dommages causés. Le 
régime répressif est un "régime de droit " par la primauté qu'il accorde aux droits individuels.' 
This is contrasted with the 'régime préventif as being
'...quand l'autorité publique impose préventivement des obligations aux individus, de 
manière à empêcher le fait ou l'acte contraire au droit. L'individu ne peut exercer ses libertés 
qu'après avoir accompli une formalité préalable. Le régime préventif est un "régime de 
police" par la place qu’il fait à la réglementation.’
For a discussion of the case law concerning the parliamentary and executive regulation of 
civil liberties under arts.34 and 37, see Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 101 et. seq.
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competence to parliament, whilst the executive enjoyed general competence. 
In this context of a desired weakening of parliament's role, the Cc was created 
in order to police the boundaries between statutes and regulations (i.e. 
between parliament and the executive) but with the balance of power in 
favour of the executive.110 This intention is clear from its composition.111 In 
addition, the Cc operates in political space and consequently was, to a certain 
extent, intended to constitute a continuation with the tradition of executive 
dominance. It was never intended that lois should be subordinated to the 
human rights in the Preamble, but rather that the Cc should merely uphold 
the constitutional provisions that limited and controlled parliamentary 
procedure112 and its competence. In short, it was an institution that was 
intended to rationalise parliament.
However, in spite of its departure from its intended purpose by virtue of its 
case law on the protection of human rights, the Cc remains a highly political 
body113 and permits the continued existence of parliamentary sovereignty,
See, Rousseau, op. cit., 23, Duhamel, op. cit., 308, Braud, op. cit., 291 et. seq., Stone, op. cit., 
46-59 and Bell, op. cit., 27 who notes;
'As originally conceived, the Conseil constitutionnel was not to be a radical departure from 
what had gone before in terms of institutional competence. The essential difference was the 
new view of parliamentary sovereignty as limited by the role accorded to the executive. The 
Conseil was merely one institutional mechanism to ensure that this new function of 
Parliament was adhered to.'
H I The Cc has nine members, renewable by one third every three years. The members are 
nominated in rotation by the Presidents of the Republic, the National Assembly and the 
Senate (cf. art56, Rousseau, op. cit., 37 et. seq., Bell, op. cit., 34-41 and Stone, op. cit., 50-3).
112 gee art.61(l) and Bell, op. cit., 31-2;
The scrutiny of parliamentary standing orders is justified by the desire that Parliament does not 
overstep the boundaries set out for it in the Constitution. If Parliament were to adopt 
procedures that blocked the dominance of the executive, this could clearly upset the new 
arrangements of 1958.'
(cf. Stone, op. cit., 4!7 and Rousseau, op. cit., 24-5).
113 Rousseau, op. cit., 47 et. seq., notes the existence of a debate as to whether the Cc is a 
'juridiction' or a political organ. He feels this debated can be reduced to the question, does 
the Cc create or apply law? If it performs the former function, it is a political organ. The 
disagreement is claimed to reflect a struggle between lawyers and political theorists for 
control over the constitutional domain (pgs.52-3).
Stone, op. cit., 96-7, also mentions this debate but claims that since the late 1970's there has 
been a consensus amongst theorists that the Cc is a 'juridiction';
'According to this paradigm, all juridictions must conform to certain minimal criteria (as 
easily recognised by common lawyers). Juridictions are (1) composed of judges who are (2) 
primarily engaged in settling disputes brought by (3) real-life litigants who (4) argue a 
concrete case or controversy before them according to (5) fixed, contradictory judicial 
procedures.’ (pg.96).
French theorists abandoned their traditional hostility to the Cc and began to argue that it was 
a 'juridiction' by relaxing the criteria of the paradigm;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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thus it constitutes a certain continuation with tradition. Parliamentary 
sovereignty can still be said to exist by reason of the fact that the Cc may only 
review statutes before they become real /ois.114 Before promulgation, they 
remain incomplete and thus divested of the sovereignty enjoyed by 
statutes.115 In addition, the Cc does not have the competence to review 
statutes that have been previous passed and consequently, these still enjoy a 
superior position in the legal hierarchy.116
Present arrangements in France show how human rights may be protected 
against the legislature in a political forum in which political struggle and 
debate take place. The importance and inevitability of philosophical and 
political disagreement concerning human rights was pointed to in chapter I. It 
was claimed that human rights involved controversial decisions and that 
given this controversy, a Bill of Rights would not only fix certain choices but, 
if were enforced by the judiciary, it would exclude citizens from making and 
participating in such choices. A central aspect of the conception of civil 
liberties that was proposed was that they should be seen as contingent 
categories that could be used in a pragmatic manner to achieve reform and 
challenge existing configurations of power. The Cc would appear to be a 
political body that by its composition at least clearly reflects the political will 
of the political representatives of citizens. Furthermore, the procedure for 
bringing cases before it allows political actors to decide which pieces of 
legislation should be subject to review. The review that takes place also 
accords respect for political choice by only concerning legislation that has not
'A constitutional juridiction came to specify any institution charged with the power to 
determine, in a definitive manner, the content and applicability of constitutional law.' (pg.96). 
This claim is not without its problems (Stone, op. cit., 97) but what is of concern here is to 
emphasise that the Cc is an institution that permits considerations of a highly political nature. 
As a result, civil liberties are protected by reason of political struggle and debate, as 
manifested in a contested legislative process in which the Cc constitutes the final stage.
This procedure makes the Cc a unique institution as far as constitutional and supreme 
courts that review legislation as against constitutionally protected human rights are 
concerned, see L. Favoreu (éd.), 'Cours constitutionnelles européennes et droits 
fondamentaux' (1982).
H ^The same point is made by Stone, op. cit., 8 as regards what he refers to as the 
'constitutional orthodoxy' of the supremacy of law;
'The constitution of the Fifth Republic does not undermine this constitutional orthodoxy, at 
least not technically. Once promulgated, a law may not be challenged or made subject to any 
jurisdictional control other than that of parliament itself.’
116 However, this is now subject to the case law that was noted above, supra., n.92.
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yet been promulgated. Human rights are not always upheld117 but the 
question of the protection of human rights becomes a part of political debate 
and controversy. This in turn means that human rights are contingent on 
political pressure and forces but as the same time they are recognised as 
values. Essentially, the benefits of the French approach to protecting human 
rights against parliamentary sovereignty are that it provides for the continued 
role of political mechanisms, which it has been argued not only fit the 
constitutional arrangements in England but are also justified by the 
jurisprudential theory formulated in this study.
It is not suggested that the French system of constitutional protection be 
simply 'transplanted'118 wholesale into the UK. Firstly, constitutional review 
in France is dynamic and as a result, far-reaching reforms are currently under 
discussion.119 Secondly, certain aspects may need to be altered before they 
can be adopted in England. Thirdly, the Cc draws inspiration for its decisions 
from a series of texts and sources, a similar institution in England would 
require similar texts upon which it could rely and the question that is then 
raised is whether this should be a home-grown and specially drafted 
document or one that already exists, like the ECHR for example. These issues 
are subjects of further discussion, but what is submitted to be of importance 
here, is the possibility of protecting human rights via political control, a 
control that it is claimed is peculiarly suited to the 'political' conception of
117 Human rights must compete against other considerations and with each other, for 
example, a liberty may be restricted when an 'objective of constitutional value’ needs to be 
pursued, e.g. public order (and respect for the freedom of others) (c.f. No.82-141 DC 27th July 
1982 Audio Visual Law. Rec.48).
118 Watson, op. cit.
119 For example, at the moment a proposal to increase the scope of constitutional review is 
under discussion, so that when a point concerning the constitutionality of a statute is raised 
in litigation, it may be referred to the Cc; see L. Favoreu, 'L'élargissement de la saisine du 
Conseil constitutionnel aux juridictions administratives et judiciaires'. R.D.P. 4 [1990] 581 
(and other essays in this issue), 'Le retour des mvthes'. Le Monde, 11th Aug. 1989,6, J. Robert, 
'La protection des droits fondamentaux et le juge constitutionnel français: bilan et réformes'. 
R.D.P. (1990), 1255, F. Luchaire, 'Le contrôle de la loi promulguée sur renvoi des juridictions: 
une réforme constitutionnelle différée'. R.D.P. 106 (1990), 1625, B. du Granut, 'Faut-il accorder 
aux citoyens le droit de saisir le Conseil constitutionnel?'. R.D.P. 106 (1990), 309 and the 
Comité consultatif pour la révision de la Constitution, présidé par le doyen Georges Vedel, 
'Rapport au Président de la République: propositions pour une révision de la Constitution. 15 
Février 1993' (1993), 76-7. More generally the dynamism of French civil liberties is also 
illustrated by the calls for reform- even to the extent of the enactment of a new Bill of Rights; 
see for example, the propositions for a Bill of Rights made by the Gaullists, Socialist and 
Communist parties in 1975 (Nat. Assem. #2080 17th Dec., #2131 20th Dec. and #2128 20th 
Dec., respectively)
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human rights earlier proposed in this study. A comparison with France, given 
the similarity of its constitutional traditions with those of England, points to 
interesting ways of achieving reform beyond simply enacting a Bill of Rights.
The administrative courts120
When the acts of the administration violate civil liberties, the administrative 
courts have sole jurisdiction to strike down these acts. The effect of such a 
decision is that the act is void ab initio.. In what follows, the main aspects of 
the protection of human rights by the administrative courts will be set out.
As will be shortly seen, the administrative courts protect human rights in 
conjunction with the ordinary courts121 but here attention will be focused on 
the administrative courts. The administrative judge has competence to review 
a wide range of administrative acts,122 except when there is a flagrant 
irregularity (this is known as a 'voie de fait', from herein the French term will 
be retained).123 It must be underlined that the administrative courts remain
!20  For introductions to French administrative law and the courts, see L. Neville Brown & J.S. 
Bell, 'French Administrative Law' (1993), R. Chapus, 'Droit du contentieux administratif 
(1990), C. Dadomo & S. Farran, The French Legal System' (1993), 87-104 and O. Khan-Freund, 
C. Lévy & B. Rudden, 'A Source-Book on French Law: Public law: Constitutional and 
Administrative law: Private Law: Structure, Contract' (1991), 119-204.
121 Ordinary judges were excluded from reviewing administrative decisions by the 
Revolutionary Law of 16th & 24th Aug. 1790. Title II, art.13, concerning the organisation of 
the judiciary (c.f. Décret of 16 Fructidor, an III (23rd Aug. 1795) and so the 'duality' of the 
French legal order dates from this time (Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 243 et. seq.). This separation has 
been partially upheld by the Ce as a PFRLR in No.86-224 DC of 23rd Jan 1987 Competition 
Law. Rec.8 and more recently in No.89-261 DC 28th July 1989 Entry and Residence of
122 gee, Neville Brown, op. cit., 153 et seq., Chapus, op. cit., 308-47, J. Rivero, 'Droit 
administratif. (1990), op. cit., 113-23 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 150. The administrative 
courts can also review the autonomous regulations made under art.37 and the ordonnances 
made under art.38. Under the former, regulations are made independently of legislation, in the 
sense that the administration does not derive its regulatory power from an authorising 
statute. By virtue of art.38, the executive may legislate for a temporary period in what is 
normally the statutory domain (set out in art.34) via ordonnances. Both arts.37 and 38 are 
examples of the 'rationalisation' of parliament that was earlier noted but despite the 
importance and position accorded to regulatory power, regulations still find themselves 
submitted to control by the administrative courts.
!23 The term 'flagrant irregularity' is taken from Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 135;
'In the administrative context it indicates some irregularity on the part of administration 
which is so flagrant and gross that it cannot be regarded as an administrative act at all but is 
treated as if it were the act of a private body, thereby losing the privilege of being adjudicated 
upon by the administrative court and falling within the cognizance of the ordinary courts.'
(c.f. Robert & Duffar, op. dt., 8-10 & 146).
Aside from the requirement of a serious irregularity, a voie de fait is only made out if there 
has been a violation of a civil liberty, as is stated by Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 136;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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incompetent to review statutes, although recent developments may have 
made significant inroads into this traditional position.124
Civil liberties are normally protected by the action for excès de pouvoir, 
which is an action for judicial review of administrative action.125 Interested 
parties can bring this action in order to have an administrative act struck 
down.126 The effect of such a decision is that the measure will be declared to
'...the irregularity in question must have infringed some fundamental right of the individual, 
such as liberty of the person, sanctity or property, or inviolability of the home.' (c.f. Rivero, 
(1978), op. cit., 27).
Similarly, if an act is carried out by an administrative agent but this act is classified as a 'faute 
personelle' (where the civil servant is liable personally and so administrative liability for his 
actions is not found to exist), the administrative courts are incompetent to review the act.
124 The principle of the non-constitutional review of statutes was laid down in Arrighi op. 
cit.. This decision laid down (1) that where there was no statute between the administrative 
act and the constitutional text, the administrative courts could review the constitutionality of 
the act but where (2) the statute was the origin of an administrative act, the administrative 
courts could not engage in constitutional review, otherwise this could lead to the review of an 
administrative act that was contrary to the constitution but in conformity with statute. This 
result would in effect institute an indirect constitutional review by the administrative courts, 
which would constitute a breach of tradition (Rousseau, op. cit., 182). Therefore, this decision 
laid down the principle of the 'loi-ecran'; the presence of a statute constituted a 'screen' 
making constitutional review impossible.
However, this principle and that of the non-constitutional review of law was considerably 
weakened by Nicolo. supra., in which the Conseil d'État reviewed a statute against an 
international treaty. This statute had been passed after the Treaty of Rome (art.227(1)), which 
was the international treaty in question in the case. Despite the existence of a statute, the 
Conseil d'État held that its constitutionality could be reviewed. This decision has been widely 
seen as the Conseil d'État upholding the hierarchy of legal norms that is partially set out by 
art.55 of the Constitution (granting treaty law a higher status than statute), see, M. Long, et. 
al. op. cit., 742. It has also been interpreted as an application of indirect constitutional review. 
It is argued, that in reviewing the statute in question against a treaty, the court is applying 
art55 of the constitution and ensuring that it is respected by the legislature (Rousseau, op. cit., 
184 and Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 269).
125 This action forms part of what is called 'Le contentieux de l'annulation' (litigation for 
annulment) but is but one of many forms of action that can be brought before the 
administrative courts (c.f. Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 168-71 and Chapus, op. cit., 117-40). 
All the actions that constitute the contentieux de l'annulation are initiated by individuals 
seeking to have administrative acts quashed by reason of their illegality.
126 pOT details of locus standi and the conditions precedent before the action can be brought, 
see Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., chp.7. As a consequence of local authority reforms, it is not 
only individual citizens but representatives of central government at a local level who can 
also bring actions for excès de pouvoir, should civil liberties be in danger of being violated by 
the local administrative authorities. Thus, the existence of the déféré préfectoral which was 
introduced by the decentralisation reforms of 1982 (Law n.82-213,2nd March, art.3) abolished 
préfectoral 'tutelle' and replaced it with administrative tutelle. As a result, the prefect lost 
his/her a priori supervisory powers over local authority decisions but under the new system, 
he /she could apply an a posteriori control. A local authority is now obliged to transmit its 
decisions to the prefect who can decide to refer them to the administrative courts, should 
he/she consider that, inter alia, they violate human rights (c.f. Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 523-29).
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have never existed. The particular type of illegality of an act (cas d'annulation 
or cas d'ouverture) can be broken down according to whether it concerns 
external or internal legality. External legality refers to the legal basis of the 
decision, i.e. that its author did not have the legal power to so decide, or that 
he/she has not followed the correct procedure. On the other hand, internal 
illegality concerns the purposive elements of a decision, i.e. has the author of 
a decision used his/her administrative authority for purposes outside of 
those for which it was granted, or have they acted on the basis of illegal 
motives.127
The administrative courts will review administrative decisions with varying 
degrees of scrutiny, according to such factors as the interests of the 
individuals affected and the public interest. Two factors that are of 
importance are whether a civil liberty is involved and further, whether it is 
protected by statute.128 Therefore, if parliament has not passed a statute to
127 The division between external and internal illegality conforms to the classic distinction 
employed by theorists (although it is not referred to in the judgements of the courts). 
Accordingly, external illegality consists of 'l'incompétence' (acting without authority) and 'vice 
forme' (a form of procedural ultra vires). Internal illegality consists of 'détournement de pouvoir' 
(it looks to the motives of the dedsion-maker and claims that he /she exerdsed powers for 
objects other than for which they were conferred) and 'violation de la lor (this concerns the 
content of the act: does it conform to the legal conditions imposed on administrative actions), 
(c.f. Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 313-30 and Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 223-35).
Worthy of note is the doctrine of 'inexistence' (N.B. Chapus, op. cit., 121, refers to it as a 
separate form of action within 'le contentieux d'annulation'). This doctrine can be applied by 
both the administrative and ordinary courts, where the latter finds itself faced with a point 
that concerns administrative liability. Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 225, describe the doctrine 
in the following terms;
’Inexistence assumes that the judge has gone so far as to doubt whether the administration has 
really taken any dedsion for him to review: the illegality is so gross and flagrant as to amount 
to the administration's acting completely outside its jurisdiction. The administration has 
virtually behaved as an outlaw and deserves no consideration from the judge.'
Acts of this nature are considered as voie de faits and so can be dealt with in the ordinary 
courts. The doctrine is seldom used, given the existence of other grounds of illegality which 
are normally suffident to ground an action.
128 J. Bell, 'The Expansion of ludicial Review Over Discretionary Powers in France' P.L. 
[1986] 99,106, talks of the existence of a 'sliding scale' of judidal review;
"What one seeks is, thus, a kind of sliding scale of intensity of review depending on a number 
of variables looking both to the public interest and to the interests of individuals affected by 
the dedsion, as well as to the respective competences of the administrator and judge.'
He contrasts this with a tripartite division between minimum, normal and maximum control. 
However, where a civil liberty is present, it is claimed that the courts exercise maximum 
control (c.f. Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 250, n.50).
Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 151 et. seq., claims that
'...lorsqu'il s'agit d’une liberté publique, il n'y a plus de pouvoir discrétionnaire reconnu à 
l'Administration.'
(Footnote continues on next page)
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protect a liberty, the executive is accorded a wider scope of action as far as its 
regulation. This means that other interests, such as public order, may enjoy 
greater weight.129 On the other hand, when parliament has intervened, the 
administration is prohibited from regulating the liberty in such a manner that 
it would have the affect of reversing the statute.130 Although the case law and 
theories of administrative law are not of direct interest here, it is important to 
note the plurality of considerations involved in the decisions of the courts and 
the varying degrees of protection that may be accorded as a result.
The action for judicial review has recently been supplemented by what is 
termed the 'déféré prefectoral'. This system was introduced in 1982 by virtue 
of Law no. 82-213 of 2nd March 1982, art.2(II)131 as part of the Socialist
By this they mean that the administrative courts have assumed the power to review the 
correctness of the facts upon whose basis a decision was taken, the reasons, the 
proportionality of restrictions and the appropriateness of the act, given the legitimacy of the 
object to be pursued (c.f. Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 237-50).
Therefore, in these exceptional circumstances, less judicial scrutiny will be exercised (see, 
Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 150-1).
130 Colliard's observation (op. cit., 120) can be taken as an illustration of this point;
T)ans le mesure où la liberté atteinte est une liberté garantie par la loi, il n'appartient point au 
règlement de la supprimer, mais si la loi est muette, les pouvoirs de l'autorité de police 
deviennent plus importants.'
An important administrative authority in this context is the police. Burdeau, op. cit., 43 et. seq. 
observes that the existence of a statute limits the police scope of action, in that, as part of the 
administration, they can only regulate the exercise of the human right in question. Any 
decision going beyond this would constitute grounds for an action for excès de pouvoir. The 
police enjoy an autonomous regulatory power (i.e. one not derived from an authorising 
statute) and so can regulate civil liberties without being specifically authorised. Once again, 
however, this power is limited by the intervention of parliament. It should be noted that even 
in the absence of statute, this regulatory power will still be subject to limits imposed by the 
administrative courts, albeit of a more liberal nature than would have been the case had 
parliament intervened.
Burdeau, op. cit., 45-8, claims that this control is guided by two principles. Firstly, police 
powers are to be limited to the fundamental purpose of the police which is to keep good order, 
Toute mesure qui ne peut se reclamer de la tranquillité, de la sécurité ou de la salubrité 
publique est donc, en principe, irrégulière, car si les libertés peuvent être limitées dans leur 
exercice, ce ne doit être qu'en considération d'un intérêt au moins égal à celui que présente le 
respect de leur intégrité. Il s'ensuit que, si plusieurs mesures sont possibles, l'Administration 
doit choisir celle qui affecte le moins la liberté de l'individu.' (pg.44-5).
(It will be noted that this view seems to indicate that public order is constituted by human 
rights, i.e. an expansive view of civil liberty, see chapter IV, infra.).
Secondly, although there is wide scope for regulation, police powers are not permitted to 
completely repress the exercise of civil liberties. The extent of police powers is inverse to the 
legal status of the civil liberty in question, so that when there is statutory protection, 
regulatory power is more limited.
131 As amended by Law no. 83-8 of 7th lune 1983. art.65 and Law no. 84-53 of 26th lan. 1984, 
art.113-1.
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reforms aimed at devolving greater powers to the local elected authorities.132 
It lays down a procedure whereby the departmental prefect has the right to 
request an interim injunction to suspend what he/she considers to be an 
illegal act and also lays down an emergency expedited procedure as far as 
civil liberties are concerned.
More precisely, this article sets out a series of local authority acts which the 
local authority is obliged to transmit to the representative of the state at local 
level (the prefect). These include decisions by the police authorities;
Les décisions réglementaires et individuelles prises par le maire dans l'exercice de son 
pouvoir de police.
By virtue of art.3, the prefect can refer these acts to an administrative tribunal, 
within two months of their being transmitted to him/her and a request for an 
interim injunction can be attached to such a reference.
If the administrative tribunal considers that an administrative act that is 
referred to it is likely to 'compromise' the exercise of a civil or individual 
liberty, it must grant an interim injunction, suspending the decision within 
forty-eight hours.133 An appeal can be made from the tribunal's decision to 
the Conseil d'État within fifteen days of the decision's notification and, in 
turn, this appeal must be disposed of within forty-eight hours. It should be 
noted that according to the terms of art.3, the decision to grant injunctive 
relief does not depend on the fulfilment of the same conditions set out as 
regards other decisions that the prefect can refer to a tribunal, so that in the 
case of the compromise of a civil liberty, the injunction is mandatory once the 
likelihood of its infringement is shown. Another advantage for civil liberties 
under this new framework is that of speed. The obligation to decide the 
matter in forty-eight hours is an improvement on the two to three months 
required as far as ordinary injunctions. The individual can request the prefect
132 See generally V. Wright, The Government and Politics of France' (1990), 294 et. seq., S. 
Mazey, 'Paris Outside Paris', in P. Hall, J. Hayward & H. Machin, (eds.) T>evelopments in 
French Politics1 (1990), 157 and the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, No.82-137 DC of 
25th Feb. 1982. Rec.1982.38.
133 Art.3 reads, inter alia;
'Lorsque l'acte attaqué est de nature à compromettre l'exercice d'une liberté publique ou 
individuelle, le président du tribunal administratif ou un membre du tribunal délégué à cet 
effet prononce le sursis dans les quarante-huit heures.'
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to refer a local authority decision or request the prefect to seek an interim 
injunction, without prejudice to his/her own rights to bring an action for 
judicial review.134
This reform is an improvement on the normal procedure for an interim 
injunction in the administrative courts.135 The normal order is discretionary 
and exceptional136 and two general conditions have to be met before the 
administrative court is able to exercise its discretion. Firstly, the 
administrative decision in question must be likely to lead to a loss to the 
applicant that is of such a nature that it will be difficult to compensate. 
Secondly, the facts alleged must be serious and capable of being struck down 
by the court. Aside from these two conditions, the Conseil has developed a 
number of principles; one of which is that an interim injunction may only be 
granted to preserve the legal position of the applicant before the 
administrative decision is taken.
Aside from these obstacles, the grant of an interim injunction can take 
between two and three months at the fastest.137 Therefore the déféré
134 See M. Courtin, Tribunaux administratifs: procédure d'urgence, demande de sursis à 
exécution' J.-Cl. (Admin), (1990), Fasc. 635-2, 5,14, Rivero, (1990), 526-9 and D. Chabanol, 'Un 
renouveau du sursis à exécution?'. Gaz.Pal. 1985.1.doctr.87. It should also benoted that by 
virtue of art.3, reports are laid before the national assembly detailing the number and kind of 
references that are made each year, entitled 'Rapport du Gouvernement au Parlement sur le 
contrôle a posteriori des actes des collectivités locales et des établissements publics locaux 
établi en application des dispositions de la loi no.82-213 du 2 mars 1982 modifiée relative aux 
droits et libertés des communes, des départements et des répons' and for a recent assessment 
of these reforms, see TDécentralisation. bilan et perspectives' A.J.D.A., numéro spécial, 20th 
April (1992).
135 An interim injunction in French law is known as a 'sursis à exécution'. Recently (by virtue 
of the Decree no.88-907 of 2nd Sept. 1988) the adminsitrative courts have been granted the 
competence to grant the emergency remedy known as the 'référé'. This allows the President 
of one of the various levels of administrative courts to grant an interim order containing such 
measures necessary as to
'...to put an end to a plainly unlawful situation other than by a stay of execution of the 
administrative decision...or by issuing orders to the administration (but he may issue orders, 
"vue l'urgence", to private individuals).'
Neville-Brown & Bell, op. cit., 117. However, because these remedies have been noted to have 
been used only with some reticence by the administrative courts (Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 281), 
attention will focus on the interim injunctions and the déféré préfectoral, which are likely to 
have a greater impact on human rights.
136 See Decree no53-934 of 30th Sept. 1953. art.9 and see generally, Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 
278-81 and J.J. Gleizal, 'Le sursis à exécution des décisions administratives - théorie et 
politique iurisprudentielle’ A.J.D.A., 1975381.
137 J-R. Etchegaray, 'Limites du sursis à exécution, Gaz.Pal. 1985.1.doctr.87,89.
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préfectoral can provide a more speedy remedy that is all the more valuable as 
far as human rights are concerned.
Having laid out in structural form some of the procedures generally used to 
protect human rights against the administration, attention will now be turned 
to issues of substance as regards the most widely used procedure - judicial 
review of administrative action. The administrative courts have generally 
struck down administrative decisions on the basis of the principle of légalité 
via the elaboration of the general principles of law. Under the Fifth Republic, 
the Conseil d'État has expanded the sources from which they have derived 
the general principles and secondly, they have granted some of them 
constitutional status.138 The general principles provide the substantive 
criterion by which a decision to annul an administrative decisions for excès de 
pouvoir is taken.139
It has been noted that there is a symbiotic relationship between the principles 
and the human rights contained in the 1789 Declaration. Therefore, it is said 
that the principles have permitted the legal application of the human rights, 
while the legitimacy and importance of human rights has granted a high
138 jt was noted that it was first stated that a general principle of law might have 
constitutional value by the Commissaire du Gouvernement Fournier, in Syndicat général des 
ingénieurs-conseils, supra, n.62, (ci. Grazier et. ai, op. cit., 161 and C.E. 12th Feb. 1960 Société 
Ekv. Rec.101). Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 91 suggests that this development was in response to 
the creation of autonomous regulations by virtue of art37 of the Constitution. These were not 
subordinate to the law and so it was not possible to use the general principles of law, which 
only had legislative status, to override them. Thus, the importance of granting of 
constitutional value to certain general principles of law. However, he feels, op. cit., 91 that this 
move was unnecessary;
'Même autonome, le règlement se situe toujours, dans l'échelle des actes juridiques, à un 
niveau inférieur à celui de la loi. Dans certains cas même, il lui est soumis. C'est notamment 
le cas des règlements pris dans le champ réservé à l'Exécutif en matière de libertés publiques, 
c'est-à-dire tout ce qui excède "les garanties fondamentales” (du seul ressort du Parlement). 
Dans cette hypothèse, ces règlements, bien que prévus à l'article 37, doivent respecter les lois 
qui ont institué ces garanties fondamentales. Ainsi n'était-il point nécessaire...de conférer 
valeur constitutionelle aux principles généraux pour que les règlements autonomes fussent 
tous tenus de s'y conformer.'
(c.f. R. Chapus, *De la soumission au droit des règlements autonomes* D.1960 chr.117 and 'De 
la valeur juridique des principes généraux du droit et des autres règles iurisprudentielles du 
droit administratif D.1966. chr.99)
139 For examples of the application of these principles to the protection of human rights and 
the diversity of principles, see Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 210-23 (it should be underlined 
that the principles do not solely concern human rights), c.f. Grazier, et. al., op. cit., 162-4 and 
Cummins, op. cit.
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degree of authority to the principles.140 It is submitted that the same 
relationship also holds as regards those rights found outside the 1789 
Declaration but referred to in the 1958 Preamble.141
There are, however, weaknesses in the administrative courts' protection. 
Firstly, there is the long length of time before the court takes a decision, which 
can have serious consequences as far as civil liberties are concerned.142 
Secondly, an administrative decision is not suspended when proceedings are 
commenced and injunctions may only be granted under what are claimed, 
relative to England, to be very strict and limited conditions.143 Thirdly, given 
the administrative courts' position within the administration, they cannot 
direct the administration as to how it should behave in the judgements that 
they hand down, thus there are difficulties in securing the administration's 
compliance with its decisions.144 Finally, given the dual competence of the 
administrative and ordinary judges, it is often complained that litigants may 
find it difficult to choose the appropriate forum. For example, if a litigant
14® See, Grazier, et. ai, op. cit., 173.
141 This view is confirmed by Grazier et. ai, op. cit., 171-2;
'Enfin quant aux principes qui n'ont été l'objet d'une formulation ni dans la Déclaration des 
droits de l'homme, ni dans les lois de l'époque révolutionnaire, ni dans le Préambule...il reste 
encore que, pour la plupart, il sont imprégnés de l'esprit de la Révolution française et du 
souci d'assurer le respect et la garantie des droits de l'homme dans le cadre d'institutions 
démocratiques et républicaines.'
142 See, Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 281 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 152-3.
143 The fact that in general the initiation of proceedings before the administrative courts does 
not suspend the effects of an administrative decision (Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 152), is part of 
the doctrine of la décision exécutoire (see, Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 116 et. seq.). Injunctions (known 
as 'sursis à exécution’) may only be granted, as already noted, if the grounds upon which the 
proceedings are based are serious and capable of giving rise to an annulment and secondly, 
that the administration's decision is likely to cause loss which it would be difficult to 
compensate or reverse.
Interim orders are also available but also only under strict conditions (see, Neville Brown & 
Bell, op. at., 116-7 and Chapus, op. cit., 799-832).
144 The purpose of the contentieux de l'annulation is to have an administrative decision 
annulled, therefore the administrative courts are generally prevented from issuing orders to 
the administration or substituting their decisions. This power is only available if another 
action is taken, i.e. the contentieux de pleine juridiction (see, Khan-Freund et. ai, op. cit., 
pgs.163-4). Therefore, an individual may sometimes be forced to commence two actions in 
order to secure his/her rights (this possibility is illustrated by the case of Rodiere. cited in 
Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 111-2). The weaknesses of mechanisms for the enforcement of 
decisions has for long been an area of criticism (see, Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 110-11 and 
Khan-Freund, et. ai, op. cit., 167 et. seq.). As a result, reforms have been introduced in order to 
secure a greater degree of compliance with the judgements of the administrative courts (see, 
Khan-Freund et. ai, op. cit., 165 et. seq., Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 113-5, Rivero, (1990), op. 
cit., 287-91 and Chapus, op. cit., 632-46).
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commences an action for excès de pouvoir before the administrative courts, 
he /she may then discover that because a voie de fait has been found, the 
action has to be suspended and recommenced before the ordinary courts. By 
virtue of the fact that the doctrine of the voie de fait has been developed by 
case law, it is a fluid and uncertain notion.145 As a consequence, a litigant 
must face some uncertainty as to whether he /she has commenced his action 
in the right jurisdiction. Moreover, the litigant may fall victim to conflicts of 
competence that tend to arise on occasion between the two orders of courts.146
14^ Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 27, notes;
'La théorie de la voie de fait est purement jurisprudentielle. Elle ne s'appuie sur aucun texte.
Il en résulte qu'elle est fragile: le juge, qui l'a créée, peut y renoncer;..'.
He also notes (pgs.246 et. seq.) how many victims of voie de faits make a mistake and initiate 
actions in the wrong jurisdiction. This slows down proceedings where speed is essential for 
the protection of civil liberties.
146 Conflicts of competence are an inherent feature of the dual system of courts and when 
they arise they are usually referred to the Tribunal des conflits (see, Neville Brown & Bell, op. 
cit., 144-50). The existence of the possibility of referring questions of jurisdiction to the 
Tribunal has itself become a locus of struggle between the ordinary and administrative 
courts. It will be seen below that the ordinary judge has jurisdiction to hear cases where 
personal liberty has been violated; by virtue of art.66 of the Constitution. This competence, 
combined with that of the voie de fait, leaves the ordinary courts a wide scope of action as far 
as civil liberties are concerned. However, the administration has sought to delay proceedings 
before the ordinary courts where administrative agents are alleged to have violated the civil 
liberties of an individual. This has been attempted via the practice of raising a conflict of 
jurisdiction. This leads to the suspension of proceedings until the Tribunal has decided upon 
the question. Although conflicts cannot be raised in criminal proceedings, this is only the case 
where administrative liability is concerned and not where the personal fault of an 
administrative agent is raised. Thus, conflicts were raised by the administration in both the 
civil and criminal courts.
Despite the prohibition, by virtue of the former art.112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on 
the raising of conflicts when a public agent had violated a civil liberty and its confirmation by 
the ordinary courts, the case law of the Conseil d'État and the Tribunal encouraged the 
continuation of the practice. Firstly, in Alexis et Wolf (C.E. 7th Nov. 1947 D.1948.472) the 
Conseil d'État found a civil liberty had been violated by a public agent but instead of 
declaring itself incompetent, went on to decide the case. Secondly, the Tribunal narrowly 
interpreted art.112 in Dame de la Murette (27th March 1952, D.1954.291), to the effect that 
only where an administrative agent was alleged to be personally at fault did the ordinary 
courts have competence. On the other hand, where an action was brought against an 
administrative agent, but it was claimed that the administration was liable, the administrative 
courts were granted jurisdiction. The new art.112 effectively abolishes this case law, by 
declaring the raising of conflicts inadmissible, irrespective of whether the action is against a 
public body or one of its agents (see, Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 249-50, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 
147-9 and Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 151 for the case of M. et Mme Cuvillier (C.E. 22 Dec. 
1954, Rec.688), as an example of the unfortunate consequences of such conflicts for litigants).
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The ordinary courts147
The role of the ordinary courts in protecting human rights is most clearly 
expressed in art.66 of the Constitution;
No one may be detained arbitrarily.
The judiciary, the guardian of individual liberty, ensures respect for this principle in 
circumstances provided for by ioi.148
Although, on its face, art.66 only accords the ordinary judge jurisdiction to 
protect one liberty, namely personal liberty, it has been noted that this liberty 
has been widely interpreted. For example, it has been held to cover freedom 
of movement and some theorists have claimed that personal liberty even 
extends to the protection of private life and political and religious freedom.149
The ordinary courts, more precisely, the criminal jurisdictions, have exclusive 
competence whenever a penal sanction is envisaged, irrespective of the status 
of the accused (i.e. whether or not they are civil servants).150 Another area of 
exclusive competence is the already mentioned voie de fait. Although the 
administrative courts have the competence to qualify an action as a voie de 
fait,151 only the ordinary courts can apply a sanction once this has been 
found.152 Therefore, should an administrative court decide that an 
administrative decision constitutes a voie de fait, they must stop the 
proceedings and the plaintiff must bring an action before the ordinary courts. 
This, as already noted, has lead to problems for litigants as far as the correct 
choice of court order and the subsequent delay that error causes.153
147 The term 'ordinary courts' will here be used to cover both civil and criminal jurisdictions. 
For a general introduction to the structure of these courts, see Khan-Freund et. al., op. cit., 258- 
88.
148 Translation taken from Bell, op. cit., 259.
149 See( p . Turpin, 'L'Autorité judiciaire, gardienne de la liberté individuelle' A.J.D.A. 
1983.653,655 et. seq.
150 Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 245.
151 Therefore, both court orders can qualify an administrative act as a voie de fait;
'Seule la caractérisation de la voie de fait peut être partagée entre le juge judiciaire et le juge 
administratif.'
(Ledercq, op. cit., 157).
152 Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 246 states, as regards the doctrine of the voie de fait, that the 
ordinary judge
'...est la seule qui, dans le droit administratif français, attache une conséquence juridique, sur 
le terrain de la sanction, à la qualification de "liberté publique" donnée à un droit'
153 Rjvero, (1978), op. cit., 247, has noted two attempts by the Conseil d'État to reduce the 
disadvantages suffered by litigants when the administrative courts declare themselves
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Civil liberties are also protected by the ordinary judge in an area in which 
he/she enjoys 'parallel competence'154 with the administrative judge. This is 
the defence of illegality before the criminal courts (known as 'l'exception 
d'illegaliteé). Essentially, this is the defence raised by the defendant by which 
he/she claims that the administrative decision upon which the plaintiff or 
prosecution rests their case, is illegal. This collateral attack allows the 
ordinary judge to investigate the legality of an administrative measure, as 
does the administrative judge in excès de pouvoir proceedings. The 
consequences of a finding that the act was illegal is not an annulment, rather, 
the act remains in force but is simply not applied by the judge in the instant 
case, so that no criminal sanctions are applied on its basis. Therefore, the 
defendant can claim that his/her civil liberties have been violated by the very 
measure upon which the case against him/her rests. It should be noted that 
as with the doctrine of inexistence, there is no limitation period in which this 
claim must be made. Finally, it is only the criminal courts that can decide the 
issue of illegality, the civil judge must refer the issue as a preliminary 
question ('question préjudicielle') to the administrative courts.155
incompetent after a finding of a voie de fait. Firstly, the Conseil d'Etat appears to have 
established a link between the voie de fait and the doctrine of inexistence. According to the 
latter, both orders of courts can declare
'...that an administrative decision may be simply non-existent for want of some essential 
element. There is no need to annul it, as the court only has to declare its non-existence.’ 
(Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 224).
The doctrine results in an decision being declared void ab initio and can be alleged by any 
interested party, even after the expiry of the normal limitation period of two months. Another 
benefit is that the doctrine permits the administrative courts to, in effect, strike down the 
administrative measure, instead of declaring itself incompetent, thus avoiding extra cost and 
time for the litigant. The connection that has been made results in
'La gravité du vice qui entache l'acte constitutif de voie de fait en ferait, nécessairement, un 
acte inexistant.' (Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 247).
Once struck down the measure becomes a voie de fait and the ordinary courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the sanctions that should be consequently applied (see, Neville Brown
& Bell, op. cit., 225-6).
The second development that Rivero notes is the decision Ministre de l'Intérieur, c. Soc. Le 
Témoignage chrétien (CE. 4th Nov. 1966, A.J.D.A., 1967.40, Rec.584), in which the Conseil 
d'État declared that administrative courts could grant compensation for a decision that in the 
course of proceedings was found to be a voie de fait (c.f. Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 9). Once 
again, the Conseil refused to simply declare itself incompetent, which would have left the 
litigant with the sole of option of having to initiate proceedings in the ordinary courts. At the 
same time, this case can be seen as yet another example of the battle between the two court 
orders over jurisdiction.
154 7hjs term is taken from Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 247.
155 See generally, Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 142-4, Rivero, (1978), op. cit., 247 and 
Leclercq, op. cit., 157.
I l l
SUMMING UP
The above are considered to be the main legal methods by which civil 
liberties are protected in France. While they have not been dealt with here, it 
should be borne in mind that non-legal mechanisms also exist, such as the 
'Médiateur' (the French version of the Ombudsman).156 French theorists also 
talk of politico-legal guarantees of rights which are derived from the French 
Revolution. However, these are claimed to be of little practical significance, 
given the existence and scope of the legal guarantees.157
More concretely, it can however, be seen that civil liberties are protected by a 
diversity of methods, they are conceived as positive law categories and both 
negative and positive rights are protected. The most strongly protected are 
those that are located within a statutory framework. French law has had to 
come to terms with a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in order to 
protect human rights. Despite belonging to different legal families, a 
relationship has been shown to exist between France and England and what is 
more, this exists in the area of public law. Thus, more comparative studies 
should be undertaken in this field. In addition, certain French arrangements 
institutions have been seen to be of interest in so far as they seem to point to 
the practical application of suggestions made by jurisprudential theory as far 
as the manner in which human rights ought to be protected.
At the same time, the French context shows that the legislature has not been 
seen as the sole threat to liberties. Therefore, the development of specific 
forms of protection against the administration and against other individuals 
(by the administrative and ordinary courts, respectively), is once again 
supported by the conception of human rights that was earlier adopted. 
Finally, these general considerations provide the context in which the specific 
liberty under study is situated. It remains to be seen to what extent this liberty 
differs from the general picture that has been described.
156 See, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 135-42, Neville Brown & Bell, op. cit., 29-31, Leclercq, op. at., 
161-8 and L. Neville Brown & P. Lavirotte, The Mediator: A French Ombudsman?' L.Q.R. 90 
[1974] 211.
157 Politico-legal guarantees are normally said to consist of the so-called rights to 
disobedience, resistance to oppression and revolution (see, for example, Robert & Duffar, op. 
at., 122 et. seq. and Colliard, op. cit., 188-95).
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SECTION III 
ANOTHER PRACTICAL CONCERN: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION158
Having argued for the application of comparative theory to the Bill of Rights 
debate, this next section points to another practical issue where the 
application of theory is claimed to be required. This concerns the protection of 
civil liberties in the European Union.
In the late 1960s, the lack of adequate protection for human rights vis a vis the 
powers and activities of the Community institutions led to a threat to the 
supremacy of EC law. As a response, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
developed a body of case-law which sought to compensate for the perceived 
deficit in civil liberties protection. By virtue of this case-law, fundamental 
rights were found to be part of the Union legal order and were thus to be 
respected and protected. These unwritten rights were derived from the 
common legal traditions of the Member States. As a result of this claim, it is 
suggested that there is now a practical need within the European Union to 
identify what the traditions of human rights common to the Member States 
actually are and that more importantly, this requires resort to comparative 
theory.
The liberty of assembly, that is the subject of this study is prima facie a human 
right that is part of this stated common tradition.159 Therefore, by 
concentrating on two Member States in which assembly has historically 
played a prominent role,160 it will be attempted to elaborate the content of the 
common tradition of the liberty to assemble more precisely. It is suggested 
that the ECJ's approach requires an interpretative comparison of the
158 The problems concerning human rights in the European Union were brought to light 
when the Union was the European Economic Community and then the European 
Community. Therefore, on occasion, this latter term is also used but with the realisation that 
the protection of human rights in this context is still a live one today in the Union.
159 This is instanced by the inclusion of the liberty to assemble in the ECHR, (art.11) and in 
the words of Palley, op. at., 224, the Convention;
'...is part of the common heritage of Europe and something which every Government as a 
member of the Council of Europe has for 40 years been committed to observing.'
160 The historical role of the liberty to assemble in France and England will be looked at in 
chapter III. below, as part of the justification for concentrating on this specific liberty.
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traditions of the Member States. Although at the present time it seems 
unlikely that the liberty to assemble will be raised in the context of European 
Union law, this study can be taken as an example of the methodological 
approach that the ECJ would need to adopt as far as more relevant liberties. 
However, it should be recalled that it was not foreseen that civil liberties 
would be relevant to the EC at the inception of the Treaty of Rome but 
subsequent history, which will now be presented, has proved this belief to 
have been erroneous. To accept that the liberty in question is irrelevant to the 
EU may therefore be a repetition of this error.
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The lack of civil liberties in the EEC Treaty
It is clear that the primary motivating factor behind the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was the desire to achieve lasting 
European peace through closer economic co-operation. The economic 
emphasis in the Treaty has been much noted and criticised because it is seen 
as resulting in a lack of human rights protection.161 Consequently, such rights 
as do exist in the Treaty are instrumental rights; intended to facilitate closer 
economic union between Member States.162
The absence of a Bill of Rights in the Treaty eventually led to serious concern 
on the part of the German Constitutional Court. The ECJ initially denied that 
human rights existed in the Treaty but finally, after the German 
Constitutional Court's claim that they could review EEC decisions and 
legislation against its Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and, more importantly, its 
assertion of a power to strike down measures that it felt were in violation of
161 An interesting exception to these criticisms is provided by J.H.H. Weiler, 'Eurocracv and 
Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of lustice in the 
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European 
Communities’ (1986) Wash.L.R. 1103, who notes at 1111 that the 'tenor' of the provisions that 
provide for judicial review in the Treaty indicate a desire on the part of the ECJ to maintain a 
separation of powers and the power to hold the acts of the Community institutions ultra vires 
the terms of the Treaty. There is no concern to subject these organs to higher law. For him, 
therefore, the absence of fundamental rights is not linked to the economic content of the 
Treaty. Instead, he sees the reason for the absence as being the result of a concern that 
entrenched rights would threaten the competencies, supremacy and jurisdiction of the EC 
institutions.
For an example of a more traditional observation as to the economic priority of the Treaty, see 
M.A. Dauses, 'The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order' [1985] 
E.L.R. 398 at 399;
The historical reasons for such silence in the Treaties are well-known. In view of the largely 
technical nature of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, it was not 
realistic to envisage situations where the Community authorities might encroach upon what 
might be termed fundamental rights. Subsequently, the establishment of the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community by the Treaties of Rome 
in 1957 was influenced by the political failures which preceded it. The comprehensive drafts 
for a European Defence Community and a European (Political) Community had foundered in 
1954; the original euphoria gave way to sober utilitarian considerations and sight of a general 
concept of fundamental and human rights was lost.'
162 Such rights include the prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
(art.7), the right to equal pay for equal work, irrespective of gender (art.119), the right to 
move goods freely (arts.9-37), the right for workers to move freely and establish themselves 
in other member states (arts.48-58), the right to provide services freely (arts.59-66) and the 
right to move capital freely (arts.67-73).
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German human rights, it began to develop a body of case-law in which 
human rights were found to exist within the Community legal order.163
The work of the EC] and the Nold dictum
The ECJ's motivation for claiming the existence of human rights within the 
EU legal order is generally seen to have not been based on human rights 
concerns; it was a strategy designed to ensure the general supremacy of EU 
law over national laws, including, perhaps most importantly, those at a 
constitutional level.164 Notwithstanding the purposes behind the ECJ's case- 
law, the Court, in a series of cases was able to find and apply human rights 
from within the Community legal order. It drew these civil liberties from 
different sources, which were eventually set out in consolidated form in the 
case of Nold v Commission:
As the Court has already stated fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles of law, the observance of which it ensures.
In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from Constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are 
incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and protected by the constitutions of those 
states.
Similarly, international Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should 
be followed within the framework of Community law.'165
163 The ECJ's early decisions denying the existence of civil liberties in the Community's legal 
system were Friedrich Stork & Co. v High Authority of the E.C.S.C. fl/58) [1959] E.C.R. 17 at 
26, Geitling v High Authority of the E.C.S.C (36-8,40/59) [1960] E.C.R. 423 at 438 and 
Sparlata v Commission of EC (40/64) [1965] E.C.R. 215. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court indicated its disquiet and issued its challenge to the supremacy of EC law in the area of 
human rights in its judgement BVerfG [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. The court gradually softened 
the rigour of this ruling by eventually deciding to only review the primary legislation of the 
EC against German human rights (c.f. Steinke BVerfG [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 531).
164 Weiler, op. cit., at 1119, critically analyses the motivation of the court in developing a 
body of civil liberties case-law. He claims that the ECJ's judgements show a 'surface language' 
of human rights but the 'deep structure' is concerned with supremacy and the preservation of 
the integrity and uniformity of the legal order. A. O'Neill & J. Coppel, The European Court of 
lustice Taking Rights Seriously' [1992] C.M.L.Rev. 669-692 concur in the view that the 
development of this case-law was a defensive response by the court, on the other hand, T.C. 
Hartley (The Foundations of European Economic Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community' (1981)) states, op. cit., 
122;
'...it is probably fair to say that the conversion of the European Court to a specific doctrine of 
human rights has been as much a matter of expediency as conviction.'
165 (4/73) [1974] E.C.R. 491 at 507. It is worth noting here the structural similarities between 
this dictum and the source of law mentioned in the statute to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (arL38(3));
'...general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.'
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Using these sources the Court has claimed that the rights to pursue a trade or 
profession,166 to enter a state (subject to the limitations that may be imposed 
by the legitimate needs of a democratic society),167 to property,168 to privacy 
and due process of the law169 and to freedom of religious practice,170 are, inter 
alia, within EU law. This interpretation has been accepted by the Member 
states171 and the other organs of the Union.172 As a result of these
166 Staatsanwalt Freiburg v Keller (234/85) [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 875.
167 Rutili v Min. Interior (36/75) [1975] E.C.R. 1219.
168 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (44/79) [1979] E.C.R. 3729.
169 National Panasonic v Commission (136/79) [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169.
170 Prais v Council (44/79) [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 708
The German Federal Constitutional Court recognised the improvement in the 
mechanisms for the protection of civil liberties that had occurred in the Community legal 
order since 1974, as manifested by the ECJ's case-law. This development was seen as 
affording the same level of protection as that which existed in German constitutional law. 
Therefore, the German Constitutional Court stated in fRe the Application of Wünsch 
Handelsyeslischaft [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 at 265);
'...in view of those developments it must be held that, so long as the European Communities, 
and in particular in the case law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective 
protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which 
is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required 
unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential 
character of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation... and it will no 
longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights contained in the 
Constitution..'.
The Italian government also signalled a conditional acceptance of the protection of civil 
liberties in Frontini v Ministero delle Finanze [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372. The member states in 
general have most clearly manifested their approval of the ECJ's case law by virtue of their 
determination, as stated in the Preamble to the Single European Act 1986, to promote 
'...democracy and fundamental rights as recognised by the constitutions of the Member 
States, the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
European Social Charter.'
The same attachment to the protection of human rights was made in art.F(2) of the Common 
Provisions of the Treaty on European and Political Union 1991.
17^ The approval of the Union institutions has been manifested in a series of documents; see 
Dauses, op. cit., 413-15, who notes two trends in these politico-legal developments; firstly, 
growing support for the EU to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights and 
secondly, the drafting of an autochthonous Bill of Rights for the Union (the advantages and 
disadvantages of these two proposals are set out in 'Commission Memorandum on Ascension 
to the European Human Rights Convention' 4th April 1979, E.C.BulLSuppl. 2/79). An 
example of the degree of consensus as to the importance of civil liberties in the Union's legal 
order can be gauged by the 'Fundamental Rights: loint Declaration by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1977;
'1. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stress the prime importance 
they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the 
constitutions of the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
(Footnote continues on next page)
117
developments, earlier problems concerning civil liberties would appear to 
have been resolved.173 For the present purposes, it is the source of civil 
liberties in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States that is 
of interest. More particularly, it is the type of legal research that this source 
requires, which, it is suggested, requires a comparative civil liberties 
methodology.
Comparative civil liberties
The Nold formulation, by asserting the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States as one source of the civil liberties that are said to exist 
within the EU, results in the need for a particular method of judicial 
investigation on the part of the ECJ. This is the comparative method: it is only 
by comparing the traditions of the Member States that judges can elucidate 
what is and what is not common to the Member States. If, on the contrary, 
such an investigation is not carried out, judges who continue to invoke the 
Nold formulation will be acting in bad faith, or in Dworkinian terms, without 
'integrity'. They will be merely substituting their own views of what the 
common constitutional traditions should be, without first, at least attempting, 
to state how they have actually been constructed in the Member States.174 At 
the same time, standards will be needed in order to assess judicial decisions. 
In other words, it is not only judges but also commentators and lawyers who 
will require comparative theory.
Although it has been claimed that judges are always to some extent imposing 
their own personal opinions and even prejudices behind what appears to be 
the neutrality of legal rationality in their judgements,175 these are
2. In the exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European Communities 
they respect and will continue to respect these rights.'
*73 Although there are still criticisms of the motives and use of civil liberties by the Court, see 
Weiler, op. cit. and O'Neill & Coppel, op. cit.
174 Judges may still have to exercise a wide degree of personal choice; for example, the 
constitutional traditions that are discovered may be so diverse as to permit of no plausible 
synthesis. In such a case, a judge will have to decide whether to abandon the enterprise, or to 
draw from only one tradition, perhaps (but not necessarily) the one that s/he thinks affords 
the greatest protection. The fact that this degree of choice remains open to the judge is noted 
by R. Bernhardt, Problèmes liés à l'établissement d'un catalogue des droits fondamentaux 
pour les Communautés européennes' E.C.Bull.Suppl. (1976) 5/76,27.
175 See for example J. Frank, 'Cardozo and The Upper Court Mvth' in (1948) 13 Law 
Cont.Probl. 369 and M. Kelman, 'Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law
33 (1981) Stan.L.R. 591.
118
controversial claims and it is suggested that at the outset and in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, judicial practice and pronouncements should be 
taken at face-value; in other words, taken seriously. If this is point is accepted, 
the judges of the ECJ must be seen to have a genuine allegiance to the 
employment of constitutional traditions as a source of human rights 
protection.176 In such circumstances, the only chance of successfully deriving 
civil liberties from this source is by engaging in comparative research and the 
application of comparative theory.
A SUMMARY
This chapter has sought to provide concrete examples of the kind of human 
rights reforms that could allow for the characteristics of human rights that 
were revealed in chapter I. It has sought to achieve this via the use of 
comparative theory. In applying this theory to the reform of human rights 
protection in England, it has been suggested that French law is of interest 
because of its attempts to combine a similar notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty with a concern to protect human rights. It is suggested that the 
review of parliamentary bills by the Cc and the review of administrative 
action are of particular interest. French protection has, however, been shown 
to have its problems and these have been examined in some detail in order to 
underline that a wholesale transplantation of the legal methods to England is 
not possible, or even desirable. Comparative theory, merely points to 
approaches that should be further pursued. This detailed examination will 
also serve as the context in which to see the protection as regards the liberty 
to assemble that is set out in chapters IV and V.
*76 J.M. Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique' (1987) 55 
U.Missouri at K.C.L.Rev. 392 argues, in the context of judges acting with integrity, that while 
judges may honestly attempt to apply the law independently of their own ideological and 
political beliefs, they might actually be acting under a false consciousness which means that 
they will still actually apply their own views, but sub-consciously. It is suggested that if the 
inevitability of personal prejudice and bias in judicial reasoning is accepted, this provides 
another reason in favour of the suggested use of comparative theory - so that judicial 
decisions as to what constitutes common traditions can be verified and criticised. At the same 
time, it would be considered commendable if judges deviated from a common tradition that 
violated human rights and other values. Therefore, it is not contended that judges should be 
slaves to common tradition and indeed it will be argued in Part III below that in certain 
circumstances judges should ignore common traditions.
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Furthermore, it has been argued that comparative theory might not only be of 
use as regards problems in England but also as regards the protection of 
human rights in the European Union. In attempting to forge standards of 
human rights protection from the standards of the Member States it would 
appear that regard must be had to comparative theory - hence, adding further 




A SPECIFIC CIVIL LIBERTY: THE LIBERTY TO ASSEMBLE
INTRODUCTION
Whereas chapters I and II respectively presented reasons for looking at one 
specific civil liberty and for making comparisons with French law, this 
chapter seeks to explain the concentration on the liberty to assemble and to 
define it so that the field of comparison can be clearly seen. Accordingly, this 
chapter also constitutes the third and final step towards justifying the 
comparison undertaken in this study.
Although, the reasons for focusing on the liberty to assemble are set out in 
section I, they can be briefly outlined here. The liberty to assemble is a widely 
recognised human right but one which in England tends to be subsumed 
within the right to free speech. Thus, a focus on its specific needs and context, 
with the aim of isolating the specific characteristics and values for which it 
stands, beyond what generally applies to freedom of speech is called for. 
Secondly, it is a liberty whose exercise takes place in an explicit context of 
countervailing values and activities. It follows that its regulation is acutely 
concerned with making contested choices and so it provides a good example 
by which to illustrate the difficulties concerning methods of protecting 
human rights which seek to fix these choices. Thirdly, assemblies have been 
of historic importance in both France and England. Therefore, in attempting 
to formulate a common tradition of this liberty, the experience of these two 
Member States will be of significance.
Having looked at these reasons in section I, section II defines the liberty to 
assemble. It will be claimed that while there is a general concept of the liberty 
to assemble that is shared by France and England, within this concept there 
are differing conceptions which may not be accepted in both jurisdictions. A 
range of different activities will be covered by the liberty, according to which 
conception is adopted and it may make more sense to talk of the liberties to 
assemble, instead of assuming a single liberty. However, by focusing on what 
is argued to be the central conception of this general concept, the liberty to 
assemble is defined as securing peaceful meetings and processions (or 
marches). Consequently, the laws regulating these activities will be the object 
of comparative analysis.
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Finally, it should also be noted that in accordance with the abstract level at 
which the jurisprudential theory is situated, the terms ’liberty' and 'right' to 
assemble are here used interchangeably.
SECTION I 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIBERTY TO ASSEMBLE
The liberty to assemble has certain features that make it an interesting right to 
study. These features which were set out briefly above and will be examined 
in greater detail here.
AN INDEPENDENT LIBERTY?
The liberty to assemble is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (art.20(1)) and in the ECHR (art. 11). It is also commonly found within 
the lists of rights protected in many national constitutions.1 For this reason, it 
can be said to be a widely recognised human right. Notwithstanding this 
status, there is some uncertainty as regards its meaning or, more precisely, 
what are the activities or values that it protects. Given this uncertainty, the 
right tends to be seen in England as part of the right to free speech and 
ultimately, the freedom of expression. However, subsuming the right as 
merely an aspect of the liberty of expression may mask the particular value of 
the right and renders the fact that it is normally declared separately in 
constitutional texts somewhat difficult to justify. In addition, specific legal 
mechanisms that are designed with specific characteristics of the liberty in 
mind may not be provided for. It is for these reasons that the liberty to 
assemble appears to be an ideal liberty by which the particularity of a specific 
civil liberty can be examined.2 If specific functions or values of the liberty to 
assemble can be discovered, there will then be grounds for according it an 
independent status, buttressed by its own particular means of protection.
1 For example, Denmark (art.79), Germany (art.8), Greece (art.ll(l)), Italy (art.17), the 
Netherlands (art.9(l)), Portugal (art.45(1)) and Spain (arL21(l)).
2 It will be recalled that this is one aspect of the jurisprudential theoiy of human rights that 
was formulated in chapter 1.
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The claim that the liberty under study is not an independent liberty will first 
be examined before then looking at some of the problems this view has been 
seen to raise. 
An aspect of free speech 
The English tendency to see the liberty to assemble as an aspect of the right to 
free speech is instanced by Bonner and Stone, who state;
No special protection is given to political demonstrators exercising freedom of speech through 
procession and assembly. 3 (emphasis added).
Indeed, for some commentators, assemblies secure protest speech and as a 
consequence they actually use the term 'freedom to protest' rather than the 
liberty to assemble in order to emphasise the latter's protest function;
It might be thought that freedom of protest is simply one aspect of the more general right of 
freedom of speech...but protest involves the communication of ideas, not their formulation or 
validity. This aspect of human rights is about the means of persuasion or airing of grievances, 
and public protest is seen as a distinct human right worthy of individual treatment in 
positive constitutional codes.4
On occasion, this protest speech function is also seen as serving more 
fundamental aims. For example, Alderson, in discussing the right to protest, 
sees this liberty as acting as a 'safety-valve';
The key relationship between rights and power is worthy of note. Politics being concerned 
with the power to govern there is a constant tendency, a need perhaps for governments to 
seek an accretion of power. This may in turn induce protest from subjects whose activation 
of any right or freedom to protest may make the task of governing more difficult. On the 
other hand rights or freedoms to assemble, to process, and to exercise freedom of speech offer 
a safety valve. This acts as an insurance against driving protest below the surface where it 
may take on more sinister forms. 5
3 The Public Order Act 1986: Steps in the Wrong Direction?' P.L. [1987] 202,203. (c.f. 229-30) 
For further examples of the same approach, see V.T. Bevan, 'Protest and Public Order' [1979] 
P.L. 163,163-4, D.G.T. Williams, 'Keeping The Peace: The Police and Public Order' (1967), 10 
and C. Gearty, 'Freedom of Assembly and Public Order', in C. McCrudden & G. Chambers 
(eds.) 'Individual Rights and the Law in Britain' (1994), 39.
4 J. Murdoch, The Rights of Public Assembly and Procession' in Campbell et. aL, (eds.), op. 
cit., 174. D. G. Bamum, The Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity in Britain and the 
United States’ P.L. [1977] 310, sees the right as performing a protest function, which in turn is 
part of the freedom of speech and A. Sherr 'Freedom of Protest, Public Order and The Law’ 
(1989) takes the same protest view, although more implicitly (c.f. Dworkin, op. cit., (1990), 6-7 
and Feldman, op. at., 782-5).
5 J. Alderson, The Right to Protest' in R. Hoggart (ed.), 'Liberty and Legislation' (1989), 29-30.
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Alternatively, Sherr links the safety-valve function to the requirements of 
democracy. He claims that liberal political theory asserts a principle of 
government of the people by the people, which is then effected by democratic 
electoral procedures. If political change is required, these procedures should 
ideally be used to effect such changes. However, protest and demonstration, 
via the liberty to assemble function when these kinds of political channels are 
inefficient or insufficient.6
Another function attributed to free speech which is sometimes seen to be 
served by the liberty to assemble is that of self-government. According to this 
view, speech again serves the purposes of democracy but this time the 
emphasis is on protecting political speech and encouraging political 
participation. Political speech serves to inform citizens so that they may make 
informed political choices and participate in government.7 Those who 
assemble can then convey or signal to their governors decisions as regards 
choices that affect them, in this way they can participate in government: self- 
government.8
6 Sherr, op. cit., 9-10.
7 The democratic function of free speech is traditionally associated with the American 
theorist, A. Meiklejohn, 'Political Freedom: The Political Powers of the People' (1965). The 
right to assemble is seen by Murdoch, op. cit., 74-5 as but another mode of encouraging 
participation in governmental decision-making and thus provides another example of the 
speech-democracy function view;
'Nor has the advent of more democratic processes rendered protest less valuable. 
Participation in influencing, persuading and directing decision-making is deep rooted in 
Western political systems: the great gatherings of Scandinavian tribes in the Althing arenas 
may today only be mirrored in the annual town parliaments in Swiss cantons and in New 
England townships, but more sophisticated political devices, such as referenda and 
initiatives, have emerged in recent years even in states in which a high degree of 
representative government has been achieved. Democracy requires the governors to keep in 
contact with the governed. Guaranteeing rights of public protest can therefore be seen as 
another, albeit informal, way of encouraging participation in decision-making, for it allows 
the governed to signal to their rulers. The existence of the ballot box does not render 
assembly and procession obsolete.'
(c.f. Barendt, op. cit., 20-3 and L.H. Tribe, 'American Constitutional Law' (1988), 786-7).
8 G. Rutherglen, Theories of Free Speech' [1987] 7 Ox.J.L.S. 115,121;
'...all...of the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment are deeply connected by a common 
principle of respect for the opinions and decisions of individual citizens. The justification for 
democratic political processes, including free speech on political issues, proceeds from this 
principle to a general right of all citizens to participate in the government of the community. 
The arguments from truth and self-fulfilment justify free speech as an aspect of respect for the 
individual's ability to form his own opinions and to make decisions about the basic course of 
his own life.1
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These diverse opinions have in common an instrumental view of the liberty to 
assemble; it has no value in itself but rather as a means to secure other values. 
In consequence, it is not seen as an independent liberty but as either an aspect 
of the freedom of speech and ultimately the freedom of expression. Once this 
view is adopted, the liberty is seen to carry out speech functions or values, 
such as protest or democracy, truth or individual self development and 
fulfilment; these being values that free speech is traditionally claimed to 
protect.9
These views of the liberty are problematic because firstly, they do not, as seen 
above, seem to accord with the legal practice of citing the liberty separately 
from speech rights and a jurisprudential theory that emphasises a look at 
specific civil liberties. Secondly, if the liberty in question is not a liberty that is 
independent from speech rights, a distinction must be maintained between 
speech and conduct. This will however be shown to be a somewhat problematic 
distinction.
Some problems
Where the liberty to assemble is claimed to perform free speech functions, it 
follows that the activities that are subject to protection are those that fall 
within the scope of this freedom. Therefore, the act of assembling is not 
protected per se but rather it is any valued communication/speech that occurs 
during an assembly that is protected.10 The assumption here is that there is a
9 Summaries of the strengths and weaknesses of the main free speech theories can be found 
in Barendt, op. cit., 7 & 8-23, F. Schauer, 'Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry' (1982), 15-60 
and for a lengthy critique of the truth function, see C.E. Baker, 'Human Liberty and Freedom 
of Speech' (1989), 6-70. It has also been noted that freedom of speech may serve more than 
one value; see Schauer, op. cit., 14;
'Freedom of speech may have but one core, and there is nothing unseemly about looking for 
one. But it may instead have several cores. If this is what the analysis reveals, there is no 
reason to think that something is missing.',
and similarly, G. Marshall, 'Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory' P.L. [1992] 40,44;
There may be more than one human interest that is promoted by the free expression 
principle. Indeed, it must be rash to suppose that there is a single purpose served by all forms 
of civil liberty that involve communication. Communication rights include a number of 
loosely related freedoms, including those of free assembly, free association and the right to 
petition. They have also been held to embrace in recent times a further range of expressive 
actions, including freedom to picket, to advertise and to spend money in financial political 
campaigns.'
10 The overriding importance of speech activities as objects of protection within assemblies is 
illustrated by Schauer's defence of assemblies as 'speech in the streets' (op. cit., 201 et. seq.). He 
notes a traditional concern with the content of speech which has recently been joined by a 
concern as to the location of speech;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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distinction between speech and conduct so that people can be assembled 
(conduct) whilst at the same time be engaged in the distinctive activity of 
communication (speech). In these circumstances the liberty to assemble 
functions to protect such conduct but only because of the presence of valued 
speech. The distinction means that it must be possible to separate those 
speech activities which are the proper object of protection from conduct, 
which lies outside the scope of protection.
However, there are problems with this distinction. As Barendt notes, 
communication may be effected not only by verbal or literary means but also 
using symbols (he gives examples of badges, uniforms, styles of appearance 
and gestures). This form of communication is referred to as 'symbolic 
speech'11 and it reveals that on certain occasions speech and conduct can 
become blurred. Furthermore, Barendt notes;
The courts are frequently confronted by circumstances which clearly contain some 'pure 
speech’, but also involve an element of physical conduct: leafleting and canvassing, 
demonstrations and many forms of picketing constitute examples of these situations. They 
should perhaps be treated more benevolently than 'symbolic speech' which is not 
accompanied by verbal or literary communication. The justification for this discrimination is 
that in the former group of cases there is a clearly understood intention to transmit 
information or opinions, and the difficulties only arise because the object is achieved by, or in 
conjunction with, some linked activity, which may create a social nuisance or harm unrelated 
to the content of the speech.'12
Traditionally, these concerns with content have constituted the only important free speech 
questions. But as speech has moved into new settings, new contributions not related to 
content have appeared. When people communicate by picketing, through the use of 
demonstrations or in parades, interests not related to the content of the communication are 
implicated. Parades interfere with the flow of traffic, demonstrations may prevent people 
from going where they wish to go, and picketing may interfere with the operation of a 
business or office. All of these are legitimate concerns. Yet these settings for communication 
are becoming increasingly prevalent in contemporary society. Reconciling the free speech 
interests with the acknowledged importance of traffic - and crowd - control has as a result 
become an increasingly important problem for free speech theory.' (pg.201).
For Schauer, assemblies are a form of speech, which, by virtue of their less conventional form, 
can secure more attention;
'There is a din of speech, and our limited capacity to read or hear has resulted in effective 
censorship by the proliferation of opinion rather than by the restriction of opinion. We learn 
no more from a thousand people all speaking at the same time than we leam from total 
silence.
Under such circumstances it is frequently necessary, literally or figuratively, to shout to be 
heard.' (pg.202).
11 op. cit., 41.
12 op. cit., 42 and c.f. L. Tribe, 'Constitutional Choices' (1985), 199-200.
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The possibility that firstly, there may be no firm distinction between speech 
and conduct and secondly, that in certain fact situations, such as assemblies, 
speech and conduct may be linked, leads to uncertainty as to whether and 
how the liberty to assemble performs free speech functions.
The above-mentioned problem is addressed by Baker, who rejects the 
dichotomy between speech and conduct;13
Common sense operates less to divide the world of behaviour objectively between expression 
and action than to indicate the perspective of the person doing the dividing. If the distinction 
is between 'expressing' and 'doing,' most conduct falls into both categories. Most consciously 
undertaken actions are at least self-expressive; and many - a political assassination, a hair 
style, a knife placed behind another's back - can be primarily intended to communicate 
something to others. Contrarily, verbal conduct usually does something. A speaker may be 
described as composing a poem, commanding the troops, testing the student, creating a 
mood, threatening an enemy, or making a promise or contract.14
He further claims that freedom of speech and the liberty to assemble function 
to protect 'substantively valued conduct' and that such conduct is 'inherently 
expressive'. For Baker, the two liberties both protect expressive conduct which 
is a wider category of activities than mere speech. These expressive activities 
provide for individual self-development and self-realisation.15 The liberty to 
assemble protects assemblies because they are activities in which individuals 
engage in self-expression and creation.16 These activities promote individual 
fulfilment and self-determination, which are in turn, key values upon which 
democratic decision-making and legal obligation are based.17 It should be
13 op. tit., 70 et. seq.
14 op. at., 71. Baker relies on the linguistic theory of speech acts (c.f. J.L. Austin, 'How To Do 
Things with Words' (1962) and 'Philosophical Papers' (1970)), which essentially asserts that 
speech is a form of action. Thus a distinction between words and actions is denied.
15 Therefore, Baker adopts an 'individual fulfilment' function for the liberty to assemble, op. 
at., 59;
'The key ethical postulate is that respect for individual integrity and autonomy requires the 
recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to influence or 
interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values...Granted this ethical 
postulate, and since the concept of coercion only has a place within some such ethical order, 
the use of speech (normally) ought not to be viewed as coercive - even if the person's 
expression, for example, her racist or sexist speech, reflects and perpetuates an unjust order 
and affirms or promotes a much more stunted view of the person. Likewise, this same 
premise, which views people as agents who can either reject or accept views that they hear, 
implies that a person's speech cannot normally be viewed as improperly interfering with a 
listener's or third-party's proper realm of decision-making authority.'
(c.f. Tribe, op. cit., (1988), 787).
16 op. tit., 53-4.
17 op. tit., 49-50.
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stressed that, according to Baker, the liberty to assemble shares this function 
with the freedom of speech and it is not to be seen as a mere aspect of the 
latter liberty.18 For these reasons he presents an independent, if shared, 
function for the liberty to assemble, that can be seen as part of the broader 
liberty of expression. In short, both speech and assembly are aspects of 
expression.
It is not possible to assess Baker's claims here. This will only be possible after 
comparison has been undertaken in order to see how French law views the 
liberty but his views point to the uncertainty that surrounds the English view 
which tends to place the liberty within free speech. Adopting the English 
view of the liberty would therefore prejudge this issue and prejudice the 
orientation of the study, especially if French law is revealed to have an 
alternative conception of the liberty. It may also be the case that the two 
jurisdictions differ as to the functions that they accord to the liberty. The 
jurisprudential theory that underpins this study can, however, accommodate 
these differences whilst providing a sufficiently precise basis on which to 
commence investigation. Although it insists that all civil liberties ultimately 
function to provide a means of challenge and change, this is compatible with 
a range of different means (or functions) by which this is sought to be 
achieved. For example, the liberty to assemble might be used in order to 
protest or to discover or assert truth (as long as it is remembered that the 
latter is contingent and thus should be open to change) in order that social 
and political change can be brought about. It will be by concentrating on its 
specific context that it will be seen what, if any, are the particular and 
different ways that the liberty is claimed to achieve these ultimate ends in the 
two jurisdictions.
COUNTERVAILING VALUES
A second reason for studying the liberty in question is that its exercise reveals 
the often sharp conflicts that arise between it and other values. As such it
18 op. cit., 128;
'Courts often treat conduct as at best, "speech-plus," which receives less protection than pure 
speech. Moreover, courts and commentators tend to value the conduct, the assemblies and 
associations, the picketing and parades, only because and, thus, only to the extent that they 
facilitate speech, which remains the primary focus. The first amendment explicitly protects 
assemblies, an activity that obviously involves more than verbal conduct. In fact, the 
dichotomy even disembodies speech itself - which is necessarily a physical activity that takes 
place at specific times and places and can interfere with other activities.'
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provides a particularly good example of the difficult choices and uncertainties 
that are claimed to constitute the context or environment inhabited by all 
human rights.19
When an assembly takes place, its exercise might restrict the rights of others, 
for example the freedom of movement of pedestrians and drivers of motor 
vehicles. If it disturbs another assembly it may be said to restrict free speech 
(and even the right to assemble). The fact that rights conflict is not what 
makes the liberty to assemble such an interesting right, this, after all, has been 
widely noted as a feature of other human rights.20 What the liberty in 
question brings into such sharp focus is the choices that may need to be made 
between other values which are not commonly viewed as human rights - 
most commonly public order21 - and the exercise of the liberty itself.22 It is
19 See chapter I, section I, supra. The importance of the liberty to assemble as a barometer of 
how human rights are respected generally was noted by French comparativists when in the 
1930's comparisons were made with England in order to search for responses to continued 
outbreaks of disorder during this period;
'...l’étude du droit de réunion nous permet-elle d'apprécier dans quelle proportion un régime 
de droit positif s'accorde non seulement avec le droit naturel mais encore avec le dégre de 
libéralisme politique d'un pays donné. Une telle liberté est intimement lieé au libéralisme et 
ne vit que sous son climat.'(M. Baffrey, 'Le droit de réunion en Angleterre et en France' (1937), 
6) and c.f. P. Mousset 'Les meetings: essai sur les caractères politiques et juridiques de la 
liberté de réunion en Angleterre' (1931), 11.
20 See, for example, Gewirth, op. cit., 57, Dworkin, (1977), op. cit., 193 and J.W. Nickel, 'Are 
Human Rights Utopian' Philosophy and Public Affairs (1982), vol.II, 247,250.
21 Some commentators assert that public order is really a human right. For example, A.J.M. 
Milne, 'Should We Have A Bill of Rights' [1977] 40 M.L.R. 389, 392 claims that, inter alia, the 
following rights exist;
The right to life. The right to freedom, in particular from unprovoked violence, in general 
from arbitrary coercion.’
It will be recalled that Gewirth, op. cit., founded civil liberties on the conditions that were 
necessary for human action (op. cit., 69). These conditions were freedom and well being. It 
might, therefore, be claimed that protection from physical violence and protection of one's 
personal property are rights without which freedom and well being could not be secured.
See also, Hart, (1961), op. cit., 189-95, where under what is called the 'minimum content of 
natural law', with survival as a human aim, Hart claims that an authority would have to 
protect people from physical harm and the destruction of property. These functions may be 
seen as condition precedents for the exercise of other human rights and this would justify a 
claim to their being the most fundamental civil liberties. In the context of Rawl's theory of 
justice Hart, however, claimed that liberty is not merely restricted for the sake of other 
liberties but also for other valued interests; 'Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority' in N. Daniels 
(ed.), 'Reading Rawls: Critical Legal Studies on Rawl's A Theory of lustice1 (1975), 230 at 244- 
7. The tendency to expand the use of human rights, including to these other interests, has 
been criticised by critical scholars, as was seen above and also some liberal theorists; K. 
Minogue, 'What is Wrong With Rights' in C. Harlow (ed.), 'Public Law and Politics' (1986), 
209 and a warning against the overuse of rights may be found in P.P. Craig, 'Public Law and 
Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America' (1990), 7;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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contended, although this will be explained at greater length below, that the 
liberty is concerned to protect peaceful assemblies23 and this means that if it is 
decided that an assembly has or is likely to become violent, it falls outside of 
the protective scope of the liberty and can be restricted in order to secure 
public peace and order.
However, such decisions become all the more controversial where a view is 
not taken on the basis of actual violence but on apprehended violence, either 
from those intending to assemble or those opposed to their views. In these 
circumstances, it can be asked to what extent the law should uphold the right 
to assemble when this threatens public order and when is this right 
legitimately restricted. Furthermore, decision-makers and their perceptions 
become crucial,24 as well as what is considered to be violent.25 These difficult
There is often an unspoken assumption that, if an issue is not capable of being framed as a 
legally enforceable constitutional right, it is therefore of no constitutional concern to lawyers. 
This is erroneous. One may reach the conclusion that a particular interest is incapable of 
being framed as a justiciable legal right, but still believe that it generates a constitutional 
obligation which the legislature is bound to advance.'
22 According to S. Uglow, 'Policing Liberal Society' (1985), 80;
'...with any gathering the interests of other people, both as individuals and as the "public", are 
adversely affected. Competing rights and public interest both provide subtly different 
justifications for the dispersal of a crowd or the arrest of participants...'.
23 infra., section II.
24 These decisions are often taken by the police, see, in the British context, D. Galligan, 
'Preserving Public Protest: The Legal Approach' in L. Gostin (ed.), 'Civil Liberties in Conflict’ 
(1988), 39;
'...there are difficulties in handling public protest. At the theoretical level, there is little 
common ground as to how the liberties involved - assembly, speech, and movement - are to 
be reconciled with each other, with conflicting rights and liberties, or with notions of public 
order. At the practical level, these conflicts become real and immediate; decisions have to be 
made and actions taken which directly or indirectly define the scope of public protest. 
Sometimes the problems of clashing values and interests are solved by legislative 
enactment...More typically, however, matters are left to be determined in a piecemeal way by 
the police, the courts, the Home Secretary, and a variety of other officials. And even where 
there are statutes, they are unlikely to provide more than a broad framework of guidance 
within which specific decisions are to be made.'
D. Waddington, K. Jones & C. Critcher (eds.), 'Flashpoints: Studies in Public Disorder' (1989), 
163, note that one of the key factors behind outbreaks of violence in assemblies is the 
relationship between the assemblers and the police. For an example of an analysis of police 
occupational culture and its effects on police behaviour and attitudes towards assemblies, see 
Waddington et. al., op. cit., 181 et. seq. and for an introduction to crowd theory, see J.S. 
McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob: From Plato to Canetti’ (1988), C. McPhail, The Mvth of 
the Madding Crowd' (1991) and N. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour' (1962).
25 E. Dunning, P. Murphy, T. Newbum & I. Waddington, 'Violent Disorder in Twentieth- 
Centurv Britain' in Gaskell & Benewick (eds.), The Crowd in Contemporary Britain1 (1987), 
19 at 29 et seq. note that there has been a change over time as to what is considered to be 
violent in the context of collective disturbances in Britain since 1900. More precisely, it was 
discovered that before the 1930's street fights involving the police and members of the local
(Footnote continues on next page)
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issues will be seen to suffuse the case-law in both France and England but 
here it should be noted that they illustrate the peculiarly vivid context of the 
liberty.26
Moreover, one more the point it can be seen that the laws that will be needed 
to regulate the exercise of the liberty will need to deal with this specific and 
particular context. It is argued that from a jurisprudential and political 
viewpoint, the right to assemble is not be a value that constantly overrides 
other values but at the same time the fact that a community grants it special 
status should be respected and secured by the law. This is once again the 
challenge of providing for change and uncertainty whilst at the same time 
protecting human rights. The particular and specific ways in which these two 
requirements are met in the law is investigated because of the emphasis on 
the specific and the particular, which is a central part of this study. By 
employing this method it is hoped to elucidate a more detailed picture of the 
context of the liberty to assemble.
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE
This last reason may be dealt with briefly because it will be illustrated in 
greater detail by the French and English legal regulation of the liberty.
Historical studies have shown the important role played by assemblies, often 
of a violent nature,27 in the demand for political and social change. This has
community were regarded by spectators and participants as entertainment. This is claimed to 
be linked to the existence of the 'street' as a principal centre of working class leisure. It is 
further asserted that due to the clearance of the working class from the inner cities after the 
war, the street declined as a location for this type of entertainment and there was a 
concomitant decline in the view that these disorders were legitimate. It is submitted that this 
evidence suggests that the criteria for distinguishing between violence and non-violence is 
dynamic and fluctuates in response to changing circumstances, including, as in the above 
examples, the economic and the social. Essentially, violence is not a fixed, objective category 
but is a social construct that very much reflects the opinions and values of the time.
26 Feldman, op. cit., 782;
'In every society there is a tension between the desire of citizens to be free from annoyance 
and disorder and their wish to be free to bring to the attention of their fellow citizens matters 
which they consider to be important. The way in which any legal system resolves the tension, 
and the balance which it strikes between competing interests, is indicative of he attitude of 
that society towards the relative value of different sorts of freedom.'
Robertson, op. cit., 66 also asserts the importance of the liberty;
'More than any other freedom it comes at a price...’.
27 Sherr's safety-valve conception also leads to a view that violence may be necessary where 
democratic channels to effect change and to voice one's interests are blocked. Violent 
assemblies might also be felt to be a legitimate means to challenge a violent and grossly
(Footnote continues on next page)
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especially been the case in France and England.28 For example, Rude notes, in 
studying popular protest in Paris and London in the eighteenth century, that 
assemblies were an important means of seeking reform;
In neither city were the wage-eamers or craftsmen of the eighteenth century considered a 
part of the political community...In consequence, at moments of crisis and social and political 
tension, the menu peuple or 'lower orders' sought redress for their grievances through street 
demonstrations, in strikes and in riots.29
Tilly also underlines the historical importance of assemblies in France and 
England when he asserts that a 'repertoire' of collective action was developed 
in these two countries around the mid-nineteenth century.30 He claims that 
this signals the birth of modem social movements, as the interests of people 
shifted away from the parochial and local to national affairs and major 
concentrations of power and capital.31 This change occurred in England in the 
1830's and in France around the 1848 Revolution.32 The reasons for the 
development of these new forms of collective action were linked to electoral 
reforms and the expanded scope of participation in national politics. A new
unjust political regime. This leads on to the issue of civil disobedience, which is again dealt 
with by Sherr, op. cit., 5-14 and c.f. J. Rawls, 'A Theory of lustice' (1972), 363-91 and H.A. 
Bed au (éd.), 'Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice' (1969).
28 See generally, G. Rudé, 'Paris and London in the Eighteenth Century: Studies in Popular 
Protest' (1970) 35-60, 223-67, 319-40, C. Tilly, 'Les origines du répertoire de l'action collective 
contemporaine en France et en Grande Bretagne' Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'Histoire 4 [1984] 
89, E. Hobsbawm, 'Primitive Rebels' (1959), E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English 
Working Class’ (1963), M. Lobban, 'From Seditious Libel to Unlawful Assembly: Peterloo and 
the Changing Face of Political Crime cl770-1820' Ox.J.L.S. 10 [1990] 307 and R. Cobb, The 
Police and The People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820' (1972). Bamum, op. cit., 312, sums 
up the use of assemblies as one important vehicle for achieving change;
Throughout history, large numbers of religious zealots, labour leaders, left- and right-wing 
propagandists, suffragettes, racists, pacifists, students, poor people, and many others, have at 
least temporarily forsaken conventional political processes and means of communication and 
chosen a public forum for expression of their grievances. Their activity has been as varied as 
publishing, meeting, speaking, parading, leafleting, picketing, and in many ways 
demonstrating their dissatisfaction.'
It was concern over police practices as regards the liberty to assemble in England that led to 
the birth of the National Council for Civil Liberties (now Liberty) in the 1930's; see M. Lilly, 
The National Council for Civil Liberties: The First Fifty Years' (1984) and R. Kidd, 'British 
Liberty in Danger: An Introduction to the Study of Civil Rights (1940), 123-50 for a 
description of some of their activities at this time.
29 op. cit., 54.
30 op. cit., (1984) and 'Speaking Your Mind Without Elections. Surveys, or Social Movements' 
Public Opinion Quarterly 47 (1983), 461,464 et. seq.
31 op. cit., (1983), 468 and op. cit., (1984), 95 & 102.
32 op. cit., (1984), 100;
'Ce n'est qu'au printemps de 1848 que la passion de s'assembler, de défiler et de délibérer fit 
pencher l'action collective vers le répertoire qui domine depuis lors.'
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discipline was called for, as opposed to the sporadic and localised violence of 
previous forms of collective action.33 The new repertoire that was developed 
is concerned with trying to achieve change and here assemblies play a central 
role;
The social movement consists of a series of challenges to established authorities, especially 
national authorities, in the name of an unrepresented constituency. Its concrete actions 
combine various elements of the newer repertoire: public meetings, demonstrations, marches, 
strikes, and so on, coupled with an attempt by leaders to link the actions organizationally and 
symbolically, as well as to bargain with the established authorities on behalf of their claimed 
constituency.34 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, some commentators view contemporary assemblies as 
also being characterised by the manifestation of grievances and protest.35 It 
may therefore be claimed that in contemporary times, assemblies have a 
political and democratic significance, and this view would coincide with the 
function of human rights as proposed by the jurisprudential theory adopted 
here.
Having stated the reasons for concentrating on the liberty to assemble, the 
next section will define it in more precise terms in order to have a clear view 
of what is being compared.
SECTION II 
DEFINING THE LIBERTY TO ASSEMBLE
In defining the liberty to assemble an effort will be made not to prejudice how 
the right is constructed in France by imposing conceptions derived from 
English law. At the same time, the liberty must be sufficiently well defined so 
that the relevant areas of law may be investigated. These two concerns seem
33 op. cit., (1984), 102. Rude, op. cit., 17-34, also notes a transition in collective action and 
contrasts this with the more violent, disorganised characteristics of what he calls the 'pre­
industrial crowd'. Furthermore, he also claims that these forms of collective behaviour date 
from the early eighteenth century in England and France until around the 1840's. Therefore 
both these historians point to the birth of modem assemblies in eighteenth century France 
and England.
34 op. tit., (1983), 466.
35 See, for example, J. Benyon & J. Solomos (eds.), The Roots of Urban Unrest' (1987), 
particularly, J. Benyon, 'Interpretations of Civil Disorder'. 23 and S. Hall, 'Urban Unrest in 
Britain'. 45 and G. Gaskell & R. Benewick, op. tit., especially G. Gaskell & R. Benewick, The 
Crowd in Context1. 1.
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to pull in different directions: openness/flexibility on the one hand and 
closure and certainty on the other. The dilemma that results will be resolved 
by having regard to jurisprudential theories which have sought to come to 
terms with similar problems in other areas of law.
The result of the application of these theories is that the liberty to assemble 
will be seen to be a complex general liberty that protects a range of activities. 
However, for the purposes of this study, two central activities will be focused 
on. These are found to be peaceful meetings and processions, which are 
claimed to be commonly understood and accepted aspects of the liberty to 
assemble. It follows that a reasonably certain definition of the liberty is 
formulated by which to commence comparison and which at the same time 
does not prioritise one national conception over that of the other.
A comparison will therefore be made of the laws that regulate these two 
fundamental aspects of the liberty to assemble. Finally, attention is drawn to a 
point that was touched on in the previous section; namely the possibility that 
the liberty to assemble would be best seen as a series of sub-liberties and 
therefore referred to as the 'liberties to assemble’. Although the English view 
of a single liberty within free speech has been noted, it will be seen to what 
extent French law points to a single liberty or instead a bundle of plural 
liberties and what would seem best from the point of view of jurisprudential 
theory, after comparison has been carried out in Part III. Here, this 
uncertainty and the need to avoid prejudicing this issue are recognised by 
once again using interchangeable terms: thus the 'liberty/right to assemble’, 
'liberties/rights to assemble’, 'liberty/right to meet' and the 'liberty/right to 
process' will be provisionally employed until Part III.
DEFINITION AND COMPARATIVE LAW
As previously stated, comparative analysis should avoid defining the subject 
to be compared in terms that reflect a particular set of values and 
understandings. For present purposes, this means that it is possible that the 
liberty to assemble may be defined differently in England and France; a 
definition from one jurisdiction cannot at the outset be posited without the 
risk of excluding features from the other jurisdiction. The liberty to assemble 
that would be compared using such an approach may legitimately be open to 
the criticism that it produces a distorted and partial understanding of that 
human right. Therefore, identifying and defining the subject of comparison is
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essentially an enterprise that searches for the highest degree of generality 
possible, in an attempt to avoid presenting the subject of study in terms that 
are pre-determined by a particular legal system. This seems to be conceded in 
the comparative methodology adopted by Zweigert and Kotz;
The question to which any comparative study is devoted must be posed in purely functional 
terms; the problem must be stated without reference to the concepts of one’s own legal 
system.36
and further;
If one's comparative researches seem to be leading to the conclusion that the foreign system 
has 'nothing to report' one must rethink the original question and purge it of all the dogTnatic 
accretions of one's oum system,'37 (emphasis added).
It follows that the act of defining is crucial; as stated above, it should be 
sufficiently precise to permit comparison to be carried out, whilst at the same 
time avoid the danger of imposing the features of one system on that of 
another. It might be thought that resort could be had to existing texts in which 
the liberty is mentioned. Art. 11 of the ECHR immediately springs to mind 
because of the fact that it binds both France and England and because, as 
already mentioned, it constitutes part of the common European heritage.38 
However, this provision does not provide much assistance; it merely refers to 
the 'right to peaceful assembly'. The only advance that can be said to be made 
towards resolving the problem of definition is that the liberty is concerned 
with peaceful assemblies but it is still unclear what is meant by 'assembly' in 
this context.
Another means of defining the liberty can be found in jurisprudential theory. 
Put briefly this theory claims that water-tight definitions are often impossible 
in the law but notwithstanding this there will often be substantial, if not 
unanimous agreement, as to certain legal terms. Hart firstly argued for the 
existance of a 'core* and 'penumbra' as far as the application of legal rules to 
factual circumstances.39 This was been taken up by other theorists, including
36 op. at., 31.
37 op. at., 31.
38 supra., chap.II, section III.
39 op. df., (1961), 119
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Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis.40 For example, Dworkin's consensus theory 
that was analysed above,41 works with a similar sort of point. Dworkin 
therefore claims that there is broad agreement as to the concept of law but 
broad disagreement as regards particular conceptions of law. Although 
Dworkin wishes to move beyond the core/penumbra distinction to wider 
considerations about interpretation and meaning in the law, for present 
purposes it is sufficient to note that he accepts that at a certain point there will 
be broad consensus as to the concept of law.
Secondly, Hart argued that the meaning of law and legal concepts could be 
gleaned from their use.42 This was because legal concepts did not refer to real 
objects or entities. For example, the meaning of the word 'dog' can be 
elucidated by pointing to a object to which it refers or stands for but this not 
the case for concepts such as 'rule', 'duty' or 'obligation'. To discover what 
they mean an examination of their different uses must be carried out.43
These insights will be adopted here so that the core meaning of the liberty to 
assemble will be elucidated and this will be undertaken by primarily 
examining its uses or values. More precisely, the liberty is defined by asking 
what are the functions or values which it is generally seen to carry out and 
then seeing which activities are generally seen to carry out these values. It 
these activities that constitute the core of the liberty.
FROM THE PENUMBRA TO THE CORE
The liberty to assemble does not cover all assemblies. For example, it would 
be unlikely that it would cover those gathering to watch a football match or a 
play in a theatre. These activities can be located well within the penumbra of
40 See Dworkin (1986), op. cit., 90-6, Finnis, op. cit., 9-11. However, this approach is not 
without its critics, for example, M.H. Kramer, 'The Rule of Misrecognition in the Hart of 
Jurisprudence’. O xJ.LS [1988] 401, op. cit., (1991) and R.M Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement' (1986), 5-42.
41 Chap.l, section III, supra.
42 See Definition and Theory in lurisprudence1 (1954), 70 L.Q.R. 37, also found in 'Essays in 
lurisprudence and Philosophy' (1983), especially 2-6 & 26 and (1961), op. cit., 120-7.
43 Here, Hart drew heavily on linguistic theory, especially that of L. Wittgenstein, 
'Philosophical Investigations' (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe: 1953), 43;
'For a large class of statements - though not all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it 
can be defined thus; the meaning of a word is its use in the language' 
and at 421;
'Look at the sentence as an instrument, and its sense its employment'.
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the meaning of the right. On the other hand, other activities can be placed 
within the core, for example picketing, sit-ins and vigils. These will generally 
be felt to be activities which the liberty to assemble should protect. What is 
the reason why one set of activities can be placed within the core, while the 
others are consigned to the penumbra? The response would seem to lie in the 
value of the activities concerned. As a consequence, the meaning of the liberty 
of assembly is not just simply a list of diverse activities that can, according to 
ordinary language, be called assemblies. Instead it refers to certain valued 
activities and their value in turn will be seen to be linked to their perceived 
functions, and ultimately their context of countervailing interests, that was 
presented in the previous section. It is therefore because of the valued 
functions of certain assemblies that justifies them being activities that are 
protected by a civil liberty.
If attention is returned to those examples of activities that were stated to be 
likely to be placed within the core of the liberty under study (picketing, sit-ins 
and vigils), it can be seen that they are placed in this position because they 
can be seen to be capable of performing the valued functions that, were 
generally thought to be those of the liberty. Thus, for example, picketing can 
be carried out in order to protest. If this protest acts as a safety-valve, in 
providing an outlet for grievances instead of violence, it could also be said 
that another aforementioned function is being carried out. The same 
observations could be made of a sit-in and a vigil. All three types of assembly 
could be employed as regards matters concerning democratic decisions and 
governance, thus they could fulfil the democracy and self-governance 
functions and values. Furthermore, these core aspects of the liberty to 
assemble can be used in the search for truth, which is yet another claimed 
value/function. Therefore, whether via protest or as part of the democratic 
process, they might be used as means to challenge established truths and in 
so doing it might be further argued that the self-fulfilment (yet another 
valued function) of those that participate is increased.
These examples show why these activities are valued and consequently why 
they are covered by the liberty to assemble. They can be contrasted with other 
assemblies which belong in the penumbra because of the relative difficulty of 
arguing that they fulfil the valued functions of the liberty. For example, it is 
not so easy to argue that gathering in order to watch a football match or a
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play in a theatre performs a democratic, truth, self-fulfilment, safety-valve or 
protest function /value.44
It is not contended that these functions are totally beyond these kinds of 
assembly but that they are not so obviously vehicles for effecting these values. 
Instead, in order for them to be seen as fulfilling the functions of the liberty to 
assemble, new and unusual factors must be added. Therefore, gathering to 
see a play could be said to be a means of protest but there would have to be a 
relationship between the assemblers and the play which resulted in the fact of 
their gathering to see it being viewed as protest. A similar relationship would 
need to exist between a football match and the gathering spectators in order 
for the assembly to be seen as performing democratic or truth functions. 
Nevertheless, the assembling is important: having to watch a football match 
or a play alone may often reduce the significance and pleasure of the 
spectacle. Thus, it would appear that the assemblies in these examples have 
value but not the values commonly attached to the liberty to assemble. For 
this reason they are not what is meant when the liberty to assemble is 
mentioned.
What is then shown is that the liberty to assemble means a series of assembly 
activities that are valued because of their functions and because these 
functions have value. In addition, it is claimed that the liberty covers peaceful 
assemblies. This quality is related to the aforementioned context of the liberty, 
which is the possibility that it might conflict with other liberties and values. 
Thus, a vigil might interfere with rights of passage, if it takes place on the 
public highway and a sit-in in a factory might adversely effect rights to work. 
The core activities of the liberty may also raise problems of public order, 
which have to be weighed up against the values that would be secured by 
assembling. Even though a penumbral activity such as assembling to watch a 
football match often causes problems of disorder, there is very rarely any 
assembly value that is seen as being at stake. As a consequence, it would be
44 Function and value are used synonymously here in that what is being referred to is the 
commonly put forward justifications for the liberty to assemble; in other words why is the 
liberty worth protecting and respecting. Marshall, op. cit., (1992), 44 acknowledges this 
approach as regards free speech rights
'Foundational theories and arguments deal in justification and answer the question, " Why is 
free expression or communication in general worth protecting as a political and constitutional 
interest? What social aims or purposes does the practice serve?"'
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unlikely to be claimed (and even less likely to be accepted) that the liberty to 
assemble was being violated if a decision was taken to ban spectators from 
watching a match. Therefore, the context, like the function/value of 
penumbral and core assembly activities would appear to differ. In the latter 
case of a football match, the values that conflict with values such as public 
order have a different weight and priority and for this reason they a priori fall 
within the scope of the civil liberty.
The fact that the liberty covers so many different activities points to the 
possibility that it is not a single liberty but is rather a bundle or series of 
related liberties. Moreover, it may be that the grouping of all these activities 
within one general liberty might obscure the particular legal mechanisms of 
protection that they require, as well as the difficulties from which they suffer. 
Recalling the priority given to specific analysis in this study, it would then 
seem best to separate out these different aspects and speak of the liberty to 
picket, the liberty to sit-in etc. and investigate their particular contexts and 
needs. Such a strategy would not only be theoretically based but would also 
avoid making any prejudgement that the liberty to assemble is a unified 
liberty in both French and English law. Consequently, this strategy is adopted 
here, so that along with the terms 'rights' and 'liberties', the terms the 'liberty 
to assemble' and the 'liberties to assemble' will both be employed.
A final aspect concerns the peaceful nature of assemblies. It is claimed that 
the liberty to assemble means peaceful assemblies. This claim is founded upon 
a consensus view. This consensus is seen in the fact that in national 
constitutions the liberty is invariably declared to secure peaceful assemblies. 
Thus, for example, in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
the 'right of the people to peacefully assemble' is guaranteed, whereas in art.8 
of the German constitution it is stated that 'Germans shall have the right to 
assemble peaceably'. Similar provisions are invariably found in national Bills of 
Rights.45 The same can be said as regards international texts, for example, 
art.20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states;
Everyone has the right of peaceful assembly
45 See the various provisions quoted in n.l of this chapter, supra.
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This formula has also been widely taken up in regional texts, such as art.15 of 
the American Declaration on Human Rights 1969;
The right of peaceful assembly, without arms is recognised.46
Given the broad degree of consensus, this view is also adopted here as being 
part of the general definition of the liberty. This is not to suggest that violence 
does not play a role in the regulation of the liberty. As was noted above, a 
decision that an assembly has or is likely to become violent will be of crucial 
importance, as it is on the basis of this decision that an assembly can be 
restricted. Nevertheless, it is one thing to note that assemblies within the 
liberty to assemble may become violent and another to equate them with 
violent assemblies, such as riots.47 These assemblies have no place within the 
protective scope of the liberty and consequently the focus of the study will be 
on the legal regulation of the former, but with careful regard as to the way in 
which violence conditions its legal framework.
MEETINGS AND PROCESSIONS
At this point the liberty to assemble could be defined as peaceful assemblies 
that perform certain valued functions but whose exercise may conflict with 
other human rights and values. However, this would not suffice as a 
definition of the liberty in this study because space precludes a detailed 
comparative analysis of all the assemblies that could commonly be said to be 
covered by so widely a defined liberty in France and England. Three 
examples of assemblies that are commonly agreed to belong within the liberty 
have been mentioned but, without claiming to be exhaustive, others such as 
meetings, processions and sit-downs could also be included. Given the limits 
of space, a choice has to be made as to which core activities should be 
examined.
The choice that is made in this study is that the liberty to assemble should be 
taken to mean meetings and processions. In Dworkinian terms they will be 
taken to be 'paradigms' of the liberty to assemble.48 This choice is justified on
46 For other examples, see art.21 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
1948, the already noted art.ll of the ECHR and art.21 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966.
47 D. Taratowsky, 'La politique et la rue' Ethnologie française 21 (1991) 317.
48 op. cit., (1986), 72-3 & 75-6.
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a number of grounds. Firstly, they have a longer history and were the first 
kinds of core assemblies to be legally regulated.49 This means that the legal 
regulation that concerns them is likely to be closer to the origins of the liberty 
to assemble. Secondly, they have in the past broken out into violence and 
their exercise can cause inconvenience and the restriction of other liberties.50 
As a consequence, they squarely raise the context of countervailing values 
that was mentioned above. Thirdly, it is contended that these two assemblies 
can act as the means to achieve the kinds of challenge and social change that 
is advocated by the theory of human rights that has been formulated in this 
study. Fourthly, the law regulating the liberty to assemble has often been seen 
in England as a reliable indicator of the way in which human rights are 
generally regulated. Thus Dicey stated;
No better instance can indeed be found of the way in which in England the constitution is 
built up upon individual rights than our rules as to public assemblies.51
and more recently but in a less optimistic vein, Feldman has made the same 
point;
This field, perhaps more than any other, makes manifest the consequences of a constitutional 
and political ethos which values pragmatism above principle, and has little or no room for 
rights.52
49 Tilly, op. cit., (1983), 476 and (1984), 104, observes that in the twentieth century there have 
been some new initiatives or themes as regards the repertoire of collective action (i.e. 
assemblies). These have generally involved the occupation of space (op. cit., 468) but he insists 
that people have retained and adopted 'centuries-old' established means of, inter alia, 
meetings and demonstrations, This repertoire developed in the 1830's and was manifested by 
the use of meetings and marches; op. cit., (1983), 473;
It bore a number of stigmata of our own time's social movements: holding public meetings, 
organizing associations, mounting petition drives, marching through the streets... 
Throughout Great Britain, people mobilized for and against different programs of 
parliamentary reform. They called meetings and marches, claiming victory when many people 
showed up for them.' (emphasis added).
Therefore these two activities can be claimed to lie at the heart of collective behaviour via 
assemblies, as noted by Robertson, op. dt., 67;
'Demonstrations helped to win the democracy we enjoy today. The right to stand for 
Parliament, the right to vote and the right to join trade unions were all hastened by meetings 
and marches and protest movements.' (emphasis added).
50 Tartatowsky, op. dt., 317 and Waddington et. al, op. dt. and Rudé, op. dt.
51 'Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution1 (1885), 271 and Baffrey, op. dt., 31 
states;
'Etudier le droit de réunion en Angleterre, c'est retracer non seulement son histoire, c'est vivre 
une des plus parfaites réalisations de la Common Law...'.
52 Feldman, op. cit., 842.
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It is therefore of considerable interest to English law to examine how this 
important liberty is regulated in France. These remarks were made about the 
regulation of the liberty under ordinary circumstances and not under states of 
emergency. The regulation of the liberty under these circumstances will not 
be studied here because its regulation in normal times provides a better 
example of how the law decides if the right is to prevail against other 
interests. On the other hand emergency measures or states of emergency 
invariably mean that human rights are curtailed and so do not exert their 
normal influence and importance.53
The liberty to assembly will therefore be defined in this study as the activity 
of peacefully meeting or processing/marching in order to carry out certain 
valued functions which can be ultimately employed to challenge the status 
quo and achieve political and social change. Furthermore, the possibility that 
these aspects are liberties in their own right will be recognised by employing 
the terms 'liberty/liberties to assemble' and 'liberties to meet and process or 
march'.
Having defined and highlighted the specific importance and meaning of the 
liberty to assemble, the liberties to meet and to process can be seen as justified 
objects of comparison. Therefore, it is to the legal regulation of these central or 
paradigmatic aspects of the liberty to assemble that attention is now turned.
A SUMMARY
In this chapter the concern has been to justify the concentration on the liberty 
to assemble in this essay. In this connection, it has been argued that this is an 
important human right both historically and in contemporary times and that 
it classically presents the kind of issues that legal regulation must deal with as 
concerns human rights in general but also particular problems that stem from 
its specific nature. The second concern has been to define the liberty in order 
that France and England may be compared. The definition of the liberty to 
assemble focuses attention on central aspects of this liberty, while at the same 
time indicating the possibility that there, on the contrary, liberties to assemble.
53 On states of emergency generally, see K. Jeffrey & P. Hennessy, 'States of Emergency’ 
(1983) and D. Bonner. 'Emergency Powers in Peacetime' (1985).
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PART TWO
THE LIBERTY TO MEET AND THE 
LIBERTY TO PROCESS IN FRANCE
The two chapters in this part of this study present the legal regulation of the 
two central aspects of the liberty to assembly - the liberties to meet and to 
process - in France. Consequently, Chapter IV looks at the liberty to meet, 
whereas Chapter V focuses on the liberty to process.
CHAPTER IV 
THE LIBERTY TO MEET IN FRANCE
The legal regulation of the liberty to meet in France will be presented in this 
chapter. Like the next, this chapter constitutes the 'raw material' of the study, 
in the sense that it is this legal framework that will be compared and 
evaluated with that in England. The emphasis is therefore on description but 
an accurate report of the law would not be complete without pointing to 
problems and inconsistencies that may exist and so the more important of 
these will also be included.
The liberty to meet will be presented in three sections. First it will be seen 
how it is commonly defined in French law. Secondly, its legal history will be 
explained because this provides the context for the current arrangements that 




There is no legislative text in the French legal system which defines the liberty 
to meet. However, the importance of definition has been recognised1 and as a 
consequence, French commentators have formulated different definitions of 
the liberty to meet by claiming that it performs certain functions and 
guarantees certain values. These will be set out here.
Therefore, on some occasions the liberty is placed within a category referred 
to as the liberties of thought and expression. Examples of this are provided by 
Colliard who places the liberty within what he entitles the 'liberties of thought 
and intellectual liberties,'2 whereas Robert and Duffar claim that the liberty to
1 For example, M. Waline, 'Ou'est-ce qu'une réunion publique?’ D .l937.73;
'...il reste utile et même nécessaire de distinguer la réunion de plusieurs activités; la 
manifestation - le spectacle - enfin, le cours d'enseignement postscolaire ou d'enseignement
supérieur. Cette nécessité réside en ceci, que ces activités sont soumises à des régimes 
juridiques différents, moins libéraux.'
2 op. cit., 409, these include;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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meet is an aspect of the 'liberties of collective expression'.3 It follows that 
meetings are claimed to be of secondary importance compared to the 
communicative functions that are carried out within them;
La réunion n y est jamais qu'un élément accessoire et secondaire qui vient se greffer sur une 
autre liberté dans la législation de laquelle elle est englobée.4
If this definition is accepted, the liberty under study can be seen as occupying 
a position set out by article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen 1789, which states that
La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de 
l'homme
This is the claim that is made, for example, by Berthon;5
Dans la Déclaration [d]es Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, de juillet-août 1789, est affirmée 
la liberté en général, la liberté d'aller et de venir; par conséquent la liberté de se réunir, la 
liberté de la pensée et de l'expression de la pensée - cela suffit pour établir le droit de réunion.
On other occasions the liberty to meet is placed within a category of group 
liberties.6 Interestingly, Duffar and Robert's formulation of collective liberties 
of expression can be seen as a fusion of the group and expressive aspects of 
the liberty.
Alternatively, the liberty to meet, along with the liberty to process, is placed 
within the liberty to protest/demonstrate ('manifester'), thus Tercinet 
distinguishes between those liberties that protect the individual against 
public power and those liberties that;
tendent à l'expression active de convictions telles la liberté de la presse, la liberté de réunion 
ou la liberté de manifestation.7
'La liberté d'opinion - La liberté religieuse - La liberté d'enseignement - La liberté de la presse 
- Le régime des spectacles, du cinéma - Le régime de la radio-diffusion, télévision - La liberté 
de réunion - La liberté d'association.'
3 op. cit., 17 et. seq„ & 567.
4 A. Joubrel, "Du droit de réunion' (1904), 14.
5 R. Berthon, 'Le régime des cortèyes et des manifestations en France1 (1938), 15.
6 Costa, op. cit., 84 claims that group liberties contain five principle rights: the liberty of 
association, the liberty to meet, the liberty to process, the liberty to belong to a trade union 
and the right to strike.
7 M-R. Tercinet, 'La liberté de manifestation en France' RX>.P. (1979), 1008 at 1009.
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Nevertheless, the liberty to meet is mentioned as an independent liberty in 
the penal code.8 This construction of the right has a long pedigree, for 
example, both the studies by Lefebvre and Joubrel, at the beginning of this 
century, mention the liberty to meet and provide historical accounts going 
back to the eighteenth century.9 It should be added that there is a tendency 
not to make reference to the liberty to 'assemble' and but rather a preference 
for concentrating on specific assembly rights, such as the liberty to meet. An 
exception is provided by Le Clère,10 who speaks of the 'liberté d'assemblée' 
but even so his study emphasises specific types of assemblies. Therefore, he is 
critical of the use of the word 'meeting' to cover till the various and distinct 
forms of assembly. He claims that meetings are commonly and erroneously 
simply held to mean the gathering together of persons with the simple goal of 
being together and asserts that this obscures the diverse forms of assembly 
and the value that they secure;
attachons-nous de suite au cœur du problème: être ensemble! Oui, c'est bien là que gît le 
principe directeur, la vérité lumière, sous l'écorce du mot roturier qui cache aussi bien la 
conférence, le meeting, l'émeute, le spectacle ou le culte. Parce qu'on imagine tout cela avec 
un seul mot, on oublie son acception plus étroite et le but d'être ensemble est éclipsé par celui 
de penser ensemble. Le mot réunion à caché le concept assemblée.11
The aim of Le Clère's study is therefore to examine the specific legal 
frameworks of the different assemblies and as such, his method can be seen to 
emphasise the particular, as appears to be the tendency in France.12 Thus, 
even with Le Clère's use of the broad term 'liberty to assemble', there is an 
acknowledgement of the specific and diverse activities that this covers.13 In
8 Art.431-1, section III, infra.
9 E. Lefebvre, 'Le droit de réunion' (1903) and Joubrel, op. cit.
10 'Les réunions, manifestations et attroupements en droit français et comparé' (1945), 3 et. 
seq.
11 op. cit., 4.
12 op. cit., 7;
’A chacune de ces incarnations d'un même phénomène social, le législateur français a 
appliqué des règles différentes,...'.
13 op. cit., 7;
'L'assemblée, fait social, se manifeste sous trois activités principales: la réunion, assemblée qui 
pense et que l'échange des idées oppose à la manifestation, deuxième groupe de la grande 
famille, qui se caractérise dans la matérialisation d'un but par le nombre. Enfin, voici 
l'attroupement, forme dégénérée de la réunion et de la manifestation et bien plutôt maladie 
de l'espèce qu'entité distincte et caractérisée de la trilogie ainsi groupée sous le terme 
assemblée.'
(For an explanation of attroupement, see infra., chapter VI).
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French law it is therefore possible to point to a distinct liberty to meet, even if 
it is seen as part of a wider and more general category of expression. 
However, the differences in definition point to the uncertain and flexible 
nature of the liberty, which were characteristics hat were noted of human 
rights in chapter I.
DEFINITION VIA CHARACTERISTICS
Notwithstanding this kind of uncertainty, there have been attempts to define 
the technical characteristics of meetings, in order to distinguish them from 
other forms of assemblies but these can also be characterised by uncertainty. 
Therefore, French commentators commonly assert that a meeting must have 
three characteristics.14 These are drawn from the opinion expressed by the 
Commissaire du gouvemement in the case of Beniamin.15 in which he stated 
(1) that a meeting must be limited in time. In other words that a meeting must 
be a momentary assembly of persons, (2) that it must be organised in advance, 
meaning that the meeting must have been intentional and (3) that it must 
have a specific goal, namely the exchange of ideas and opinions, or the 
protection of interests.16
This opinion can be seen as a synthesis of prior decisions which sought to 
isolate those activities which are covered by the liberty to meet.17 Thus, in du 
Halgouet,18 the court found that there was not the requisite element of prior 
organisation in the gathering of a group of people who, having just left 
Sunday mass, stood to listen to the 'haranguing' of a deputy from the balcony 
of the local town hall.19 However, the vagueness of this notion of organisation
14 For example, R. Dautan, 'Police des réunions, manifestations et attroupements’, J.-Cl. 
(Admin), Fase. 210, 2, (1992), 3, Colliard, op. cit., 720-3, Burdeau, op. cit., 216-7, Robert & 
Duffar, op.cit., 570, J. Montreuil, 'Réunions publiques’ J.-Cl. (Pénal), Fase. 10,11, (1990) 3 and 
Joubrel, op. cit., 3.
15 C.E. 19th May 1933, Rec.541 and see M. Long et. ai, op. cit., 277-283, Colliard, op. cit., 737, 
Burdeau op. cit., 219-220, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 574-5, Rivero op. cit., 340 and Dautan op. at.,
3.
16 The Commissaire de gouvemement stated;
'La réunion publique constitue un groupement momentané de personnes formé en vue 
d’entendre l'exposé des idées ou d’opinions en vue de se concerter pour la défense d'intérêts.’ 
(c.f. M. Menanteau, 'Les nouveaux aspects de la liberté de réunion’ (1937), chps.I & II).
17 riy 77th Feb. 1886. S.1888.1.9. and Delmotte C.E. 6th Aug. 1915, D.P.1916.3.1.
Cass. civ. 14th March 1903, S.1906.1.103.
19 This opinion was followed in Castex, Cass. crim. 13th Dec. 1923, D.P.1924.1.121.
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has been noted20 and can be further seen in the later decision, in Castex.21 that 
an assembly of persons who stayed after the close of a formal meeting in 
order to hear a speaker who had not been permitted to speak at that meeting, 
manifested a sufficient degree of organisation in order to constitute a meeting. 
There is a novel departure from du Halgouet in the introduction of the notion 
of a degree of organisation. The case therefore adds a gloss to the former 
requirement of mere organisation by stating that a minimum level of 
organisation must be present in order to constitute a meeting for the purposes 
of the liberty to meet. However, what this level actually is, is not specified, 
thus making the requirement somewhat vague.
A second type of uncertainty is revealed when an attempt is made to 
distinguish the two cases. From their respective facts it is difficult to isolate 
the salient differences between the two which would justify their different 
outcomes. In the du Halgouet no organisation was held to exist, whereas in 
the Castex there was found to be a sufficient degree of organisation. Between 
these two points there is an almost infinite variety of possible levels of 
organisation and thus further uncertainty.
It is submitted that light may be thrown on the ratio of du Halgouet if it is 
read as a decision concerning both the so-called characteristics of organisation 
and momentariness. It seems possible to interpret the gathering in this case as 
not merely being by chance but also momentary. Though, as stated above, a 
meeting must have momentariness as one of its characteristics, it is submitted 
that a meeting which is both momentary and lacking in prior organisation, as 
the facts suggested in the instant case, would lead the court to hold that a 
meeting had not been legally constituted for the purposes of the liberty to 
meet. In this sense Castex can be read as solely concerning the question of 
organisation. The two cases can therefore be said to respond to two different 
circumstances and it is for this reason that they lead to different conclusions.
However, this reading of du Halgouet presents yet another problem. If, as 
stated above, a meeting must be of momentary character, but at the same time 
it must not pass below a minimum degree of momentariness, the uncertainty 
that formerly tainted the requirement of prior organisation now effects that of
20 Colliard, op. cit., 720.
op. cit.
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momentariness. Moreover, this characteristic is important in setting out the 
scope of a meeting. It is by reason of its momentary and discontinuous 
character that a meeting is commonly differentiated from an association.22
It is submitted that both requirements of organisation and momentariness 
have areas of greater or lesser certainty, which corresponds to a core and 
penumbral distinction referred to in chapter II above. The elucidation of these 
characteristics defines, with a relative degree of certainty, those elements that 
combine to constitute a meeting as opposed to other assembly activities. 
However, such a delimitation is open to constant uncertainty. The same can 
be said for the third characteristic; that of a specific goal or object.23 
Nevertheless, the three serve to hive off (with the accompanying interplay of 
certainty and uncertainty mentioned above) meetings from associations, and 
other kinds of assembly.
The inter-relationship between the different defining characteristics of 
meetings is illustrated in the recent case of Préfet du Finistère.24 The facts of 
the case concerned the decision by the Mayor of Brest to ban the use, by 
elected communist council representatives, of the town hall for political 
meetings every Friday. The prefect sought judicial review of this decision and
22 The momentary character of a meeting is contrasted with the more durable nature of an 
association and more specifically, the common link or lien between the members of the latter, 
as is stated by the Commissaire du gouvernement in Benjamin (supra.);
'La réunion se distingue de l'assodation en ce que cette dernière implique un lien permanent 
entre ses membres; elle ne doit pas être confondue non plus avec un spectacle théatral ou un 
spectacle de curiosités soumis, l'un et l'autre, à des régimes juridiques différents de celui de la 
réunion.'
and Colliard, op. cit., 721;
'Le critère qui permet d'opposer la réunion à l'association est que la réunion à un caractère 
momentané, discontinu, à la différence de l'association. Le lien d'association est beaucoup 
plus fort, beaucoup plus durable que le lien de la réunion. Les membres d'une réunion ne se 
retrouveront peut-être plus jamais alors que les associés se retrouvent périodiquement.'
As will be seen in the next section, the authorities have not always been scrupulous in 
recognising the distinction between meetings and associations.
^  For the first time, in the case of Delmotte et Senmartin, C.E. 6th Aug. 1915, D.P.1916.3.1., 
the Conseil d'État formulated a definition of meetings as the following;
'Réunion concertée ou organisée en vue de la défense d'idées ou d'intérêts.'
Although, this definition emphasises the third of the requirements mentioned above it is 
incomplete because it fails to address such questions as the difference between meetings and 
associations. In this case the Conseil refused to confer upon a group of consumers who met 
unintentionally, even if regularly, in a cafe, the status of a meeting (c.f. Colliard, op. cit., 720- 
!)•
24 Trib. Admin. Rennes 10th Jan. 1985, A.J.D.A., 490.
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requested that it be struck down as being discriminatory and therefore an 
excès du pouvoir.
The court had to decide whether the representatives were prevented from 
exercising their liberty to meet. According to the relevant legislation, electoral 
meetings fell within the protective scope of the liberty,25 therefore the court 
had to decide in law if the representatives had sought to hold an electoral 
meeting. It was held that the meetings were of a permanent kind. This 
permanent nature was based upon the councillors' request to use the town 
hall every week. Thus, the proposed meetings were not found to be 
momentary and so did not constitute meetings for the purposes of the liberty 
to meet. However, the judgement went further and held that the degree of 
permanence that had been found had the effect of altering the purpose of the 
meeting; in that a permanent gathering of councillors had different objectives 
than those of an electoral meeting.26
The court's reasoning is of interest because it shows how one of the three 
delimiting characteristics can be altered by a change in one of the other 
characteristics. In the instant case it was the lack of momentariness that 
altered the purpose of the meetings. In addition, the same observation can be 
made here as was made earlier, as to the lack of certainty as regards the 
requirement of momentariness. Therefore, it remains an open question as to 
what degree of momentariness would have been sufficient for the court to 
find that an electoral meeting had been constituted: would, for example, an 
intention to hold a meeting once every month have had the requisite degree 
of momentariness?
Furthermore, there is a tension between a minimum degree of advanced 
organisation (the third of the traditional defining characteristics) and 
momentariness. It is contended that the instant case can also be seen as an 
example of where the degree of organisation was too high, so that it eclipsed 
any momentary nature that the meetings had. However, it is not suggested 
that every meeting that is organised with great detail will lose its momentary
25 See section III, infra.
26 The court stated;
'...une permanence d'élus tend à la réalisation d'objectifs différents tels que le maintien du 
contact avec les électeurs et la prestation de certains services: intervention, secours...'.
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character, but rather that if the prior organisation involves planning for a 
series of future meetings, it will be more likely that the court will find that the 
meetings no longer have the requisite momentariness.
Public and private meetings
It should be noted that the three characteristics noted above can also be 
applied to private meetings. As will be seen later in this chapter, private 
meetings are subject to greater legal protection than public meetings and as a 
result it may be important to distinguish between the two.27 Consequently, in 
a number of cases it has been sought to determine the scope of public and 
private meetings and a number of principles have been drawn from this case- 
law, whilst the subject is treated at length by legal commentators.28
Essentially this case-law has shown that attempts to distinguish between 
public and private meetings on the basis of their location do not succeed. 
Such a distinction was long ago rejected in the case of Larcy,29 in which it was 
held that a meeting could be of a public nature even if held in a private 
domicile. The court did not rely on the location of the meeting but instead on 
the nature of the people invited to attend the meeting. Therefore, although 
invitations had been circulated, they were in effect available to anyone.30 This 
same principle was again applied in order to state that a private meeting was 
one to which members had been personally invited31 but as a criteria there is 
much uncertainty as to what exactly a personal invitation means.32
27 Dautan, op. dt., 3;
'La différence de régime entre ces deux types de réunions exige qu'elles soient nettement 
définies l'une par rapport à l'autre.'
(c.f. Burdeau, op. dt., 223).
28 Colliard, op. cit., 723-6, Robert, op. cit., 570, Montreuil, op. cit., 5-6 and Dautan, op. dt., 3-4.
29 Cass. crim. 9th lan. 1869. S.69.1.281.
The court ruled as follows;
'...Est publique, bien que tenue dans le domicile privé d'un citoyen, la réunion pour laquelle
des invitations ont été distribuées soit à domicile mais sans adresses, soit sur la voie publique,
soit à la porte de l'habitation du prévenu, ou chacun pouvait s'en procurer...'
and it has been confirmed that a meeting can be found to be private even where it is held in a
venue that is normally considered to be public; Trib. civ. Rennes 10th March 1905, D.P.
19055.8.
31 Cass, crim. 6th Dec. 1909, D.P. 1910.1.4%.
32 In Beniamin the Conseil refused to uphold the applicant's claim that a literary conference 
was a private meeting because the invitations were again open to all. In the case of Pyçard 
(C.E. 23rd Dec. 1936, Rec.Leb.115), the Conseil upheld a mayor's ban on a series of meetings 
planned by the right-wing Franciste movement. The mayor had feared that these purported 
private meetings were in reality public, or would degenerate into public meetings that were
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Another principle that seeks to distinguish public from private meetings is 
the existence or non-existence of a link between the persons invited to attend. 
According to this view, a private meeting is one in which attendance is 
reserved to members of a club or association. There is a connection between 
this reservation to members only requirement and the personal invitation 
requirement, which can be seen in the following hypothetical fact situation, in 
which a meeting is to take place and the persons invited are a class of persons 
defined by some common characteristic. It follows that it is this characteristic 
which constitutes the link between the invitees. Membership of an association 
is invariably conditional on persons meeting the required characteristics. The 
broader the class of persons, the more difficult it becomes to maintain that 
they are linked by any particular characteristic that justifies differentiating 
them from the broadest class of all: the general public. Finally, if the general 
public are in effect the class of persons invited to the meetings, it can then be 
claimed that there is no special or assodational link between the members. 
Indeed, it could further be argued that the class has become so wide as to no 
longer constitute a class.
There must, therefore, be limits to the generality of an assodational link and 
the courts have recognised this. In Cass, crim. 7th Dec. 1927,33 the court held 
that an association that purported to be holding private meetings in which all 
the members of the public were permitted to enter upon the payment of a 
membership fee, was in fact holding a series of public meetings. The 
membership fee was found in effect to be an entrance fee. The court went on 
to require a narrower assodational link that actually united all the members.34 
It is clear that the assodational link requirement, as a means of delimiting
likely to cause public disorder (see section III below for powers to ban or restrict public 
meetings that threaten public order). The Commissaire du gouvernement made four points as 
to the invitations lack of personal qualities: (1) the invitations were non-nominative, in that 
they bore no names on them; (2) they were distributed widely and without charge; (3) they 
were distributed in all public buildings in the locality and (4) they were in the possession of 
virtually every person in the locality. The points made in this case appear to be the sole 
occasion in which any attempt has been made to give content to the personality requirement. 
For an extensive discussion of the nature of personal invitations, see joubrel op. cit., 121-133.
33 S.1928.1.85.
34 Colliard op. at., 725 asserts the following;
'La réunion, dès lors, n'est plus privée lorsqu'elle comporte à côté des sociétaires permanents, 
des membres temporaires ou des invités qui constituent un public, public désigné par les 
tribunaux sous le nom de "public spécial", "public restreint".'
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public and private meetings, is itself uncertain in its scope and is a question of 
degree.
Two further characteristics have been raised as means of distinction.35 The 
first is a requirement that the venue of a private meeting be closed. This can 
be seen as a sophistication of the personal invitation requirement because the 
essence of this characteristic is that a private meeting must have access 
reserved to those personally invited. The venue therefore becomes 'closed' to 
those who are not invited, i.e. the general public. The second requirement is 
linked to the first, in that it states that for a meeting to be considered private, 
there must be an effective, constant and real control of those who are 
admitted. This control could therefore be constituted by the difficulty of 
access for the uninvited, demanded by the first requirement. It must, 
however, be noted that no legal authority is stated to support the existence of 
these two characteristics.
The question of the distinction between public and private meetings as with 
the definition of meetings in general, is therefore answered in French law by 
the utilisation a number of different characteristics, of varying degrees of 
uncertainty and authority. What is however clear is that even if there is not a 
water-tight definition of the liberty, it is recognised as a distinct civil liberty 
that protects a distinct form of assembly that functions to secure certain 
values.
SECTION II 
THE HISTORY OF LEGAL REGULATION
The history of the legal regulation of the liberty to meet36 will be seen to have 
greatly affected the present regulation of this liberty. It also provides the 
context of this liberty and therefore leads to a better understanding of the law. 
For these reasons its history is presented here. A recurrent theme will be seen 
to be the close link between political events and the exercise and regulation of 
the liberty, so that it may be asserted that perhaps to a greater degree than
35 Montreuil, op. cit.. 6.
36 See generally, Lefebvre, op. tit., 27-81, Joubrel, op. tit., M-L. Degrenne, 'Les reunion5.g,t jes 
pouvoirs de police' (1938), chp.l and Le Cl ere, op. cit., 8-41.
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other civil liberties, the history of the liberty to meet closely follows the 
changes in the political climate, as stated by Robert and Duffar;
'L'histoire de la liberté de réunion suit en effet directement l'évolution politique de notre 
pays'.37
Finally, this investigation of history will further illustrate the importance of 
this liberty in the political and social history of France, as was initially 
claimed in chapter III above.
THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES
It was the 1789 Revolution38 that led to the legal articulation of the liberty to 
meet. Although the 1789 Declaration did not expressly include the liberty 
under study, there is support for the view, as mentioned above, that this 
liberty can be derived from the Declaration of 1789.39 An express mention of 
this liberty can be found in article 62 of the Decree of 14th December 1789. 
which for the first time recognises the 'right' of citizens to meet peacefully and 
unarmed. This proclaimed right could only be exercised if a prior declaration 
was made to the municipal authorities. The insistence on a prior declaration 
was not the only restriction placed upon this right: it was only granted to 
politically active citizens.40 The right to meet was thus more of a benefit to the 
middle classes and was viewed instrumentally as enabling participation in 
political life rather than a value in itself. This can be seen as an early example 
of the liberty performing a democratic function.
37 op. cit., 571.
38 See generally, G. Lefebvre, 'The French Revolution: from 1793 to 1799' (1967), G. Rudé, 
The French Revoultion' (1988) and A. Soboul, 'Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution 
Française' (1989).
39 See section I, supra.,. It should also be recalled that the liberties set out in the Declaration 
were unenforceable and that this reflected the supremacy of parliament, as influenced by 
Rousseau's theory of the 'general will' (see chp.II, section II, supra., C. Fohlen, 'La filiation 
américaine de la Déclaration des Droits1 and T. Marshall, op. cit., both in C-A. Colliard et. al., 
op. cit., (eds.), 21 & 36 respectively).
40 The distinction between 'active' and 'passive' citizens was introduced by Sieyès. The 
qualifying conditions that had to be met in order to be classed as an 'active' citizen are to be 
found in Title III, First Chapter, section II, art. 2 of the 1791 Constitution. The requirements 
basically concerned wealth (c.f. Soboul, op. cit., 1001). In consequence, this distinction was 
itself met with violent resistance, co-ordinated by the 'Club des Cordeliers'. The Jacobean 
revolutionaries were therefore attacked despite their Republican ideology. Moreover, the 
Cordeliers drew greater support from the proletariat because they were predominantly 
'passive' citizens and the Jacobeans were predominantly from the middle classes (c.f. Joubrel 
op. cit., 56)
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A series of legislative measures were passed in the immediate aftermath of 
the Revolution, which recognised the right of peaceful assembly and reflected 
the dominant revolutionary ideology of this time: Instruction of 12-24th Aug: 
1790, art.3(8), Decree of 19-20th Sept 1790 and the Decree of 13-19th Nov 
179041. In addition, the liberty to assemble was finally recognised at a 
constitutional level in the Constitution of 3rd Sept. 1791, Title ip).42 It should 
therefore be noted that during this period, it was the liberty to assemble that 
was generally spoken of, as opposed to the liberty to meet and other kinds of 
assembly. However, sporadic disorder and the responses by the authorities 
were to lead to a central role being played by meetings and initially it was the 
meetings of dubs that were of pivotal importance.
The politically volatile nature of the Revolutionary period and the need to 
keep under control dissenting elements which threatened to cause public 
disorder can be seen by the Constituent Assembly's concern over the excesses 
of the clubs.43 On the other hand, the power of the clubs is demonstrated by
41 See further, E. Lefebvre, op. cit., 28-9.
*2 'La liberté aux citoyens de s'assembler paisiblement et sans armes, en satisfaisant aux lois 
de police...'.
43 As is instanced by the Decree of 16-17th lune 1791 which required a prior declaration 
before a club could be formed. The revolutionaries were extremely uneasy about the 
existence and proliferation of clubs, as indeed was the case for any form of intermediate body 
or group that sought to place itself between the citizen and the state;
'Les hommes d'État de 1789 étaient avant tout des individualistes, repoussant complètement 
tout corps intermédiaire entre les citoyens et l'État, repoussant également au maximum 
l'intervention de cet État, le concept pour eux étant l'État gendarme...',
(G. Lepointe, 'Histoire des institutions du droit public français1 (1952), 9). Indeed, it has been 
noted that one of the characteristics of the Revolution and the 1789 Declaration was that of 
individualism, for example, Morange, op. cit., 29-30, points to the fact that only individuals 
are holders of rights in the Declaration and no group, except the nation as holder of 
sovereignty (art.12), is mentioned. What therefore resulted was a deep suspicion of groups 
and group rights, as highlighted by the content of the Declaration;
'Il n'est fait aucune allusion à la famille et les droits de réunion ou d'association ne sont pas 
reconnus. Ces omissions sont volontaires. On craint que les groupes n'étouffent l'individu et, 
suivant le raisonnement de Rousseau, ne gênent la formation de la volonté générale. 
L'individu, être générique et non "situé", se voit conférer des droits abstraits.' (op. cit., 30). 
Clubs, and indeed all forms of opposition to the government were not institutionalised at this 
time. Therefore the constitutions of the revolutionary period can be seen as partisan, 
procedural devices which sought to set out the policies and general conditions by which the 
particular group in power at the time were to rule; see Hayward, op. cit., 2;
Therefore with the fall of the constitutional Monarchy in August 1792 and the King’s 
execution on 21st Jan. 1793, the various factions that were subsequently to take control of 
parliament each sought to secure their positions against perceived and often actual violent 
opposition.'
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their securing of the Decree of 13th June 1793.44 which, inter alia, prohibited 
the police from interfering with club members and those that took part in 
popular assemblies. This decree was followed by an even stronger prohibition 
against interference with club members by virtue of the Decree of 15-25th July 
1793.45 In addition the Convention's constitution of 24th June 1793 (arts.7 & 
122) guaranteed the liberty to assembly peacefully and the right to meet in 
clubs. Despite the formal liberality of these texts, everyday practice during 
this period was generally illiberal. For example, such was the hegemony of 
the Jacobeans, that the Monarchists were forced to meet secretly (their club 
was known as the 'Club des Feuillants') in fear of their lives.46
Eventually the Assembly was unable to endure the political and physical 
agitation caused by the clubs and they were gradually banned. The process 
began with the banning of women's clubs47 and then finally all clubs that met 
periodically were banned by virtue of the Decree of 16th Oct 1794 48
44 Article 2. This measure must be seen in the context of two earlier pieces of restrictive 
legislation that were passed to curb the violent excesses of the clubs; Law of 19-22nd lulv 
1791. Title 1, art.14 and Law of 29th lulv 1791 (as regards seditious meetings).
Joubrel op. cit., 54-67 states that the first French club appeared in Paris in 1782. The French 
clubs were basically inspired by those in England. Their popularity grew, especially given the 
liberalising of the legal environment by virtue of the Decree of 14th Dec 1789. (supra.). It is 
within this period that the Jacobean Club achieved its position of political dominance; urging 
for a more Republican orientation in policy, in opposition to the demands of the Monarchists. 
The often violent excess of the Jacobeans was one of the factors which had led to the 
Revolution, and violent opposition to the Ancien Régime was encouraged when all clubs 
were ordered to be closed down in 1787 by the Royal Police.
Despite this relatively long pre-Revolutionary pedigree, the nature of clubs presented a 
problem for the liberty to meet. This stems from the fact that the clubs were associations that 
also held meetings. In spite of judicial recognition that these clubs were associations, formed 
with the aim of arranging periodical public meetings, it will be seen below that measures 
aimed at clubs were also applied to public meetings; thus taking advantage of the dual 
qualities of clubs (c.f. Joubrel op. cit., 20-1).
45 The provision provided for a penalty of ten years in irons for officials and five years for 
ordinary citizens who attempted or actually disrupted the meetings of clubs.
46 See further E. Lefevbre, op. cit., 30 et. seq.
This period of Jacobean rule saw the institution of The Great Terror, c i . G. Lefebvre, op. cit., 
116-125, Rude (1988) op. cit., 85-107 and Soboul, op. cit., 1020-5.
47 Decree 30th October 1793. Joubrel op. cit., 70 quotes a member of the Convention as stating 
the following in support of the measure;
'...les femmes sont, par tempérament, plus portées que les hommes à l'exaltation et la vivacité 
de leurs passions, leur présence dans les débats publics, serait funeste aux intérêts de l'Etat.'
48 This outright ban occurred shortly after the execution of the Jacobean leader, Robespierre 
(28th July 1794). The measure might be seen as the implementation of the Girondins' more 
conservative philosophy as regards public order, as well as an example of their use of their 
newly secured legislative power to ensure the emasculation of the primarily Jacobean- 
organised.
(Footnote continues on next page)
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The activities of the political clubs had finally led the authorities to depart 
from their earlier liberalism but more importantly, the clubs had used 
meetings as the predominant mode of assembly by which to communicate 
and discuss their views. The liberty meet consequently achieved recognition 
as an important value, separately from the liberty to assemble, and was 
eventually enshrined in art. 122 of the 1793 Constitution;
La Constitution garantit à tous les Français...le droit de se réunir en sociétés populaires
Thus, despite the general use of the term 'liberty to assemble' in the legislative 
measures of this time, it was the more specific activity of meetings that were 
felt to be fundamental. However, it was because of the link between meetings 
and clubs, that efforts to control the excesses of the latter restricted the liberty 
to meet. In other words, legislation aimed at controlling political associations 
was also applied to meetings.
It was the Constitution of the 22nd Aug. 1795 which first introduced the 
distinction between meetings and associations in order to ban the latter49 but 
because the law was clumsily applied meetings were often repressed.50 
Furthermore, the constitution restricted the liberty to meet by virtue of 
art.362, which prevented any discussion of political questions in the meetings 
of those clubs that were not banned by the constitution;
Aucune société particulière, s'occupant de questions politiques, ne peut correspondre avec 
une autre, ni s'affilier à elle, ni tenir des séances publiques, composées de sociétaires et 
d'assistants distingués les uns des autres51
(c.f. N. Hampson, 'Will and Circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau and The French 
Revolution1 (1983), 5-62 for a detailed analysis of the influential political theories during the 
revolution).
49 Art.361;
'Aucune assemblée de citoyens ne peut se qualifier de société populaire.'.
This provision was reinforced by the more specific Decree of ¿3rd Aug 1795 dissolving clubs.
50 See E. Lefevbre, op. cit., 32-5.
51 Other provisions of the constitution illustrate the primacy of public order concerns at this 
time, for example, art.360;
'Il ne peut être formé de corporations ni d'associations contraires à l'ordre public.', 
and art364 concerning the right of petition;
'tous les citoyens sont libres d'adresser aux autorités publiques des pétitions, mais elles 
doivent être individuelles; nulle association ne peut en présenter de collectives..'
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In effect, the liberty to meet was prevented from being used in order to 
support and provide for participation in political decisions, which, as has 
been seen, was a major function in the early period of the Revolution and is 
today claimed to be one of its values. The Revolutionary period can therefore 
be summarised as a time of continual political upheavals and resulting public 
disorder that led to restrictions on the liberty to meet after its earlier liberal 
treatment.
1810-1848
The legal framework dating from the Revolutionary period was essentially 
maintained until 1848. The statutory developments between the constitution 
of 1795 and this date were principally aimed at controlling (and thereby 
invariably restricting) the liberty to associate. For example, the penal code of 
1810, in an attempt to once again restrict the liberty to associate and the 
activities of clubs, was used to restrict the liberty to meet by virtue of art.291;
Nulle association de plus de vingt personnes dont le but sera de se réunir tous les jours ou à 
certains jours marqués pour s'occuper d'objets religieux, littéraires, politiques ou autres, ne 
pourra se former qu'avec l’agrément du Gouvernement, et sous les conditions qu’il plaira à 
l’autorité publique d’imposer à la société.’
In response, clubs ceased to meet periodically and split into small groups of 
less then twenty, thus avoiding prosecution under the penal code. In this way 
they continued to incite anti-government feeling and public disorder.52 In 
consequence, the government passed the Law of 10th April 1834. which 
amended art.291 so that it applied to associations of more then twenty 
persons even if they were
partagées en sections d'un moindre nombre et qu'elles ne se réunissaient pas tous les jours ou 
à des jours marqués
These restrictions became even more severe in the penal code of 1848: 
arts.291-294 banned all associations of greater than twenty persons and 
submitted smaller associations to a regime of prior government authorisation. 
These provisions were essentially the same as the provisions in the 1810 penal 
code, except that in the latter case associations of less than twenty persons 
were formerly unrestricted.
52 Colliard, op. at., 754 and M. Deslandres, 'Histoire constitutionnelle de la France: de 1789 à 
1870' Vol. D (1932), 163-173.
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The legislative intention behind the provisions of the 1810 code can clearly be 
seen from the debates in the Assembly.53 These show that arts.291-294 were 
only to be used to restrict associations.54 Decisions by the Cour de Cassation 
also confirm the non-application of these provisions to meetings (16th Aug 
1834 and 14th Feb 1835). Nevertheless, despite these avowed intentions and 
the judicial pronouncements, the exercise of the liberty to meet was virtually 
impossible during this period. This was because the local authorities could 
also use their general powers to maintain public order, granted by virtue of 
art.50 of the Decree of 14th Dec. 1789. art.3(5), Title XI of the Laws of 16-24th 
Aug 1791 and the Decision of the Consuls du 12 Messidor An VIII (1st July 
1800), against those who sought to exercise the liberty.55
In order to by-pass these legal restrictions, special kinds of meetings were 
thought of in which what was often violent opposition to the government was 
co-ordinated and sustained.56 This was principally achieved via a series of 
banquets that were later to become known as 'La campagne des banquets 
reformistes'. An attempt was made to resort to the Revolutionary statutes that 
had been already passed in order to fill the legal lacuna which enabled these 
anti-government meetings to continue but there was considerable doubt as to 
the legality of such a move57 and in any case it remained largely ineffective. It
53 Recorded by E. Lefevbre, op. cit., 33-4.
54 However, Le Clère, op. cit., 11-12, daims that the despite the legislature's claims to only 
restrict associations, there was also an intention to strike at the liberty to meet;
'On a prétendu que cet article ne visait que les associations. Mais nous avons déjà dit quelle 
était la rubrique du chapitre: Des associations ou réunions illicites. Et, pour dissiper tout 
malentendu, lors de la discussion des articles 291 à 295, Berlier, rapporteur au Conseil d'Etat, 
déclara le 16 Février 1810: "Le droit absolu et indéfini qu'aurait la multitude de se réunir pour 
traiter d’affaires politiques, religieuses ou autres serait incompatible avec notre politique 
actuelle."*
55 For an explanation of these powers, see section III, infra., ?
^Menanteau, op. cit., 11 & 70 claims that it was because deputies were unable to assemble 
people together in order to have small political meetings that the idea of having political 
dinners was developed.
57 The government claimed that it could apply the provisions of the 1848 penal code and the 
similarly restrictive Law of 10th April 1834 (as regards associations) to meetings and 
therefore to the series of banquets that had begun at the end of 1847. For details of the 
acrimonious debates concerning the legal propriety of the government's claim, see Joubrel op. 
cit., 90 et. seq. and for the application and effect of this law, see Menanteau, op. cit., 66-70. At 
this time an impressive array of public order powers existed: the Minister of Interior had an 
outright power to ban meetings (confirmed by art. 13 of the 1868 statute). Mayors had duties 
to maintain order (by virtue of their general public order powers noted above and see section 
HI, infra.) and the public peace fLaw of 22nd Dec.-10th lan. 1790, art.2). In addition, the Law 
of 18th lulv 1837. art.11 gave them the power to take regulatory decisions regarding those
(Footnote continues on next page)
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was thus a banquet which the government had insisted it could ban (planned 
for 22nd Feb. 1848) which caused the riot that in turn led to the revolution 
which brought down the government and the July Monarchy of Louis- 
Philippe.58 This is a clear instance of where the liberty to meet was of crucial 
historical importance.59
1848-1881:
Owing its very existence to the demands to exercise the liberty to meet, the 
new government had little political choice but to liberate meetings and clubs 
from the legal and extra-legal restrictions under which they had been placed 
between 1810 and 1848.60 However, once again serious public disorder was to 
follow as the clubs took advantage of this liberalisation.61 This is an 
interesting period for the liberty to meet, in that the statutory developments 
were in general of a liberal trend but there were continual oscillations 
towards restrictive measures. This highlighted the government's fear and 
suspicion that certain groups (i.e. the clubs) were abusing the liberty.
Therefore, while the liberty to meet was preserved with little restrictive 
regulation and the Constitution of 1848, by virtue of art.8 reçognised the 
liberty of citizens to peacefully assemble and associate,62 clubs proliferated
areas they were to keep under surveillance by law. This power permitted mayors to take 
action to prevent the continuance of public disorder once it had broken out. In the exercise of 
this power, mayors had the same powers as the prefects of police; the latter also drawing 
their authority from the 1790 act. In Paris the prefect was given, by virtue of Consular 
decision of 12 Messidor. An VIII (supra.), the power to
'...prendre les mesures propres à empêcher ou prévenir les réunions tumultueuses ou 
menaçant la tranquillité publique...'.
58 A more detailed account of 'La campagne de banquets’ can be found in Des land res, op. cit., 
209-217, E. Lefevbre op. cit., 36-7 and A. Jardin & A-J. Tudesq (trans. E. Forster), 'Restoration 
and Reaction. 1815-1848' (1983), 200-204.
59 Colliard, op. cit., 732;
'La liberté de réunion n'est pas aussi nettement la cause de la Révolution de 1848 que la 
liberté de la presse de celle de la Révolution de 1830.'
60 E. Lefevbre op. cit., 37 states;
'Le gouvernement du 24 Février, né d'un mouvement en faveur de la liberté de réunion, dût 
reconnaître d'une manière absolue cette liberté.'
This liberalism was further underlined by the proclamation of 19th April 1848;
'Citoyens, la République vit de liberté et de discussion. Les clubs sont pour la République un 
besoin, pour les citoyens un droit.'
61 Menanteau, op. cit., 11, notes that after the liberalisation of 1848 and between 24th February 
and 30th March of that year, 145 clubs were formed in Paris and its suburbs.
62 'Les citoyens ont le droit de s'associer, de s'assembler paisiblement et sans armes, de 
pétitionner, de manifester leurs pensées par la voie de la presse ou autrement. L'exercice de 
ces droits n'a pour limites que les droits ou la liberté d'autrui et la sécurité publique.'
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and were suspected of inciting the riots of the summer of that same year. 
Eventually, after an attack on the Assembly, the government was eventually 
forced to act. On 28th July it passed a Decree whose title clearly stated that its 
object was to restrict the activities of the clubs.63 Notwithstanding this 
intention, the measure severely restricted most meetings.
It was the July Decree that first made a distinction between public and private 
meetings. It was only the former that were regulated; being required to 
submit a declaration to the authorities not less than forty-eight hours before 
the holding of a meeting.64 This system of prior declarations did not prevent 
further rioting and general public disorder, again solicited by the clubs, but 
this time aided by a burgeoning and vociferous press. Indeed a state of siege 
was declared in response to an attempted coup on 13th June 1849. However, 
it was the Law of 19th Tune 1849 which most severely restricted the liberty 
under study. This emergency legislation enabled the government to ban clubs 
and other meetings (be they public or private) which were felt to compromise 
public security. The bans had a duration of one year. However, each year the 
Assembly renewed the provisions65 and it essentially remained the statutory 
regime until the coup d'état of the 2nd December 1851 and the return of an 
authoritarian monarchy.
When the Second Empire was subsequently proclaimed (1851), the initial 
intention appeared to be that of liberalising the legal framework that 
regulated the liberty to meet. By virtue of the Decree of 25th March 1852, the 
July 1848 Decree, which was ostensibly aimed at clubs, was repealed and the 
provisions of the 1810 penal code (as amended by the 1848 code)66 were 
reapplied, as well as the law of 1834 to public meetings. Nevertheless, as time 
passed there was a return to the oscillation between liberality and restriction
63 *Décret sur les Clubs'. It should be further noted that the general exdusion of women from 
political assemblies (dating back to the Decree of 30th Oct 1793, see n.47, supm.,) remained in 
force by virtue of art.3, which prohibited women from being club members.
64 For a general account of the provisions of the July Decree, see Joubrel, op. cit., 97-8. After 
the Decree no subsequent legislation has ever sought to regulate private meetings, 
Menanteau, op. at., 122.
65 The provisions of this statute were renewed on 6th June 1950 and then again on the 21st 
June 1851 and it was stated in art.l;
'Le gouvemement est autorisé pendant l'année qui suivra la promulgation de la presente loi, 




and this is made nowhere more explicit than in the Decree of 15th Tanuarv 
1853 which, inter alia, banned all clubs and public meetings of a political 
nature and subjected all associations and meetings consisting of more than 
twenty persons to tin obligation to seek prior authorisation. Even electoral 
meetings were caught by this statute.67 On the other hand, a liberal trend in 
the legislation then followed, as instanced by various ministerial circulars and 
the forbearance of the police authorities.68 This was to culminate in the Law of 
6th June 1868.69
The 1868 Act was the central provision that once again established a more 
liberal legal framework.70 All public meetings, except those of a religious and 
political nature, were no longer subjected to an obligation to seek prior 
authorisation. Instead, a declaration had to be made three days in advance of 
the proposed date of the holding of the meeting (art.2).71 However, religious 
and political meetings remained subject to the prior authorisation 
requirement under the 1853 decree.72
The Act also contained some interesting features (some of which were 
inspired by the 1848 Decree) which were to have a considerable bearing on 
the drafting of subsequent legislation. Thus, the prior declaration had to be 
signed by seven persons who were domiciled in the commune where the
67 The application of the law to electoral meetings was supported in the decision by the Cour 
de Cassation; 4th Feb. 1860: D.l.65.91.
68 See Colliard, op. cit., 733.
69 Entitled 'Loi relative aux réunions publiques1.
70 For example, a circular from the Ministry of Interior (12th Feb. 1866) permitted authorities 
to authorise public meetings, as long as they did not appear likely to compromise public 
order. In cases of doubt authorities were to seek guidance from the Minister.
71 Electoral meetings enjoyed more favourable regulation. Therefore, by virtue of art.8 it was 
provided that electoral meetings could take place one day after the authorities had issued a 
receipt acknowledging a prior declaration had been made. The statute also introduced a clear 
distinction between associations and meetings by stating that only the former were subject to 
arts.291-294 of penal code and the 1834 law;
'Le projet de loi, ainsi que l'indique son titre, n'a pas pour but de modifier les prescriptions 
des art. 291 et suivants du Code pénal, ni celles de la loi du 10 avril 1834, qui atteignent les 
associations; il ne s'applique qu'aux réunions publiques se produisant à l'état de fait 
accidentel et temporaire, sans les caractères de permanence et d'organisation qui constituent 
et caractérisent les associations.'
(Presentation of the legislative bill to the Senate; 13th March 1867, by M. Peyrusse: Rec. de 
lois 1868253).
72 Art.l(2);
Toutefois, les réunions publiques ayant pour objet de traiter de matières politiques ou 
religieuses continuent à être soumises à cette autorisation.'
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meeting was to take place (art.2(2)) and had to indicate the time, place, date 
and subject of the meeting. The proposed meeting was also required to have 
an organising committee of three persons,73 whose duties were to maintain 
order and to keep the topic of the meeting within that stated in the prior 
declaration (art.4). An official74 could also attend the meeting and he /she had 
the power to dissolve it if he/she believed that it was ultra vires its stated 
purposes, or was becoming riotous (arts.5 & 6).
An anti-liberal feature of the Act was that meetings could only be held in 
closed and covered locations and then only up until the closing time of public 
buildings and shops in the locality (art.3). Once again this provision was 
originally to be found in the July 1848 Decree (art.3). Furthermore, by virtue 
of the continued application of the penal code and the 1834 law, clubs were 
still, as in 1853, banned.
The wide powers accorded to the authorities within article 13 provide yet 
further evidence of the continued vacillation between liberality and restriction 
in the statutory developments of this period. The article in question provides 
that
Le préfet de police à Paris, les préfets dans les départements peuvent ajourner toute réunion, 
qui leur paraît de nature à troubler l'ordre ou à compromettre la sécurité publique.
L'interdiction de la réunion ne peut être prononcée que par le ministre de l'Intérieur.
There was severe criticism of this power of 'adjournment' (which will 
henceforth be referred to as postponement) in the Assembly. Most of the 
article's critics claimed that there could be little difference between the stated 
power to adjourn and an outright power to ban. Given the temporal nature of 
public meetings, a decision by the prefect to postpone a meeting until a later 
date would have the same practical effect as a ban because the impact
73 The 1848 Decree (arts.4-6) was the first legislative measure to provide for the concept of an 
organising committee. However, the 1868 Act substantially modified the nature and 
functions of this committee.
74 The exact wording is 'un fonctionnaire de l'ordre judiciaire ou administratif. In the 
parliamentary discussion of the bill, the Commissaire du Gouvernement stated;
'Ce n'est pas un simple agent comme on a paru le croire, c'est un fonctionnaire qui doit 
assister aux réunions. Ce fonctionnaire peut être un préfet, un sous-préfet, un maire, un 
commissaire de police, un juge de paix. Cette nomenclature n'est évidemment 
qu'énumérative.'
(Rec. des lois, op. dt., 259).
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achieved by holding a meeting at its originally intended time would be 
weakened, if not completely destroyed.75
It must be noted that both the official's power to dissolve (art.6) and the 
prefect's power to postpone (art.13) public meetings complemented the 
existing local authority police powers regarding public order (art.7). It will be 
seen in section III below that these local authority powers are crucial to the 
regulation of the liberty to meet.
Deslandres76 makes the point that the 1868 Act was received coolly because 
there was party-political distrust of a liberty which had in the past been the 
cause of so much public disorder. Nevertheless, legal practice at this time 
seemed to be liberal because the distinction between political and other 
meetings was not in practice applied and officials did not see themselves as 
obliged to attend public meetings as one of the members of the organising 
committee.
It was after the fall of The Second Empire in 1870 that the Third Republic was 
installed.77 It had to deal with serious public disorder.78 Meetings were 
restricted using the Law of 7th lune 1848, which however was a measure 
aimed at disorderly assemblies (attroupements).79 Strict application of the 
criminal sanctions attached to the 1868 law (art.9) and those of a general 
nature (arts.291-294 of the penal code) were the order of the day. Therefore, 
the Third Republic commenced by only permitting the exercise of the liberty 
to meet within the terms of the 1868 framework but this was sufficiently 
liberal to allow clubs to meet.80 The government was however forced to try to
75 For accounts of the debates in the Assembly regarding art.13, see Joubrel op. cit., 106-8.
76 op. dt., 641
77 For a detailed commentary of the precarious but long-lived Third Republic, see J.F. 
McMillan, Dreyfus to de Gaulle: Politics and Society in France 1898-1969' (1985).
78 For example, the events surrounding the Paris Commune of 1871; see R. Williams, The 
French Revolution of 1870-1871* (1969) and S. Edwards, The Paris Commune. 1871' (1971) 
and for the disorder of the 1930s, see chap.V, section II, infra.
79 For an explanation of these assemblies, see chap.V, section II, infra.
80 see, M. Deslandres, 'Histoire constitutionnelle de la France: l'avènement de la Troisième 
République: la constitution de 1875' (1937), 44;
'...le Gouvernement aurait pu les interdire. Il l'aurait dû, car en pareilles circonstances ils sont 
extrêmement dangereux, étant des foyers tout préparés pour la révolution. Il les toléra, étant 
un gouvernement d'autorité morale, et dans les Débats le 27 septembre de Molinari les déclara 
nécessaires comme les baromètres permettant de mesurer la pression de l'opinion publique.
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curb the excesses of the clubs and so for the third time in history they were 
banned (by virtue of the Decree of 22nd-23rd lanuarv 1871V
Despite this restriction, other types of meetings were liberalised. A statute 
was passed on 2nd August 1875, which, inter alia, created a special, more 
liberal regime for electoral meetings (art.16). They were permitted to be held 
up to, and including, the day of voting, whereas under the 1868 Act they 
could not be held less than five days before an election (art.8).81
This liberal trend was confirmed when eventually, after two years of debate 
and study, the government passed the Law of 30th Tune 1881. Although the 
measure is generally agreed to be a liberal reform of the law,82 it should be 
noted that it is located within the penal code and was passed in the context of 
a perception that public meetings no longer posed the same threat to public 
order as before;
l'expérience démontre que grâce au progrès des mœurs publiques, les périls que l'on pouvait 
redouter autrefois ne sont plus à craindre aujourd'hui.83
Nevertheless, the Act states in bold terms in art.l that 'Les réunions publiques 
sont libres' and so the intention to secure the position of the liberty is clear. 
For the first time, the liberty was explicitly guaranteed.84 Although the 
previous practice under the Third Republic had generally been liberal, as seen 
by the continued application of the 1868 Act, the 1881 Act can be said to be 
even more so, in that though it also states that the liberty will not be subject to 
prior authorisation, it adds an explicit statement of principle which sets the 
tone for the remaining provisions. It follows that the provisions are qualified 
by the need to uphold liberty, as is noted in the report to the Senate during 
the legislative passage of the bill;
vous avons cru devoir proclamer plus nettement le principe même de la loi, la liberté des 
réunions publiques; nous avons cru qu'il était utile que cette déclaration dominât toutes les 
dispositions qui vont suivre, non seulement afin qu'elle constituât une affirmation théorique 
indiscutable, mais aussi afin qu'elle servit de règle d'interprétation à l'administration et à la
81 However, it should be noted that this liberalisation of electoral meetings was limited in 
scope by the fact that the provisions only applied to elections to the Senate.
82 For example, Robert & Duffar, op. at., 571 and Colliard, op. at., 735.
®  Rec. des Lois, 1881,210.
84 Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 571.
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magistrature, pour toutes les questions qui ne seraient pas expressément résolues par les 
dispositions réglementaires suivantes.®*
THE 1881 ACT
However, in its original form the 1881 Act relied heavily on the novel features 
first introduced by the 1868 Act. Therefore, in requiring a prior declaration 
before a meeting could be held (art.2), it drew on the 1868 system.86 It also 
adopted the requirement, although with some modification, of the organising 
committee (art.8)87 and the possible attendance of an official (art.9). The same 
article also left intact the public order powers of the local police, as was the 
case under the 1868 Act. Finally, clubs remained banned (art.7) as under the 
1868 Act.
There are however, important differences between the two acts.88 Firstly, the 
1881 Act subjected all meetings, irrespective of their content, to the more 
liberal requirement of having to make a prior declaration. This repealed the 
regime that existed under the 1868 Act, by which political and religious 
meetings had to seek prior authorisation, while all other kinds of meeting had 
only to provide a prior declaration. Furthermore, in contrast to the 1868 Act, 
the declaration only had to be submitted twenty-four hours before a meeting, 
instead of the former requirement of forty-eight hours.
85 op. at., 211.
86 The major difference between the two statutes was that in the 1881 Act the prior 
declaration had to be made for all public meetings, including those of a religious or political 
nature (see supra.).
87 The presence of the organising committee was a prerequisite of a properly constituted 
public meeting under art.8 of the 1881 Act. The committee were to police public order in the 
meeting. This appears clear in consequence of its four functions;
(1) to maintain order (2) to stop all breaches of the law (3) to keep the meeting to the subject 
that had been stated in the declaration and (4) to prohibit all discussion that was contrary to 
public order and good morals or which consisted of a provocation to commit criminal 
offences.
Nevertheless, in being bound by these duties the committee had no police powers; at most it 
could either request that the official intervene to dissolve the meeting or it could close the 
meeting. Once the committee had closed a meeting it was no longer criminally liable for any 
crimes that may later have been committed within the meeting.
88 For a general comparison between the 1868 and 1881 acts, see E. Lefebvre op. at., 67-81.
166
Secondly, this declaration only had to be signed by two persons of good 
character from the locality89 and it no longer had to state the object of the 
meeting (art.2).90
Thirdly, whereas the 1868 Act merely stated that a certificate had to be 
immediately given by the authorities upon receipt of a prior declaration, the 
1881 Act went further. In art.2, it laid down that a legal record of a refusal to 
provide a receipt could be made; it is submitted that the purpose of this 
provision was to enable an aggrieved party to use this official record as 
evidence in any judicial or administrative proceedings that might 
subsequently ensue.91
Fourthly, and perhaps most interesting for the future development of this 
area of law, the 1881 Act fails to adopt article 13 of the 1868 statute. This 
article provided that only the Minister of the Interior could ban a meeting. 
The 1881 Act is therefore silent as to banning powers, in that it does not 
contain its own banning powers. Instead, the power to prohibit meetings is 
thus to be found in other statutes that, as already noted, are mentioned and 
preserved in art.9.92
Further differences can be noted; although the 1868 Act did not mention a 
prohibition of meetings on the public highway, as in art.6 of the 1881 
enactment, it must be noted that it did include the far wider and more 
draconian measure of limiting public meetings to closed and covered 
locations (art.3). Thus the location of meetings was liberalised, in that they no 
longer had to be held in these closed and covered places.
89 See Joubrel, op. cit., 135-45. The prior declaration was justified in terms of both public order 
and the protection of the right;
'11 est facile d'en justifier l'utilité: la déclaration est une mise en demeure à l'autorité, non 
seulement de sauvegarder l’ordre, mais de faire respecter la liberté qui pourrait être menacée 
par des manifestations hostiles aux promoteurs de la réunion.'
(extract from the report to the Senate, Rec. des Lois, 1881,211).
90 However, art.4 required that the declaration state what kind of meeting was to held;
'La déclaration fera connaître si la réunion a pour but une conference, une discussion 
publique ou si elle doit constituer une réunion électorale..'.
91 Art .2(5) reads;
Dans le ras où le déclarant n'aurait pu obtenir de récipissé, l'empêchement ou le refus pourra 
être constaté par acte extrajudiciaire ou par attestation signée de deux citoyens domiciliés 
dans la commune.'
92 These are the general public order powers of the police.
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In addition, as in the 1868 Act (art.9), the criminal sanctions for breaches of 
the 1881 Act set out in art. 10 also provide for police penalties,93 
notwithstanding prosecution for crimes that may be committed within the 
meeting itself but it also provides uniformity in comparison with the 
previously complex criminal sanctions within the 1868 Act by treating all 
breaches of its provisions as contraventions. In contrast, the 1868 statute 
provided that failure to obey the orders of the official (art.10) could be 
sanctioned by tougher fines and the possibility of longer prison terms than 
were applicable for other breaches of its provisions (art.9). Interestingly, the 
1868 Act also sanctions those that enter a meeting armed (art. 11). This is not 
sanctioned in the 1881 Act but as will be seen below, it is dealt with by the 
general public order powers of the police.
Finally, the statute reduced the scope of the official's power of dissolution so 
that this power could only be exercised either when he/she was requested to 
exercise these powers by the organising committee or if the meeting became 
violent. Under the 1868 Act, by virtue of art.6(l), the official could also 
dissolve on the grounds that the discussion had strayed onto matters outside 
those stated in the prior declaration. Thus, in general, the 1881 Act can be said 
to be a measure that emphasises the regulation of the liberty to meet rather 
than one that is primarily concerned with maintaining public order.
The original Act has been amended on two occasions at the beginning of this 
century. Both amendments have been seen as liberal reforms and are
93 Art.10 reads as follows;
'Toute infraction aux dispositions de la présente loi sera punie des peines de simple police, 
sans préjudice des poursuites pour crimes et délits qui pourraient être commis dans les 
réunions.'
Police penalties were the lowest criminal sanctions in French law. They punished police 
contraventions, which were divided into five classes, according to the maximum fine that 
was applicable (art.R.25). According to art.464 of the former penal code the sanctions 
consisted of imprisonment, fines and the confiscation of certain goods, which were either 
obtained illegally, were the products of a contravention or were to be used to commit a 
contravention (art.470).
These provisions have now been repealed (art.372 of the Law of 16th Dec 1992. infra.) and 
have been replaced by a new scale of contraventions and police penalties, set out in arts.131- 
12-18 of the new penal code. The sanctions are generally the same as under the former code, 
except no provision is made for imprisonment. Therefore, a breach of any of the provisions of 
the 1881 Act can still now only lead to a fine or the confiscation of goods.
168
contrasted by what are commonly seen to be later restrictions on the part of 
administration and the judiciary.94
The first amendment was effected by the Law of 1st Tulv 1901. For the first 
time, this statute provided a legal framework for the liberty to associate,95 it 
also legalised the formerly illegal clubs by repealing art.7 of the 1881 Act, 
which banned them. It follows that the meetings of clubs are now permitted 
and are therefore regulated by the amended 1881 Act on the same terms as 
any other public meeting.
The second statutory amendment was effected by the Law of 28th March 
1907. By virtue of art.2, the requirement that public meetings had to provide a 
prior declaration was repealed.96 Art.l sets out the current position;
les réunions publiques quel qu'en soit l'objet, pourront êtres tenues sans déclaration préalable
Although clearly a liberal step, the statute actually represented a considerable 
concession by the government vis à vis the Catholic church, which had 
refused to obey the Law of 9th December 1905. concerning the separation of 
Church and State. As part of this objective, the Act laid down that all religious 
meetings, like all public meetings, would merely be required to make a 
symbolic prior declaration. This declaration would cover all meetings, 
whether permanent, periodic or occasional for an entire year. However, the 
Church felt that such a regime breached the principle of hierarchy as far as 
the position of the Catholic religion was concerned and so consequently it 
rejected and subsequently refused to obey this measure. Their argument was 
based on the view that requiring the same prior declaration as other meetings 
was to assert that the Church was on the same footing as an ordinary lay 
organisation and other religions.
The government seemed to be faced, prima facie, with three possible, but 
awkward, choices of action. Firstly, it could take legal action against the
94 For example, Colliard op. cit., 736;
'L'évolution contemporaine à été successivement marquée par deux tendances 
contradictoires, une tendance plus libérale, avant 1914, une tendance moins libérale, très 
limitatrice de la liberté de réunion depuis 1933.'
95 See J. Morange, 'La liberté d'association en droit public français' (1977), Colliard, op. cit., 
751-77 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 584-604 for the history and regulation of this liberty.
96 Therefore, arts.2-4 of the 1881 Act were repealed.
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Church for breaking the law; a prospect with high political and moral costs. 
Secondly, it could decide not to prosecute the Church; but then it would be 
countenancing, by its forbearance, the systematic breach of the law. Thirdly, it 
could amend the 1905 Act by extending its provisions to all religious 
meetings, except those of the Catholic church; exposing them to the criticism 
that they were according the Catholic religion a privileged position.
There was, however, a less obvious alternative, which the government 
accepted and is manifested by the Act of 1907. This was to remove the 
requirement of a prior declaration for all meetings (whether religious or non­
religious). The result was to put all the religions on an equal footing which 
left the Church with no ground upon which to complain about the loss of 
their position of superiority: because they could not point to the imposition of 
any positive legal requirements that smacked of treating them on the same 
level as a lay organisation other religions.97
Finally, the 1907 Act also repealed art.3 of the 1881 Act which regulated 
electoral meetings. Art.3 had laid down the periods when such meetings 
could be held and the procedure for the submission of a prior declaration. 
Anomalously, the statute did not repeal art.5 which defines electoral meetings 
in terms of the function of choosing candidates and the categories of persons 
who can attend such meetings.98 The result is that the 1881 Act defines 
electoral meetings but does not refer to them anywhere else. It can be asked 
why electoral meetings are still separately defined when they are now treated 
in exactly the same manner as other public meetings.
The liberty to meet has been seen to have a long history but one linked to 
public disorder. On the other hand, it has often been repressed because it has 
been confused with other activities such as associations. Its history has also 
been seen to have been linked to important political events in France. The 
1881 Act is an important measure for three reasons. First, it was the first 
statute to deal exclusively with a specific human right. To turn the idea round
97 See Berthon, op. cit., 24-5 and Colliard, op. cit., 736.
98 A rt5 reads as follows;
'La réunion électorale est celle qui a pour but le choix ou l'audition de candidats à des 
fonctions publiques électives, et à laquelle ne peuvent assister que les électeurs de la 
circonscription, les candidats, les membres des deux Chambres et le mandataire de chacun 
des candidats.1
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the other way, as Rivero does, the liberty to meet was the first to receive 'its 
[own] statute'.99 It is also interesting to emphasise the legislative desire to 
provide a detailed and specific set of legal rules, which could regulate the 
liberty, as well as containing a declaration of principle;
une simple déclaration de principes, qui ne serait accompagnée d'aucune disposition 
d'organisation, n'offrirait de garantie ni pour l'ordre public, ni pour la liberté des citoyens.1®®
Secondly, the statute not only distinguishes the right from other liberties, 
such as the liberty to associate, but it is also prioritises a concern to regulate a 
civil liberty, as opposed to securing public order. Therefore, although the 
application of police powers is provided for should disorder break out, the 
focus of the measure is on securing the right to assemble peacefully.
Thirdly, by virtue of 1881 Act the right is recognised by statute, which it will 
be recalled enjoys a pre-eminent position in French law by reason of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. It will be seen in the next section that 
in the face of countervailing values and interests that often call for the 
restriction of the liberty, its statutory status gives it an important weight and 
value that must be taken into consideration.
SECTION III 
THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, the current legal arrangements that regulate the liberty to meet 
will be described. The provisions of the 1881 Act, which form the centrepiece 
of the current legal framework, have already been presented as part of the 
historical examination above and so attention can now be turned to other 
aspects of this framework. The liberty will be seen to be regulated by a 
combination of statute, administrative regulation and case-law. In addition, a 
major concern or justification for its limitation is that of maintaining public 
order. Consequently, this value will also be examined.
99 'Les libertfe publiaucs' vol. II, (1977), 334.
Extract from report to the Senate, Rec. des Lois, 1881,210.
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STATUTES
Protection from other citizens
As part of the new penal code,101 the protection of the liberty to meet has 
been extended, so that by virtue of art.431-1 the liberty is protected not only 
from interference by the state but also from other citizens. While it may be 
recalled that in the early Revolutionary period a similar protection was 
provided for,102 the present measure can be said to reflect a modern 
understanding that this right can be just as much threatened by official power 
as by other members of society. The provisions of art.431 read as follows;
Le fait d'entraver, d'une manière concertée et à l'aide de menaces, l'exercice de la liberté 
d'expression, du travail, d'association, de réunion ou de manifestation est puni d'un an 
d'emprisonnement et 100 000F d'amende.
Le fait d'entraver, d'une manière concertée et à l'aide de coups, violences, voies de fait, 
destructions ou dégradations au sens du présent code, l'exercice d'une des libertés visées à 
l'alinéa précédent est puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 300 000F d'amende, 
(emphasis added).103
Therefore, this article, inter alia, protects meetings from being disrupted by 
threats or actual violence. Whereas the 1881 Act was a measure that was 
primarily addressed to the police authorities, art.431-1 would appear to send 
a message to ordinary persons as to the importance and value of the liberty. 
This is also reflected by the heavy penalties that can be imposed on those 
found guilty of guilty of disrupting meetings. However, it should be noted 
that a key elements in these crimes are actual or threatened violence and 
acting in a group. It follows that firstly, mere heckling would not be 
criminalised, unless what is expressed constitutes a threat and secondly, the 
violence would have to be carried out by a group acting together, therefore a 
single person, acting on his/her own, could not be sanctioned. From its terms, 
it seems that the mischief that the legislature had in mind is that of the serious 
disruption of public meetings via actual or threatened public disorder.104 This
101 The new code came into force on 1st March 1994, by virtue of Law no.92-683. Law no.92- 
684. Law no.92-685 and Law no.92-686 of the 22nd July 1992 and art.373 of Law no.92-1336 of 
16th Dec. 1992 (as amended by Law no.93-913 of July 1993).
102 See, for example the Decree of 15-25th Tulv 1793. section II, supra.
103 Introduced by Law no.92-686 of 22nd July 1992 (J.0.23rd July, pg.??).
104 However, the origins of the article are surrounded in mystery. The article was introduced 
as a last minute amendment in the Senate (J.O. Sénat, 7th July 1992,2477) as being the result 
of a Government amendment in the legislative commission. However during the debate 
before the vote on adopting Title HI of the new penal code, the article was attacked by the 
Communists, who alleged that it would be used against strikers and the right to strike (see 
J.O. Sénat, 7th July 1992,2479).
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view is confirmed by the location of the article within the penal code: it is 
found in the chapter entitled T)es atteintes à la paix publique’.105
The police
Statute also affects the regulation of the liberty in more indirect way; by 
providing for the police, who in turn play a fundamental role in the 
regulation of the liberty. In France, the police authority at the local level 
consists of the mayor and the prefect.106 Both are at the same time agents of 
central and local government and both can exercise public order powers.107 
However, this sharing of competences is complex and needs to be explained 
as it demonstrates who can decide whether to restrict the right to meet. The 
best way to explain these features is by an analysis that follows the 
administrative divisions of local according to communes and departments.
(a) the police authority in the commune
It is the mayor that is responsible for the maintenance of public order in 
communes with populations of less than 10,000. In these areas, the municipal 
police are at his/her disposal.108 However, in those communes of over 10,000 
inhabitants the prefect acts as the police authority and has recourse to the 
national police.109 The mayor nevertheless retains some police powers, 
notably as regards habitual assemblies110 but the vast majority of communes 
today are served by a national police force ('police étatisée').111 Whereas the 
mayor is elected, the prefect is a centrally appointed civil servant, as are the 
members of the national police. It follows that the prefect, although also a
105 Furthermore, this chapter is located within the part of the code entitled 'Des Crimes et 
Délits contre la Nation, L'Etat et la Paix'.
106 For the history of the French police, see G. Carrot, 'Le maintien de l'ordre en France: 
depuis la fin de L'Ancien Régime iusqu'à 1968' (1984) and for a general introduction to the 
system of policing, see J. Moreau, 'La police municipale' in F. Bénoit, J.-Cl. 'Collectivités 
locales' (1982), vol III, 2201-1, P.J. Stead, 'The Police of France' (1983), R.I. Mawby, 
’Comparative Policing Issues: The British and American System in International Perspective'
(1990), 34-49 and J. Rivero, (1990), op. at., 544-7 and J.J. Gleizal, 'La Police en France’ in J.M. 
Erbès, ’Polices D'Europe' (1992), 159.
107 These powers are explained below, as part of the examination of the French notion of 
public order.
108Art.L.131-2 of the Code des Communes, see infra.
109 Art.L.131-13 and art.L.132-8.
110 Art.L132-8.
111 Chapus, op. at., 524.
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local government representative is much closer to central government than is 
the mayor.112
If public order is threatened in two or more neighbouring communes in 
which the mayor is the police authority, the prefect may exercise public order 
powers. The prefect may also substitute for the mayor after a request to the 
mayor to use his/her powers has been met with no result.113
Here a distinction should be made between substitution and annulment. Both 
are supervision ('tutelle') powers that are enjoyed by the prefect. The latter 
gave the prefect the power to override the decisions of the mayor which 
he/she felt were, inter alia, illegal. This power was abolished in 1982.114 
Substitution, on the other hand, does not involve an alteration of the mayor's 
decision, but rather concerns an act or decision taken in place of the mayor. 
These powers over the mayor indicate the continuing emphasis on central 
control that characterises the system of French policing.115 However, recent 
reforms under President Mitterrand have attempted to devolve more power 
to the local level, hence the abolition of the préfectoral tutelle (supervision) 
and its replacement with a system known as the 'déféré préfectoral'.116 This 
procedure has been more extensively used to protect the liberty to march and 
so it will be explained in detail in the next chapter concerning this liberty.
112 The mayor is the representative of the local council (arts.L.122-11 & L.122-19 of the Codes 
des communes), as well as the representative of the state at local government level 
(arts.L.122-23 & L.122-26 of the Codes des Communes), whereas the prefect has one position: 
that of the representative of the state at the local level (the department). It can readily be seen 
that both the mayor and the prefect are state representatives but this is within a hierarchical 
system in which the mayor, when acting in this capacity, does so under the authority of the 
prefect (art.L.122-23). The foregoing does not alter the formal recognition of the mayor as the 
local police authority (arts.L.122-22 & L.131-1) but it must be noted that the mayor’s dual role 
of central and local representative means that he/she can also be seen as a branch of the 
central police authority.
113 Art.L.131-13. However, in these circumstances the prefect may only exercise the public 
powers set out in art.L.131-2(2) & (3) of the Codes des communes (see infra.), c.f. Moreau, op. 
cit., 2210-13, Préfet. Commissaire de la République d'Eure-et-Loir c. Maire de Preux, T.A. 
d'Orléans, 7th April 1987, req.no.84-4675, R.F.D.A. 1987.9., and Préfet du Finistère, op. cit.
114 By virtue of art.34-III of Law no.82-213 of 2nd March 1982. relative aux droits et libertés 
des communes, des départements et des régions' ( J .0 .3 et. rectif. 6th March 1982).
115 See Mawby, op. cit., and Gleizal, op. cit., 160-1.
116 Law no.82-213 of 2nd March 1982 ', supra., arts.3-4 (as amended by Law no.82-623 of 22nd 
lulv 1982. 0 -0 .23rd  July 1982, pg.2347) and Law no.83-8 of 7th Ian. 1983 (J.O. 9th Jan. pg-215), 
art.65. J-M. Auby, in his note on the case C.E. 15th Dec 1982. D.1983.279, refers to this new 
procedure as 'judicial tutelle'.
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(b) the police authority in the department
In the department, the prefect is the police authority and exercises police 
powers117 and once again makes use of the national police. However, other 
state police forces, such as the Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (CRS) 
exist, which he/she may deploy.118 Since 1982, the prefect exercises these 
powers after consulting with the Conseil général of the department, which is 
an elected body. This change once again reflects the recent desire to de­
centralise police governance.
(c) Paris
The prefect of police is the sole police authority for Paris. This position is 
justified by the special circumstances of the capital.119
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
The 1935 decree-law
During the Third Republic the executive increasingly issued what came to be 
termed 'décret-lois' (from henceforth, the term 'decree-laws' will be 
employed). These were executive regulations which had the force of law; in 
other words, they could alter existing statutes.120 This derogation from the 
principle that legislating was the exclusive prerogative of Parliament was not, 
as today, provided for in the constitution but was justified firstly by the
117 See for example, art.9 of Decree no.86-475 of 14h March 1986. Since the decentralisation 
reforms of 1982, the prefect now shares some police powers and duties with the President of 
the General Council but not as regards public order (art.25 of the Law of 2nd March, op. cit.).
118 See generally, E. Picard, 'Forces civiles et militaires de police: organisation1 in J.-Cl. 
(Admin), (1987), Fasc.201-2,5.
119 Art.L.184-12 of the Codes des communes and see, J. Moreau, op. cit., 2210. For the 
particular arrangements pertaining to the departments of the Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin, 
see art.L.181-47 of the Codes des communes. The competences of the Mayor have been 
increased as part of the decentralisation reforms (art.9 of the Law no.86-1308 of 29th Dec. 
1986. J.0.30th  Dec. pg.15773) but public order remains in the prefect's hands.
120 See generally, V£). Rusu, ’Les décrets-lois dans le régime constitutionnel de 1875’ (1942), 
Gicquel, op. cit., 539-40 & 794-5 and Bell, op. cit., (1992), 80. The following definition clearly 
explains the executive origin and statutory force of decree-laws;
’Les décrets-lois sont des décrets pris par le Gouvernement à la suite d'une loi d'habitation 
par laquelle le Parlement autorise le gouvernement à réglementer certains questions pendant 
un certain délai. Le décret-loi a la même valeur juridique que les lois qu'il peut modifier ou 
abroger. Généralement il est ensuite soumis au Parlement pour ratification.'
(J-M. Auby and R. Ducos-Ader, T)roit public, droit constitutionnel, libertés publique, droit 
administratif (1984), 55).
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special circumstances of World War I and the subsequent financial difficulties 
in which France found itself during the 1920s.121
In the legal framework that governs the liberty to meet the most important 
regulation is that of the Decree-law of 23rd Oct. 1935. As will be explained 
below, this regulation is only of relevance to the liberty under study by virtue 
of an accompanying government circular that makes a controversial 
interpretation of the law. Although administrative circulars have no 
legislative effect, they do have considerable persuasive authority and so will 
be considered as part of the administrative framework, and thus part of the 
wider legal regime that regulates the liberty under study.122
121 There was no provision made for decree-laws in the 1875 Constitution because art. 3 
placed all legislative power in the hands of parliament. However, decree-laws developed 
during the 1914 war and became an accepted practice and thus a constitutional custom (c.f. A. 
Martin-Pannetier, 'Institutions et vie politique françaises de 1789 à nos jours'. (1981), 57 and 
also Rivero, op. cit., (1990), 72-91). Their emergence resulted from (1) the brevity of the 1875 
Constitution; it was silent as to the regulation of many issues and (2) the procedural 
encumbrances then faced by parliament; its inability to quickly pass all the legislative 
measures which it deemed necessary.
The present constitution lays down that parliament can delegate its legislative power to the 
government in order that it can make ordinances (art.38). These most closely approximate to 
the former decree-laws, except that today they have a constitutional basis.
In the field of civil liberties, the emergence of decree-laws during this period posed problems 
for their legal protection. During this period it was statutes that generally protected civil 
liberties (the 1881 Act being a prime example). This protection could be undermined by the 
use of executive measures like decree-laws, especially where they contained detailed 
regulations concerning civil liberties which had the effect of altering the statutory regime of 
protection. However, in recognition of this danger, the Conseil d'État has held that decree- 
laws issued under the Third Republic can be the subject of an action for excès de pouvoir; 
C.E. Ass. 25th June 1937 Union des véhicules industriels; Rec.Leb. 619.
122 Administrative circulars are also sometimes referred to as 'instructions de service' and 
defined as;
'...des communications par laquelle un supérieur hiérarchique, normalement le ministre, fait 
connaître à ses subordonnés ses intentions sur un point relatif à l'exécution du service ou à 
l'interprétation d'une loi ou d'un règlement.'
(Rivero, (1990), op. cit., 118).
Circulars can, and often do, affect the legal position of citizens, in this sense they can be seen 
to have regulatory effects. Following on from this, they have been recognised as being 
susceptible to judicial review when they are more than simply internal administrative 
instructions. In C.E. Ass. 29th Jan. 1954 Institution Notre-Dame du Kreisken R.F.D.A. 1954.50, 
the Conseil d'État held that a circular concerning subsidies to private schools was of a 
regulatory nature. The court's reasoning was based on a finding that the issuing minister had 
added new legal provisions to the statutory framework by virtue of the circular. The court 
then annulled the statute on the grounds that it was ultra vires the enabling statute. The 
Conseil went on to formulate a distinction between 'interpretative' and 'regulatory' circulars. 
Only the latter type of circulars could be reviewed by the courts (c.f. M. Long et. al., op. cit., 
504-14 for a detailed analysis of the judgement of this case and the case-law on the 
administrative review of circulars).
(Footnote continues on next page)
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The government passed three decree-laws on the 23rd Oct 1935 in an attempt 
to control the increasingly violent outbreaks of public disorder at this time.123 
For the purposes of the liberty to meet only one of these decrees is of 
relevance.124
The title of the 1935 decree-law ('Portant réglementation des mesures relatives 
au renforcement du maintien de l'ordre publique1) clearly states that it 
concerns measures to be used to maintain public order. In effect, the decree- 
law lays down the statutory framework for the liberty to process/march. It 
does however, make one reference to the liberty to meet in its first article;
Les réunions sur la voie publique sont et demeurent interdites dans les conditions prévues 
par loi du 30 juin 1881, article 6.
However, this article merely reiterates the position concerning the liberty to 
meet that was laid down in the 1881 Act.
The 1935 Decree-law goes on to require that the organisers of a 
procession/march that is planned on the public highway must submit a prior 
declaration to the public authorities (arts. 1 & 2). It also explicitly grants the 
police authorities banning powers as regard marches. The regime is therefore 
less liberal than that which governs the liberty to meet, where it will be
In more recent times the transparency of circulars for citizens has been increased by two 
legislative measures. The first is the mandatory publication of circulars provided by art.9 of 
the Law no. 78-753 of 17th lulv 1978 (J.O. 18th July, pg.2581) and the second is by virtue of 
arts.l & 8 of the Decree 28th Nov 1983 (no. 83-1025; J.O. 3rd Dec, pg.3492) concerning the 
relations between the administration and its users. This decree provided, inter alia, that 
circulars that were not contrary to laws and regulations could be relied upon by a citizen in 
any legal action against the administration. It is submitted that both of these measures 
confirm the view, first enunciated by the Conseil d'État, that regulatory circulars can be more 
than merely documents that are internal to the administration.
Finally, based on a report by the Conseil d’État (18th April 1985), the government drew 
attention in its circular of 15th June 1987 ('Relative aux circulaires ministérielles; J.O. 17th 
June, pg.6460) to certain problems concerning circulars. These included their excessive use. It 
sought to improve the situation by restating their legal nature and the legal requirements 
regarding their use. In this connection, it is interesting to note the following statement in the 
circular;
'La circulaire ne peut créer, pour les usagers, d'obligations qui ne résulteraient ni de la loi, ni 
du règlement'.
123 For a more detailed explanation of this public disorder, see Chap.V, section II. infra.
124 The other two decrees concerned the confiscation of arms and the dissolution of leagues.
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recalled that no prior declaration is required and there are no special powers 
to ban meetings contained in the 1881 Act.
The decree-law keeps the two regimes governing the liberty to meet and the 
liberty to process /march separate. The bulk of the provisions in the decree- 
law are clearly directed towards the latter, whilst merely re-affirming the 
illegality of meetings on the public highway as regards the former liberty. 
However, this was not how the decree-law was interpreted by the Minister of 
the Interior, Joseph Paganon, who published and distributed a circular 
concerning its application to the prefects two days after it had been issued.125 
In this circular Paganon gave his interpretation of the case-law regarding the 
liberty to process/march. He noted that the case-law in this area had 
established that processions and marches could be banned if there was a 
likelihood that they would compromise public order. The most crucial aspect 
comes in his next step, in which he interprets the case-law as also establishing 
that mayors have the power to ban public meetings which
par la période choisie, le lieu ou elles doivent se tenir, la façon dont elles ont été organisées, le 
mode selon lequel elles doivent se dérouler sont de nature à laisser prévoir des incidents et à 
faire redouter des troubles tels que les services de police seraient dans l'obligation 
d’intervenir sur la voie publique.
Further, Paganon declares that prefects can, by exercising their powers of 
substitution, decide to ban a meeting where a mayor fails to do so.126 Paganon 
implicitly claims that these banning powers are to be found in the public 
order powers of the police.127 However, this emphasis on public order in the 
circular and the role of central government is criticised by Colliard because of 
the restrictive effects on the liberty to meet;
Les préfets sont ainsi invités à intervenir, donc les garanties que pourrait procurer la diversité 
politique même des maires disparaissent devant les directives gouvernementales. Confier à 
un fonctionnaire dépendant aussi étroitement du pouvoir que le préfet la possibilité 
d'interdire des réunions publiques équivaut à une étrange inapplication de la loi de 1881.128
125 Its full title was, 'Circulaire du Ministre de l'Intérieur aux préfets, du 27 novembre 1935, 
sur les réunions publiques et privées*.
126 Toutefois, la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre public incombant en définitive au 
gouvernement, celui-d estime que son représentant est qualifié, soit pour donner son accord 
à l'exercice incontestablement délicat de cette interdiction, soit pour substituer son autorité à 
celle du magistrat municipal défaillant.'
127 See, section II, infra.
128 op. cit., 738-9.
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At this point a number of further criticisms can be made concerning the 
circular. Firstly, its interpretation of the case-law. It can be forcibly argued 
that there were no judicial decisions up until this time which applied 
principles established in cases dealing with the liberty to process/march to 
the regulation of the liberty to meet129. A second criticism, which must be left 
in outline until the case-law is analysed below, once again concerns Paganon's 
interpretation. It is submitted that the case-law of this period (certainly that of 
the Conseil d'Etat) established the primacy of the liberty to meet over 
considerations of public order, so that liberty was the rule and its restriction 
the exception. The circular therefore reverses, rather than applies the case-law, 
as it purports to do. The use of the banning power becomes the first resort 
when public disorder is apprehended, instead of the last resort, as will be 
seen to have been the requirement laid down by the case-law. Thirdly, the 
terms used in the circular as to the grounds upon which a public meeting may 
be banned are both extremely vague and leave too much discretion to the 
police.130
The effect of the circular was to place the liberty to meet, which was 
guaranteed by the 1881 Act, under the less liberal auspices of the 1935 decree- 
law governing the liberty to process/march. The circular actually reads 
words into the decree-law, instead of merely providing guidance to police 
authorities as to its application. This blurring of the legal framework 
governing the two liberties is open to even more criticism because of the 
palpably different civil libertarian consequences that result from the 
respective legal frameworks.131
129 See infra.
130 Colliard, op. cit., 738 makes this point;
'Les expressions utilisées, telles que "susceptibles" ou "de nature à", sont extrêmement vagues 
et imprécises et autorisent une fâcheuse extension des pouvoirs de police.'
131 This has been the subject of much criticism from the commentators, for example, Burdeau, 
op. cit., 221;
'Aucun de ces textes ne concerne les réunions. Cependant les instructions administratives 
données pour leur application excédèrent les termes des décrets et mirent en cause la liberté 
de réunion.',
and Colliard, op. cit., 739;
'...cette confusion sans doute volontaire a permis de soumettre à un même régime une 
tolérance toujours révisable et une liberté garantie par la loi.'
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The question to be addressed now is how far this guidance was followed by 
the prefects and mayors? Although the decree was legally binding on the 
police authorities, the circular, in offering interpretative advice merely offered 
guidance. Nevertheless, Colliard is clear as to its illiberal effects;
Certains maires prirent le parti d'interdire toutes les réunions publiques de manière à assurer 
l'ordre et de garantir à tous une même égalité, celle du silence!132
Moreover, according to Burdeau, a certain arbitrariness became 
commonplace, which was justified on the grounds of the need to maintain 
public order. In addition to the unpredictable use of the broader banning 
powers, he notes the development of general bans which were pronounced 
by prefects in certain departments and which covered all meetings in the 
area.133 Although provision for such sweeping powers is not mentioned in 
the 1935 measure and the previous case law will be seen to have only 
envisaged their use in exceptional circumstances, the clear emphasis in the 
circular on the maintenance of public order seems to have provided ample 
justification for their use.
Another practical effect was that certain mayors required that the organisers 
of public meetings seek prior authorisation.. Such a requirement ran directly 
counter to the provisions of the 1881 Act, which, as was noted, by virtue of 
the 1907 amendment dispensed with any prior form of notification, not to 
mention requirements to seek prior authorisation. It was also contrary to the 
controversially applicable provisions of the 1935 decree-law themselves, 
which merely required a prior declaration. Notwithstanding, this extra-legal 
practice was sanctioned by the government when it declared on the 4th Oct. 
1936 that it would only 'authorise' ten meetings, among fifty-two planned by 
the Communist party in the departments of Alsace-Lorraine.134
The context which firstly justified the illiberal Paganon circular and secondly, 
its application by mayors and prefects, was one of growing public disorder 
throughout France. Although this will be explored in greater detail as regards 
the liberty to process, this context explains the attitude taken towards the 
liberty to meet and so will be briefly noted here.
132 Colliard, op. cit., 739.
133 op. cit., 221.
134 Colliard op., cit., 739 and Burdeau, op. tit., 221.
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This period was characterised by continual public protest in the form of 
strikes, marches, and meetings, which often degenerated into riots in which 
people were injured and killed and serious damage to property sustained. 
These protests were against the austere economic measures imposed by the 
government and the rise of right-wing and fascist leagues (the most 
prominent being 'L'Action Française').135 The leagues also engaged in often 
violent protests against the government. The protests against the 
governments economic policies, however, were co-ordinated by a coalition of 
left-wing and Communist parties under the banner of the 'Front Populaire'. 
Opposition to the austerity measures was even more pronounced because of 
the chosen method for their implementation: by decree-laws.
On the 7th June 1935 the government had succeeded in gaining the power to 
legislate solely by decree-laws up until the 31st October of that same year. It 
immediately set to work issuing a large number of economic decree-laws 
which were hugely unpopular but because of their regulatory nature were not 
subject to any parliamentary scrutiny.136 In summary, this context led the 
government to set out a regulatory framework, via the 1935 decree-law, for 
marches that was inspired by public order anxieties, as opposed to concerns 
to guarantee human rights. Meetings were also a concern but the Paganon 
circular conveniently avoided the need for controversial legislation which 
would have been required in order to restrict the 1881 Act. Finally, police 
authorities seized the opportunity granted by the 1935 decree and the 
accompanying circular to clamp down on public meetings.
135 See generally E. Weber, 'Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century 
France* (1962), particularly, 341-3 & 361 for an account of the protest activities organised by 
Action Française in the years 1934-6. This period saw the rise of fascism in France via the 
emergence of a number of leagues; see R. Soucy, 'French Fascism: The First Wave, 1924-1933' 
(1986). Fascism also spread in Britain, see for example , C. Cross, The Fascists in Britain* 
(1961) and provided the context in which legislation affecting the liberties to assemble was 
passed.
136 Leon Blum, a central figure in the Front Populaire movement, wrote these words in 'Le 
Populaire' on the day that the Laval government issued its first nineteen decree-laws (16th 
July, 1935) by virtue of their new powers;
Des aujourd'hui nous ouvrons la lutte contre les décrets-lois de M. Laval.'
Taken from E. Bonnefous, 'Histoire politique de la Troisième République' (1973) vol.V; 1930- 
1936,345.
For a detailed analysis of the Front Populaire, see K.G. Harr Jnr., The Genesis and Effect, of 
The Popular Front in France' (1987).
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The 1985 circular137
In this year the Minister of the Interior issued a circular to the police (only the 
prefects) concerning both the liberty to meet and the liberty to process. As far 
as the former is concerned, the circular constitutes a resume of the law: it 
reminds the police of their public law powers and duties, whilst at the same 
time recalling the fact that 'La loi reconnaît le libre exercice des réunions’. The 
circular is important because it firstly contains model examples of bans and 
secondly it provides important indications of the administration's view of the 
law.
It should be briefly noted that the circular makes reference to the Decree of 
28th Nov. 1983.138 art.8, by virtue of which the organisers of a public meeting 
have a right to be heard and to make representations before a ban is made 
and to circular no.80-292 of 18th Aug. 1980 ('sur la motivation des actes 
administratifs'), which in the present context requires that when a ban is 
made it must be accompanied by the reasons or grounds upon which it was 
taken.139
Having set out the main legal texts140 that regulate the liberty to meet, 
attention will now be turned to the cases in which the law has been applied 
and interpreted.
CASE-LAW
It will be recalled that judiciary have attempted to define the kinds of 
meetings that fall within the protective scope of the liberty to meet.141 These 
cases will not be repeated here but instead attention will be focused on 
decisions concerning the actual exercise of the liberty, which form the central 
aspect of any description of its legal regulation.
137 Circular no.85-180 of 25th July 1985.
138 supra.
139 These measures complement that of Law no.79-587 of 11th lulv 1979 ('relative à la 
motivation des actes administratifs'). See also S. Sur, 'Motivation ou non-motivation des actes 
administratifs' A.JD.A. 35.19793.
140 Montreuil, op. cit., 13-14, lists a series of other offences that may be committed during a 
procession. These include insulting a police officer in the exercise of his or her duty (now 
found in art.433-5 of the penal code) and press crimes, such as the provocation to commit a 
crime (Law of 29th July 1881). However, it will be seen from the case-law that these have not 
played a role in the regulation of the liberty to meet.
141 See section I, supra.
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Benjamin
The leading authority in this area is the decision in Benjamin.142 It is generally 
regarded as laying down a principled ruling as to how the liberty in question 
should be exercised in relation to other countervailing concerns, notably 
public order. There is, however, disagreement as to whether the case lays 
down a libertarian or restrictive principle.143 This disagreement reflects the 
attempts by the Conseil d'Etat to 'reconcile' two interests: that of the need to 
maintain public order and the need to protect and guarantee the liberty to 
meet.
The facts of the case, briefly stated, were as follows: a literary conference was 
to be held in the town of Nevers in which Benjamin was to parody to comic 
effect the state educational system. Upon hearing of Benjamin's proposed 
contribution, left-wing groups and unions notified the Mayor of their 
intention to counter-demonstrate. The Mayor, apprehending that there would 
be an outbreak of public disorder if the conference was permitted to go 
ahead, banned the conference, justifying his actions on the grounds that he 
was fulfilling his duty to maintain public order under article 97 of the Law of 
5th April 1884.144 The organisers than sought to hold a private meeting 
instead but this was banned once again on the same grounds. Benjamin 
brought an action for judicial review,145 alleging that the Mayor had acted 
ultra vires his powers, on the grounds that he had violated the 1884 Act and 
the liberty to meet, protected by the 1881 Act. The Conseil d'Etat upheld his
142 C.E. 19th May 1933, Rec.541; see generally, M. Long et. al, op. cit., 286-288, Colliard, op. 
cit., 737, Burdeau, op. cit., 219-220, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 574-5, Rivero, (1977) op. cit., 340 
and Dautan, op. cit., 3.
143 Colliard, op. cit., 737, describes the case under the following heading 'L'atteinte 
jurisprudentielle' and goes on to state;
'...malgré le succès du requérant, dans l'espèce, le principe posé par l'arrêt n'est pas un 
principe libéral.'
Similarly, Costa, op. cit., 91 and Mestre, S.1934.3.1., see the decision as restricting of liberty to 
meet.
On the other hand, M. Long et. al., op. cit., 287-8 present the case as an example of the Conseil 
d'État's liberalism. Rivero, (1977), op. cit., 341, analyses the case as formulating both liberal 
and anti-liberal principles; he feels that the case contains (1) 'le principe de l'interdiction' and
(2) 'la limitation' of this banning power.
144 At the time of the case, this measure laid down the police general public order powers. 
These are now found in art.L.131-2 of the Code des Communes. The previous statutes that 
contained these local police powers have been mentioned above (section II, supra..). It was 
also noted that these powers were preserved in art.9 of the 1881 Act (section II, supra.).
145 See chap.II, section II, infra.., for a general introduction to French judicial review.
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action but also accepted that public order powers could be used to limit the 
exercise of the liberty.146
The dispute in the Benjamin case can be characterised in the following ways: 
(1) as a conflict between two legal notions: civil liberty (the liberty to meet) 
versus public order and (2) as deciding upon the nature and existence of 
banning powers and the conditions governing their use. In its judgement the 
Conseil d'État seems to have dealt with each of these characterisations.
The Conseil accepted that the Mayor was under a duty to maintain public 
order under the 1884 Act; they accepted that he could exercise banning 
powers in order to fulfil this duty and that such powers were applicable 
within the regime set out by the 1881 Act.
The applicability of the public order powers is clear from art.9 but the court 
can be seen to have gone further by deciding how those powers could be 
exercised as regards the liberty to meet. Therefore, it was stated that banning 
powers were to be exercised within certain limits: they had to be 'reconciled' 
with and 'respect' the liberty to meet, guaranteed by the 1881 Act;
Considérant que s'il incombe au maire, en vertu de l'art.97 de la loi du 5 avr. 1884, [now 
art.L.131-2] de prendre les mesures qu'exige le maintien de l'ordre, il doit concilier l'exercice 
des ses pouvoirs avec le respect de la liberté de réunion garantie par les lois du 30 juin 1881 et 
du 20 mars 1907 (emphasis added).
The apprehended public order had to be firstly serious and the degree of its 
seriousness had to be such that no other police measures were available to 
prevent it. In the instant case, the Conseil agreed that serious public disorder 
was apprehended but they felt its degree of seriousness was not sufficient to 
justify the use of the banning powers because other adequate police measures 
could still have been taken to maintain public order. It was therefore held that 
in circumstances in which a conflict arises between the liberty to meet and the 
duty to maintain public order, banning powers can only be used as a final 
resort; when all other measures for the maintenance of public order would 
prove to be inadequate.147
146 Colliard, op. cit., 737 observes;
’L'arrêt admet la possibilité pour l'administration de supprimer véritablement une liberté 
reconnue et organisée par la loi.*
147 See, for example, Rivero, (1977), op. cit., 340;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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However, at the same time as setting out the limits of the power to ban public 
meetings, the Conseil d'État for the first time recognised that meetings, legally 
constituted under the 1881 Act, could be banned using the public order 
powers of the police. The limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers 
also leave a margin of discretion to the authorities; firstly, as to the likelihood 
of the occurrence of public disorder and secondly, whether, if disorder 
occurred, it would be of such a degree of seriousness that other available 
police measures could not prevent disorder. At the same time, these two 
factual circumstances are open to review by the courts, as this judgement has 
shown.148
Subsequent cases
The principles laid down in Beniamin have been applied and refined in 
subsequent cases. These will be set out here, as well as other cases touching 
on other aspects not touched by this decision.
Thus, in the case of Buiadoux,149 one of the principles in Benjamin was 
underlined. This concerns the last resort requirement, which lays down that a 
meeting can only be justifiably banned if the facts at the time go to show that 
serious public disorder could not be avoided in any other way. The instant
'...il fait de l’interdiction l'ultime remède, lorsque la conciliation entre le respect de la liberté et 
le maintien de l'ordre s'avère impossible, compte tenu notamment de l'importance des forces 
de police par rapport à la gravité des troubles prévisibles..', 
and Dautan, op. dt., 6;
'L'autorité de police doit tout mettre en oeuvre pour que puisse s'exercer la liberté de réunion 
et ce n'est qu'exceptionnellement que celle-ci peut être paralysée quand l'ordre public ne peut 
être autrement sauvegardé...'.
This position is expressed in the much quoted phrase, first mentioned by the Commissioner 
of Government in Berthenet et Baldv (C.E. 10th August 1917, Rec.Leb.637 at 638;.
'...la liberté est la règle et la restriction de police l'exception'.
148 In the instant case the Conseil held that firstly, there was a sufficient likelihood that public 
disorder would occur but that secondly, adequate police measures could have been taken to 
prevent it without having to have banned the meeting. The Conseil reached this conclusion 
by pronouncing on what in England would have been considered an 'operational' matter that 
is as a result left to the appreciation of the police authorities (c.f. L. Lustgarten, 'The 
Governance of The Police' (1986), 78 & 172-3).
At the same time, Robert & Duffar, op. dt., 574, point to the uncertainties surrounding the 
Conseil's conditions limiting the banning powers;
'On peut présenter, malgré tout, une interprétation moins optimiste de l'arrêt. On 
mentionnera par exemple, qu'un trouble simplement éventuel peut amener l'interdiction. On 
avancera également l'incertitude qui règne sur le point de savoir, en face de simples menaces, 
si le risque couru est suffisamment grave pour légitimer une interdiction...'.
149 C E. 2nd Feb. 1937; D.1938.3.19.
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case concerned the Mayor of Lyon's decision to ban a banquet organised by a 
league of Monarchists.150 The Conseil struck down the ban because the Mayor 
had failed to show that he did not have other means available to maintain 
public order. The case not only stresses that the exercise of banning powers 
must be a last resort but also highlights the extent of the review that can be 
carried out by the administrative courts. This is manifested, more precisely, in 
its exacting examination of the factual circumstances pertaining at the time 
the decision was taken, in order to judge whether sufficient police officers 
were at the Mayor's disposal.
Where a Mayor banned a meeting on the grounds that it could not have taken 
place without the deployment of police officers in order to preserve public 
order, the Conseil in Xavier Vallat151 did not hesitate to strike it down. The 
case represents a subtle extension of the Benjamin principles applied in 
Buiadoux. In the instant case the Conseil agreed with the Mayor's view of the 
factual circumstances prevailing at the time he took his decision; viz., that the 
proposed banquet would have required him to exercise his public order 
powers in order to maintain public order. However, the court went on to add 
that the mere fact that public order could not be maintained without the 
police being deployed still did not justify a ban. In other words, other 
alternative public order measures could have been employed.
Another way of viewing the case is to see it in terms of the court's refusal to 
widen the grounds of justification upon which a ban could legitimately be 
made, and a re-affirmation of the justificatory grounds set out in Benjamin. To 
have upheld the Mayor’s ban in the instant case would have been tantamount 
to holding that situations which force the mere exercise of police powers 
mean the same thing as serious outbreaks of public disorder and therefore 
justify a ban.
In Bucard.152 the Conseil seemed to grant a greater emphasis to public order 
by upholding a prefectoral ban on all meetings in the department, even 
though these bans purported to extend to private meetings. The fact that the 
department was situated on the border with Germany and the tense relations
150 The 'Monarchists' was another name for 'L'Action Française' (see section II, supra.).
151 C E  2nd Feb. 1938; D.H.1938.2.95.
152 C.E. Ass. 23rd Dec. 1936; Rec.1151.
186
with that country at the time, may be seen as constituting exceptional 
circumstances that justified the decision. However, the greater accent on 
public order is clear from the terms of the judgement;
Considérant que le principe de la liberté ne saurait faire échec aux nécessités du maintien de 
l'ordre public, avec lesquelles il doit se concilier; qu'il incombe aux autorités compétentes de 
prendre les mesures que commandent la sécurité et la tranquillité publiques et même si la 
sauvegarde de l'ordre public l'exige impérieusement, d'interdire les réunions.
The case is also interesting because it implicitly concedes that public order 
powers may be used to ban private meetings but it would seem that this is 
only justified where there are exceptional circumstances, as in the instant 
case. This interpretation has been adopted by the administration, as is noted 
by the following advice in the 1985 circular;
Les réunions publiques...ne peuvent être interdites que dans certaines circonstances 
exceptionnelles telles que la gravité particulière des troubles attendus la transformation 
prévisible en réunion publique, la simultanéité de plusieurs réunions tenues en des points 
très disséminés d'un département (CE 23 décembre 1936 - BUCARD), la contre- 
manifestation.153
Therefore, although the legislature had not sought to regulate private 
meetings in the 1881 statute, it has become understood that by virtue of the 
wider public order powers, the police may exceptionally ban such meetings.
While the emphasis on public order can be seen in a number of cases during 
this period,154 these seem to have been in the context of the special 
circumstances caused by the Second World War and the Occupation. 
Therefore, after the Liberation, the Benjamin principles were re-applied in a 
series of later cases155 but that of Naud stands out because of it peculiar 
facts.156 This case concerned a conference to be held in Paris which had been 
held four years earlier in other French towns and cities. The Mayor banned 
the conference on the ground that he apprehended serious public disorder. 
However, the court struck down the ban on the grounds that other police 
measures could have been taken to prevent serious disorder. Therefore the
153 op. tit., 2.
154 See for example, Beha et Masson. C.E. 9th April 1938; Rec.245, Wodel, C.E. 17th April 
1942; Rec.122 and Ferraton. C.E. 26th Feb. 1943; Rec50.
155 For example, Hemazieres et autres. C.E. 29th July 1953; Rec.407, Houphouet- Boigny, C.E. 
19th June 1953; Rec298 and BakarvPiibo, C.E. 30th Nov. 1956; Rec.719.
156 C.E. 23rd Jan. 1953; Rec32.
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court, while accepting that there was a threat of public disorder, did not 
accept that this, without more, justified restricting the right to meet; as a 
consequence, it insisted that the restriction should only be as a last resort.157
The report of the case suggests that the Mayor sought to rely on the fact that 
in other towns his counterparts had banned the conference because the police 
officers that were available were not sufficient to prevent public disorder. It 
would appear that the Conseil responded to this argument in the following 
manner: they stressed that the relevant time period for deciding whether or 
not public disorder could be prevented by available police measures was the 
time on or around the date of the proposed meeting. In view of this, the only 
factual circumstances that could be relied upon were those occurring at this 
time and these circumstances would of course be subject to judicial review.
Another example of the relevant time period upon which to base a decision to 
restrict the liberty can be seen in Commune de Genissac.158 This was an 
appeal against a decision by the Administrative Tribunal of Bordeaux to 
strike down a ban, by the part of the mayor, of any balls in the area for the 
whole month of January. Although the case does not concern meetings, the 
principle of the relevant time period is the same as that which Naud applied 
to meetings. As a consequence, the appeal was allowed and so the ban was 
upheld because of the serious damage and injury caused by a previous ball 
organised on 31st December. A close proximity was held to exist between this 
date and any balls organised in January, to the extent that a likelihood of the 
repetition of such disorder was justified.
Access to local authority premises
The degree to which the courts will engage in factual review of police 
decisions in this area may once again be seen in the recent decision of the 
Conseil d'Etat in Communes de Chartrettes.159 This case concerned a mayor's
157 For an example of a similar judgement, see Ministre de l'Intérieur c. sieur Salem. C.E. sect. 
27th Nov. 1959; Rec.632 at 633;
'Cons, qu'il ne ressort pas de l'instruction que la conférence projetée par le sieur Salem pour le
20 décembre 1956 à la salle des fêtes de la mairie de Valence, fût de nature à menacer l'ordre 
public dans les conditions telles qu'il ne pût être paré au danger par des mesures de police 
appropriées, lesquelles pouvaient être prises en l'espèce...'
158 C.E. 23rd July 1974; Rec.445.
159 C.E. 10th Feb. 1984; req. no.39010. Unfortunately, only a brief summary of this case is 
available.
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decision to ban a meeting in a communal hall. The court found that the ban 
had been based upon erroneous facts and therefore struck it down. The 
Conseil once again engaged in a typical 'operational' judicial review and 
emphasised that decisions to ban meetings could only be upheld if they were 
based upon a correct factual basis. It should be underlined that in order to 
discover an error as to the facts, the court has to review the facts at the 
relevant time and this might require the investigation of detailed and 
specialist information. In the cases thus far this has been instanced by 
examining the numbers of police available and the likelihood of disorder at 
the relevant time. In some ways, the court can be seen to be putting itself in 
the shoes of the police authority and it is for this reason that it must examine 
often detailed operational evidence.
In more recent times, a series of cases have concerned disputes that arise 
when local authorities refuse local groups and associations the use of local 
authority halls and rooms in order to hold public meetings.
In Communes de Tourrettes-sur-loup160 the local mayor refused to authorise 
the use of a room in a town hall by a local pressure group. The group 
requested the room in order to hold a public meeting and it was noted that 
the room in question had frequently been made available to other local 
groups for the same purpose. The Conseil's judgment in this case drew upon 
its previous case-law161 and can be viewed as containing three elements. 
Firstly, it was held that the Mayor's decision could not be upheld because it 
was not based upon the needs arising from the practical management and 
administration of the buildings in his charge. Secondly, the decision could not 
be upheld because it was not based upon the necessities of maintaining public 
order and thirdly, it was in consequence, a violation of the principle of non­
discrimination.
The second of these elements can be seen to be derived from Beniamin. Thus, 
the Conseil decided that one of the reasons that could justify the withholding 
of premises, normally made available for public meetings, from a particular 
person or group, was the need to maintain public order. Although local
160 C.E. 21st March 1979; Rec.739.
161 See Assnc. ’Caen-Demain1. C.E. 15th October 1969; Rec.435, Commune de L'Hermitagg,
C.E. 8th July 1970; Rec.469 and Ville de Caen, C.E. 21st April 1972; Rec.302.
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authorities are under a duty to maintain order, the practical implications of 
this duty are that liberty must as far as possible be respected. Therefore the 
case can be said to apply principles from Benjamin as to the need to maintain 
public order but also the limitations that were placed on this need.
The third element, the principle of non-discrimination162 has been taken up in 
Préfet du Finistère.163 It will be recalled that this case concerned a refusal on 
the part of a mayor to permit communist local councillors to use local 
authority premises in order to carry out electoral meetings. Although, it was 
held that the intended meetings were not within the scope of the liberty to 
meet, it was however stated that there was still a prohibition against 
discriminating between different individuals and groups when it came to 
granting them access to local authority premises. This application of the 
principle to the use of public property has a long history and has been 
declared to be a general principle of law164 but the instant case is important in 
showing that it is also applicable in the domain of the liberty to meet and 
local authority property.
The first element in Communes de Tourrettes-sur-loup that concerns the 
needs arising from practical management and administration, is not an 
exception to the prohibition on discrimination but rather the expression of 
another value like that of public order. It concerns the aim of providing an 
efficient service for all. Therefore, given the scarcity of local authority 
premises relative to the demand for them, choices will have to be made and 
criteria and procedures adopted which provide for the best possible use of the 
premises. These procedures/criteria should not however be discriminatory. It 
is in this sense that the court speaks in terms of managing and administering; 
if access to premises were completely unregulated there would be chaos and 
ultimately only the groups and individuals that were the most powerful 
would be able to exercise their liberty to meet.
162 This is a fundamental principle that underpins French law, (see generally, Colliard, op. 
cit., 202-29, Bell, (1992), op. cit., 199-226 and G. Vedel, 'L'égalité' in Colliard et. ai, op. cit., 171- 
80). The principle is now enshrined in art.2 of the 1958 Constitution.
163 op. dt., section I, supra.
164 See for example, C.E. 9th May 1913, Roubeau: Rec.521 and C.E. 18th May 1928, Laurens:
D.19283.65.
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The approach of the court in Communes de Tourrettes-sur-loup is therefore 
to examine the facts in order to see whether the denial of access is based upon 
either public order or management and administrative grounds. If this is not 
the case, the court will find that the principle of non-discrimination has been 
violated and will then strike down the decision.165 The cases in this area 
therefore introduce another countervailing value - practical management and 
administration - that limit the exercise of the right to meet.
Meetings on the public highway
The cases have dealt with another issue within the framework of the 1881 Act. 
In Mutuelle nationale dps Etudiants de France.166 a student's association 
requested the Conseil d'État to strike down the local mayor's refusal to grant 
them authorisation to hold an electoral meeting on the public highway. 
Although art.6 of the Act (prohibiting meetings on the public highway) was 
not mentioned in the judgment, the court's refusal to overrule the mayor's 
decision can be seen to draw implicit support from this provision;
Considérant qu'aucune disposition ne fait obligation aux maires de mettre la voie publique à 
la disposition des étudiants pour l'organisation d'élections qui les concernent.
It has nevertheless been recognised that municipal law grants mayors the 
power to authorise public meetings on the public highway, without reference 
to the specific origins of this discretion. Joubrel claims that the omission of 
such a reference within the 1881 Act was the result of a view on the part of the 
legislature that such a provision would be superfluous because it was 
generally conceded to already exist.167 If this is accepted, meetings on the 
public highway, as is clearly shown by art.6 of the statute and the above case, 
cannot take place except at the discretion of the local police authority.
165 The formulation in the judgment can also be seen, for example, in Ville de Caen, op. cit.; 
'...qu'il n'est pas allégué que le refus de l'utilisation d'une salle opposé par le maire de Caen à 
l'association 'Caen-Demain' ait été motivé par l'administration des propriétés communales; 
qu'il ne ressort pas des pièces du dossier que l'ordre public ait été menacé; que dès lors, la 
décision du maire de Caen ne respectait pas l'égalité de traitement entre les usagers, qui 
s'imposait...'.
166 C.E. 3rd May 1974,; A.J.D.A.1975.188.
167 op. cit., 147;
'On admet même que les maires pourraient autoriser les réunions sur la voie publique, s'ils 
jugeaient qu'elles sont dépourvues d'inconvénient. Le projet de la commission exprimait 
formellement le droit d'autorisation de l'autorité municipale...si cette disposition a disparu du 
texte définitif, c'est qu'il a paru inutile de rappeler un droit que la loi municipale accorde aux 
maires et que nul ne leur conteste.'
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However, it would also seem to be likely, from the case-law on access to local 
authority premises, that in exercising this discretion, there should be no 
discrimination between individuals and groups. Therefore, discretion should 
be exercised on the grounds of public order and the needs of practical 
management and administration.
PUBLIC ORDER
Despite the existence of management and administrative considerations, the 
recurrent value that appears to conflict with the exercise of the liberty to meet 
has been seen to be that of public order. However, the initial impression that 
public order and the liberty are seen as conflicting values in French law is 
dispelled if a closer look is taken at the nature of the French conception of 
public order. Such an examination is undertaken here.
Public order powers and duties
It has been seen above in the investigation of the history of the liberty that the 
police general public order powers and duties168 date back to the Revolution. 
Today, these powers are found in the first three paragraphs of art.L.131-2 of 
the Code des Communes;
La police municipale a pour objet d'assurer le bon ordre, la sûreté, la sécurité et la salubrité 
publiques. Elle comprend notamment:
I o Tout ce qui intéresse la sûreté et la commodité du passage dans les rues...et voies 
publiques;
2° Le soin de réprimer les atteintes à la tranquillité publique telles que les rixes et disputes 
accompagnées d'ameutement dans les rues, le tumulte excité dans les lieux d'assemblée 
publique, les attroupements, les bruits, y compris les bruits de voisinage, les rassemblements 
nocturnes qui troublent le repos des habitants et tous les actes de nature à compromettre la 
tranquillité publique;
3° Le maintien du bon ordre dans les endroits où il se fait de grands rassemblements 
d'hommes, tels que les foires, marchés, réjouissances et cérémonies publiques, spectacles, 
jeux, cafés, églises et autres lieux publics;
The carrying out of these tasks and others concerning public health and 
morality are stated to be the specific purpose of the police and it will be seen 
below that this reflects the fact that policing in France has a wide signification 
than in England.169 Here, what should be first noted is that public order is
168 The two terms of 'powers' and 'duties' will be used here because the police clearly enjoy 
public order powers but since the decision in C.E. 23rd Oct. 1959 Doublet: Rec.540, it has been 
held that there is a duty to exercise these powers when, inter alia, public order is threatened.
169 Mawby, op. at., 46.
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itself a broad term that includes a trilogy of duties mentioned in the above 
article - good order, safety, security and public health - but this is not an 
exhaustive list.170
Within this broad conception of public order, sometimes referred to as 
'general public order',171 the liberty to meet often seems to be competing with 
a narrower conception of public order which concerns physical violence. 
More specifically, this latter notion of public order is captured by 'le bon 
ordre matérial' or 'tranquillité du public, au sens passif du terme' within the 
wide 'le bon ordre' category in art.L.131-2;172
Il résulte de l'absence de bagarres, de discussions, de violences, de tumultes et d'agitations 
dans les rues, les foires, les marchés, les salles de spectacles, les cafés et tous autres lieux 
d'assemblées publiques.'173
Four characteristics of these narrower public order powers/ duties should be 
noted that are of particular relevance to the legal regulation of the liberty to 
meet. The first is that the public order power is seen as a pervasive. Thus, 
Teitgen notes that even where a liberty is given a specific legal framework, it 
does not escape the duties to maintain public order. Legislation concerning a 
liberty, does not therefore exclude public order powers /duties, rather it 
simply limits the means which the police may use to regulate the liberty. If, 
on the other hand, there has been no legislation, the police have a wider 
discretion as to how they may regulate the liberty.
The liberty to meet has its own legal framework by virtue of the 1881 Act and 
the express mention in art.9 of the continued application of the public order 
powers/duties can be seen to simply reflect the pervasive nature of public 
order powers. However, it has been seen that it was left to the judiciary (in 
Beniamin and subsequent cases) to lay down the specific ways in which these 
powers could be used, since the legislature merely chose to enumerate these 
powers, instead of detailing how they might be used. However, the courts
170 See S. Ktistaki, 'L'Evolution du contrôle juridictionnel des motifs de l'acte administratif
(1991), 102 and the second sentence of the article; 'Elle comprend notamment'.
171J. Buisson, 'L'Acte de police' (1988), 480-2.
172 P-H. Teitgen, 'I-a police municipale: étude de l'interprétation iunsprudentielle des articles 
91. 94 et 97 de la loi du 5 avril 1884’ (1934), 28 & 30 uses both these terms and c.f. Buisson, op.
at., 478-9.
173 jeitgen, op. cit., 30.
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had recourse to the tenor of the enactment, which emphasised civil liberty 
before public order.
A second characteristic of the public order powers/duties is that they are 
original powers that exist prior to law;
le pouvoir de police,....n'est pas un pouvoir délégué par le législateur aux autorités 
administratives. Il est antérieur à la loi; il appartient, par nature, au pouvoir exécutif et puise 
originairement dans sa fonction tous les droits qui lui sont nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre 
dont il est responsable.174
From this point of view art.L.131-2 can be seen as the legal expression of what 
are ultimately pre-legal powers that are fundamental to the role and function 
of the executive itself.175 Once again it must be underlined that legislation 
cannot exclude these powers/duties from the regulation of a liberty, it can 
only limit the means by which they are exercised. Furthermore, because of the 
unforseeable nature of factual circumstances it is impossible to set out in 
advance all the ways in which these powers may be used.176 Essentially, the 
police function of maintaining public order is wider than the non-exhaustive 
list of these functions in art.L.131-2. Therefore, this provision only highlights 
some , but no doubt the most prominent, of these police powers because it is 
actually impossible to list them all.
The third characteristic of the French notion of public order is that it is seen as 
securing the necessary conditions within which human rights may then be 
exercised. It is therefore claimed that public order and human rights do not 
conflict and that public order is often seen as the harmonious conciliation of
174 Teitgen, op. cit., 379.
175 J. Bédier, 'Les principes de la législation sur le maintien de l'ordre public' (1938), 7-8; 
'Qu'est-ce que l'ordre public? Cest essentiellement l'ordre dans la rue. Le devoir élémentaire 
de tout gouvernement est de le maintenir. Un gouvernement qui serait décidé à ne pas 
maintenir l'ordre dans la rue ne pourrait être qualifié de gouvernement; l'Etat serait 
proprement anarchique.',
and op. cit., 75;
'En vérité la police fait essentiellement partie de la compétence naturelle du pouvoir exécutif; 
ses pouvoirs en général, elle les tient de l'exigence de l'ordre public...ordre qu'elle est chargée 
de maintenir.'
176 Teitgen, op. cit., 379;
'...quand la loi intervient par la suite pour le consacrer, l'organiser et le définir, elle ne peut 
pas le limiter à la mise en œuvre de dispositions législatives préétablies, parce que les 
exigences de l'ordre public dépendent de circonstances imprévisibles et concrètes que les lois, 
générales et abstraites, ne peuvent pas prévoir.'(ci., op. cit., 122-3).
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order and liberty. For example, Ktistaki refers to public order as a 'social 
order' in which liberty and order are in a 'dialectic relation’, whereby each 
provides the raison d'etre of the other;
les libertés ne peuvent être conçues que dans le respect de l'ordre; même, l'ordre public ne 
constitue point une fin en soi et doit donc être réalisé en tenant compte des libertés. L'ordre 
public et la liberté sont nécessaires l'un à l'autre, sans que leurs objectifs soient 
antagonistes.177
This view is also echoed by Buisson and Teitgen. Buisson refers to public 
order as 'global public order' in order to indicate its breadth but he stresses 
that it is a social order that serves a chosen general interest; which in liberal 
society is to secure the most expansive exercise of liberty in order that people 
can formulate and achieve their own their goals;
Cet ordre social consiste dans l'harmonisation de la vie sociale, et partant, dans 
l'aménagement des libertés, et plus généralement dans la faculté donnée à chacun d'atteindre 
ses aspirations légitimes dans le respect des autres.178
Teitgen asserts that public order is not antagonistic to human rights but 
instead works to secure the human rights of all;
Il ne se réalise pas contre elles par leur amputation, il se réalise pour elles par leur 
conciliation, dans l'intérêt commun des libertés de tous179
Public order is therefore seen as the equitable determination of the liberties of 
each person or group, which then permits their harmonious exercise in a 
society. Finally, Rivero sums up the fact that public order is not a value in 
itself but rather that in liberal society;
Il s'agit de créer les conditions matérielles d'une vie paisible, dans laquelle l'homme ne soit 
pas entravé par des volontés étrangères à la sienne, et puisse choisir et suivre sa voie.180
The fourth characteristic that will be mentioned is that the French notion 
stresses that public order is socially constructed. In consequence, Rivero sees
177 op. cit., 100.
178 op. cit., 499 and see generally, 476-508.
179 op. cit., 385-6.
180 »Ordre public et état démocratique'. Revue de la Police Nationale 1980-81, no.13,16 and at 
17 he asserts;
'L'ordre public n'est pas une fin en soi; il faut qu'il serve à quelque chose.'
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public order as securing the interests that are considered valuable in a 
particular society;
L'ordre public est donc fonction de ce que les responsables de la collectivité considèrent 
comme nécessaire à l'épanouissement de celle-ci et à la poursuite des buts qu'ils se sont 
assignés.181
Given that it is the product of social forces, public order does not have a 
constant and unchanging content. On the contrary, it is a value that is subject 
to change and this change in turn reflects the changes within the society that 
created it, as is observed by Bédier;
L'ordre public est une notion essentiellement relative, évolutive, dépendant de l'état politique 
et moral à un moment donné.182
As another consequence of this contingent and flexible nature, the 
requirements of public order change in response to different fact situations 
and human rights.183 This social and flexible view of public order seems very 
similar to that adopted in this study as concerns human rights.184 This should 
not surprising if it is recalled that public order was seen as a countervailing 
social value and that human rights were also seen as socially constructed 
values.
It is this conception, which Bédier has referred to as 'essentiellement l'ordre 
dans la rue',185 that is commonly the countervailing value in the cases. Thus in 
Beniamin, the Conseil d'État had to weigh the Mayor's duty to preserve public 
order against respect for the exercise of the liberty to assemble. However, a 
closer reading of the cases and an examination of public order, reveal that 
public order is not seen to require a balancing of conflicting values but rather 
the conciliation of different, but ultimately, compatible concepts. It also shows 
that the liberty to meet is accorded a higher degree of protection than would 
be the case if it did not have the benefit of a specific statutory framework.
181 (1980-1), op. cit., 16 and c.f., Buisson, op. cit., 498.
182 op. cit., 9.
183 Ktistaki, op. dt., 101.
184 See supra., chap.I, sections 1 & II.
185 Bédier, op. dt., 7.
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Judicial review
In the decisions concerning the liberty to meet, the conciliatory nature of 
public order can be seen. Therefore, in Beniamin the Conseil d'Etat was clear 
in its ruling that even though the Mayor had a duty to maintain public order, 
this had to be reconciled with respect for the right. The Conseil expressed 
itself in virtually the same terms in Naud186 but this time regarding a prefect's 
decision to ban a meeting. However, judicial review of such decisions (and 
thus the conciliation of public order and the liberty to meet) is affected by a 
number of factors and these will now be set out. It will be seen that these 
factors that go to the substance of judicial review and build upon the outline 
presented of judicial review in chapter II.187
Theorists commonly group these factors into a number of interpretative rules 
or doctrines which the Conseil d'Etat, in particular, has formulated. Two188 of 
these which seem of relevance here are the doctrines of necessity and 
proportionality.
(a) necessity
According to Ktistaki,189 this rule is of particular significance to human rights 
that are guaranteed by statute, such as the liberty to meet. When such rights 
are involved, the doctrine is claimed to require that any restriction of such a 
liberty that is not provided for in the specific protective statute will only be 
permitted if it is necessary in order to maintain public order in the face of a 
real threat of serious disorder. The judge must make a decision as to whether 
the measure was taken in view of the maintenance of public order and 
whether it was necessary to achieve this objective.190
The principle of necessity can be clearly seen in Beniamin. In this case, the 
liberty to meet was protected by statute and bans were not specifically 
provided for in this enactment. However, they would have been upheld had 
it been shown that they were necessary to maintain public order in the 
circumstances of the case. Instead, the Conseil found that other police 
measures could achieve this objective. Where the circumstances are so grave
186 For other rules, see M. Long et. aL, op. cit., 280.
187 Section II.
188 See Teitgen, op. cit., 402-69.
189 op. cit., 92.
190 See generally, Buisson, op. cit., 628-62.
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that they leave no scope for other measures, bans will be upheld, as in, for 
example, Houphouet-Boignv.191 where the court found that serious and 
widespread public disorder necessitated the banning of a congress. The 
measure was necessary because there was no other means to maintain order 
given the gravity of the disorder that was threatened.
It follows that the judge examines whether the restriction was necessary in the 
specific factual circumstances of each case; thus in Bakarv Diibo192 the Conseil 
upheld the decision by the Governor of Niger to ban all the meetings of a 
particular political party on the grounds that they threatened such 
widespread disorder that a general ban was 'indispensable' in order to assure 
public order. The necessity of the ban was therefore made out by the specific 
seriousness of the disorder.193 The review of what the specific context 
necessitates also covers the length of time of a restriction, in the sense that the 
duration of a restriction must also be shown to be necessary in the face of 
serious public disorder. This was the judgement in Commune de Louroux- 
Beconnais.194 in which the mayor was permitted to ban all balls in the area 
until public order was re-established but the duration of the ban had to be 
related to the persistent risk of disorder; in other words, it had to be shown to 
be necessary.
(b) proportionality
Sometimes the restriction of a human right, cannot be merely what is 
necessary to maintain public order, in the sense of the most efficient measure. 
Consequently, the courts have further required that there be a balance or 
proportional relation between the measure and the specific circumstances to 
which it responds.195 Essentially, the measure must be proportional to the
191 op. cit.
192 op. dt.
193 Ktistaki, op. cit., 93, asserts that there is a kind of presumption of illegality as far as such 
general bans are concerned because of the emphasis on specific factual circumstances;
'Par suite, les règlements de police, prescrivant une interdiction absolue et générale sont, à 
l'évidence, illégaux pour insuffisance de leurs motifs, car la généralité de leur portée prouve à 
elle seule que l'autorité compétente n'a pas tenu compte des circonstances et qu'il (sic) a 
certainement dépassé, de ce fait, les nécessités de l'ordre public.'
194 C.E. 28th Oct. 1983; Rec.645. This case concerns balls but illustrates the application of the 
principle under discussion.
195 See generally, Buisson, op. cit., 683-96 and Teitgen, op. cit., 423-69.
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seriousness of the disorder that it is sought to be prevented and the value of 
the liberty that is restricted.196
As regards the first factor, the judge reviews to the nature of the 
circumstances confronting the liberty in issue. The judge therefore gauges the 
degree of the seriousness of disorder by looking at such factors as the time 
and place in which the meeting is to be held.197 Attention is then turned to the 
measure and it is assessed in relation to this context. Thus, while in Beniamin 
the less serious degree of potential public disorder and the possibility of 
calling for police reinforcements198 resulted in a finding that the ban was 
disproportionate, Bucard can be seen as a case in which the special 
circumstances pertaining to time (World War II) and place (the department 
being located on the border with Germany) justified a series of bans that were 
also extended to private meetings. Similarly, in Djibo Bakarv, it was seen that 
general bans were justified because of the extremely grave disorder at the 
time in Niger. In short, serious disorder in turn justifies serious restrictions, 
such that the restriction is in proportion to the disorder.
The other aspect of the doctrine of proportionality involves the judge 
weighing up the severity of the restriction against the value of the liberty.199 
This value is judged by whether or not the liberty in question has been given 
statutory protection. In this sense, the judiciary can be seen to measure value 
in democratic terms.200 The result, as has be noted above, is that human rights 
that are protected by statute are accorded greater value. This greater value 
translates into greater weight in the conciliation with public order.
196 Ktistaki, op. cit., 94-5 states;
'Cette règle se traduit par le fait qu'une décision de police prise dans une matière dépend, 
d'une part, de l'importance du trouble à éviter, en liaison avec la gravité du préjudice 
matériel que cause effectivement cette décision aux individus qu'elle atteint; d'une autre part, 
elle varie selon la valeur juridique de la liberté atteinte. En d'autres termes, une mesure de 
police restrictive d'une liberté publique doit être proportionnée à l'intensité de la menace sur 
l'ordre public ainsi qu'à la valeur de la liberté en cause.'
197 Ktistaki, op. cit., 96.
198 See M. Long, et. ai, et. seq., 278.
199 Teitgen, op. cit., 438;
'L'étendue des droits que possède le maire pour éviter un désordre d'une gravité donnée 
dépend de la valeur juridique abstraite du droit ou de la liberté qui lui est opposé.
200 Ktistaki, op. cit., 99;
'...lorsque certaines activités humaines sont particulièrement reconnues et organisées par le 
législateur, elles doivent être respectées par l'autorité de police. Il s'agit des comportements 
qui ont bénéficié de cette individualisation protectrice, normalement liée à leur importance 
pour l’homme et la société.'
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The liberty to meet is dearly an example of human right that has a high value. 
The result is that restrictions of its exercise must not only be necessary to 
maintain public order but they must also be related to the value of the right to 
meet. To illustrate this point regard can be had to Buiadoux. where it will be 
recalled that the Conseil struck down the Mayor’s ban because of the 
availability of other, less restrictive police measures. This can be interpreted 
as a decision that the ban was disproportionate to the value of the liberty to 
meet; in the sense that given its high value, all other measures should have 
been shown to be insufficient to maintain public order before it was 
restricted.
It has been noted by Teitgen that the location in which a liberty is exercised 
can have a bearing on the severity of the restrictive measure, even if this 
liberty is highly valued. More precisely, he asserts that a liberty that is 
guaranteed by the law but which is exercised in a location which has been 
created for different purposes can be restricted by police measures in order to 
maintain the original function of the location;
Les libertés garanties par la loi, mais exercées sur une dépendance du domaine contrairement 
à son affectation, ne sont pas opposables à la police municipale, lorsqu'elle agit pour 
sauvegarder l'affectation de la dépendance du domaine dont il s'agit.201
This view appears to throw more light on Mutuelle Nationale des Etudiants 
de France.202 where it will be recalled that a ban of a meeting to be held on the 
public highway was upheld. This decision would have been supported by 
art.6 of the 1881 Act but this provision was not dted by the court. It was then 
asserted by Joubrel that police authorities enjoyed a discretion as to whether 
to permit meetings on the public highway. However, Teitgen's claim indicates 
that the liberty to meet has a lesser value than the rights of passage of 
pedestrians and vehide drivers when it is sought to be exercised on the public 
highway. This secondary position means that the police may exerdse a 
discretion as to whether to accord priority to rights of passage. In addition, 
the existence of the express prohibition in the 1881 Ad may make it difficult 
to defend the exercise of meetings in such locations but it must be underlined 
that this does not mean that meetings on the public highway are always
201 op. cit., 449.
202 op. cit.
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illegal but simply that they will be held at the discretion of the police and are 
under a presumption of illegality.
Although necessity and proportionality are distinct, they may often be 
difficult to distinguish in the cases and indeed both may applied at the same 
time. Therefore, the Conseil would not accept that a ban based on the mere 
necessity of having to deploy police officers in Xavier Vallat203 was 
proportionate to the disorder threatened. Put more simply, the liberty to meet 
was too important a liberty to be legitimately restricted by such an extreme 
measure and the degree of potential disorder was not sufficiently grave so as 
to legitimate a ban. However, the measure was also unnecessary given that 
public order could be maintained by merely deploying the police, which was 
an alternative measure that would have permitted the exercise of the right.
This brief analysis of the two central doctrines of judicial review provides a 
more detailed explanation of the 'sliding scale' or different degrees of review 
noted earlier.204 Essentially, the degree to which the judge will accept the 
factual findings of the police have been seen to depend on a multiplicity of 
factors that are raised by the doctrines of proportionality and necessity. The 
regulation of the liberty is thus a constantly changing and flexible adjustment 
according to the different configurations of factors in each specific case and 
the equally flexible demands of public order.
A SUMMARY
It has been seen that after a somewhat chequered early history, the liberty to 
meet is currently regulated and more importantly, guaranteed by a 
combination of legal measures and case-law. The legislature can thus be said 
to have recognised the specific needs and context of the liberty by according it 
a specific legal framework. In the case-law the importance of this right has 
also been stressed, as well as the exceptional nature of its restriction, although 
the administration, as highlighted by the Paganon circular, has not always 
interpreted the cases in this way. It has fallen to the judges to hone down and 
refine the broad police powers and an important factor in this process has 
been seen to be the fact that the right is statutorily guaranteed. This in turn 
provides another example of the continuing vigour of parliamentary
203 op. cit.
204 See chap.II, section II, supra.
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sovereignty in France. At the same time, space has been created in which this 
human right is respected and prioritised. In short, the regulation of the liberty 
to meet provides an example of how parliamentary sovereignty can co-exist 
with the protection of human rights.
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CHAPTER V 
THE LIBERTY TO PROCESS IN FRANCE
In this chapter the legal regulation of the liberty to process1 will be set out and 
the same structure as was used for the liberty to meet in the previous chapter 
will be employed. Therefore, an examination of how the right is defined will 
be carried out in section I, before then presenting the history of the legal 
regulation in section II. Finally, the current legal regulation of the right will be 
set out in section III.
It will be seen that in contrast to the liberty to meet, the liberty to process is 
not constructed as a pedigree human right in French law. In other words, its 
lack of statutory protection means that it is generally tolerated, so that its 
exercise is permitted because processions are not illegal and not because there 
is a recognised right to process. In this sense, the liberty to process is very 
similar to the notion of negative civil liberty that exists in English law.2 
Interestingly, it will be seen that in French law a distinction is made between 
the liberty to meet and the liberty to process.
SECTION I 
A DEFINITION
Despite the above remarks as to the lesser status of the liberty vis a vis the 
liberty to meet, it will be noted that definition of the liberty to process is of 
considerable importance. Essentially, this right has its own particular legal 
regime, which in addition seeks to protect a different type of assembly right 
or activity than does the liberty to meet. However, there has been less 
attention paid to the definition of the right to process than to the right to 
meet.
DEFINITION VIA CHARACTERISTICS
No statutory definition of the liberty to process exists in French law 
Consequently, it has been left to the legal commentators to formulate 
definitions and it to these that attention will now turn. The first set of
1 The terms 'processions' and 'marches' will be used interchangeably here.
2 See chap.l, section I, supra.
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definitions that will be looked at are those that seek to set out the 
characteristics of processions.
One of the characteristics that is traditionally isolated is that of mobility. A 
standard definition can be said to be the following by Montreuil;
La manifestation est le fait pour une groupe de personnes d'user de la voie publique pour 
exprimer une volonté collective; si elle est mobile c'est un cortège, si elle est immobile c'est un 
rassemblement.3
From this definition, it can be seen that processions are presented as a 
particular aspect of a wider notion of demonstrations. Therefore the liberty to 
process is generally defined in a secondary manner; as a demonstration that is 
distinguished by its mobile nature. This mobile form of demonstration is called 
a 'défilé' or 'cortège' and can be seen as the equivalent of a procession.
Le cortège est une suite nombreuse de personnes qui entendent manifester leur opinion par 
un défile sur la voie publique.4
For this reason a presentation of the law regulating the liberty to process will 
focus on the law of demonstrations and when this term is referred to, it 
should be understood that reference is being made to processions. A second 
characteristic builds upon the demonstration function and is present in all 
types of demonstrations. It asserts that participants in demonstrations express 
a single and collective will or opinion;
Les cortèges et manifestations sont des rassemblements d'hommes qui se produisent dans 
certaines circonstances. Ces rassemblements expriment une volonté collective, des sentiments 
communs.5
There is therefore no exchange of views or discussion in a procession and 
moreover, this characteristic is generally used to distinguish meetings from 
processions;
Manifester consiste pour les citoyens à se rassembler sur la voie publique en vue d'exprimer 
une opinion commune par la présence et par la voix. Par la-même, la manifestation, mobile
3 J.-Cl. (Pénal), 'Manifestations'. Art.104 à 108, (1990), Fasc.20,11,4.
4 Bédier, op. cit., 18 and Berthon, op. cit., 67-8 also stresses the idea of movement as a 
characteristic of mobile demonstrations, thus processions are defined as;
'...une troupe de gens qui vont ou qui viennent ensemble vers un même endroit, ou d'un 
même endroit.'
5 Colliard, op. cit., 743-4.
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ou immobile, se différencie de la réunion publique dont le lieu d'exercice ne peut pas - du 
moins légalement - être la voie publique et dont l'élément principal est le discours, l'échange 
de discours, voire le débat contradictoire.6
In consequence, whereas the liberty to meet protects stationary assemblies, 
the liberty to process guarantees not only mobile assemblies but also those in 
which debate and the exchange of ideas is not a feature but where there is a 
single or unified expression of opinion. No official guidance is however given 
as to the degree of consensus that is required in order to constitute a 
demonstration, or what degree of divergence in the opinions expressed by the 
participants in a march will lead to the activity being characterised as a 
meeting.
Some commentators use order as an alternative defining characteristic. For 
example, Colliard asserts;
Le cortège, en dehors de cette notion de mobilité, comporte un élément d'ordre qui est plus 
marqué qu'en ce qui concerne la manifestation.7
This view is echoed by Robert and Duffar;
Le cortège implique un élément d'ordre plus marqué que la simple manifestation; il suppose, 
en effet, une organisation, des dirigeants, une service d'ordre, du matériel (banderoles, 
pancartes ou drapeaux..), bref tout un dispositif mis en place par une équipe responsable.8
According to this view, processions are a more orderly form of 
demonstration, than a static demonstration (assembly). This characteristic 
was also used to distinguish processions from attroupements (assemblies that 
threaten to breach the peace, which will be examined below);9
tandis que dans la notion d'attroupements, semble contenue une idée de spontanéité, 
d'organisation et de rassemblement accidentel, celle des cortèges et des manifestations éveille 
à l'esprit au contraire une idée d'organisation et de rassemblement concerté.10
6 Tercinet, op. cit., 1010. Another example is provided by Le Gère, op. cit., 7;
'...la réunion, assemblée qui pense et que l'échange des idées oppose à la manifestation, 
deuxième groupe de la grande famille, qui se caractérise dans la matérialisation d un but par 
le nombre.'
7 op. cit., 743-4.
® op. cit., 560.
9 See section II, infra.
10 Berthon, op. cit., 32.
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A further defining characteristic is that of the location of processions, so that 
it is generally agreed that they take place on the public highway.n This can be 
most clearly seen in the definitions by Mon treuil and Tercinet that were set 
out above.12
From the examples presented here it can be seen that there is a tendency in 
French law to talk of the right to demonstrate ('manifester') and to see 
processions or marches ('les cortèges' or 'les défilés') as a mobile example of 
this wider category.13
Thus far the liberty to process in France could be defined as protecting 
processions that are characterised by order, mobility, the public highway as a 
location and the expression of a consensus opinion. These characteristics have 
not been tested in the case-law but nevertheless they can be seen to have the 
same degree of uncertainty or flexibility as was noted as regards the 
characteristics that defined the right to meet. For example, there is no 
indication of the degree or kind of movement that is required in order to 
constitute a procession. Does, for example, moving around in a circle, as in
11 In French law there is no definition of what constitutes the public highway for the 
purposes of the liberty to process but via a combination of legislative texts and case-law, its 
legal nature can be elucidated. If it is assumed that public highways are the property of state 
authorities, then according to art. L.2 of the Code du Domaine de l'État, all property
’...qui ne sont pas susceptibles d'une propriété privée en raison de leur nature ou de la 
destination qui leur est donnée sont considérés comme dépendances du domaine public 
national. Les autres biens constituent le domaine privé.'
(c.f. Ville de Bordeaux. CE. 7 Oct. 1967; J.C.P.67.II.15053). As a result, it can be stated that the 
public highway is part of the 'domaine public' (c.f. Code Civil, art.538 and J. Duffau, 
'Domaine Public'. J.-Q. (Admin.), vol.V, Fasc.405-1, 5, (1992), 6-8).
Returning to the question of what constitutes the public highway, as opposed to questions as 
to its legal ownership, the responses that have been provided have been at best circular, or 
they rely on the fact of belonging to the 'domaine public', for example Ordonnance no.59-115 
of 7th lan. 1959. art.l;
'La voire des communes comprend: (1) Les voies communales qui font partie du domaine 
public; (2) Les chemins ruraux, qui appartiennent au domaine privée de la commune.' 
According to Duffau, op. cit., 15, the 'domaine public routier' consists of 
'...des voies de communication terrestre affectées à la circulation du public.'
It is submitted that public highways are part of this category of the public domain and that 
what characterises them ownership and their dedication to the purpose of the movement of 
pedestrians and motorised vehicles.
12 See notes 3 & 6, supra.
13 For example, Le Gère claims;
'La manifestation devient l'expression d'une opinion extériorisée par un groupe d'hommes 
utilisant à cette fin la voie ou un lieu public. Si la foule se déplace, nous parlerons de cortège; 
si elle reste immobile, ce sera un rassemblement. Mais dans l'un et l'autre cas, il ne saurait 
être question de discours; sinon, nous verserions dans la réunion ou dans l'attroupement.'
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the English case of Tynan v Balmer.14 constitute a procession? Clearly, 
whether a procession has occurred or not will often be obvious but what is 
underlined here is that the defining characteristics have a flexible degree to 
them. In other words, they have a core and a penumbra.
DEFINITION VIA VALUES/FUNCTION
If the above definitions seek to mark out the kinds of activities that the right 
protects (i.e. marches), the approach that will now be looked at attempts to 
isolate the values that this right seeks to secure. It will be recalled that the 
same approach was used in chapter III as regards a general definition of the 
liberties to assemble.15 Consequently, it is an inquiry into attempts to define 
the liberty by isolating the valued functions of processions such that their 
protection is justified. Although this approach has not generally been 
followed by the commentators, a response can be formulated from the 
definitions given above.
Therefore, by reason of its being seen as a demonstration, the liberty to meet 
can be claimed to perform expression functions. It will be recalled that the 
definitions of the liberty to meet by Waline and Tercinet16 also placed the 
liberty to meet within a wider category of rights of expression. Robert and 
Duffar provide yet another example, this time concerning the liberty to 
process;
On entend généralement par 'manifestation' le fait d'un groupe utilisant la voie publique 
pour exprimer une opinion par sa présence, ses gestes ou ses cris.17
This view can also seen to be supported by the claim, noted above, that one of 
the defining characteristics of processions is that they express a single 
opinion. In addition, it opens up the possibility that the right protects 
marches that permit the wide range of values that expression was claimed to 
secure when the general definition of the liberty to assembly was formulated
14 [1967] 1Q.B. 91.
15 Section, II, supra.
16 See, chap.IV, section I, supra.?
17 op. cit., 580 and Costa, op. dt., 93;
'Les manifestations sont des rassemblements d'hommes sur la voie publique en vue de 
l'expression d'idées ou de revendications.'
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in chapter II: democracy, protest, safety-valve, truth and self-fulfilment. This 
seems apparent from the definition by Berlioz;18
La manifestation consiste dans l'expression publique et collective d'une opinion; quelle qu'en 
soit l'origine, elle correspond à un besoin humain d'expression, elle fait partie intégrante de la 
liberté d'opinion à laquelle toute démocratie est attachée.
To take protest as one example that illustrates this point, Costa asserts that 
processions perform a protest function and that this function also indicates 
public opinions to political leaders. He can therefore be said to be linking 
protest and democracy as valued functions of the liberty to process;
Le droit de manifester est...devenu peu à peu une revendication assez universelle, un moyen 
de faire pression sur les pouvoirs publics ou d'attirer leur attention sur un problème ou sur le 
mécontentement de telle ou telle partie de l'opinion. La bataille pour les droits civiques aux 
États-Unis s'est appuyée sur de vastes rassemblements devant le Capitole; les manifestations 
en Afrique du Sud soutiennent la lutte contre l'apartheid; moins dramatiquement, les 
catégories sociales qui sont en conflit momentané avec des employeurs ou avec l'État 
cherchent à peser sur eux, ou à frapper l'opinion, par la grève et par la manifestation.19
If the liberty to process is accepted as a liberty that protects marches because 
they are a means to communicate and express views, then it could be argued, 
as it was for the liberty to meet, that it falls within the liberty of opinion 
guaranteed by art.ll of the 1789 Declaration.20
An alternative function or value that is isolated by Costa is that the liberty to 
process is part of a wider category of group liberties. It has already been seen 
that he makes the same claim for the liberty to meet21 but it should be noted 
that he hints that the valued function of group liberties is a democratic one;
l'individualisme, en France, a longtemps prévalu, du point de vue des libertés, sur les droits 
des groupes.
Ce fut le mérite de la IIIe et de la IVe Républiques de reconnaître progressivement ces 
derniers, de faire passer notre pays de la démocratie politique à la démocratie sociale, ou 
plutôt peut-être de la démocratie atomisée à la démocratie organisée..
'Les manifestations'. Revue de Police Nationale, no.126 Dec. (1987), 4 at 6. 
op. àt., 93-4.
20 Montreuil, 'Manifestations', op. cit., 2
21 See, chap.IV, section I, supra.
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This section concludes with the observation that as far as definitions that seek 
to delimit the characteristics of processions, the liberty to process is seen as an 
assembly right, whereas definitions that concentrate on the values and 
functions of the liberty emphasise its position as performing expressive 
functions. Therefore, the liberty to process in France can be said to protect 
marches on the public highway because they are seen to be an important 
means of communicating opinions and feelings. In turn these opinions and 
feelings are valued for the traditional variety of reasons that are claimed to be 
the functions and values of the right of expression.
SECTION II 
THE HISTORY OF LEGAL REGULATION
The 1935 decree-law, which was also seen to partially regulate the liberty to 
meet, forms the central legal measure as far as the liberty to process is 
concerned. This section therefore concentrates on the history of this 
enactment. However, in analysing its history, it would appear that two 
separate but related historical contexts reveal themselves, which require a 
historical analysis that goes beyond solely discussing the decree-law.
The first relates to previous legal provisions which regulated other forms of 
assembly but which may have influenced the provisions of the 1935 decree- 
law. It has already been noted that in relation to the liberty to meet, the 1881 
Act, although innovative in many aspects, draws much from preceding 
legislative texts. In the same way, the 1935 decree-law has a legislative history 
that strongly influences, and to a large extent explains, its current provisions. 
Consequently, an attempt will be made to elucidate this history by an analysis 
of the relevant provisions prior to the decree-law. It will be observed that 
there was a tendency on the part of the authorities not to differentiate 
between different categories of the liberty of assembly and non-peaceful 
gatherings when enforcing the law. The result was that although 
differentiation was sometimes evident at a formal level - in that some texts 
were clearly stated to have other forms of assembly and/or violent activities 
in mind - as far as actual practice these laws were indiscriminately applied 
across the wide range of activities that constitute the liberties to assemble, 
including the liberty to process.
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The second historical context relates to the political and social context in 
which the 1935 decree-law was passed. Just as the 1881 Act was seen to be the 
product of a period of calm and the belief that meetings were less of a threat 
to the public peace, so the 1935 decree-law can be seen to be the product of a 
particular historical moment. The socio-political events of this time explain a 
great deal of its provisions. This type of more specific historical investigation 
is linked to the first since in responding to the particular needs raised in the 
1930s, the authorities were able to draw on previous legal provisions.
PRIOR LEGAL TEXTS
Before the 1935 decree-law, the liberty to meet was characterised by a lack of 
formal legal recognition, such that it was either simply tolerated by the 
authorities or restricted using the police general public order powers or those 
provided by specific enactments aimed at other types of assemblies.
Public order and other enactments
Despite the fact that processions of a political and religious nature have been 
noted as having taken place under the Ancien Régime,22 it is the 
Revolutionary period that provides the starting point for texts which have 
influenced present legal regulation because it was via the general public order 
powers, first formulated at this time, that marches were, and to a great extent 
still today, regulated.23 Therefore, it is in this period that the fundamental 
principles and practices of public order were formulated.24 Montreuil notes 
that the organisation of a public force to maintain public order took place at 
this time.25 In addition, the principle of a public force to maintain public 
order, consisting of ordinary citizens, whose intervention was only to be at 
the request of civil authorities, became established in this period.26
22 For example, Colliard, op. cit., 744 and Montreuil, 'Manifestations', op. cit., 2-3.
23 For public order powers before the Revolution, see Bédier, op. cit., 21-37 and Le Clère, op. 
dt., 8-10.
24 Bédier, op. dt., 14;
'C'est pendant la Révolution que sont nés les grands principes du maintien de l'ordre public 
et de la défense nationale...la primauté du pouvoir civil...'.
25 op. dt., 3.
26 See, for example, Carrot, op. dt., v and 15-24. His central thesis is that it was the Revolution 
that established the principle of a public force to maintain order, aside from the army or other 
forces under executive control which had been one of the hallmarks of the Ancien Regime 
(pg.v). This public force was exemplified by the creation of the 'les Gardes Nationaux' (pg.20- 
2). The practical application of this principle was to last until the Thermidor Convention of 
1795, when the army re-assumed a predominant role (pgs.195-220). Nevertheless, despite the
(Footnote continues on next page)
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The constituent assembly, therefore set up local police forces ('corps 
municipaux': prefects and mayors) and granted them powers and duties to 
maintain public order by virtue of the Law of the 16-24th Aug. 179027 and the 
Law of 19-22nd lulv 1791 concerning the organisation of local police forces. 
Although, the liberty to process was not subjected to any specific legal 
requirements, such as prior declarations as in the case of meetings, the police 
authorities were able to regulate processions by reason of these general duties 
and powers to maintain public order.28
An important text in this period was the Decree of 20th Tulv-3rd Aug. 1791. 
which prohibited seditious assemblies. This is because these assemblies were 
widely defined and could be used to prevent many types of assembly, as well 
as justifying the use of force to disperse them.29 This is an example of a text 
whose terms were sufficiently wide, despite the ostensible aim of only 
regulating a specific form of assembly, to permit of its application to other 
forms of peaceful assembly, such as processions and meetings. The law on 
attroupements is a classic case in point.
Attroupements
Despite the passage of texts which secured the right of peaceful assembly30 
and prohibited interference with those who wanted to organise and 
participate in the activities of clubs,31 it was noted in chapter IV that there
use of the army by subsequent political regimes, a public force was always maintained at 
least in law, if not in practice, as enshrined in art.12 of the 1789 Declaration;
'La garantie des droits de l'homme et du citoyen nécessite une force publique; cette force est 
donc instituée pour l'avantage de tous, et non pour l’utilité particulière de ceux à qui elle est 
confiée.'
27 gp a'( jt will be recalled that these powers and duties are today found in art.L.131-2 of the 
Codes des Communes.
2® Le Clère, op. cit., 43 and Burdeau, op. cit., 225.
29 The decree prohibited;
'...tout rassemblememt séditieux de plus de quinze personnes s'opposant à l'exécution d'une 
loi, d'une contrainte ou d'un jugement.'
This text was in turn repeated in the laws granting police powers to the prefects of police; 
Law of 28 Pluvoise an VIII (17th Feb. 1800) and Consular Decision of 12 Messidor an VIII. 
supra., chap.IV, section n.
30 See for example, art.62 of the Law of 14th Dec 1789, supra., chap.IV, section II, which it will 
be recalled secured the right to peaceful assembly.
31 jh e  Law of 13-19th Nov. 1790. legally recognised clubs, whilst it was earlier noted that the 
Decree of 13th lune 1793 prohibited interference with those who attended dub meetings (see 
chap.IV, section II, supra.).
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were continued outbreaks of public disorder after the Revolution. Much of 
this disorder was dealt with by laws concerning 'attroupements', which were 
assemblies that threatened to breach the peace.32 Even though these measures 
formally sought to restrict attroupements, the width of their definition and 
the anxieties of the authorities often meant they were applied to a wide range 
of assembly activities, including processions.33 For example, according to Vitu 
and Montreuil,34 attroupements were defined by art.9 of the Decree of 26th 
Tulv-3rd Aug. 1791 in exactly the same terms as seditious meetings;
Sera réputé attroupement séditieux et puni comme tel, tout rassemblement de plus de 15 
personnes s'opposant à l'exécution d'une loi, d'une contrainte ou d'un jugement.
There appears to be no direct translation of this term in English law, therefore the term 
'attroupement' will be retained in this paper. It has been defined as;
'...une atteinte à l'ordre public, à la tranquillité publique, constituée par le rassemblement sur 
la voie publique ou dans un lieu public d'un nombre indéterminé de personnes, soit lorsque 
ledit rassemblement est armé, soit lorsque non armé il "pourrait troubler la tranquillité 
publique" alors que les premieres sommations légales ayant été effectuées, les participants ne 
se sont pas dispersés.'
(A. Vitu & ). Montreuil J.-Cl. (Pénal), 'Attroupements'. Fasc.30,11, (1990), 7.
However, this definition was formulated before the coming into force of the new penal code, 
which by virtue of art.431-3 defines attroupements as;
'..tout rassemblement de personnes sur la voie publique ou dans un lieu pubbc susceptible de 
troubler l'ordre public.'
This new definition would seem to have resolved a controversy as to meaning of 
attroupement. Thus, Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 581-2 previously asserted that there were two 
competing definitions. The first stated that an attroupement was an unorganised gathering of 
people on the public highway and that it only became illegal when it did not disperse when 
requested to do so by the police authorities. The defiance of police authority was therefore 
required, according to this definition. The second definition asserted that an attroupement 
was constituted by an organised gathering of persons on the public highway, who intended 
to breach the peace or had another illegal object in mind. In this definition the emphasis was 
on public disorder and not the failure to obey authority. The current formulation adopts the 
second definition in that an attroupement is formed before any requests to disband have been 
made (see infra.). However, it will be seen that sanctions are only applicable to those who do 
not disband once requested to do so and for this reason the second definition has also 
influenced the law.
33 Montreuil, 'Manifestations', op. cit., 3 notes of this period;
'L'époque connaît, outre les journées révolutionnaires, d'innombrables manifestations 
tumultueuses que la force publique est incapable de réduire (quand elle s'y efforce) 
autrement que par l'usage des armes...Dans une telle conjoncture, il est impossible de 
distinguer l'attroupement séditieux de la simple manifestation, cette confusion étant aggravée 
par l'amalgame entre l'association, la réunion publique et la manifestation, amalgame 
entretenu par le pouvoir en réaction contre l'immixtion permanente des clubs dans l'exercice 
du législatif et de l'exécutif.'
34 op. cit., 6.
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Given the already noted width of the definition of seditious meetings, the 
control of attroupements could similarly restrict peaceful assemblies.35 The 
intermittent disorder of the Revolutionary period eventually led to a ban on 
attroupements by virtue of art.365 of the 1795 Constitution;
Tout attroupement non armé doit être également dissipé, d'abord par voie de 
commandement verbal, et s'il est nécessaire, par le développement de la force armée.
From this time the French legal structure continued to contain measures 
against attroupements which were then applied to other forms of assembly, 
including the liberty to process. For example, the Law of 10th April 1831 
provided that;
Toutes personnes qui formeront des attroupements sur la place ou la voie publique seront 
tenues de se disperser à la première sommation des Préfets, Sous-Préfets, Maires, Adjoints au 
Maire, Magistrats, et officiers civils, chargés de la police judiciaire.
The provisions of the 1831 Act were taken up in the Law no.459 of 7th Tune 
1848,36 by virtue of which the authorities could disperse such attroupements 
using force, after it had been summoned to disperse by an official. The 
incitement of an attroupement was also declared a crime.37 This procedure 
was in the main retained in arts.104-108 of the former penal code.
However, it is important to underline that an attroupement was, and still is, 
characterised as a threat to public order. Therefore a view must be taken by the 
authorities that such disorder is likely and this is a subjective decision that is 
invariably taken by the police on the spot. This public order requirement has 
now been recognised in art .431-3 of the new penal code, which regulates 
attroupements.
35 In this connection, Le Clère, op. cit., 53, notes that the 1791 decree could be used to sanction 
any threat to legal authority, no matter where it took place;
'En vertu de l'article 9, il est donc possible à tout magistrat civil de pénétrer dans le domicile 
privé d'un citoyen où se trouveraient rassemblés plus de 15 personnes dont l'attitude 
manifesterait clairement leur opposition à l'exécution d'une loi...'.
36 This was in turn inspired by the English Riot Act 1714.
37 See generally, Berthon, op. cit., 34-40, Le Clère, op. cit., 51-67, Bédier, op. cit., 218-225 and 
Vitu & Montreuil, op. cit., 6-7.
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A legal combination
It was the combination of the general public order powers and more specific 
enactments restricting attroupements that provided the police with the power 
to ban or attach conditions to processions from the mid-nineteenth century up 
until the 1935 decree-law.
Processions could thus be banned in order to maintain public order and 
therefore the imposition of conditions relating to time, location, route and 
numbers could be justified on a similar basis. However, almost exclusively 
the public order power was used to ban. It would seem that as far as 
sanctions for breaches of these bans were concerned and the use of force by 
the police, the 1848 statute concerning attroupements was relied upon, so that 
if a procession took place after it had been banned on the basis of the public 
order powers, the organisers could be prosecuted for having provoked an 
attroupement and also the participants for failing to disperse after having 
been ordered to do so. Essentially, breach of a ban had the legal effect of 
transforming the subsequent procession into an attroupement.38
It is doubtful whether such decisions to ban, or otherwise regulate, the liberty 
were subject to judicial control.39 The discretion granted to the police whether 
to characterise processions as actually or potentially violent has already been 
noted as regards the laws concerning seditious assemblies and attroupements 
and must be added to by that provided by the general public order powers of 
the police.
3® Colliard, op. cit., 744-5;
'...l'autorité de police ayant connaissance d'une manifestation ou d’un cortège projeté pouvait 
le réglementer et même l'interdire dans certains cas. Lorsque la manifestation ou le cortège 
étaient ainsi interdits, s'ils se produisaient tout de même, il y avait lieu de les considérer 
comme les attroupements illégaux, pouvant être dissous par la force.'
(c.f. Terdnet, op. cit., 1014).
In fact the Conseil d'état only began to review the facts in a case in order to ascertain their 
material accuracy ('l'exactitude matérielle') and whether they justified the administrative 
act/decision in 1916 (Camino. C.E. 14th Jan. 1916; S.1922.3.10) and 1914 (Gomel. C.E. 4 April. 
1914; S.1917.3.25) respectively. Berthon, op. cit. 43-45 notes the slow development of judicial 
review by the Conseil d'État, especially as regards the exercise of local police powers; 
'Introduire dans les motifs que l'interdiction s'inspirait d'un souci d'ordre public constituait 
une présomption de rectitude n'admettant pas la preuve contraire; c'est une présomption juris 
et de jure. Le Conseil s'interdit de rechercher au fond la sincérité de l'arrêté attaqué.' (pg.45).
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Authorisations and general bans
The police took advantage of this position of strength in order to authorise 
processions. It has been noted in the context of the liberty to meet that Mayors 
could justify general bans on the basis of their general public order 
powers/duties and the same situation existed as regards the liberty to 
process. This, in turn, resulted in a framework where, in effect, authorisation 
was required from the police authorities. Therefore, organisers of processions 
had to seek an exemption from the general ban. In other words, their 
procession had to be authorised. Where, on the other hand, the organisers 
desired to have the ban lifted, they would have to provoke a refusal by the 
police authorities to authorise the procession which could then be challenged 
before the Conseil d'Etat.40
It has been claimed that the Conseil d'Etat annulled every refusal to 
'authorise' processions in such circumstances and was generally hostile to 
general bans.41 However, this only occurred from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when the Conseil began to engage in a detailed factual 
review of police decisions and furthermore, was only as regards religious 
marches (see, infra.). Before then, it has been noted that the Conseil rarely 
interfered with these police decisions,42 so that when they struck down 
refusals to authorise, this was based upon their unwillingness to countenance 
discriminatory authorisation. Therefore, the court would typically state that 
where the authorities exempted certain processions from the terms of a 
general ban, whilst still applying it to others, and where there were no factual 
circumstances to lawfully justify such discrimination, this constituted 
unlawful discrimination on the part of the administration.43
40 Berthon, op. cit., 122;
'Lorsqu’en effet, de tels arrêtés avaient été pris, l'état normal était...l'interdiction et pour lever 
cette interdiction il fallait obtenir une autorisation.'
41 Berthon, op. dt., 49.
42 A. Fossier, 'Les manifestations cultuelles sur les voies publiques en France'. (1927), 95-99 
and Berthon, op. dt., 43-7.
43 Berthon, op. dt., 121 quotes the following dictum as a typical example of the Conseil's 
decisions at this time;
'...Annulé l'arrêt d'interdiction, le maire ayant par deux fois repoussé la demande 
d'autorisation de la Société Philharmonique de Fumay, alors que la Société musicale 
subventionnée sort librement.'
The Conseil d'État had thus not yet begun to develop a form of judicial review by which they 
could scrutinise the administration's reasoning, other than for the breach of the general 
principle of equality before the law (c.f. Colliard, op. dt., 202-29). In this way, the Conseil
(Footnote continues on next page)
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It would seem that as a result of this development of exacting judicial review 
and the consequent hostility that the judiciary came to show towards general 
bans, they gradually became virtually non-existent. Instead, by the 1920s and 
1930s police interference with the liberty to process could only be justified on 
public order grounds relating to a particular procession. This development 
has been seen as the beginnings of the application of the doctrine of 
proportionality, so that the Conseil eventually came to investigate the nature 
of the apprehension of public disorder in order to check that it was 
legitimately related to the resulting restriction;44
Le Conseil d'État ne se borne pas à faire une constatation des faits, dans leur existence pure et 
simple, dans leur matérialité. Il examine si dans les circonstances de temps, de lieux, de 
milieux, révélées par l'instruction, les mesures de police devaient ou non être édictées.45
However, the degree of protection accorded to the liberty to process was less 
than that accorded to human rights that were guaranteed by a statute, such as 
the liberty to meet;
nos libertés de cortège de manifestation, ne sont garanties par aucun texte précis; ce ne sont 
que des conséquences certes inéluctables, mais des conséquences de la liberté du citoyen. 
Leur interdiction est elle aussi, de ce fait, une mesure moins grave que celle d'une réunion.46
The result is that the police enjoyed a greater discretion as to how they 
employ their public order powers because the legislator had not laid down 
any specific restrictions as to how this power was to be exercised.47 
Nevertheless, this greater discretion was and still is subject to the traditional 
and general requirement, noted in the previous chapter, of having to reconcile 
public order and liberty.
d'État did not see itself as second-guessing substantive decisions but rather as ensuring a 
form of procedural propriety.
44 Berthon, op. cit., 108 and Fossier, op. cit., 104-115 trace the origins of this development in 
the case-law between 1903 and 1905.
*5 Fossier, op. cit., 110.
46 Berthon, op. cit., 115.
47 Teitgen, op. cit., 133;
Dans le silence de la loi, il lui appartient de les définir complètement et de déterminer toutes 
leurs limites d'ordre public.'
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Another important development occurred in the same period concerning 
religious processions and these changes were to have important implications 
for the 1935 decree-law.
Traditional and religious marches
At the same time as the Conseil d'Etat developed a more rigorous review of 
administrative decisions in the early years of this century, it formulated a 
distinction between processions of a local-traditional character and other 
types of processions. These types of processions benefited from a more 
libertarian legal framework, according to which bans had to be more strongly 
justified than would have been the case as regards ordinary processions. The 
case-law regarding processions within this category is vast but from the 
welter of cases, commentators have identified the gradual expansion of this 
category of more highly protected processions.48
Initially, when general bans were being struck down n the 1920s and 1930s, 
no distinction was made between local-traditional and other types of 
processions. However, for a long time prior to this period the Conseil had 
required that when the police decided to interfere with funeral convoys, the 
decision had to be justified by public order concerns. In other words, the 
police authorities had to reasonably apprehend public disorder as a result of 
the funeral procession and the only way in which order could be maintained 
was by restricting the march.49 On this basis, the Conseil struck down these 
kinds of bans on several occasions and this was extended to other kinds of 
religious processions. The Conseil then began a process of widening this 
privileged category in such a way that it also came to include secular 
processions.50
See generally, Fossier, op. cit., 99-103.
49 gçg gerthon, op. cit., 48 and Marchand. C.E. décr. 10th Jun. 1900; S.1904.3.44, lourdain. C.E. 
décr. d'abus 14 th Aug. 1905, Rec.Leb.855 and Olivier. C.E. 15th Feb. 1909; Rec.Leb.180.
50 Fossier, op. cit., 101 observes;
Tout l'effort de la jurisprudence administrative va tendre à élargir la notion de procession 
traditionnelle, à la rendre de plus en plus compréhensive.'
Berthon, op. cit., 49 notes the use of two formulae by the Conseil d'État when striking down 
decisions to ban such processions;
'..parce que ces interdictions s'appliquent au port viatique, aux convois funèbres et aux 
cérémonies fondées sur les traditions locales.' 
and also,
'...parce que ces interdictions s'appliquent aux cérémonies qui ont pour objet le culte des 
morts et celles qui sont consacrées par les habitudes et les traditions locales.'
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First it assimilated traditional Catholic51 processions which celebrated the 
feast days of saints to the libertarian greater protection it accorded to funeral 
convoys.52 From 1920, as it gradually expanded the types of processions 
within this category, the Conseil finally developed a presumption that local- 
traditional marches and not solely those of a religious nature, did not pose a 
threat to public order.53
The Conseil has never justified this differential treatment. That these types of 
processions were seen as posing less of a threat to public order is clear but 
little or no attempt has been made to analyse the reasons behind this 
perception.54 It is submitted that the beneficial treatment of religious 
demonstrations is to a large extent connected to the politics surrounding 
religion at this time. This, in turn, concerns the wider relations between the 
Church and the State, which were already touched upon in the context of the 
liberty to meet but will be investigated in more detail here.
Firstly, the Catholic church had become definitively separated from the State 
in 1905, by virtue of a statute that at the same time guaranteed the liberty of 
conscience and religion.55 Despite the fact that this Act specifically applied 
the general public order duties/powers (art.27) to religious assemblies that
51 Given the dominant position of the Catholic church as the State religion before the 
separation between Church and State (supra., chap.IV), it is this religion that was affected by 
the legal regulation and case-law of this time.
52 According to Colliard, op. cit., 454, this first occurred in Abbé Didier. C.E. 1st May 1914; 
Rec.Leb.515 (c.f. Fossier, op. cit., 101 who confirms this view).
53 See for example, Behague. C.E. 10th Dec. 1920; Rec.Leb.1057, Loeuillet. C.E. 24th Dec. 1920; 
Rec.Leb.1116 and Fossier, op. cit., 102-3.
54 Robert & Duffar & Duffar, op. cit., 581, simply remark;
’Ce régime de faveur se justifie ici pour deux raisons: d'une part, ces processions sont 
couvertes par la liberté des cultes; d'autre part, la tradition garantit qu'il n'y aura pas des 
troubles.'
55 Commonly called the 'Law of Separation' of 9th Dec. 1905, (chap.IV, supra.)-, see generally 
Colliard, op. cit., 438-40 & 453-6, Le Clère, op. cit., 92 and Robert & Duffar, op. cit., 421-9. The 
statute removes the status of state ceremonies from Catholic and other religious ceremonies 
but preserves the surveillance powers of the police. The crucial articles for present purposes 
are art.l;
'La République garantit le libre exercice du culte sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après 
dans l'intérêt de l'ordre public.' 
and art.27;
'Les cérémonies, processions et autres manifestations extérieures d'un culte continueront à 
être réglées en conformité des articles 95 et 97 de la loi municipale du 5 avril 1884 [the general 
public order powers were contained in these provisions at this time].'
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took place in public, the Conseil d'Etat went on to interpret the Act as creating 
a presumption in favour of the liberty of religion. The result was that public 
order powers could only be exercised whilst respecting religious freedom. In 
effect, this meant that religious marches could only be interfered with by the 
authorities in exceptional circumstances and a decision to so interfere would 
be reviewed more closely in order to ascertain whether those circumstances 
had actually existed. It could therefore be claimed that because of the 
statutory level of protection given to religious freedom a higher burden of 
justification was required before official interference with religious 
processions would be accepted as lawful; in other words, there was a 
rebuttable presumption that religious processions were orderly.
Secondly, it is suggested that despite the formed separation of Church and 
State, religion remained central to local life. At a local level, important 
personages were connected with the Church and religion continued to be a 
nexus of community solidarity and consensus. Dissenting and violent 
elements were therefore perceived as unlikely, and, what is more, it was not 
perceived that people of influence and important local standing (who were 
those normally involved in church affairs) would be likely to be involved in 
encouraging public disorder. Essentially, it is submitted that at the level of 
perception, religious processions were not perceived as being likely to result 
in or indirectly cause public disorder in the form of violent counter­
processions and demonstrations.
Legal theory is accustomed to the notion that the law as an institution can, by 
virtue of its ultimate recourse to coercive force, alter the perceptions of those 
that are subject to it.56 In social theory it has been asserted that religion, as an 
institution, acts in much the same way because it is part of the state's coercive 
apparatuses. According to this theory, most clearly elaborated by L. 
Althusser,57 an institution which can ultimately resort to coercion invariably 
produces an ideology that legitimates that institution. This is because the sole 
use of force to ensure social compliance and acceptance of the institution is at
56 See for example, K. Olivecrona, 'Law as Fact' (1939).
57 'ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in 'Lenin and Philosophy’ (1972). The claim 
that religion is a way of legitimating, reproducing and ensuring social order is made by E. 
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life' (1912), particularly, 207 et. seq. If this 
theory is accepted, the perception that religion and order were compatible can be better 
understood.
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best inefficient and, at worst ineffective. It can be claimed that this process 
occurred as regards the perception of religious processions in the early 
nineteenth century, so that religious processions came to be perceived as 
overwhelmingly orderly.
Thirdly, religious processions, because of the reasons stated above and their 
long history, were seen as one of the normal and legitimate uses of the public 
highway. Far from being contrary to the public interest, they were seen to 
serve this interest. This can be contrasted with secular processions which were 
seen as exceptional, in the sense of not being connected so closely with local 
life and thus were not so easy to assimilate into what were considered to be 
normal quotidian activities, such as the use of the public highway.
Prior negotiation
Within this pre-1935 context of no explicit regulation of the liberty to process, 
the formal legal position of the liberty was that it could take place without 
legal restrictions or formalities. However, it has been shown that the public 
order authorities could intervene in order to prevent a threatened or actual 
breach of the peace and to disperse an attroupement. This formal legal 
position seems to have led to a practice of prior negotiation and consultation 
between those desiring to exercise the liberty and the police authorities.
Thus, Tercinet claims that the ability of the police to intervene upon 
discovering that a procession was to take place was the reason why this 
practice developed;
Cest pourquoi un modus vivendi s'est établi, les organisateurs d'une manifestation venant, 
dans la plupart des cas, demander officieusement, aux autorités administratives, si leur projet 
ne risquait pas de se heurter à une interdiction.58
Le Clère appears to make the same point;
les organisateurs d'une manifestation venaient s'enquérir officieusement auprès des autorités 
si celle-ci ne risquait pas d'être interdite et les préfets et les maires protégaient l'exercice du 
droit de manifestation ainsi autorisé d'une façon detoumée.59
58 op. dt., 1013.
59 op. dt., 44.
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Essentially, the powers enjoyed by the police accorded them a position of 
strength that allowed them to impose a practice of prior negotiation. This 
practice of prior negotiation was based upon the police having the potential 
to resort to the power to restrict processions, not merely by reason of the law 
of attroupements but also because of their general public order duties and 
powers.
Summing up
The history of the regulation of the liberty to process has shown that this 
liberty was regulated by a combination of texts and powers, none of which 
were formally aimed at the liberty. The emphasis in this regulatory 
framework was on the prevention of public disorder, hence the application of 
laws that were clearly aimed at violent assemblies and the maintenance of 
public order. This legal framework also led to informal or extra-legal 
negotiation and authorisation procedures. An important historical factor was 
the development of a perception that religious and traditional marches were 
unlikely to be the cause of public disorder. Nevertheless, it must be stressed 
that other types of processions were not yet distinguished from disorderly 
and riotous assemblies and it will be seen that although a distinction can be 
said to have been achieved in the 1935 decree-law, this context of disorder 
retains a powerful hold over how processions and the liberty to process are 
perceived. The specific context of the 1935 decree-law will now be analysed 
and it will also be seen in the next section, which describes the current 
regulation of the liberty, that the provisions of the decree-law are very much a 
product of the public disorder of the 1930s.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE 1935 DECREE-LAW
Although it is clamed that the 1935 decree-law was a response to serious 
public disorder, this was part of a wider context of violence in the mid-1930's 
which took place against a backdrop of economic depression, political and 
ideological confrontation and the gradual establishment of the politics of the 
street as an alternative to parliamentary politics. It is these three elements that 
intertwine to form the context of the 1935 decree-law.
Economic depression
The economic depression, precipitated by the Wall Street crash of 23rd 
October 1929, can be taken as a starting point. The depression took much 
longer to hit France but its effects were longer lasting. In fact, the timing of
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the crash coincided with a feeling of prosperity across the nation.60 The 
measures taken by successive governments in response to the economic crisis 
have generally been seen to have been as at best inadequate and at worst to 
have caused even further economic damage.61 The failure to respond to the 
problems posed by the depression were as much due to economic ineptitude, 
as to political in-fighting and corruption.
Political crisis and street politics
The Left came to power in the May elections of 1932. However, this was a 
highly unstable coalition between the Socialists and Radicals.62 It was
60 It is widely agreed that the period around the resignation of Poincaré in 1929 was the 
period during which France was at its most prosperous; see P. Bernard & H. Dubrief, 'The 
Decline of The Third Republic: 1914-1938' (1985), 173-5, A. Werth, 'The Twilight of France: 
1933-1940' (1942), 4. The depression did not affect France until the Autumn of 1931, according 
to W.L. Shirer, The Collapse of The Third Republic: An inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940' 
(1970), 170 and J.P. Azéma & M. Winock, 'Naissance et mort: la Troisième République' (1976), 
208. The feeling of prosperity was to a large degree based upon illusory wealth, in the form of 
speculative capital (Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 174). Although France did not suffer as much 
as other countries during the depression, the economic effects should not be underestimated; 
according to Shirer, op. cit., 170, it was the worst economic crisis to hit France for one hundred 
years.
The depression had the effect of reducing retail prices more than wages, so that in 1932 the 
cost of living fell by 10% but the problem was that there was not a corresponding rise in 
purchasing power (which actually fell), this being due to an increase in unemployment of 
two million (Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 179-89). Throughout this period each successive 
French government was to pursue, with varying degrees of rigour, deflationary policies. This 
policy is claimed to have been disastrous for the French economy;
The depression was kept going by the decline in purchasing power, which was required to 
sustain deflation. Meanwhile other countries were pulling out of crisis.'
(Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 188 and c.f. 187-202), 
and Shirer, op. cit., 171;
'At home the governments followed a disastrous policy of severe deflation. Production was 
curbed, wages and salaries cut. Misery increased. And resentment.'
For further analysis and criticism of French economic policy during this period, see E. 
Bonnefous, op. cit., 224, 228 & 341-2 and J. Chastenet, 'Histoire de la Troisième République: 
déclin de ta Troisième 1931-1938' (1962), 125-7 & 171.
62 it was the Radicals that remained in power during the most acute period of the depression, 
despite the often faltering coalition with the Socialists. For an account of the conflict between 
these two political parties, see Werth, op. rii., 10-13. One of the Socialist's most vehement 
criticisms of the Radicals during this period was that deflationary policy was aggravating the 
economic crisis. The conflict between them has been seen as a contributing factor to the re- 
emergence of the extreme right and the consequent public disorder;
The discord between the two great Left parties - the victors of 1932- was the dominant note 
in French parliamentary life during the next two years, and was largely responsible for the 
great crisis of French democracy, which culminates in the riots of February 6th, 1934',
(Werth, op. cit., 11),
and Azéma & Winock, note op. at., 206;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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therefore not long before the Socialists left the coalition and so for the next 
two years they were only able to either simply vote against measures 
proposed by the Radicals (thereby in effect siding with the Centre or Centre 
Right) or abstain from voting. This division within the political Left weakened 
their power to deal with the depression and also enhanced the electoral 
credibility of the Centre-Right.63
As resentment against the Left grew, a series of financial scandals were 
exposed and exploited by the right-wing press, the worst of which was the 
Stavinsky affair.64 The object of resentment then became the Republican 
system itself. It came to be seen as corrupt, as well as being bankrupt as far as 
policies to alleviate the hardships caused by the depression. The extreme- 
Right again became popular, manifesting this popularity in the re-emergence 
of the Leagues,65 who marched in the streets and held protest rallies.66 The
'....l'inaptitude de la gauche à retrouver un principe d'unité et à établir un programme de 
gouvernement, en des temps qui ne sont plus ceux de la défense républicaine, mais ceux de la 
défense monétaire (en apparence) et de l'expansion économique (en réalité).'
63 The list of left-wing governments during this period is testament to the weakness of the 
Left; (1) E. Herriot, 3rd June-14th Dec. 1932; (2) Paul-Boncour, 18th Dec. 1932-28th Jan. 1933; 
(3) E. Daladier, 31st Jan.-24th Oct. 1933; (4) A. Sarraut, 26th Oct.-23rd Nov. 1933; (5) C. 
Chautemps, 26th Nov. 1933-27th Jan. 1934; (6) E. Daladier, 30th Jan.-7th Feb. 1934.
In addition to the growing resentment felt at the instability of the governments of the Left 
and their consequent inability to govern in the face of the worsening economic crisis, the Left 
also lost support to the Right, in large part because, according to Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 
195, the depression worst affected those on fixed incomes and the non-salaried: the 
traditional supporters of the Left. In contrast, the supporters of the Right, because they were 
predominantly people of 'rank and substance', remained relatively unaffected by the 
depression.
64 The Stavinsky affair first came to national attention on 5th Jan. 1934 (see Werth, op. cit., 14- 
15, Chastenet, op. dt„ 191, D.W. Brogan, 'France Under The Republic: The Development of 
Modem France' (1940), 653-4 and for a brief résumé of the financial scandals during this 
period, see Shirer, op. tit., 191). The scandal implicated members of all three branches of 
government. This further added substance to the belief that the Republic was irredeemably 
corrupt (Azéma & Winock, op. tit., 209-11).
65 There were numerous leagues, including the Croix de Feu (under the leadership of La 
Rocque), Action Française (supported by right-wing deputies such as Xavier Vallat), the 
Camelots du Roi and Françisme (founded by M. Bucard). Some were openly Monarchist, 
whilst others merely sought the return of a strong executive. All, however, were against the 
Republican status quo and its perceived corruption (c.f. Shirer, op. tit., 183-5, Carrot, op. cit., 
713-4 and A. Cobban, 'A History of Modem France' voi HI, (1978), 142-4).
66 These rallies were sometimes held on private land, as Werth, op. cit., 60 notes;
The Croix de Feu had numerous patrons among the wealthy landed proprietors, and it was 
usually on some "private" estate that the rallies were held - which in the eyes of the Croix de 
Feu leaders, rendered them perfectly legal.'
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whole political system was now under attack and this is made particularly 
evident by the advent of street politics and the events of 6th February 1934.67
The riot of 6th February and the political consequences66
Under this pressure the Chautemps government resigned and Edouard 
Daladier took over. His attempts to appease public opinion as regards the 
scandals largely failed.69 Indeed, his decision to remove the popular Prefect of 
Paris (Chiappe) from his position exacerbated matters and gave the extreme- 
Right yet another cause for which to attack the government. Thus, the 
Leagues marched in order to protest against the way Chiappe had been 
treated. Apart from his embarrassing involvement in the Stavinsky scandal, 
another reason Daladier removed Chiappe was because of his widely 
acknowledged leniency towards the Leagues, as well as his cordial relations 
with their leaders.70 The Leagues grew in confidence as a result of the 
resignation of the Chautemps government, which they interpreted as a 
success for their style of street politics. Given this fervent atmosphere, a
67 The Right became indignant and demanded that an inquiry into the Stavinsky affair 
should be held but the prime-minister (Chautemps) refused their demands. He eventually 
resigned as a result. Meanwhile, as part of the growing anti-Republican feeling, the Leagues 
swelled in number and took to the streets, with the growing support of public opinion;
The public, especially in volatile Paris, was getting fed up with such doings. If Parliament 
and government would not clean up their own houses then the people of Paris might have to 
take to the street, as they had in 1789,1830,1848 and 1871.'
(Shirer, op. cit., 188).
68 For accounts of the riot and its political aftermath, see generally, S. Bernstein, 'Le 6 Février 
1934' (1975), M. Le Clère, 'Le 6 Février' (1967) and M. Charvardès, 'Le 6 Février 1934: La 
République en danger' (1966).
69 In response to the Stavinsky scandal a series of marches were organised by the Leagues in 
Jan. 1934 (c.f. Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 226 and Azéma & Winock, op. cit., 15-17), some of 
these resulted in serious public disorder. Daladier sought a compromise by making a cabinet 
reshuffle but this only succeeded in alienating the Radicals (two of whom resigned from the 
government).
70 Chiappe was removed, by being given 'promotion' as the French Resident-General of 
Morocco, which he refused (see Le Clère (1967), op. cit., 112-3, for his caustic letter in response 
to the offer). The Prefect of the la Seine region also resigned in protest over the way Chiappe 
had been treated. Chiappe's dismissal was an attempt to appease the Socialists, who with 
some justification, complained of biased policing, as is noted by Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 
222;
The police were far from neutral. Although many superintendents and inspectors, often 
radicals and Freemasons, disliked all troublemakers, Chiappe, the prefect of police, used the 
uniform branch only against the left, while the radical ministers turned a blind eye.', 
and Werth, op. cit., 15, this time concentrating on the public disorder caused by the 
Monarchist leagues;
The Royalist demonstrations in the streets had in the meantime, become, not only more 
frequent but more and more violent in character; they were popular with a large part of the 
public. The police, under M. Chiappe, treated the rioters with the utmost consideration.'
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decision by Daladier finally to hold a parliamentary inquiry into the 
Stavinsky affair came too late to abate further public disorder.
This manifested itself in the riot of 6th February 1934 which was the worst 
outburst of public disorder in Paris since 1871. Fifteen people were killed and 
two thousand injured after the events of that night. Essentially, huge crowds 
gathered in different locations around Paris, these crowds consisted of 
League members and the general public. As the evening wore on, disorder 
ensued, the worst of which was a pitched battle on the Pont de la Concorde; 
the bridge leading to the National Assembly. The bridge, and the National 
Assembly building, were only just held by the police and the army.71
The riot has been stated to have had many consequences, including the re­
uniting of the Left, culminating in the eventual development of the Front 
Populaire.72 Of more relevance to this study was the manner in which the riot 
briefly established an alternative form of politics to that presented by the 
Republican form of government. Thus, although the Right was back in power, 
it had achieved this position not via traditional democratic means but 
through the use of mass street violence. The Republic had only just survived, 
but at a considerable cost to its credibility, as the most legitimate form of 
government.73 The use of public assemblies in the street (and most
71 For various accounts of the build up and the events leading up to the riot, see Bernstein, 
op. cit., 155-86, Le C16re (1967), op. cit., 129-166, Charvardes, op. cit., 193-248, Carrot, op. cit., 
717-20, Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 226 et. seq., Bonnefous, op. cit., 204 et. seq., Azema & 
Winock, op. cit., 217 et. seq. and Werth, op. cit., 17 et. seq. An eye-witness account of the 
violence is provided by Shirer, op. at., 195-201.
Events inside the parliament were also stormy, with the Daladier government having to 
survive three votes of confidence (c.f. Bonnefous, op. cit., 207-11). Therefore, the government 
was under attack both politically and physically on 6th Feb. 1934.
72 Bonnefous, op. cit., 220-232, describes the continued violence after the 6th February and 
also how the Left united in their opposition to the deflationary decree-laws made by the new 
Doumergue government (see chap.IV, section II, supra, for the words of defiance by the 
leader of the Popular Front, L. Blum). Chastenet, op. cit., 213-4, records how the long-running 
conflict between the Socialists and the Communists was set aside in order to 'defend' the 
Republic against a perceived fascist threat. Bernard & Dubrief, op. cit., 228, sum up how the 
Left viewed the riot;
'Whether or not the rising of 6th February was a fascist putsch, its historic role was to have 
prepared the way psychologically for the anti-fascist Front Populaire.'
The Left also reacted by engaging in public displays of strength, in the form of marches and 
general strikes, therefore, according to Werth, op. cit., 21;
'...the overthrow of the Daladier Government by "the street" could not remain unchallenged 
as far as the Socialists were concerned..'.
73 The significance of the riot for parliamentary democracy and the Republic is summed up 
by Shirer, op. cit., 192;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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prominently marches) to achieve desired political change had proved to be 
successful. Essentially the parliamentary system of government had for the 
last two years been in competition with a more populist form of democracy, 
which on the 6th February had temporarily prevailed.
The succession of governments of the Right which came to power after the 
riot could count on the support of the Leagues but they found themselves 
under attack from a newly unified Left, which adopted the same methods of 
marches and rallies as the Right had done earlier. Aside from protesting 
against a perceived fascist threat to the Republic, the Left also vigorously 
attacked the deflation policies of these governments.74 As far as party-politics 
were concerned, the struggle between Left and Right was now centred on 
whether the executive should be granted extraordinary legislative powers (i.e. 
the power to legislate by decree-law). Governments of the Right fell as 
Parliament continued to refuse to grant the powers sought.75 The Left not 
only objected to the substantive policies of the Right (i.e. severe deflation), 
they were also against the intended manner of implementing their policies. 
More precisely, they were critical of the use of decree-laws, which they 
claimed were anti-Republican because they took power away from the
'It was the first time in the history of the Third Republic that a government, backed by a solid 
majority in both chambers, had given way to the menace of the streets. The Leagues had won 
their first victory. They had overthrown a 'leftish' government. The triumph wetted their 
appetite.'
Doumergue came to power after the riots; although he presented his cabinet as being a 
coalition of left and right, it was widely regarded as a right-wing government. Azéma & 
Winock, op. tit., 217, stress that Doumergue was accepted by the Right because of the 
authoritarian conception of the Republic which he favoured. The orientation of the 
government to the Right can be seen firstly, by the way the activities (if not the membership) 
of the right-wing Leagues decreased and secondly, the eventual decision of the Socialists to 
leave the government, after refusing to vote in favour of the greater legislative powers 
demanded by Doumergue. The Socialists also distrusted Doumergue because of the support 
he enjoyed from the Leagues (c.f. Werth, op. tit., 29-33).
74 Although traditionally, it was the Right who favoured deflation and the Left who were 
against it (c.f. Cobban, op. tit., 139), it was ironic that despite their opposition to such policies, 
when the Left had been in power (1932-34) they had pursued deflationary policies with at 
least as much vigour (see supra.).
For an account of the party-political developments and the failure of successive 
governments during the period after the February riots, see Werth, op. tit., 30-51. However, 
by way of a brief summary: Doumergue resigned because he was unable to secure the power 
to resort to referendums when parliament was unable to agree to certain legislative 
proposals. Flandin resigned as a result of a serious financial crisis involving the Bank of 
France's inability to cover maturing government bonds and the legislature's refusal to grant 
him plenary financial powers and Buisson's 'one-day' government fell for much the same 
reasons.
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legislature and placed it in the hands of the executive - an executive 
dominated by the Right and backed by the often violent extreme-Right.76
It was in June 1935 that the new Laval government broke the deadlock by 
obtaining full legislative powers (i.e. the power to legislate via decree-laws).77 
The timing was fortuitous; just before the prorogation of Parliament for the 
summer recess. The power to legislate by decree-laws was granted in order to 
pursue the specific object of ensuring financial stability and the defence of the 
franc. The Left manifested their strong objection to the decree-laws by a series 
of mass marches, during which there were sporadic outbreaks of violence and 
rioting.78 At the same time, relations between Laval and the Leagues became 
closer and the Leagues began to demonstrate their support for the 
government and to counter-demonstrate whenever the Left marched in 
protest.79 The result was that violence and general public disorder continued 
throughout the summer.
It was in this context that the 1935 decree-law was passed. The Laval 
government gave a wide interpretation to the meaning of the defence of the 
franc and the decree-law was passed on 23rd October 1935, a mere eight days 
before Laval's plenary powers expired.80
76 See also chap.IV, section II, supra.
77 See Bonnefous, op. cit., 339-347. The same author notes, at pg-341;
'Le Gouvernement avait donc les mains libres pour agir par les décrets-lois jusqu’au 31 
octobre "pour assurer la défense du franc et la lutte contre la spéculation.'
With the Chamber dissolved on the 30th June 1935, the Laval government issued its first 
group of decree-laws; twenty-nine of them. Most prominent among the measures was a 10% 
reduction in the salaries of state-employees and an increase of 7% in property transfer tax.
78 Werth, op. cit., 50, notes;
'In Paris, there were a few protest demonstrations and more serious disorders broke out 
among the arsenal of workers at Brest and Toulon in the second week of August. There the 
"protest" against the cuts degenerated into rioting, and three people were killed in the 
protest.'
79 See Werth, op. cit., 51 et. seq., for an account of the demonstrations and counter- 
demonstrations held during this period.
80 In the preamble to the decree-law it is stated;
'Le caractère légal des ces mesures ne saurait être contesté, puisqu'elles tendent à renforcer le 
maintien de l'ordre public, condition essentielle du calme et de la confiance nécessaire pour 
permettre le redressement économique du pays.'
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What remains unclear is why the decree-law was passed at this particular 
moment in time.81 From contemporary accounts, the level of public disorder 
due to public assemblies was no more serious than before, indeed it was far 
better than the months immediately succeeding the February riot. It is true 
that the Radical Congress at Salle Wagram on 20th October 1934 had issued a 
strongly worded communiqué to Laval that he should tackle the Leagues.82 
However, it seems, prima facie, unlikely that first, Laval would have been 
sympathetic to such calls and secondly, that he would have responded so 
rapidly. Upon closer examination, it does nevertheless appear possible that 
Laval could have been convinced that something needed to be done to stop 
the continuing public disorder and that he did not want to run the risk that 
his coalition government - that was mainly of the centre-Right - might break 
up as a consequence of inaction as regards public order.
Support for this view that the decree-law was a concession to the Radicals in 
Laval's government, can be drawn from the events surrounding Laval's 
resignation. The Laval government fell on 22nd January 1936 as a result of 
legislation passed by the Minister of State, E. Herriot. He was himself a 
Radical and the legislation basically provided for the dissolution of para­
military organisations; which were in effect the Leagues. Despite the fact that 
the statute had been passed, Laval refused to apply it. It is submitted that he 
refused to do so because of his sympathies and the political support he
It is true, as Berthon, op. cit., 138-9 notes, that a Bill to regulate the liberty to process was 
laid before Parliament as early as 7th March 1934 and that this failed to become law (c.f. 
Tercinet, op. cit., 1014 and Bédier, op. cit., 243-4 for further information on measures 
recommended by the commission of inquiry after the events of 6th Feb. 1934). However, the 
question remains, why did the Laval government decide to legislate so long after the worst of 
the public disorder?
Carrot, op. cit., 727 suggests that the reasons were those of expediency: legislative backlog;
'Le gouvernement Laval, qui avait obtenu par la loi du 8 juin 1935 le pouvoir de prendre par 
décrets toutes dispositions ayant force de loi "pour lutter contre la spéculation et défendre le 
franc" était à même de faire aboutir un certain nombre de dispositions demeurées dans les 
cartons des ministères. Il en profita pour glisser parmi les nombreux textes parus en octobre 
1935, des mesures tendant à renforcer le maintien de l'ordre public..'.
However, this view is unsubstantiated and does not explain why the backlog of measures 
was not dealt with much earlier, for example on the 30th June, when it was noted (supra.) that 
the government issued twenty-nine decree-laws. Furthermore, given the already noted good 
terms that Laval enjoyed with the Leagues, it does not explain why he should issue a 
restrictive measure that so obviously would affect them as well as processions from the Left..
82 Werth, op. cit., 61.
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enjoyed from the Leagues. As a result of his unwillingness to act, the Radicals 
left his government and Laval was forced to resign.83
This episode clearly illustrates the way that Laval was caught between 
appeasing the political centre/left and not antagonising the extreme-right. If 
this theory is accepted, the decree-law can be seen as a measure to ensure the 
continued support of the Radicals, who feared for the Republic. Therefore, for 
the first time, public demonstrations were placed under statutory regulation. 
However, at the same time, the terms of the decree-law left intact the wide 
degree of discretion that was available to the police authorities. Consequently, 
it was they who continued to decide whether the liberty to process could be 
exercised; in other words the Leagues could in practice carry on their 
activities.
It is suggested that in the absence of any further evidence surrounding the 
1935 decree-law, it was a measure produced by reason of the particular 
circumstances described above. As such, the measure can be traced back to 
the events of February 6th and the continuous public disorder that ensued 
from then onwards.84 It was a partisan measure in one sense but because of 
Laval's precarious political position it was one designed to achieve political 
compromise. The delay in implementing measures to regulate public 
processions and other forms of demonstrations can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the sympathetic attitude that the post-February 6th governments 
of the Right showed towards the Leagues. The Republic was no longer under 
attack, therefore measures to protect it were seen as unnecessary, as were, 
more specifically, measures to deal with public processions. This was so 
despite the resurgence of an united Left, which attempted to reinstated street 
politics. This time rival groups fought each other on the streets, unlike in 
February 1934, when the political system itself was the target of attack. The
83 for an account of the circumstances surrounding Laval’s resignation, see Chastenet, op. cit., 
127 et. seq. The statute in question was the Law of 10 Ian. 1936. which, according to Colliard, 
op. cit., 757-8, provided that the government could dissolve associations that pursued any of 
the following objectives;
’...provoquer à des manifestations armées dans la rue - présenter, en dehors des sociétés de 
préparation militaire ou d'éducation physique agréées par le Gouvernement, par leur forme 
et leur organisation, le caractère, de milices privées ou de groupes de combat; - porter atteinte 
à l'intégrité du territoire national ou attenter par la force à la forme républicaine du 
gouvernement.'
Some commentators, for example, Berlioz, op. at., 6, go further in claiming that the decree- 
law was the direct result of the disorder of February 6th.
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events of this time were extraordinary and thus it must be noted that the 
decree-law is a legislative text passed with abnormal circumstances in view - 
a type of emergency measure.
Having analysed its original context, the actual content of the decree-law and 
the legal framework that currently regulates the liberty to process will next be 
examined.
SECTION  III 
THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAM EW ORK
THE 1935 DECREE-LAW
Despite the apparent novelty of the measure - in that the decree-law was the 
first legal instrument to directly regulate the liberty to process - the decree- 
law adopted, sometimes with slight modifications, many of the previous 
practices and provisions of earlier laws.
Prior declarations
This can be clearly seen in art.l, which requires that the organisers of 
processions on the public highway have to make a prior declaration.85 It can 
be thus claimed that the legislature formalised the prior practice of informal 
negotiation between organisers and police authorities. However, there is a 
difference; whereas there might previously have been a discretion to consult 
and negotiate with the relevant authorities, instead there is now an obligation 
to do so. Apart from formalising previous practice, the substance of practice 
was also amended. In effect, organisers of processions lose their previous 
position as bargaining partners (even if their position may have been a weak 
one, given the extensive powers enjoyed by the police) and instead, their role 
is reduced to that of merely informing the police.86 It has also been claimed
85 Processions, as well as other forms of group demonstration on the public highway, were 
submitted to the same requirement;
'...tous cortèges, défilés et rassemblements de personnes et, d'une façon générale, toutes 
manifestations sur la voie publique.1
Art.l(l), interestingly repeats that meetings on the public highway are banned by virtue of 
art.6 of the 1881 Act that regulates the liberty to meet.
86 P.M. Martin, 'La déclaration préalable à l'exercice des Libertés Publiques*. A.J.D.A.1975.436 
at 438, in noting that the prior declaration requirement can be used as part of a punitive,
(Footnote continues on next page)
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that the police now use their stronger bargaining position in the negotiation 
process in order to impose conditions on processions;
Or, de plus en plus souvent, les maires et les préfets se livrent au chantage suivant: "Vous 
passez par là où j'interdis la manifestation."87
The imposition of the prior declaration requirement has been criticised from 
the viewpoint that the decree-law now permits the police to in effect apply a 
practice of prior authorisations,88 since upon hearing of a proposed march 
they can ban it (therefore refusing in effect to 'authorise' it). On the other 
hand, if they decide not to ban the march, it is claimed that this also, in effect, 
represents authorisation. It must here be underlined that since no mention is 
made in the decree-law of anything other than a prior declaration 
requirement, this criticism must be based solely upon the practice of police 
authorities. If this view is accepted, it provides another instance of the 
adoption of a former practice; that concerning the discretion on the part of the 
police to exempt particular marches from general bans. However, the critics 
generally do not appear to provide concrete evidence with which to 
substantiate their claims89 but in the later examination of the case-law, it will 
be seen that there is evidence of such a practice.
preventative or hybrid legal framework, however asserts that a common characteristic of all 
prior declaration requirements is that they act as;
'..un moyen d'information de la puissance publique.'
As far as spontaneous marches are concerned (i.e. those that fail to be preceded by a prior 
declaration on account of their lack of prior organisation), the Minister of the Interior 
confirmed in the National Assembly in 1977 that they breached the terms of the decree-law 
and that those responsible for its breach could be prosecuted but that;
'Il appartient à l'autorité judiciaire de décider de l'ouverture de poursuites à leur encontre.' 
(Rép. Quest, écrite M. Colin: J.O. débat Sénat 29 mars 1977, pg351).
8?  D. Langlois, 'Le droit de manifester'. Après-Demain no.219 (1979), 14 at 15. These 
conditions are said to weaken the effect of a demonstration by forcing it into deserted areas 
where without onlookers, the demonstration risks becoming;
'...une pièce de théâtre jouée devant des fauteuils vides.'
(Pg-15)
8® See for example, Dautan, op. cit., 9.
'Sous le couvert d'une élaboration, le régime institué par le décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935 exige 
pratiquement une autorisation puisque l'administration peut interdire la manifestation dès 
que la déclaration en est faite.'
89 An exception is provided by Tercinet, op. cit., 1020, n.43, who presents some examples of 
ministerial communiqués in which government ministers refer to the 'authorisation' of 
marches. Although this is revealing of government attitudes and expectations, it is submitted 
that Terdnet's examples throw no further light on the question as to whether in practice 
organisers are obliged to seek prior authorisation from the police to march.
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Nevertheless, the requirement of a prior declaration is different from that of a 
prior authorisation. Therefore, although Martin has pointed to the manner in 
which the effect of requiring a prior declaration can change as a result of the 
manner in which it is implemented, he nevertheless maintains that there is a 
fundamental distinction between prior declarations and authorisations. The 
former serves to inform the public authority of future activity, so that it is 
then in a position to decide whether to exercise its powers. However, at the 
moment of being correctly informed, the police authority cannot act, there 
must be a delay before it can intervene. In this way there is a formal 
difference between the informing process and any subsequent action taken by 
the public authority. On the other hand, prior authorisations do not have this 
formal separation between the obtaining of knowledge of the proposed 
activity by the authorities and the subsequent decision to act. A prior 
declaration gives the declarer the right (subject to possible a posteriori control) 
to carry out the proposed activity, whereas a prior authorisation means that 
the activity cannot be exercised prior to a positive intervention from the 
relevant public authority. There is consequently no difference between the 
period during which the public authority is informed and the subsequent 
decision.90
By reason of these differences, prior declarations are formally less restrictive 
than prior authorisations. The legislature can, however be criticised for 
shifting the balance of power in favour of the police as regards the regulation 
of the liberty to process by enacting an obligation to approach the police. Such 
an obligation increases the scope within which the police can operate an 
informal practice of prior authorisations. The scope for such a practice would 
have been reduced if the legislature had instead laid down that both 
organisers and police should seek to consult and negotiate before marches. 
Although it may be objected that such exhortatory terms are incompatible 
with statute, it is suggested that this would, on the contrary, have been the 
appropriate subject-matter for a circular. While the government has recently
^0 See generally, Martin, op. cit., and Terdnet, op. cit., 1020 & 1023. More specifically, Martin 
notes at pg.444;
•Si, en pratique le résultat obtenu peut être similaire, juridiquement il n'est pas acceptable de 
qualifier d'autorisation préalable le régime de la manifestation.', 
and Berthon, op. cit., 122 similarly asserts;
'Il était tout même utile de signaler la nuance, malgré l'analogie existant surtout, dans le cas 
d'arrêté général d'interdiction lorsqu'il y a un refus de l'autorité de lever cette interdiction et 
le cas d'interdiction subséquent à la déclaration.'
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sought to encourage negotiation and consultation via advice in a circular, it 
will be seen that its terms once again allow the police to dictate terms, rather 
than facilitating negotiation between the parties.
Article 2(2) of the decree-law continues the shift in the balance of power by 
making it obligatory to supply information in the prior declaration that was 
previously and at least formally optional and subject to negotiation between 
organisers and the police.91 While this accords with the logic of the 
informative function of the prior declaration, in that, as Martin states, for the 
police to Act, it must be informed in a detailed and precise manner,92 this 
measure again evinces the public order emphasis in the decree-law.
The declaration is made to the local police authority; namely the mayor of the 
locality in which the march is to take place or the prefect, if the area is 
covered by the national police, this is also the case in Paris and the communes 
in the department of la Seine.93 The declaration is made a minimum of three, 
or a maximum of fifteen days in advance of the march. Finally, art.2(3) 
requires that the police authority must immediately give the organisers a 
receipt, which can be used as evidence in any subsequent legal action.
Local and traditional processions
Aside from the formalising and restrictive effects of the prior declaration 
provisions, the decree-law seems to enact the case-law of the Conseil d'État 
regarding marches of a local-traditional character by subjecting them to less 
rigorous requirements. Consequently, the decree-law states that marches on 
the public highway, which conform to local traditions, are exempt from the 
obligation to make a prior declaration.94 This category of marches is left
91 The article reads;
'La déclaration fait connaître les noms, prénoms et domiciles des organisateurs et est signée 
par trois d'entre eux faisant élection du domicile dans le département; elle indique le but de 
la manifestation, le lieu, la date et l'heure du rassemblement des groupements invités à y 
prendre part et s'il y a lieu, l'itinéraire projeté.’
92 op. cit., 438 and at 439;
*£n effet, dans la mesure où la puissance publique doit être informée, il est préférable qu'elle 
le soit avec précision.'
9^ Art.2(l).
94 Art.l(3) reads;
Toutefois, sont dispensées de cette déclaration les sorties sur la voie publique conformés aux
usages locaux.1
(c.f. Terdnet, op. cit., 1017).
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undefined and it will be seen below how the courts have interpreted and 
applied the provision. However, the exemption clearly reflects the earlier 
noted perception as to the less problematic nature of local-traditional 
marches. The public disorder of the early mid-1930's would not have altered 
this perception, since as has been seen above, the violence did not result from 
marches celebrating religious and local traditions.
Banning powers
Nevertheless, by virtue of art.3 both types of marches are subject to police 
powers to ban them;
Si l'autorité investie des pouvoirs de police estime que la manifestation projetée est de nature 
à troubler l'ordre public, elle l'interdit par un arrêté qu'elle notifie immédiatement aux 
signataires de la déclaration au domicile élu.
According to a prima facie reading of the decree-law, a ban does not have to be 
the final resort in order to maintain public order; in other words, the ban is not 
an exceptional measure. There is no requirement that the police must not 
have other possible measures available to maintain public order, but merely 
that the march is 'de nature à troubler l’ordre public'. As a consequence of this 
relatively low justificatory burden upon police authorities as far as the use of 
banning powers, the decree-law cannot be said to have enacted the previous 
case-law as regards local and traditional marches. This case-law had, on the 
contrary, laid down that the use of general public order powers was 
exceptional as regards these types of processions.
The decree-law is claimed to repeat the general public order powers/duties of 
the police,95 and thus it merely sets out the particular ways in which such a 
power is to be used as regards the liberty to process. This power cannot be 
excluded but only regulated.96 However, it can be seen that unlike the liberty 
to meet, it was decided not to simply repeat in the text the general public 
order powers/duties as far as the regulation of the liberty to process. The
As is claimed by Montreuil, 'Manifestations', op. cit., 8;
'Le texte ne fait que confirmer l'application du droit commun en matière de maintien de 
l'ordre public.', 
and at pg.7;
'"L'autorité investie des pouvoirs de police’ en l'occurrence n'est pas autrement définie par le 
décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935 (art.3). En d'autres termes, ce décret-loi ne déroge pas plus au 
droit commun...'.
96 See Berthon, op. cit., 75-86 and the explanation of public order in chap.IV, section III, supra.
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legislature therefore took the opportunity to indicate the specific ways in 
which these powers should be exercised. The general public order powers are 
hence left intact but are modified. It therefore follows that although the 
decree-law specifically limits police intervention to bans, other forms of police 
intervention, such as the imposition of conditions as to the route of the march, 
could still be justified on the basis of the wider general public order 
powers /duties in response to circumstances that were not foreseen by the 
decree-law. Interestingly, whereas a prior declaration is required for 
processions on the public highway, the banning powers in the decree-law do 
not seem confined to processions in this location. Nevertheless, given the 
historical context of the enactment and the fact that the vast majority of 
processions take place on the public highway, it would seem that the measure 
is aimed at the these kinds of processions.
Finally, even in communes where the mayor is the competent police 
authority, he/she must send a copy of the declaration or their decision to ban 
to the departmental prefect within twenty-four hours and it will be recalled 
that the prefect also has powers of substitution, even if he can no longer 
override the mayor's decisions. This means that although the prefect can ban 
a meeting where the mayor has decided not to, the prefect must refer a 
mayor's decision to the administrative courts in order to have it struck 
down.97
Sanctions98
The final aspect of the decree-law is the novel features it introduces as far as 
sanctions against the organisers of marches that breach the terms of the 
decree-law. The original provisions have however been repealed by the new 
penal code99 and replaced by art.431-9 of that code. The original provisions 
will however be seen to substantially repeat the former provisions.
9? See chap.IV, section III. supra., and the examination of the case-law in this section, infra.
98 Arts.5-7 of the original decree will not be dealt with as these concern the carrying of arms 
in a demonstration, which is beyond the scope of the liberty of peaceful assembly. However, it 
should be noted that these provisions were repealed and replaced by arts.104-108 of the 
former penal code, by virtue of art.12 of the Ordonnance. no.60-529 of 4th lune 1960.
99 Repealed by virtue of art.372 of Law no.92-1336 of 16th Dec 1992.
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(a) the original sanctions
Originally the sanctions in art.4 of the decree-law read as follows;
Seront punis d'emprisonnement de quinze jours à six mois et d'une amende de 60F à 20 000F: 
1® Ceux qui auront fait une déclaration incomplète ou inexacte de nature à tromper sur les 
conditions de la manifestation projetée ou qui, soit avant le dépôt de la déclaration prescrite à 
l'article 2, soit après l'interdiction, auront adressé par un moyen quelconque, une convocation 
à y prendre part;
2° Ceux qui auront participé à l'organisation d'une manifestation non déclarée ou qui a été 
interdite.
Tercinet100 breaks down the sanctions created by art.4 of the decree-law into 
three specific offences; (1) the making of an incomplete or inaccurate prior 
declaration, (2) inciting a non-declared or banned march and (3) participation 
in the organisation of a non-declared or banned march. It is noted that the 
decree-law contained no provisions for the punishment of participants in 
non-declared or banned marches, therefore such participants may either have 
been entirely free from liability, as Tercinet claims,101 or, as has been noted 
historically, liable for the offence of participating in an attroupement; an 
offence that is however not regulated by the decree-law.
More precisely, as far as the attroupement offence, it was claimed that the 
organisers of a banned march could be prosecuted for provoking an 
attroupement and the participants for constituting an attroupement. Before 
the new definition of attroupement,102 it was unclear whether this offence had 
been abolished by virtue of the decree-law, or whether it continued to exist 
because the nature of an attroupement was itself uncertain. Consequently, if 
the offence was defined by a defiance of authority, this could be made out 
merely by the organisation or participation in a non-declared or banned 
march.103 On the other hand, if an attroupement was constituted by an 
assembly that threatened public order, the mere commission of the offences in
100 op. cit., 1024.
I®1 op. cit., 1043-44.
102 See note 32, supra.
103 This was the view taken by Colliard, op. cit., 746;
'La manifestation tenue malgré l'interdiction devient un attroupement illégal qui peut être
dissout par la force.'
and by Burdeau, op. cit., 226;
'Lorsque la manifestation a lieu sans avoir été déclarée ou après avoir été interdite, elle 
devient juridiquement un attroupement qui peut être dissous selon les règles valables pour 
celui-ci.'
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art.4 would no longer be sufficient to maintain a prosecution for an 
attroupement.104
(b) the new sanctions
The sanctions in art.431-9 follow the same tripartite distinction as was noted 
in the art.4 sanctions;
Est puni de six mois d'emprisonnement et de 50 000F d'amende le fait:
1° D'avoir organisé une manifestation sur la voie publique n'ayant pas fait objet d'une 
déclaration préalable dans les conditions fixées par la loi;
2° D'avoir organisé une manifestation sur la voie publique ayant été interdite dans les 
conditions fixées par la loi;
3° D'avoir établi une déclaration incomplète ou inexacte de nature à tromper sur l'objet ou 
les conditions de la manifestation projetée.
Three changes have however occurred: firstly, the new article increases the 
severity of the sanctions. Therefore, whereas art.4 formerly provided for 
terms of imprisonment of between fifteen days and six months, a six month 
term is now provided for. In addition, the level of the fine has be raised from 
between sixty and twenty thousand francs to fifty thousand francs.
However, this stiffening of penalties is contrasted by the second change 
which is the abolition of the offence of participation in the organisation of a 
non-declared or banned procession. According to the current provisions, it is 
only organisation that is the object of sanctions.
A similar liberalisation can be seen in the repeal of the offence of inciting a 
non-declared or banned march, which constitutes the third change.
By reason of the fact that the new article focuses attention on organisers, the 
three types of offence will be typically committed by these kinds of people 
and not mere participators. In consequence, the case-law as to organisation 
under art.4 will still be of relevance and thus this will be examined below.
Montreuil, 'Manifestations' op. cit., 5 underlines this point;
'Répétons qu'une manifestation non déclarée, donc illicite, ou interdite par l'autorité de police 
ne saurait être considérée ipso facto comme un attroupement...Qu'une manifestation lidte ou 
illicite ou interdite....dégénère parfois en attroupement ne saurait justifier une telle 
assimilation.’
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As far as the continued application of the law on attroupements, the new 
definition of this offence in art.431 has been seen to clearly require a threat to 
the public peace,105 therefore, disobeying the police is not sufficient to make 
out the offence. For the purposes of the liberty to process this means that the 
offence of organising or participating in a march that has been banned or not 
legally declared does not in itself constitute an attroupement. The provision 
can be also be seen to have adopted the view taken by the administration106 
and the judiciary.107
A D M IN ISTRA TIVE CIRCULARS
The legal framework that is laid down by the decree-law has been 
supplemented by two administrative circulars, that proffer non-legally 
binding guidance as to the application of the decree-law.
The Paganon circular
The most important circular is of the 27th November 1935, issued by the 
Minister of the Interior Joseph Paganon. Despite its title, which refers to 
public and private meetings,108 the circular proffers an explanation of the 
scope of the decree-law regulating the liberty to process on the public 
highway. It has already been noted in the previous chapter that the circular 
controversially interprets public meetings as being subject to the more 
restrictive terms set out in the decree-law.109 Here, a more detailed analysis of 
the consequences of this circular for the legal regulation of the liberty to 
process will be undertaken.
According to the circular, the mayor has the power to ban demonstrations 
(and therefore marches) on private land, when these are likely to compromise 
public order.110 It is an interpretation that exploits the above noted ambiguity
I®* See note 32, supra.
Circular 85-180, op. cit., 5;
'S'ils passent outre à l'interdiction les organisateurs et participants tombent sous le coup des 
pénalités prévues par le décret-loi du 23 octobre 1935...sans préjudice de la dispersion de la 
manifestation si celle-ci, par les troubles de la "tranquillité publique" qu'elle occasionne, se 
transforme en attroupement...'.
107 for example, Mera bet Bourogaa et autres. Cass. crim. 23rd May 1955; Bull.crim.461, infra.
108 See chap.IV, note 125, supra.
109 chap.IV, section III, supra.?
11® The occurrence of private processions during the 1930s is noted for example by Werth, op. 
cit., 60;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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as to whether the decree-law is applicable to marches beyond the public 
highway. This power is stated to have been established by a strong body of 
case-law.111 Two aspects of this interpretation are worthy of further comment. 
Firstly, no case-law is offered by Paganon to support his claim as to the 
existence of police banning powers regarding marches on private land and in 
the course of the present study it has not proved possible to locate any such 
cases. However, given the already noted breadth of the general public order 
powers/duties, it may be claimed that this provides the basis for a power, 
when the police apprehend disorder, to ban marches on private land. 
However, regard to the case-law would show that the exercise of these 
powers is strictly scrutinised and subject to the doctrines of necessity and 
proportionality.112 Nevertheless, what is open to criticism is the extension of 
police powers to marches on private land, in a circular that purports to offer 
guidance in the regulation of marches on the public highway. Therefore, once 
again the circular can be said to exceed its stated function by reading words 
into the decree-law.
Secondly, in merely requiring that public disorder be likely to be 
’compromised’ before the police can ban marches on private land, the circular 
advocates a more restrictive regime in comparison to that governing banning 
powers as far as marches on the public highway. It follows that for the latter 
there must be an apprehended disruption of public order, whereas for the 
former a mere likelihood of a compromise of public order is sufficient to 
justify a ban. If the terms of the banning powers in the decree-law are subject 
to the criticism that they allow the police authorities to employ bans as a first
The Croix de Feu had numerous patrons among the wealthy landed proprietors, and it was 
usually on some 'private' estate that the rallies were held - which in the eyes of the Croix de 
Feu leaders, rendered them perfectly legal.'
As an example of the level of public disorder that sometimes resulted from such rallies, 
Werth, op. cit., 60, also describes the events of 6th October 1935, when one thousand Croix de 
Feu members assembled for a march on a large farm at Villepinte, near Paris. In response, 
several hundred Socialists and Communists, led by the local mayor assembled outside the 
farm. The two sides fought each other and some shots were fired. Eventually, the Garde 
Mobile had to be called in to restore order and the mayor was later suspended from his 
duties by the Minister of the Interior, 
m  The circular reads;
'La jurisprudence est établie par de nombreux arrêts dont les considérants sont à retenir et 
qui précisent que le maire est fondé à interdire des manifestations sur des terrains privés 
quand elles sont susceptibles de provoquer une effervescence de nature à compromettre 
l'ordre public.'
112 See chap.IV, section III, supra.
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resort, this criticism applies with even greater force as far as the guidance 
given in the circular is concerned. For example, public order can often be said 
to be compromised but can still be maintained by the employment of less 
restrictive police measures than bans. Nevertheless, the meaning of the 
circular, on its face, is that the police are under no obligation to exhaust these 
other measures before issuing a ban and public order need not even be 
actually or likely to be threatened. The circular thus considerably expands the 
degree of discretion available to the police.
The 1985 circular
More recently, another circular has been issued by the Minister of the Interior 
as regards banning powers concerning processions. This is the previously 
mentioned circular of the 25th July 1985,113 which advises departmental 
prefects of the criteria to be used before a march can be banned. This text 
confirms the analysis made above; that bans are seen by the administration as 
a measure of first resort. Consequently, prefects are advised that if the 
organisers of a march do not offer 'very serious guarantees' as far as public 
order is concerned, they have sufficient grounds to ban it.114 No elaboration 
of the meaning of 'very serious guarantees' is provided and therefore there is 
no indication as to how organisers could offer such guarantees. The banning 
power thus becomes the first resort when these guarantees are not offered 
and the prefect is not placed under the obligation to at least investigate the 
use of other, less restrictive means, to secure public order before exercising 
his/her banning powers. In addition, the circular could be said to shift 
responsibility for maintaining public order during a march to the organisers. 
However, this self-policing role becomes problematic when disorder is 
threatened as a result of factors beyond the organisers' control; for example, a 
counter-demonstration. In such circumstances, it can once again be asked 
what are, according to the circular, acceptable guarantees.
113 See chap.IV, supra.
114 ' 7he drcular reads at pg.4;
'Si les organisateurs n'acceptent pas de tenir compte des contraintes de sécurité et si 
l'ensemble des informations recueillies font apparaître que la manifestation ne présente pas 
de garanties très sérieuses sur le plan de l'ordre public, compte tenu des moyens dont vous 
disposez, vous serez fondé à prendre un arrêté d'interdiction.'
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As with the liberty to meet, this circular also provides a summary of the law 
but interestingly it also advises that police authorities should engage in some 
form of negotiation process with organisers of marches;
En fonction des informations qu'elle détient, l'autorité compétente peut prendre contact avec 
les organisateurs afin de procéder avec eux à un examen des conditions de la manifestation, 
spécialement en ce qui concerne les lieux de rassemblement, l'itinéraire retenu et le moment 
choisi.
Il est indispensable d'appeler l'attention des organisateurs sur les problèmes de sécurité et, le 
cas échéant, de leur proposer de modifier les modalités de la manifestation.115
This can be seen as an attempt to fill a gap left by the failure of the decree-law 
and Paganon circular to mention consultation and negotiation, despite the 
fact that it was observed to be a practice prior the decree-law.116 At the same 
time, the police are clearly in the stronger bargaining position (as was noted 
prior to the decree-law) by reason of their power to ban. According to the 
circular, recourse can be had to its exercise when negotiations have failed to 
produce 'very serious guarantees' as far as public order. The police are thus 
placed in a position in which they can dictate terms, as opposed to negotiating 
them.
Before turning to the case-law it should be mentioned that as with the liberty 
to meet, Montreuil has listed other laws and offences that could affect the 
exercise of the liberty to process.117 However, once again the case-law shows 
that in practice they are not applied to this liberty.
CASE-LAW
The cases appear to have dealt with six distinct but related aspects of the 1935 
decree-law and consequently their analysis will carried out by investigating 
the decisions in each of the following areas;
The nature and scope of the local-usage category
The use o f banning powers as regards normal marches
The use o f banning powers as regards local-usage marches
The practice and enforcement of the prior declaration requirement
Liability and sanctions for breach of the decree-law
115 op. cit., 5.
116 See section II, supra.
117 op. cit., 'Manifestations', 10-11.
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The role o f the attroupement offence.
The nature and scope of the local-usage category
The evolution of this category of processions by the Conseil d'État has already 
been noted in the section concerning the history of the law relating to the 
liberty to process. It was also observed that the consequences of placing a 
procession within this category was to increase the justificatory burden on the 
police for interfering with such processions. However, the decree-law does 
not recognise any special position for such marches as far as banning powers 
are concerned. Instead the benefits that accrue to local-traditional marches are 
as regards prior declarations. However, this is still a less rigorous legal 
regime than for ordinary marches, therefore the cases under the decree-law 
will now be examined in order to see whether this category has been further 
elucidated.
In Abbé Nicolet118 the court adverts, albeit briefly, to the content of the local- 
usage category and seems to continue its pre-1935 case-law. In this case, the 
Conseil d'État struck down a Mayor's decision to subject all processions on 
the public highway to a requirement to seek a prior authorisation. Only 
funeral convoys were exempted from this requirement. In the course of its 
judgement, the Conseil noted that processions having only a traditional 
character must also be placed within this exempted category. The judgment in 
this case may be taken as re-writing the local-usage category of the decree- 
law so that it became one of local and/or traditional usage.
The continuation of the previous case-law in this decision can be seen in the 
way the category is stated to consist of its former two elements: localness and 
tradition. Therefore, even though the decree-law only refers to locality, 
tradition is reintroduced by the court. The re-expansion of the category is 
effected by providing that the two elements need not be present at the same 
time, so that the local-usage category can be constituted by local and/or 
traditional marches.
The only other aspect of the nature and scope of the category in question that 
the courts have dealt with is the question of whether a local-usage procession
118 C.E. 4th Feb. 1938; D.H.280.
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can lose this status if it is not carried out for a long period of time but where 
this lapse is either due to a banning of the specific procession or of a category 
of processions to which it belongs. The earliest decision on this point, under 
the 1935 framework was Abbé Chapalain.119 in which the Conseil struck 
down a Mayor's refusal in 1934 to rescind a ban on all processions on the 
public highway in the locality that dated from 1903. The court's decision was 
based upon a finding of fact that the continued effect of the bans was not 
justified by any public order considerations. The Conseil also noted that the 
bans made no exception for processions that were linked to local traditions, or 
which had a traditional character and that processions of this nature did not 
lose their character as a result of their forced interruption by reason of a 
decision to ban them.120
The use of banning powers as regards local-usage marches
The pre-1935 case-law had required that the banning of proposed marches 
could only be justified by the need to maintain public order. This meant that a 
higher burden of justification was placed on police than for other kinds of 
marches - these being at best merely tolerated, as opposed to being seen as a 
right.
To a large extent, the decree-law adopted, by virtue of art.3, this higher 
standard but applied it to all processions. In consequence there is now a 
uniform criteria for the use of banning powers for all types of processions on 
the public highway. Thus, this article provides the police authorities with 
banning powers if a proposed procession is apprehended to be likely to 
threaten public order. The consequences of membership of the local-usage 
category have therefore been altered by the decree-law, so that according to 
its provisions, a characterisation of a procession as being of a local-usage 
character only affects the organisers' obligations as far as the prior declaration 
requirement in art.l is concerned.121
119 C.E. 14th Feb. 1936; Rec.Leb.205
!20  Sçç also Abbé Blanchard. C.E. 22nd Jan. 1947; Rec.Leb.583, Guiller, C.E. 2nd July 1947; 
Rec.Leb.293, Abbé Délusseau. C.E. 12 Dec. 1947; Rec.Leb.471, Abbé Laurent, C.E. 14th Jan 
1949; Rec.Leb.18, Duranton de Magnv, C.E, 4th Nov. 1959; A.J.D.A.1960.II.60., and Rastouil, 
C E. 3rd Dec. 1954; Rec.Leb. 639.
121 See infn.
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While, the prima facie effect of the 1935 decree-law is to remove the previous 
presumption that local-usage marches did not present a threat to public 
order, the Conseil's early decisions continued to insist upon an exception for 
these types of procession. This can be seen in Abbé Marzv.122 in which the 
Conseil held that a mayor's ban of all religious processions was not only ultra 
vires the decree-law but was also illegal by reason of the measure's failure to 
provide for exceptions as far as 'traditional' marches were concerned.123 It 
would seem that the Conseil was relying on its earlier case-law in order to 
support its contention as to the need for a special category of traditional 
marches - even though the decree-law which did not mention such a category 
- which could escape the reach of the general ban. This reflected a view that 
such marches were still not generally a threat to public order.
More recently, however the Conseil has not mentioned this category. In 
Union des syndicats ouvriers de la région parisienne C.G.T. et sieur Hénaff.124 
in upholding a ban of a traditional union march through Paris, the Conseil 
did not mention any presumption or special status for local-usage marches. 
Instead, the ban was justified by the evidence that the prefect had acted to 
maintain good order and public peace. Robert and Duffar cite this case as an 
example of a change in attitude by the Conseil,125 so that traditional and local 
marches are increasingly viewed as threatening public order. The result is 
that the lower standard of protection as regards bans made under the decree- 
law is now applied to the formerly, more strongly protected, local-usage 
category.
The present weaker protection accorded to local-usage processions under the 
1935 legal framework is highlighted in Legastelois.126 in which the Conseil 
upheld a mayor's refusal to authorise a procession on the occasion of a church 
fête in the two main streets of the commune. Leaving aside the problematic
122 C.E. 25th Jan. 1939; Rec.Leb.709.
123 It should also be noted that in the earlier case of Abbé Chapalain. op. cit., the Conseil 
disapproved of the absence of an exception for processions linked to local traditions or of a 
traditional character from a general ban on processions on the public highway.
124 C.E. 19th Feb. 1954; Rec.Leb.113.
125 op. cit., 581;
'...le Conseil d'État, tenant compte de l'évolution actuelle des mœurs, paraît admettre plus 
largement, même pour des défilés traditionnels, l'existence d'une menace pour l'ordre public 
de nature à justifier légalement l'interdiction de la manifestation...'.
126 C.E. 21 st Jan. 1966; Rec.Leb.45.
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legal basis for the authorisation procedure in the instant case, the 
inconvenience caused to traffic was accepted as a legitimate concern and no 
special category for local-usage marches was mentioned in the court's 
judgment (this was even though art.2 of the mayor's decision did provide for 
possible exceptions to be made for traditional marches organised by 
committees of local interest).
It can be argued that a local-usage category would have been irrelevant to the 
decision in this case because it was public order in the wider sense, which 
includes traffic,127 that was in issue. The local-usage category is only of 
relevance as regards the narrow conception of public order and the category 
was seen to have been developed because of a view that there was a small 
likelihood that these types of processions would threaten public order in this 
sense. It would seem to follow that the local usage category is of less 
importance in the face of inconvenience to traffic. As was noted by the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement in the instant case,128 the mayor's decision 
was taken in the light of the growth in local traffic and the increase in the risk 
of accidents; a fact which the parties did not contest. It could therefore be 
argued that given the change in methods of transport, an insistence on a local- 
usage category which is based on former concerns and perceptions as to 
physical violence has little or no affect when the reason for the ban are traffic 
considerations and no longer violence.
It is conceded that the logic of this point cannot be challenged but it is 
suggested that historically the local-usage category has not only reflected a 
perception that they would not give rise to violence but such processions 
have also been perceived as important to local life.129 This local importance 
still carries some weight against an argument based upon traffic concerns but 
it cannot exert its force, or pull, unless the local-usage category is present in 
order to provide a platform for this contention. It is not suggested that traffic 
concerns should always be outweighed by the exercise of local-usage 
marches. The claim is rather the more modest one; that the full significance of 
local-usage processions was not recognised in this case because the weighing 
process between local importance and traffic considerations was omitted. This
127 See chap.IV, section III, supra., for an explanation of the wider notion of public order.
128J.C.P.1966.II.14568.
129 See chap .IV, section II, supra., for arguments as to the rationale for this category.
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was due to the omission of a local-usage category in the legal framework set 
out by the decree-law.
The differences in Abbé Marzv and Union des syndicats ouvriers de la région 
parisienne C.G.T. et sieur Hénaff may be reconciled if the former case is seen 
as reflecting the pre-1935 case-law because it is closer in time to that body of 
liberal decisions. This can be contrasted with the latter case, where perhaps 
the Conseil had, by that time, had an opportunity to note the clear absence of 
the local-usage category as regards bans within the decree-law framework, as 
well as the growth in vehicular traffic. However, cases decided by the Conseil 
between the dates of these two cases reveal another possible explanation for 
the difference in the court's reasoning, which concerns religious marches.
All the local-usage cases decided between the passing of the decree-law and 
the handing down of the decision in Union des syndicats ouvriers etc. 
concerned religious marches.130 The Conseil laid down the same formula in 
each case: that as a result of arts.91 & 97 of the 1884 Act (police public order 
powers and duties at that time), and the 1905 Act, art.27 (the separation of 
Church and State), the police could ban processions. Such action was justified 
as long as police reasoning was based upon the necessity to maintain public 
order. The 1905 Act was seen as protecting the liberty of religious worship but 
police intervention was provided for by virtue of art.27. Both this article and 
the general public order powers/duties were therefore seen as requiring 
concrete public order justifications before the police powers which they 
conferred could be exercised. The degree to which the Conseil would review 
the public order reasons offered by the police as far as religious processions is 
clearly seen in the early case of Abbé Olivier.131 In this case the mayor tried to 
impose a condition on funeral processions and purported to be acting in 
order to maintain public order. The actual condition was a ban on members of 
the clergy accompanying such processions by foot, whilst dressed in their 
religious vestments. The court found that the mayor was acting ultra vires the 
general public order powers132 since there were no real public order
130 por example, Abbé Blanchard, op. cit.. Abbé Laurent, op. cit., and Abbé Délusseau. op. cit.
131 C E. 19th Feb. 1909; Rec.181.
132 op. cit., 187;
'....aucun désordre ne s'était antérieurement produit sur le passage du clergé dans les convois 
funèbres; qu'ainsi le maire a usé des pouvoirs, qui lui sont conférés par l'art. 97 de la loi du 5 
avr. 1884, dans un but autre que celui en vue duquel ils lui ont été donnés...'.
considerations upon which the decision was based. The court found that the 
decision merely reflected the municipal council's desire to reduce the 
differences between secular and religious funerals, as a result of the formal 
separation between Church and State.
The later cases continue to apply this higher level of protection to religious 
marches133 but the Conseil seems to see itself as upholding the liberty of 
religion rather than the liberty to process. Thus, a possible explanation for the 
difference between Abbé Marzv and Union des syndicats etc. is that the 
former, because of its religious nature, was accorded a higher level of 
protection, whilst the latter, because of its secular nature, was not seen as 
raising the freedom of religion, as protected by the 1907 statute. It was 
therefore given less protection vis à vis police banning powers. Thus, 
although in Abbé Marzv the liberty to process was mentioned, the court can 
be said to really have religious freedom in mind.
Within the category of local-usage marches, religious processions 
consequently still have a more secure status, since because of their religious 
element, they can always rely on the principled protection accorded by the 
1905 statute and the case-law concerning it, in which the judiciary has insisted 
on a special category for these processions vis à vis bans. The existence of a 
statutorily recognised right also makes this a pedigree human right in the 
French legal system. This is to be contrasted with the weaker position of 
secular marches, including those of a traditional and local character under the 
decree-law. The Conseil's early interpretation was that nevertheless local- 
traditional usage were still important vis à vis bans but recently its view can 
be seen to have changed.
The use of banning powers as regards normal marches
The cases on this issue can be said to have concerned four different aspects: 
the grounds upon which a ban is made; the kind of bans that can be made, 
who may ban and finally emergency procedures for reviewing bans. These 
will be looked at in turn.
(a) the grounds upon which bans are based
133 5^  cases cited in note 130, supra.
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For secular marches it is clear that they are subject to the banning power set 
out in art.3 of the decree-law. It has been noted that the decree-law does not 
indicate that bans are a last resort. This lower standard in the decree-law, as 
compared to the liberty to meet, reflects the lower standard concerning 
normal processions which were at best only tolerated by the authorities. It 
would also seem that the Conseil has accepted that the police authorities have 
a choice as to whether to ban processions using their general public order 
powers/duties or using these same general powers but as formulated in art.3 
of the decree-law. Therefore, the banning of marches on a specific day in the 
year using the general public order powers was upheld in Storez et autres.134 
The consequences of the use of these powers was that there was no 
requirement to notify the organisers (as under the decree-law) and other 
conditions could be imposed by the police.
Despite the relatively less strict requirements for the use of banning powers in 
the decree-law, the Conseil may have introduced a concept of proportionality 
as far as their exercise. Thus, in Anciens Combattants de Grondrecourt.135 the 
Conseil struck down a mayor's decision to ban all processions from 10am- 
12pm on Armistice Day, with the exception of official processions. The 
Conseil accepted that it was within the mayor's powers to reserve a time for 
the official procession in order to avoid too many processions taking place at 
the same time, which could in turn have resulted in public disorder. 
However, it felt that a ban of all marches for an entire two hours was 
excessive in comparison to the object to be achieved.136 The Conseil therefore 
introduced a requirement of proportionality but it is not clear from its 
judgement whether the mayor was purporting to act under the 1935 decree- 
law, or the general public order powers/duties. As a result, it remains only a 
possibility that the Conseil has interpreted art.3 as subject to a proportionality 
requirement.
134 C.E. 26th June 1937; Rec.Leb.627. The mayor banned;
'..les discours dans les rues et sur les places publiques, au cours de la journée du 14 juin 1936, 
les cortèges, attroupements ou autres manifestations de nature à troubler la sûreté, la 
tranquillité publique et la commodité de passage, le port d'emblèmes ou de drapeaux autres 
que le drapeau tricolore, et la vente d'insignes, pochettes - surprises ou autres...'.
135 C E . 3rd April 1940; Rec.Leb.115.
13^ The court stated;
'...il résulte de l'instruction qu'en interdisant tout autre cortège que ce dernier pendant deux 
heures entières, le maire est allé manifestement au delà de ce que justifiât le sauvegarde des 
intérêts dont il est parlé ci-dessus et qu'il a ainsi excédé ses pouvoirs...'.
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At the same time, the courts have been strict in requiring that public order 
reasons support a decision to ban a procession.137 Therefore, in a recent 
decision by the Administrative Tribunal of Nantes,138 the court upheld an 
injunction to suspend a mayor's ban of a proposed march in a commune in 
support of the opening of a state school.139 It was accepted that the mayor 
had banned the march because it was organised by persons who were from 
outside the commune. The court struck down the mayor's decision, on the 
basis that bans could not be based on this ground. Therefore, this case seems 
to confirm that banning powers under the decree-law are limited to the public 
order reason set out in art.3 of that measure.
This view is further supported by the decision of the Conseil d'État in 
Commune de Vertou.140 Although this case involved a static demonstration, 
the law in this case is still of relevance, given the already mentioned 
definition of processions in French law. The demonstration had been planned 
by '1'Association pour la protection de la vallée de la Sèvre', in the Commune 
of Vertou. It was then banned by the mayor but the decision was struck down 
by the Nantes Administrative Tribunal and the mayor then appealed against
137 It has been strongly underlined that banning powers are only to be exercised upon the 
basis of public order considerations, irrespective of whether the police act under art.L.131-2 of 
the Code des Communes or the 1935 decree-law. The court therefore struck down a ban made 
on the basis of the mayor's apprehension that a march was unconstitutional; Belmas et 
Brégeon. Trib. corr. Valence 7th April 1950; Gaz.Pal.1950.2.187, relying on Dames Pérot & 
Salière. Trib. de simple Police de Chalons-sur-Mame 7th Dec. 1949; Gaz.Pal.1950.1.65 (c.f. 
Société "La Fanfare de Delettes". C.E. 5th April 1940; Rec.Leb.133, in which the Conseil held 
that where a mayor refused to authorise a musical society's procession in order to favour a 
rival local society, this was illegal).
The opposite decision was reached in Assoc, des Combattants de la Paix et de la Liberté et 
autres. (C.E. 26th Oct. 1956; Rec.Leb391). In this case the Conseil upheld circulars made by a 
number of prefects which prevented peace organisations from holding a 'vote for peace' 
during a series of demonstrations on 'Peace Day'. The circulars also banned the use of official 
electoral vote slips and informed mayors that they should not put local authority buildings at 
the disposal of these organisations for the purposes of voting. The Conseil upheld the 
circulars on the basis that their aim was to prevent an unconstitutional referendum (contrary 
to art.3 of the 1946 Constitution, which, inter alia, prevents a section of the public from 
exercising the sovereignty that belongs to the French people). The vote for peace was a form 
of consultation of the people and therefore a referendum outside the terms of the 
constitution. Therefore, restrictions on the liberty to process were upheld on the basis of the 
constitution. This once again illustrates that the French notion of public order encompasses 
more than merely physical violence.
13810th Oct. 1985; Juris-Data n.043739.
139 The earlier interim injunction was granted by the same court: 8th March 1985; Juris-Data 
n.043738.
140 C.E. 12th Oct. 1983; R.FD.A. 1983, n.437; Gaz.Pal.1984.1.212.
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the Tribunal's decision. The Conseil d'État upheld the original ban on the 
basis that the object of the assembly was to illegally threaten private property 
but which, in turn, threatened public order. Thus the mayor's decision was 
based upon public order considerations which were in turn based upon the 
illegal threat to private property, as is evidenced by the organisers' slogans 
and general purpose.141
(b) what kind of bans
Another interesting feature of the formulation of the banning powers in art.3 
is that from a prima facie reading, bans can only be made as regards specific 
marches. As a consequence, general bans appear to be ultra vires the decree- 
law.142 The specific nature of bans under this measure can be contrasted with 
the possible scope for general of bans via the general public order 
powers/duties.143 As far as the decree-law is concerned, this prima facie 
reading has not been so clearly supported by the case-law. In Abbé Marzv. 
the Conseil struck down a general ban made on the basis of the decree-law 
but it is unclear as to whether this was by reason of the general terms of the 
ban or because of the court's finding of a lack of public order justifications for 
the ban. In other words, the case could be interpreted as permitting general 
bans if backed up by the legitimate public order concerns of art.3.
This uncertainty is further compounded in Belmas et Brégeon.144 As will be 
seen below, this case's central concern is with prior declarations. However it 
follows that the court is clearly discussing the decree-law, since it is only this 
enactment that lays down a prior declaration requirement. However, 
according to the facts in the case, the prefect had issued a general ban. This 
would either indicate that the prefect, although purporting to act according to 
the terms of the 1935 decree-law, had in fact exercised his general police
141 The court stated;
'Considérant qu'il ressort des pièces versées au dossier que la manifestation prévue pour le 21 
juin 1980 dans la commune de Vertou avait pour objet, selon les mots d'ordre lancés par ses 
organisateurs, de porter une atteinte illégale aux propriétés privées; qu'elle présentait ainsi 
une menace à l'ordre public...'.
*42 Art.3 lays down that if the relevant police authority apprehends that a march is likely to 
breach public order, it can ban it. This evinces a clear intention of spécifiâty.
143 The Use of general bans under the general public order powers/duties has been affirmed 
in many cases; for example, Legastelois. op. cit., Storez et autres, op. cit., Guiller. op. cit., and 
Anciens Combattants de Gondrecourt. op. cit., even though the Conseil has been seen to be 
hostile towards them and as a result they are more difficult to justify, see section II, supra.
144 supra.
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powers outside this measure or that the court accepted that general bans were 
permitted within the framework of the decree-law. In the latter case of 
Dupont et autres,145 the mayor was clearly purporting to exercise his decree- 
law powers in attempting to sanction the respondents for breach of the 
decree-law. However, the court, yet again, made no reference to the previous 
general ban of public processions that had been made by the police and 
which was the basis of the prosecution. This further illustrates the willingness 
on the part of the courts to permit the police to make general bans, despite the 
fact that the decree-law limits the police to specific bans.
The courts' seeming unwillingness to insist upon the legal source of the 
banning powers may be linked to the fact that the powers under the decree 
law are the same as the general public order powers, except that the decree- 
law merely purports to more tightly regulate their use. The general powers 
are therefore always in the background to meet unforeseen circumstances. At 
the same time, it can be argued that the liberty would be accorded greater 
respect if the courts insisted that bans, which are clearly foreseen by the 
decree-law, should be based on the more restrictive terms of the 1935 
measure, unless special circumstances required that the police had to have 
recourse to their general powers.
(c) who may ban
An interesting recent case is that of Commune de Montgeron,146 Apart from 
the grounds upon which bans can be made, this case raises the issue of the 
division of competences as between the mayor and the prefect. The case 
essentially concerns a dispute between the mayor and the departmental 
prefect as to which had the power to ban marches in communes with a 
national police force. Thus, despite the fact that a prior declaration for a 
proposed march was made in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 
decree-law, the mayor purported to ban it on the basis of his general public 
order powers/duties. More specifically, the mayor, acting in an area with a 
national police force, sought to rely on art.L.131-2-l° of the Code des
145 Cour d'appel (ch. corr.) 24th Jan. 1951; Gaz.Pal.1951.1.262.
146 C.E. 28th April 1989; Req. no.74018; R.F.D.A. 1989.557; J.C.P. éd. G.IV.218; Rec.Leb.119 
and A.JD.A.1989.644.
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Communes, by which he is charged with ensuring safe and efficient traffic 
circulation.147
The court accepted that the mayor was charged with duties as regards traffic 
circulation under art.L.131-2-l° and that the mayor kept this competence even 
in areas with a national police force by virtue of art.L. 132-8 of the Code. This 
view, it will be recalled is in accordance with the partial transfer of 
competences in national police areas.148 However, at the same time art.L.132-8 
placed the control of 'occasional assemblies' in the hands of the prefect.149 
Thus, one reason for the Conseil's finding that the mayor was incompetent to 
ban the march was because in the instant case it was an occasional one. All 
other kinds of marches (i.e. those of a regular and periodic nature) are 
therefore the responsibility of the mayor.
A second reason was that according to art.2 of the decree-law, the prior 
declaration is to be made to the prefect or sub-prefect in those areas with a 
national police force. It was therefore held that it was the prefect who had 
powers to ban processions in this area under art.3.150 Art.2 was therefore 
interpreted as indicating who was the relevant police authority according to 
the terms of art.L.132-8. This case highlights the complexities involved in the 
area of bans, which is compounded by the existence of two police authorities.
14^ See chap.IV, section III, supra..
See chap.IV, section III, supra.
1*9 Art. L.132-8 reads as follows;
'Le soin de réprimer les atteintes à la tranquillité publique, tel qu'il est défini à l'article L.131- 
2-2 et mis par cet article en règle générale à la charge du maire, incombe à l'Etat seul dans les 
communes où la police est étatisée.
Dans ces mêmes communes, l'Etat a la charge du bon ordre quand il se fait occasionnellement 
de grands rassemblements d'hommes.
Tous les autres pouvoirs de police énumérés à l'article L.131-2 sont exercés par le maire y 
compris le maintien du bon ordre dans les foires, marchés, réjouissances et cérémonies 
publiques, spectacles, jeux, cafés, églises et autres lieux publics.
Les forces de police étatisées sont chargées notamment, d'exécuter les arrêtés de police du 
maire.'
15® The court stated;
'Il résulte de ces dispositions que, dans les villes où est instituée une police d'État, l'autorité 
préfectorale a seule qualité pour prononcer l'interdiction d'une manifestation sur la voie 
publique de nature à troubler l'ordre public et que le maire est, dans ces mêmes communes, 
incompétent pour prononcer une telle interdiction, même en se fondant sur les dispositions 
de l'article L.131-2-l° du Code des communes.'
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In any case, it should recalled that the prefect may substitute for the mayor if 
the latter decides not to ban a procession,151 as for example in Assoc, des 
combattants de la Paix et de la Liberté et autres.152
(d) emergency review procedures
Despite the possibility that the courts will overturn bans on marches, it has 
been noted that, as with the liberty to meet, these decisions may often come 
too late and therefore be of little more than a symbolic victory because in 
practical terms the liberty has been restricted. However, recent administrative 
reforms have sought to improve this situation. More precisely, the recent 
introduction of the déféré préfectoral,153 which consists of a kind of 
emergency administrative review procedure where a civil liberty is restricted 
by, inter alia, local police decisions, may be of considerable use as regards this 
problem.
A good example of the working of this new procedure can be seen in the 
already mentioned case of Commune de Montgeron.154 The facts of the case 
in more detail were that the mayor of Essonne had banned a proposed march 
by the local chapter of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, which was to 
commemorate the memory of Pierre Mendès-France. Using the new 
procedure, the prefect sought, and was granted, an injunction by the 
administrative court to suspend the mayor's decision.155 The mayor's ban was 
held to be illegal at the full hearing156 and the mayor then appealed to the 
Conseil d'État to have the Tribunal's decision struck down and the original 
ban reinstated. The arguments presented before the Conseil have been noted 
above but what is of importance here is the time periods in which the decisions 
involved in this case were taken and especially the time in which the first 
injunction on the mayor's ban was granted.
151 See chap.IV, section III, supra, and Dautan, op. cit., 9;
'Au cas où le maire n'a pas jugé opportun d'interdire la manifestation, le préfet en vertu de 
ses pouvoirs de tutelle peut lui interdire de mettre les locaux publics à la disposition des 
organisateurs..'.
152 C.E. 26th Oct. 1956; Rec.Leb.391.
153 See chap.II, section II, supra.
154 op. cit.
155 Commr. de la République du Département de l'Essonne c. Commune de Montgeron, 
Trib. Admin. Versailles 21st Oct. 1983 nJ5396.
156 Trib. Admin. Versailles 5th July 1985.
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Therefore, on the 20th October 1983, the mayor banned the march which was 
scheduled to take place on the 22nd October. The request for an interim 
injunction was made on the 21st October and the President of the Tribunal 
granted an interim injunction the next day, so that the march could take place 
as planned.157 The injunction was therefore granted twenty-four hours after 
the ban and it will be recalled that the administrative court has up to forty- 
eight hours to take a decision,158 so that even in the case of the maximum 
delay, the new procedure is a considerable improvement on the normal 
application for judicial review, which usually requires at least three months 
before a decision is handed down.159
The new procedure also has another advantage which is that there is a 
presumption in favour of human rights. Thus, it will be recalled that an 
interim injunction must be granted by the court where it is shown that there is 
a likelihood that a human right will be infringed.160 This can be contrasted 
with the normal interim injunction, which it will be recalled is an exceptional 
measure that also depends on two conditions being proved to exist.161
The practice and enforcement of the prior declaration requirement 
Art.l of the decree-law lays down the requirement of a prior declaration for 
non-local-usage marches on the public highway, whereas art.2 lays down the 
conditions and form of this declaration. The criticisms that the prior 
declaration requirement allows the police to instigate a prior authorisation 
regime have been mentioned and the case-law on this requirement will be 
examined here with this in mind.
The case-law shows that the judiciary, whilst making it clear that the police 
can require prior authorisations when exercising their general public order 
powers/duties,162 have not been as categorical as regards their use within the
157 Chabanol, op. cii., 452;
'L'intervention du juge, extrêmement rapide, a pu peser sur le cours des événements et 
autoriser l'exercice d'une liberté publique au lieu de se borner à constater que cet exercice 
avait été illégalement mais irrémédiablement perturbé.'.
158 5^  chap.II, section II, supra.
I®9 See Etchegaray, op. cit.
160 See chap.U, section H, supra.
161 See chap.II, section II, supra?
1^2 In the following cases the court accepted the implementation of a prior authorisation 
requirement before a march on the basis erf their general public order powers/duties; Pitou.
(Footnote continues on next page)
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1935 decree-law framework. As regards the latter, the Conseil d'État ruled in 
Abbé Nicolet.163 that a mayor could only impose a prior authorisation 
requirement using his/her general public order powers/duties. The decree- 
law gave the police authorities no power to require prior authorisations, it 
only provided for prior declarations.
This clear ruling as to prior authorisations is to be contrasted with the more 
recent case handed down by the Nancy Court of Appeal in Dupont et 
autres.164 This case has already been mentioned as regards the duty to notify 
the organisers of a decision to ban a march, which is laid down in art.3 of the 
decree-law. However, although in this case it was noted that the organisers of 
the 'Journée de la paix’ march had not requested prior authorisation from the 
mayor, the court did not hold that such a requirement was ultra vires the 
decree-law. Indeed, no reference to the fact that a prior authorisation practice 
had been adopted by the police was made in the instant case.
Given that the court which handed down this judgement is lower than the 
Conseil d'État (although it must be remembered that the two courts are from 
separate jurisdictions) and the fact that the prior authorisation was not central 
to the dispute in hand, it could be claimed that it is unlikely that Dupont et 
autres lays down good law. However, the case is of interest because it reveals 
police practice and also judicial unconcern as far as such practices. Therefore, 
a practice of requiring prior authorisations could be said to have been 
imposed by the police authorities, even though, according to the terms of the 
decree-law and the supporting interpretation in Abbé Nicolet, such a practice 
is illegal. Furthermore, even if such a practice is not widespread, the 
discretion that the police authorities enjoy, which permits them to subject the 
liberty to process to the wider terms granted by their general public order 
powers/duties, means that the imposition of prior authorisations is always 
within the police's discretion.
C.E. 9th June 1937; Rec.Leb.574, Société 'La Fanfare de Delettes', op. cit., Guiller. op. cit., 




Liability and sanctions for breach of the decree-low
The new penal code has been seen to have modified the sanctions originally 
found in the decree-law so that it is organisers that are generally sanctioned. 
At the same time, the former article in the decree-law was seen to have 
contained similar offences aimed at organisers and so the subsequent case- 
law may still be of relevance as regards the new sanctions.
It will be recalled that the first offence is that of organising a demonstration 
without first having made a prior declaration (art.431-9(l)). The offence in 
art.431-9(l) also requires that there is the organisation of a demonstration 
which has not been legally declared but since organisation is a key element in 
the next offence, it will be dealt with when this offence is analysed. Here 
attention will be focused on the failure to make a prior declaration.
It has been held that in certain circumstances, the failure to make a prior 
declaration will not lead to criminal liability. Thus, in Belmas et Bregeon165 
the defendants had clearly breached the terms of art.4, in that after the march 
had been banned, they invited people to take part in it. The question facing 
the court was whether the defendants could also be prosecuted for failure to 
make a prior declaration. The court held that the defendants were released 
from their obligation to make a prior authorisation because the march had 
been already banned two days before the organisation and encouragement to 
participate in the march had occurred.166
It was further stated that the purpose of the prior declaration in the context of 
the decree-law was an informative and facilitative one. This meant that once 
the police had been made aware of a forthcoming march, they were then 
placed in a position to decide whether to ban the procession. In the instant 
case, the police were already aware of the proposed march and they had 
already exercised their banning powers, therefore the court found that the 
function of the prior declaration had been served. The defendants could only 
be prosecuted for their encouragement after the ban and not an additional 
offence of failing to make a declaration to the police.
*65 op. tit.
166 ^  algo j^u te . Cour d'Appel Bordeaux 18th July 1950; D.1951.41.
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The second offence is that of having organised a demonstration that has been 
legally banned (art.431-9(2)). Under the repealed art.4(2), it was, inter alia, an 
offence to participate in the organisation of a demonstration that had been 
banned. It can be claimed that this offence has been replaced by a simpler 
organisation offence and therefore the case-law under the former article 
concerning organisation can be of guidance to how the new provisions will be 
applied.
The court gave its opinion for the first time as to what is meant by 
'participation in the organisation' in Calas.167 Although this case concerned a 
static demonstration, its reasoning is still applicable to mobile demonstrations 
(i.e. processions). Calas had been found guilty of, inter alia, participating in 
the organisation of a non-authorised assembly on the public highway, 
contrary to the decree-law. According to the findings of fact, a demonstration 
had been organised in a town square after the close of an earlier political 
event. This demonstration caused an assembly to form on the public 
highway, which refused to disperse until the police were forced to disperse 
the crowd by force. Two of the defendants, Turriere and Gravie, had spoken 
at this assembly, whereas Calas had distributed leaflets calling for people to 
assemble.
The court held that the fact that Turriere and Gravie had spoken at the 
demonstration did not in itself constitute 'participation in the organisation' of 
the assembly. Speaking and participation were held to be two different 
activities. On the other hand, the claim by Calas that he was not the instigator 
of the demonstration could not be upheld, not least because of his distribution 
of the leaflets and his later admission in a newspaper that he was the 
organiser. The distribution of the leaflets was interpreted as a step in 
preparation (and therefore organisation) of the demonstration.
This finding clearly shows that the court relies in each case on an 
interpretation of different fact situations. The court is constantly searching for 
the dividing line between mere participation and organisation. This can be 
further illustrated in Merabet Bourogaa et autres.168 The respondents in this 
case appealed against the decision of the Tunis Cour d'Appel which found
167 Cass. crim. 23rd Feb. 1954; D.1955.465.
16® op. cit.
257
them guilty of participating in the organisation of a non-declared march. They 
alleged in their defence that they were merely participants in the march. The 
respondents were four local councillors and according to the facts of the case, 
they marched at the head of a procession to the police headquarters in order 
to protest against the arrest and detention of a person who had been arrested 
for affixing what were considered to be subversive posters on local buildings. 
The court accepted the evidence from eye-witnesses that the respondents not 
only physically lead the three hundred strong march but also that they were its 
organisers. The four were also seen to have stirred up the crowd and invited 
those that they passed to join the march. After the four entered the police 
headquarters and demanded to be heard, the crowd became aggressive and 
police reinforcements had to be called in.
In upholding the finding as to organisation, the court decided how far the 
four councillors had gone beyond the point of mere participation. It would 
seem that it was the particular combination of factual circumstances that led 
the court to its decision. For example, others among the crowd may have 
encouraged passers-by to join in the procession but given that they were not 
at the head of the march and did not stir up the crowd, they could not have 
been said to have been organisers. In addition, perhaps the fact that the 
respondents were not ordinary citizens and could be said to have carried 
some influence with the crowd, militated in favour of a finding of 
organisation, rather than their simple participation as local councillors, as the 
respondents had pleaded.
If the two cases above present problems as to predictability, no further 
guidance is provided by the court in M.P.c. Texereau et autres.169 The court 
held here that the mere agreement in a public meeting, by representatives of 
different organisations, to hold a non-declared march and the promise by 
certain persons to participate in this march, was insufficient to constitute 
'organisation' within the terms intended by art.4(2). The court can be said to 
have decided in this case that the respondents were still taking prqjaratory 
steps towards the organisation of an illegal march, as opposed to actual 
organisation.
169 Trib. corr. AIbi 5th July 1957; J.C.P57 6d. G.IV.175.
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From these cases, it would seem that the courts have formulated a two-stage 
approach to the question of organisation that may be of help in the future in 
deciding who and what constitutes organisation under art.431-9. Firstly, they 
will review the particular fact situations in order to decide whether the facts 
support a finding of participation,170 as opposed to organisation. Secondly, 
the court will interpret the defendant's actions in order to decide whether 
they are steps preparatory to organisation or activities in the course of 
organisation.
The last offence is that of having made an incomplete or inaccurate prior 
declaration (art.431-9(3)). This is almost an exact repetition of art.4(l), except 
that this provision also contained the offence of not having made a prior 
declaration, which is now dealt with in art.431-9(l). However, no cases seem 
to have dealt with this offence under the decree-law.
The role of the attroupement offence
It was noted above that those who participated in or incited banned marches 
on the public highway were sometimes prosecuted for the offence of 
provoking an attroupement. Participation could also fall foul of art.4(2) of the 
decree law (participation in a non-declared or banned demonstration). 
However, this overlap no longer exists, given that the new offences in art.431- 
9 do not sanction mere participation and the attroupement offence is now 
clearly defined in art.431-3 as requiring an element of disorder, so that a mere 
ban is not a sufficient condition to constitute an attroupement. Therefore, a 
clear separation is established between the public order offence of 
attroupement171 and the offences committed by those who while seeking to 
peacefully process have not followed or have actively breached the conditions 
laid down in the decree-law.
However, the distinction between public order and the liberty seems to have 
be recognised by the courts before the new formulation of the attroupement 
offence and this recognition can be said to represent a change in attitude 
towards the liberty as compared with tendency in the past to use the
170 See also Ramires. Cass. crim. 23rd March 1953; Gaz.Pal.l9522.45 and Pelissier. Cass. crim. 
26th July 1955; J.C.P.55 éd. G.IV.133
171 5^  supra. As far as the former offence of inciting an attroupement, there is now only an 
offence of inciting an armed attroupement (art.431-6).
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attroupement offence to repress processions. The role of the attroupement 
offence can thus be said to have been considerably reduced.
Thus, the courts overturned convictions where the first instance court has 
refused to review the facts in order to determine whether there was actual or 
threatened public order. As a consequence, the fact that a banned march took 
place on the public highway was not sufficient to constitute an attroupement. 
This has been held in Portet et autres172 and Puaux.173 In each case the court 
reviewed the facts to see if this constitutive element of an attroupement was 
present, if not, it was held that only an art.4(2) prosecution (for participation 
in a banned march) could be brought. The element that distinguishes the two 
offences from each other is clearly seen to be public order: a banned march 
that nevertheless takes place on the public highway may present no danger to 
public order but in order to legally constitute an attroupement it must have 
been likely to breach public order. Moreover, this public disorder must be of 
such a degree as to qualify the assembly as an attroupement. This is a finding 
of fact in each case but the decision by the police will be struck down unless 
regard has been had to these questions and the Conseil will also overrule the 
findings of the lower courts unless these issues are reviewed.
A SUM M ARY
The regulation of the liberty to process is different from that of the liberty to 
meet. The liberty to meet and the liberty to process are recognised as distinct 
human rights, even though they share assembly characteristics. This difference 
infuses the history of their legal regulation. In addition, there is no statement 
of principle to the effect that priority should be given to liberty.
Secondly, the legal framework is the product of concern about public 
disorder, whereas the 1881 Act was seen to been conditioned by a belief that 
meetings no longer posed a public order threat. It is only comparatively 
recently that a distinction has been made between public order offences 
involving violence and peaceful marches; this once again reflects the tendency 
not to prioritise the liberty to process.
172 op, ¿I'
173 Cass. crim. 25 March 1954; D.195.402.
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Thirdly, the regulation would appear to be less specific because it refers to 
demonstrations, rather than marches. Demonstrations have been seen to be a 
wide category of which processions are but one aspect. However, given the 
historical circumstances surrounding the regulation of the liberty to process it 
would seem that it was processions that were in the forefront of the 
government's mind when it laid down the legal framework for 
demonstrations in 1935. Thus, it can be claimed that the current legal 
framework is actually rather specific and takes into account the specific 




The law regulating the liberties to meet and process in France and England is 
compared here. The resulting findings will then be applied to the two 
practical concerns of the Bill of Rights debate in the UK and the protection of 
human rights in the EU. Chapter VI sets out the criteria that will be used for 
comparison and which are derived from the jurisprudential theory of civil 
liberties adopted in this study. In addition, the role of US and ECHR case-law, 
as high standards against which these criteria and their legal consequences 
can be compared will be explained. A first comparison is also made as 
regards the status and definition of the liberties in France and England. 
Thereafter the chapters look at regulation at different time periods. Thus, 
Chapter VII looks at the legal position before the exercise of the liberties, 
Chapter VIII, during their exercise and Chapter IX after their exercise. In 
Chapter X conclusions are drawn as to the application of theory to the two 
practical issues and the consequent need to apply theory as regards civil
liberties in England.
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARATIVE CRITERIA, LEGAL STATUS AND
STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
The criteria that will be used to compare and evaluate the regulation of the 
liberty to assemble will be firstly set out in this chapter. These criteria are 
derived from the jurisprudential theory of civil liberties adopted in this study 
and so provide a concrete example of the use of theoretical insights in order to 
formulate practical means to protect human rights. In order to gauge the 
degree to which these theoretically-based measures protect the liberties to 
meet and to process, the US and the ECHR case-law will in turn be used to 
evaluate them. This is because they are recognised as providing high 
standards of protection.
The second aim of this chapter is to compare the status of the liberty to 
assemble in the two legal systems, using the criteria that has been set out and 
finally a comparison will be made of the way the liberty is defined. This 
involves an investigation and comparison of its structure. Then it will be 
possible to make a decision as to which term should be used to refer to the 
liberty, as opposed to the interchangeable terms that have been used up until 
now.1
The status and definition of the liberty to assemble can be seen as having in 
common the fact that they are distinct from the more technical issues that will 
be compared in chapters VII-IX below. This is because they raise a priori 
issues, which make sense of these latter technical or 'mechanical'2 aspects of 
regulation. To take a simple example, comparing to what extent meetings are 
banned on the basis of official discretion seems a meaningless exercise unless 
it is clear that meetings are valued activities, that are so highly valued as to be 
protected as a human right. Concern as to the grounds upon which 
restrictions are based thus makes sense when the status and structure of the
1 Chap .III, section n, supra.
2 Bailey et. al, op. at., 146, speak of the 'mechanics of protest' as including the following 
questions: 'how many protesters? where are they? are they disorderly? are they violent?'
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human right is known. In other words, these theoretical issues precede 
regulation.
SECTION  I 
COM PARATIVE CRITERIA
The jurisprudential theory that has been formulated in this study indicates a 
series of measures and standards by which the liberty to assemble should be 
regulated. These will be used to compare French and English law and to 
evaluate it. These legal measures act as comparative criteria and the fact that 
they are derived from theoretical insights constitutes a central example of the 
attempt to apply theory to practice. It should be noted that if the criteria are 
explicitly derived from jurisprudential theory, comparative theory has played 
an implicit role in pointing to French law as a useful system for comparative 
purposes, despite belonging to the civil law family.
The criteria are set out in Table I below and will be outlined here but their 
nature and scope will be seen in greater detail when they are actually 
employed. These criteria will be continually referred to in the next chapters of 
comparative evaluation. In order to avoid repeating each time the theoretical 
significance of each element, their jurisprudential background has been 
explained here and it is hoped that during the ensuing investigation of what 
are often complex legal provisions, this explanation and the accompanying 
Table will be recalled and returned to by the reader.
Table I
Emphasis on difference 
and the specific
Importance o f human 
rights as social values





legal recognition of specific 
human rights
exacting judicial review consultation and 
negotiation
detailed and specific legal 
regulation
restriction as a last resort 
and clear balancing of 
values
restrictions by politically 
accountable bodies
local interest non-discrimination
priority use of certain 
locations
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AN EM PHASIS ON DIFFERENCE AND THE SPECIFIC
As can be seen from Table I, the theory supports an emphasis on specific 
human rights. It will recalled from chapter I that the theory was seen to justify 
the investigation of specific human rights. This was presented as an 
alternative strategy to the general approach taken in the Bill of Rights debate 
and as justifying the study of the liberty to assemble as an example of this 
specific approach.
The criteria that follow from this are firstly, specific analysis, which means the 
degree to which the law recognises that there are particular and specific 
human rights, rather than general rights that contain a series of different but 
related rights.
Secondly, there is a preference for the legal mention of specific human rights. 
In consequence, these rights should have a legal status and not be obscured 
behind broadly formulated human rights.
Thirdly, theory supports detailed regulation that takes account of the specific 
contexts and needs of each particular civil liberty. Thus, what will be 
examined is the degree to which the law regulates the specific aspects and 
problems of this liberty.
Fourthly, it will be recalled that the emphasis given to the specific in the 
study is part of an attempt to bring difference to the fore where it has been 
hidden behind generality. This was seen as a preference for what was termed 
the 'local narrative'. This aspect of the theory results in a concern to regulate 
the liberty by looking at the local circumstances involved. Therefore, those 
persons in the locality that will be affected by meetings and processions 
should be heard and the authorities that have the power to restrict their 
exercise should also be local so that they can better take account of what the 
local circumstances require. This is important because circumstances may 
differ widely between different areas and times and it will be easier for those 
on the spot - officials and ordinary citizens to gauge these particular 
circumstances. The degree to which French and English law provide for the 
'local narrative' will therefore be investigated.
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IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOCIAL VALUES 
The jurisprudential theory also underlined the importance of human rights 
because firstly, they are ultimately a means to achieve social and political 
change and secondly, they are constructed by communities and represent the 
values that a community considers to be so fundamental that they should be 
accorded higher protection. Despite the contingency that was said to be an 
aspect of these socially constructed civil liberties, the theory has emphasised 
that human rights should be protected because they are the values of society. 
Seeing human rights as social values of this kind leads in the present context 
to a preference for measures that reflect the importance of the liberty to 
assemble. This is firstly achieved by granting a legal status to the liberty, thus 
it will be seen how far this is the case in France and England.
More specifically, the law should also recognise this importance by providing 
for exacting judicial review. What does this mean in the context of the liberty 
in question? A detailed response will be made in the following chapters but 
essentially it means that the legal systems will be compared in order to 
ascertain the degree to which restrictions of the liberties can be challenged 
and the degree to which restrictions can be reviewed. The greater the capacity 
to challenge and the more exacting the review, the greater the degree of 
importance that can be said to be accorded to these liberties. This in turn 
reflects the view that human rights are of such importance that their 
restriction must be strictly reviewed. Another point follows on from this and 
can be seen in the requirement that restrictions of the liberty, such as bans, 
should be a last resort. This is a requirement that can form part of the 
substance of judicial review but it is also important to see how far the police 
are guided by such a requirement, so that may only have recourse to such 
measures in the final instance. Consequently, French and English law will be 
comparatively evaluated according to the degree to which they give priority 
to the rights to assemble by only permitting their restriction as the last 
possible means to secure another and more important value, such as the 
maintenance of public order.
Another principle that flows from the theory is that of a balancing or 
reconciliation of competing values. Human rights are values but it has been 
argued that other values, such as public order in the case of the liberties to
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assemble, sometimes conflict with their exercise.3 In therefore deciding 
whether the liberties are to be exercised and thus accorded more weight than 
a competing value or restricted and so subordinated to other values, the 
theory requires that this balancing is made clear. It will be recalled that it also 
requires that the importance of the liberties is recognised and this means here 
that the decision-maker must accord the liberties a weight in the balancing 
process which in turn reflects their social importance. The greater the degree 
of transparency in this balancing process the clearer will be the link between 
the liberties and the social and political forces that have constructed them, as 
well as the changes in the social value accorded to these rights.
A comparison will also be made of the degree to which discrimination as to 
who may exercise their rights is limited. Deciding that some persons may 
meet or process, while others may not may be inevitable given public order 
considerations and limited resources. Nevertheless, the theory supports a 
general prohibition on discrimination where it is based on considerations, 
such as the political views of the participants, that cannot be said to uphold 
other social values like public order or a fair distribution of scarce resources.
A final criteria concerns the locations in which the liberties can be exercised. If 
the law recognises the importance of the rights to assemble, it should accord 
them a priority when deciding if they should be exercised in locations for 
whose use there is strong competition. This is not to say that the exercise of 
the liberties should always override other uses but that in the decision­
making process it is recognised that the liberties are social values. This should 
result in there exercise only being overridden by other important values. The 
theory also favours measures by which authorities set aside certain locations 
in which meetings and processions have priority. This results in a positive 
obligation on the authorities, as opposed to the negative obligation of non­
interference.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The theory has insisted that human rights are subject to change. By reason of 
being socially constructed values they may one day no longer reflect the 
values of a community or may have to give way to new or competing values.
3 Chap.III, section I, supra.
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In other words, the social values of a community are subject to change and 
thus the values of today are contingent. Therefore, human rights are related to 
political and social change. One result of this view is that the theory supports 
the use of detailed statutes to regulate the liberty because these are more 
likely to represent the political choices of a community and more importantly, 
they can be more readily changed by the political process. Statutes can be 
repealed and amended more easily than other types of measures that seek to 
entrench liberties beyond political and social change. What follows is a 
comparative criteria that looks at the degree to which the specific context of 
the liberty is regulated by statute.
A second criteria is the degree to which a framework of consultation and 
negotiation between participants, interested and effected parties and the 
authorities is provided for as regards restrictions of the liberty. Such a process 
reflects the an interest in according as much of the decisions concerning the 
regulation of the liberty to the community. It also reflects the 
contingency/ unfixed nature of this right, since in this process it is must be 
weighed against other countervailing values in society.
Finally, it follows that restrictions on the liberties should be taken by locally 
accountable bodies or persons. In this way decisions to restrict the liberty, 
given the imperfection of present structures of democratic representation, are 
taken by the representatives of the community. The result is that the political 
and social element of human rights is retained in its regulation - in other 
words, it is the community that decides whether it should be restricted. This 
is not to be confused with a claim that human rights are merely what the 
majority decides. Rather the claim is that as far as possible local and affected 
interests should be involved and heard but they are at the same time to be 
constrained within a legal framework that generally accords importance to 
the liberties to assemble. It then follows that in the particular decisions that 
need to be made as regards meetings and processions within this framework, 
local and accountable interests should play an important role, along with 
central or national interests.
A W ORD CONCERNING M ETHOD
As will have been noted, theory sometimes indicates precise legal 
mechanisms, such as statutory protection, while on other occasions it simply 
indicates more general methods that should be pursued, as for example is the
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case with judicial review. In order to gauge the degree to which these 
theoretically derived criteria and measures would protect the liberty they will 
be evaluated by comparing them with commonly accepted standards of 
protection. These consist of the case-law from the United States of America 
and the ECHR concerning the liberty to assemble.
The use of such criteria should not be seen as an adoption of the way human 
rights are constructed in these systems. For example, the use of US case-law 
to see how questions of location are regulated does not endorse the theory 
that supports the review of human rights by the Supreme Court, by which it 
may strike down statutes. Such an adoption would contradict the theoretical 
view that has been formulated here. But at the same time, it should be 
recalled that what is offered is but one possible jurisprudential view and that 
given another view, different protections of human rights could be accounted 
for. The more fundamental aim is to show that theory can be of use to 
practice.
Another aspect of the method to be used in comparing French and English 
regulation of the liberties to meet and to process is that the starting point will 
be taken from the problems identified in England and so it will then be seen 
how these problems are dealt with in France.4
In England this is an area of law which consists of a complex battery of 
regulations of both a statutory and common law nature. It is therefore 
difficult to approach the matter in a systematic way. This difficulty is 
however compounded by the fact that few commentators in England 
specifically deal with the liberties in question. Instead, there is a tendency to 
deal with public order or at best the right to protest. More to the point, 
because they focus on public disorder and not the rights to peacefully 
assemble, these approaches are claimed to be of little use in highlighting the 
specific legal mechanisms that are required to regulate the liberties. Thus, 
while it is conceded that public order plays an important role in the 
regulation of these rights, it is not claimed to be a central one.
4 Therefore it will be noted that both the issues of prior declarations, notice and authorisation 
and that of public and private assemblies will not be centrally dealt with as these have not 
been issues of great concern in England.
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The method adopted by Bailey et. al. suffices as an example of the dominant 
English approach. Under the heading 'Public Order' they analyse the 
regulation of 'Demonstrations and riots' and the 'Freedom of association', 
before finally studying 'Public meetings and processions’. This final category 
is then further divided into three sections - location, conduct and preventative 
powers.5 Why is this classification not suitable? The answer is that the rights 
to assemble are located in the gaps left by measures to control violence. It 
thus becomes easy to view the exercise of the liberties as a public order 
problem when in fact the vast majority of public meetings and processions 
pass off peacefully.6
Therefore, the fundamental problem with the public order approach is that it 
does not accord sufficient weight and importance to the liberties to assemble. 
Thus, for example, an analysis of the public order offences that involve 
violence, such as riot, violent disorder and affray, is of little relevance to those 
who seek to assemble peacefully and the liberties to assemble are about these 
activities.7 It is true that the liberties very much exist within the context of the 
police view as to what is peaceful or violent but this does not mean that the 
liberties are the same as these public order offences. Those that seek to 
assemble peacefully are not claiming a right to riot or a right to violent 
protest, rather they seek to exercise the right to peacefully assemble and the 
focus of the analysis should consequently be on the ways that such exercise is 
guaranteed and restricted.
In the light of these criticisms, this study adopts a perspective that tends to be 
lacking in studies of the liberties to assemble in England precisely because the 
subject is approached from the point of view of public order. In consequence, 
the method adopted here begins from the point of view of those wishing to 
organise and or participate in a peaceful assembly. As a result, the liberties 
are divided up into a series of regulations that such persons may confront 
before, during and after an assembly, in other words at different stages of the 
assembly.
5 op. tit., 146 et. seq.
6 A fact that is noted by the police; see the annual Reports of HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary.
7 Chap .III, section n, supra.
270
This method is adopted because it stresses the peaceful nature of assembly; 
those wishing to assemble are not seen at the outset as presenting a public 
order problem. On the contrary, this view puts into sharp relief the 
arguments that will need to be presented in order to restrict these valued 
activities. In other words, this approach according to the different periods of 
time and the organiser/participant perspective is argued to shift the balance 
away from public order and towards civil liberty. Therefore, restrictions on 
the grounds of public order will still be of relevance but the perspective used 
here focuses on an investigation of the arguments and justifications that will 
need to be provided before restrictions can be accepted on these grounds.
A general outline of the topics concerning the regulation of English law in the 
proceeding chapters is set out in Table II below.
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It will be seen that in looking at the regulation of the liberty a distinction is 
sought to be maintained between meetings and processions in order carry out 
a specific analysis. However, since the starting point is English law, this 
distinction will not always be made. Thus, as regards chapter VII on 
regulations before assemblies it will be seen that as far as bans and conditions 
a distinction is generally not made between meetings and processions but as 
regards issues concerning location, a clearer division exists between the two 
types of assembly. Similarly, the law on restrictions during assemblies does 
not make a distinction. On the other hand, in chapter IX, which concerns the
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law after the liberty to assembly has been exercised, it will be seen that 
specific sanctions are envisaged as regards the processions.
After these areas of regulation in England that are set out in Table II have 
been compared with France using the jurisprudentially derived criteria, the 
US and ECHR will be used to evaluate the standards and mechanisms of 
protection that are developed. The general scheme of this evaluation is set out 
in Table III. This shows the aspects of French and English law that are 
compared with the relevant elements of US and ECHR law. These elements 
and their relevance will of course be explained in the course of the 
comparison but as certain elements, such as the hecklers' veto arise on more 
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sanctions terms prescribed by 
law.
More specifically, Table III shows how English and French law, once they 
have been compared using the criteria set out in Table I, will then be 
evaluated against US and ECHR case-law. Thus, for example, it will be seen 
to what extent the evaluations made by the theoretically derived criteria as 
regards the location of meetings and processions grant as high degree of
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protection as that in the United States. The ECHR will not be referred to here 
however because there has been no case-law on this aspect of regulation.
The fact that on occasion US and ECHR law is not of relevance is most clearly 
seen as regards the status and structure of the liberty to assemble. It will be 
seen that theory advocates a view of the liberty that is incompatible with the 
view in either the US or ECHR. As a result, these systems cannot be turned to 
as comparative criteria in order to evaluate what the theory supports.
It will be noted that the division between subjects differs from that in Table II 
which set out how French and English law are compared. For example, 
conditions are compared without making a distinction between these 
restrictions before and during assemblies. This and other such differences 
reflect the occasions in which the US and/or ECHR case-law do not make the 
same distinctions as in English law. Therefore, in this case, the same general 
comments that will be made as regards conditions in chapter VII (regulation 
before assemblies) can be applied to conditions imposed during an assembly 
in chapter VIII.
Having set out the comparative criteria and methodology that will be applied 
in this part of the study, the next two sections make a comparison of the more 
theoretical aspects of the liberty to assemble: its legal status and its structure.
SECTION II 
THE LEGAL STA TU S OF THE LIBERTY
This section compares the status of the liberty in question: it investigates 
whether the liberties enjoy a legal, moral or constitutional status in the two 
jurisdictions and which status is best according to the criteria derived from 
the jurisprudential theory that was formulated in chapter I.
The first task will be to set out the English position before then evaluating it 
against that of France. As already stated, the English perspective of this study 
will mean that only a brief summary of English law will be provided.8
8 See Introduction, supra.
275
THE PO SITIO N  IN ENGLAND
The status of the liberties to assemble in England can be characterised as 
being uncertain and it is generally not addressed. To some it is clear that these 
rights do not have a common law, statutory or constitutional status.9 
However, others have claimed that these rights have common law status. For 
example, in Hubbard v Pitt, Forbes J recognised the liberty to assemble10 and 
other cases have been pointed to in which the judiciary has spoken loosely 
about the rights to meet and process.11 This would therefore seem to provide 
grounds for arguing that the liberty in question has a common law status.
An attempt has also been made to argue for a common law status of a more 
limited liberty to process on the public highway. This has been based on the 
privileged position that processions have traditionally enjoyed because they 
involve passing and re-passing, for which use the public highway is 
dedicated. The result is that processions are claimed to fall within the 
common law right of passage. However, it follows that if this limited 
common law status is accepted, there can be no similar status for the liberty to 
meet by reason of its stationary nature.12
9 For example, E.R.H. Ivamy, 'The Right of Public Meeting’ C.L.P. [1949] 183, 192; G. 
Robertson, 'Freedom. The Individual and the Law' (1989), 67;
'Although the virtues of peaceful protest are frequently extolled, there is in England no legal 
right of peaceful assembly or procession or...even to hold meetings in public places. Cars and 
horses have more legal rights on the highway than people..', 
and P. Wallington, 'Injunctions and the Ripht to Demonstrate' 35 C.L.J. [1976] 82,94;
'In England, in the absence of constitutional guarantees, the question is how far there is a 
legal prohibition on demonstrations. Liberty exists in the interstices of the substantive law, 
which might be concerned with quite another matter, its recognition may be assisted by 
presumptions in favour of liberty in the construction of a statute, but not by the assertion of a 
countervailing right...' (emphasis added).
10 [1976] 1 Q.B. 142,156;
There is indeed, it seems to me, a democratic right to public assembly, and any attempt to 
suppress the meeting together of members of the public merely because it is a public meeting 
would rightly be regarded as tyrannical.'
In addition, Lord Denning MR, in the appeal of this case, at 178, agreed with the comments of 
the Court of Common Council of London after the 'Peterloo Massacre' in recognising 
'"the undoubted right of Englishmen to assemble together for the purpose of deliberating 
upon public grievances.” Such is the right of assembly. So also is the right to meet together, to 
go in procession, to demonstrate and to protest on matters of public concern.'
11 See Roskill and Cumming-Bruce LJJ in Verrall v Great Yarmouth B.C. [1981] 1 Q.B. 202 and 
Otton J in Hirst v CC of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr.App.Rep. 143.
12 For example, A.L. Goodhart, 'Public Meetings and Processions' 6 C.L.J. [1937] 161,169;
'As A, B and C have each separately the right to pass and repass on the highway, there is 
nothing illegal in their doing so in concert, unless their procession is illegal on some other 
ground.',
(Footnote continues on next page)
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The other assertions as to the status of the liberties in England appear to be 
based upon claims that they have a non-legal status but nevertheless are 
recognised by the legal system. More precisely, it is somtimes stated that they 
are not derived from the traditional sources of law (statute, common law or 
the constitution) but instead are merely political values, which, on occasion, 
the legal system responds to. Therefore, Thorton asserts that the very 
imposition of conditions on assemblies in the Public Order Act 1986 (POA) 
(infra.) is an acknowledgement of these rights in general terms.13 Similarly, 
Williams points to the police refusal to ban a National Front march in 
Lewisham, South London as reflecting concern about upholding the liberty to 
assemble.14 According to this point of view the liberty to assemble is invisible 
from a legal perspective but exerts some kind of gravitational effect, so to 
speak, on the legal system. A final illustration of this view again comes from 
Williams, this time quoting from the Government's 1985 White Paper;
rights of peaceful protest and assembly are amongst our fundamental freedoms: they are 
numbered among the touchstones which distinguish a free society from a totalitarian one.1^
Whether it is accepted that these rights have either a common law or statutory 
existence, it must be recalled that by reason of the UK's obligations under the 
European Convention, the liberty to assemble must not be infringed. It 
follows that in the face of violation it must be protected and that in turn it 
must have some kind of legal status. However, the Convention does not state 
what this should be, therefore the uncertainty of English law remains 
unresolved.16
and see generally, chap.VIl, infra.
13 P. Thornton, ’Public Order Law’ (1986), 151;
There is no statutory right of assembly either in the Public Order Act 1986 or elsewhere. Nor 
does the common law specifically recognise the right of assembly (or free speech). 
Nevertheless, the existence of the right of public assembly has been recognised by judicial 
decision, extra judicial opinion, and art.ll of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Furthermore, the creation for the first time of statutory controls on public assemblies suggests 
that their legality is not in doubt, subject to the fulfilment of the specified consideration.’
14 D.G.T. Williams, ’The Law and Public Protest’ in ’The Accountability of the Police: Two 
Studies' (1978), 36.
15 D.G.T. Williams, 'Processions. Assemblies and the Freedom of the Individual’ [1987] 
Crim.L.R. 167 quoting from the Government's 'Review of Public Order Law'. Cmnd. 9510 
(1985) at para. 1.7.
16 See arts.13,17 & 18 of the Convention.
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COM PARIN G FRANCE AND ENGLAND
In contrast to England, France gives a more certain legal status to the liberties 
under study and it is consequently to be prefered, since this reflects the social 
value of the liberty. Thus, the liberty to meet is clearly given a legislative 
status by virtue of the 1881 Act and arts. 431-1 & 2 of the new penal code.17 
This is further supported by cases such as Benjamin which mention that the 
liberty is based upon the 1881 Act18 and statutory protection accords a high 
status to human rights in French law.19 This more certain position results in 
an unanimous acceptance of its existence by the legal commentators.20 Even 
the liberty to process, which has a lower status than the liberty to meet,21 
enjoys more certainty as to its legal existence than its English counterpart. Its 
position has been seen to have been greatly strengthened recently by its 
inclusion in art. 431-1 of the new penal code.22 Nevertheless, despite this 
statutory mention, it lacks the type of bold declaration that is found in art.l of 
the 1881 Act as regards the liberty to meet.23 Only time will tell whether legal 
commentators will cease referring to the liberty to process as a mere tolerance 
on the part of the authorities24 and whether they will view the new penal 
provision as a signal that the liberty should now be considered to be a 
pedigree liberty. If this were to occur the liberty to process would have the 
same legal status as the liberty to meet.
The relatively weaker position of the liberty to process in France vis a vis the 
liberty to meet is in large part due to the different contexts surrounding the 
legal regulation of the two liberties. Thus, whereas the 1881 Act was passed in 
the relative calm of the early years of the Third Republic, during a period in 
which meetings were no longer viewed as a serious public order problem, the
1935 decree-law, was issued as a response to one of the most violent periods 
that the Third Republic was to ever see. Similarties between this historical 
context and that surrounding the passing of the Public Order Act 1936 are 
clear. This statute was passed in response to the public disorder concerning
17 Chap.IV, section III and see chap.VIII, section II, below.
18 Chap.IV, section III.
19 Chap.Il, section II.
20 Chap.IV, section I.
21 Chap.V, section III
22 Chap.V, section III.
23 'Les réunions publiques sont libres.'; see Chap.IV., section III.
24 Chap.V, sections II & OI.
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Fascist and anti-Fascist groups, especially in the East of London. It was also a 
measure that was rushed through Parliament and in a different way the 
decree-law also avoided parliamentary scrutiny.25 The results are measures 
that have public order and not civil liberty as their primary concern. In 
France, this historical legacy has been improved by later enactments but this 
legacy falls more heavily on the liberty to process. In England, on the 
contrary, it is both types of assembly rights that are affected and in the next 
chapters it will be seen that the advent of the Public Order Act 1986, continues 
this emphasis on public order.
A further point can be made as regards the traditional position of the liberty 
to process in France which can be contrasted with its position in England. The 
liberty may enjoy a more certain legal position in France but in comparison to 
England it enjoys a weaker position as regards the public highway. This point 
will be developed at greater length in Chapter VII below but here it suffices to 
note that the reason for the difference in France is because of differences in 
statutory status; in other words, because of different positions in the 
hierarchy of human rights. In France human rights have been seen to be 
traditionally protected by statute26 and up until recently (i.e. the enactment of 
art.431-1) a statutory status has been lacking for the liberty to process.
When these reasons for the difference in treatment are compared with those 
in England, it will be seen that there they are based upon the priority given to 
the common law rights of passage.27 Thus, in England there is a difference 
between the liberty to process on the public highway, which has a common 
law existence and the liberty to meet which traditionally lacks a legal 
existence even at this level. More importantly, this reasoning does not seem to 
advert, to a theory as to how human rights should be protected. There is a 
lack of a legal principle, as in France (i.e. the principle of statutory prorection), 
that decides if human rights have a legal status, instead the best that the 
liberties can hope for in England is to be declared to be part of the rights of 
passage at common law. Even if such an existence were obtained, it is 
seriously doubted that the liberties would then be accorded the status of
25 See generally, Supperstone, op. cit., 50, Williams (1967), op. dt., 21-4,57 & 216-19 and Kidd, 
op. at., 68-75.
26 Chap.il, section II,
27 See chap.Vll, infra..
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human rights.28 This would seem to have been the fate of the liberty to 
process. As a consequence, arguments that assert its compatibility with the 
rights of passage on the public highway have not advanced the arguments 
that it is a human right within the English legal system. The importance of the 
liberty comes from a strictly non-human rights perspective.29 It follows that in 
order to accord a legal status to the liberties to meet and process, England 
needs a politico-legal principle which can admit human rights into the legal 
system; a means by which their value can be legally recognised.
What should this principle be? A look at France has shown that legal status 
can be achieved via statute. This challenges the dominant view that 
constitutional enactments are the best way of introducing human rights into 
the English legal system.30 French law at least provides that statute is the 
means by which human rights fully enter into the legal system. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that given firstly, the traditional hostility to higher law, 
secondly, the fears as to the competence of the judiciary to interpret broad 
constitutional texts and thirdly, the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty,31 
statutory enactments are particularly suited to the English legal system.32
Therefore, a detailed statute containing the liberties could be altered by a later 
statute, thereby not challenging parliamentary sovereignty. Statutes also 
allow for detail (in the forthcoming chapters the extent of the detail required
28 The common law rights of passage are not generally seen to be human rights. However, an 
exception, but without further justification, is the statement by J.S. Hall, The Right of 
Passage' in J.W. Bridge, D. Lasok, D.L. Perrott & R.O. Plender, 'Fundamental Rights' (1973) 
124;
The right to walk and ride is of immemorial antiquity and was essential for the economic and 
social life of the community. With changes in the function and use of property and the advent 
of mechanised transport footpaths and bridleways survive as one of the "fundamental 
rights"...'.
29 Thus the compatibility of the liberty to process with the common law rights of passage has 
been used rather defensively in order to assert that they are not illegal activities on the public 
highway, which results in the liberty being treated as a negative liberty; see for example, 
Goodhart, op. cit., 169.
30 As presented, for example, by Charter 88, op. cit., and from an academic perspective, see 
Stevens & Yardley, op. cit., 182, Robertson, op. cit., 387 et. seq., and chap.ll, section I.
31 See Chap.X, supra.
32 Moves in this direction may be evinced by s.43 of the Education (No.2) Act 1986 which lays 
down freedom of speech in universities and other higher education establishments (c.f. R. v 
University of Liverpool, ex. p. Caesar -Gordon [1990] 3 All E.R. 821) and the Labour Party has 
proposed to enact six statutes in order to guarantee certain freedoms rather than a Bill of 
Rights, see The Charter of Rights: Guaranteeing Individual Liberty in a Free Society', Labour 
Party Document (1990).
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will be revealed), which the constitutional form seems less suited to. 
Moreover, the judiciary would have before them the kind of text which they 
are supposedly more competent to interpret.33 Finally, the jurisprudential 
point can be made that statutes constitute a practical implementation of one 
of the theoretical insights that have been reused in this thesis. Given that 
human rights are viewed as contingent and socially constructed values,34 the 
best way to reflect this theoretical nature in the practice of human rights law is 
therefore claimed to be via the instrument of statute, which can be more easily 
altered to reflect changes in social values than can constitutional 
enactments.35 This has been shown to be the very course that France has 
adopted as regards the liberty to meet and to a lesser extent for the liberty to 
process. In addition, this theoretically attractive legal method of protection 
has been revealed by applying comparative theory to civil liberties.
The above suggestions can be illustrated by a concrete example. If the case of 
Hubbard v Pitt is recalled it will be remembered that some of the judges, 
notably Lord Denning and Forbes J asserted that the right to assemble was 
involved in this case.36 However, these assertions seem to lack any legal 
foundation and since the appellants were not mobile it does not seem possible 
to place their activities within the common law right to pass and re-pass on 
the public highway.
How would the enactment of a statute that, for example stated, along the lines 
of art.l of the 1881 Act in France, that 'the liberty to assemble on the public 
highway is free from legal restriction, except on the following grounds...' 
improve matters? Or in the alternative, a statute that asserted a prohibition 
against interference with this liberty before going on to detail the grounds of 
any limitations on the liberty? If such a statute had been available, the 
appellants and those judges in favour of the liberty in the instant case would 
have been able to argue that the liberty had a legal existence - that it had a 
legal weight to be counterbalanced against other legal considerations. They 
would also have been able to present the liberty as being independent from the 
right to pass and re-pass which would have meant that the stationary
33 See Zander, op. cit., 57-64 and Lord McCluskey, op. cit., 31-40.
34 Chap.I, sections II & III.
35 For a recent criticism of the rigidity of constitutional enactments, see Waldron, (1993), op. 
cit. 18.
36 See note 10 supra.
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assembly in the case would not have needed to be justified from the relatively 
weak position of presumed illegality.
Moreover, the judges would have been made aware that the case involved a 
valued activity that is valued by the wider political community. This would 
have been evinced by an instrument from the parliamentary representatives 
of this community that guaranteed the right; in other words, statute. These 
differences may not have altered the actual result of the case but it would 
have considerably changed the nature of the reasoning used and significantly 
redressed the imbalance against the liberty to assemble.
Having compared attempts to accord a legal existence to the liberties under 
study, mention should be made of the fact that unlike France there has been 
no concerted attempt in England to argue for the constitutional status of these 
rights. It will be recalled that in France this was mainly sought by asserting 
that the liberties were protected by art.ll of the 1789 Declaration: the right to 
the free communication of thoughts and opinions.37 However, a review of 
the case-law regarding the liberties to meet and to process shows that both 
the administrative and ordinary courts invariably do not make reference to 
the 1789 Declaration. In addition, it would seem that the result of the Cc's 
case-law is that statutory protection is of greater importance, since it is by 
reason of this level of legal status that it considers a human right to have been 
legally constituted, that is to say that it is within the legal system.38 This view 
would also appear to be supported by the commentators when they assert a 
hierarchy between legally defined liberties at the top and simple tolerances or 
undefined liberties of a lesser value.39 This development may be seen as yet 
further evidence and support for the importance of statutes in the protection 
of human rights.
There is one last fundamental difference in the status and value accorded to 
the liberty to assemble in France and England that results from a different 
conception of public order in the two legal systems and which also concerns 
its status vis a vis public order. Public order presents a value that is most 
commonly the reason for the restriction of the liberty. As such it can be seen
37 Chap.IV, section I and chap.V, sectionl.
38 And is thus a PFRLR; see chap.II, section U.
39 Chap.II, section II.
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as a counterveiling value.40 This in turn means that a major element in the 
context of the liberties to meet and protest is that of violence; in that the 
liberty can only be legitimately exercised if it is peaceful and does not result 
in public disorder. Public order thus constitutes one of the most important 
limits on the exercise of the liberty to assemble. Furthermore, it is seen in both 
England and France as a non-human right consideration; a collective interest. 
Therefore, the community is seen as having an 'interest' in keeping the peace 
and maintaining public order but is not commonly said to have a right to 
public order. It should be underlined that it would be possible for the public 
peace to be formulated in human rights terms but this is not commonly the 
construction in either England or France. Thus, in both jurisdictions public 
order forms a contextual limit on the liberties. This is referred to in England in 
the language of 'balance' and in France as a 'conciliation' between the human 
rights and this collective or social interest. The terminology is at first sight 
strikingly similar, however the difference that should be noted is that in 
France public order seems to be more expansive and therefore less 
antagonistic to civil liberties than in England.
As has been seen, Beniamin presents a classic example of the French notion of 
public order and the consequent conciliation of the liberty to meet with the 
needs of public order.41 This view would seem to be close to the English 
notion of balance. However, Ktisaki has pointed out that the courts view 
public order as a wider notion in which public peace and the exercise of civil 
liberties are in an antagonistic but complementary relation. It is the 
conciliation of these elements that results in public order.42 It therefore 
follows that the undue restriction of liberty violates public order because this 
notion makes no sense unless it serves to guarantee a minimum level of peace 
such that citizens can exercise their rights. On the other hand, the extension of 
the uninterfered exercise of civil liberties to such an extent that citizens are 
threatened by violence also violates public order because the notion also 
encompasses the peaceful exercise of civil liberties on the part of all, which 
violence prevents. Civil liberty and public peace may be antagonistic but 
according to the French conception of public order they each provide the 
'raison d'être' of the other.
40 Chap.111, section III.
41 Ch*p.IV, section ID.
42 Chap.IV, section III.
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By contrast, English law does not have this broader view; therefore public 
order is presented, without more, as a collective interest in peace that is 
usually antagonistic to human rights.43 Although, the two must be balanced 
against each other and a compromise sought in which there is give and take 
on both sides, public order is a narrower notion which is put on one side of 
the equation against civil liberty on the other.
What is the relevance of this difference? The response is that the liberty to 
assemble is consequently accorded a different status and value in the two 
legal systems. Firstly, those in a position to limit the liberties may, under the 
French formulation, feel directed to be especially careful of limiting the 
liberties them on the basis of public disorder and also they might feel the 
need to provide stronger justifications before doing so. They are directed to 
see public order as serving civil liberty; as securing the conditions by which it 
can be exercised. In order to restrict the liberties they would then have to 
show that in doing so they were in effect trying to securing these conditions.
Secondly, if the liberty to assemble is restricted, it will be clear that a 
controversial choice has been made: a human right that represents a socially 
valued activity has been limited by a social concern to prevent violence. The 
choice is stark and explicit but equally controversial; it may be disagreed with 
but it must as a consequence be justified and the grounds upon which it is 
based can be reviewed to check that the appropriate reasoning has been 
undertaken. Therefore, the more rigorously formulated French doctrine 
makes this contested choice explicit and its more exspansive terms are
43 For example, A.T.H. Smith, 'Offences Against Public Order including the Public Order Act 
1986' (1987), 9 states
'..the task for the law... is not so much the striking of a single balance or compromise, but of 
establishing a framework of checks and balances within which the competing interests are 
legally accommodated.', 
and Bevan, op. cit., 164;
There is a need for a shift of emphasis in the balancing process so that the interests of public 
safety and good order should prevail only where they are threatened by disturbance and 
disorder of a serious and not merely inconveniencing and annoying nature.'
Finally, Williams (1967) op. cit., 9 asserts;
The law of public order in this country is a compromise. It seeks to balance the competing 
demands of freedom of speech and assembly on the one hand and the preservation of the 
Queen's Peace on the other. A satisfactory balance has rarely been attained...'.
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claimed to be more capable of directing decision-makers to uphold liberty as 
in itself giving effect to public order.
These two claims may be illustrated by a comparison of Beniamin with the 
English case of Duncan v lones. 44 If the former is translated into English 
terms, it can be seen to have called for a balancing of the liberty to meet 
against public order. However, the decision in Beniamin, while accepting that 
public order was a relevant consideration, went on to emphasize that public 
order had to be reconciled with 'respect' for the liberty to meet. It follows that 
the court's judgement can be seen as a conciliation of these two values, 
respect for which constitutes public order. This view has only been hinted at 
in England, most notably by Lord Scarman;
Amongst our fundamental human rights there are, without doubt, the rights of peaceful 
assembly and public protest and the right to public order and tranquility. Civilised living 
collapses - it is obvious - if public protest becomes violent protest or public order degenerates 
into the quietism imposed by successful oppression. But the problem is more complex than a 
choice between two extremes - one, a right to protest whenever and wherever you will and 
the other, a right to continuous calm upon our streets unruffled by the noise and obstructive 
pressure of the protesting procession. A balance has to be struck a compromise found that will 
accommodate the exercise of the right to protest within a framework of public order which enables 
ordinary citizens, who are not protesting, to go about their business and pleasure without 
obstruction of inconvenience.4^
The last sentence of this statement adumbrates the French notion of public 
order by which those engaged and not engaged in exercising their rights to 
assemble have their rights considered as part of the effort to maintain public 
order. Consequently, public order is more than merely the prevention of 
violence: it is the totality of interests that must be balanced against each other. 
Benjamin showed firstly, that claims to restrict liberty on the grounds of 
violence will not be accepted without more and secondly, will be narrowly 
construed. The result is that the liberty to assembly is valued even when 
exercising public order considerations because it is a component of public 
order. A conciliation must be carried out with the recognition that one value 
only makes sense with the interplay of the others and that no one value can 
always trump but that strong arguments are required for certain values, such 
as the liberty to assemble to be overridden. The result is uncertainty and
44 (1936] 1K.B. 218.
45 The Red Lion Square Disorders of 15 lune 1974: Report of Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord 
Scarmen’. Cm nd5919,1975, para.5.
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controversiality but then this is claimed to be the ’stuff of rights and should 
therefore be made clear. It is clearly the case in the French regulation of the 
liberty.
Duncan v lones provides a striking contrast in which one of the judges refers 
to the circumstances as presenting a 'plain case'46 and any hint that the 
Divisional court was here engaged in balancing public order against the 
liberty to meet is forcefully denied by the rejection of the view that the case 
involved 'what is called the right to public meeting.'47 The court went even 
further by asserting that beyond the facts of the instant case, English law itself 
does not recognise 'any special right of public meeting for political or other 
purposes.'48 Having thus firmly shut the door on any balancing or recognition 
of the existence of human rights, the court then asserted the needs of public 
order. The judges were then satisfied that at the material time the police were 
doing their duty;49 preserving the peace - without paying attention to the 
existence of other values in the case. What is the result? Public order means 
obeying the police because they are
the arbiters of what political or religious sects shall and shall not be accorded the rights of 
freedom of speech and assembly/50
In consequence, there is a risk that public order becomes the 'quietism' feared 
by Lord Scarmen. It will be seen below that this case and its conception of a 
near absolute public order value, combined with its narrowness has allowed 
the courts to effectively restrict the liberties to assemble whilst claiming that 
they are not even involved.51 More fundamentally and to close the discussion 
of the status of the liberty to assemble, despite a similar surface rhetoric in the 
two countries, the French notion of public order accords a greater value than 
does the English notion. The French notion is more sympathetic to civil 
liberty than is that of England and thus it is preferred.
46 op. cit., 223, per Humphrey J.
47 op. cit., 222, per Lord Hewart CJ.
48 op. cit., 222, per Lord Hewart CJ.
49 op. cit., 223, per Singleton J.
50 Kidd, op at., 24.
51 An example is Moss v McLachlan. see chap.VIIl, infra.
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HIGHER STANDARDS: US AND ECHR
France therefore accords a more certain legal status to the liberty to assemble 
than does England and given the theoretical preference for reflecting the 
social value of the liberty, French law is considered to be better. French law 
also compares well with the legal status accorded in the US and the ECHR. It 
will be recalled that in the US the right to peaceably assemble is included as 
one of the rights in the First Amendement of the Constitution, whereas art. 11 
of the ECHR mentions the right to peaceful assembly.52 French law clearly 
accords the liberty a legal status but one that is inferior to that of the United 
States, where a constitutional status is granted. However, a constitutional 
status which fixed rights to the degree of that in the US would infringe the 
contingent and political conception of human rights that is supported by the 
theory in this work. As a result, the French status is to be prefered to that of 
the US. As far as the ECHR, similar remarks pertain. Thus, French law, like 
the ECHR provides a formal recognition of the liberty but the status of art.ll 
as overriding member state laws would mean that it has a higher status than 
statute. The ECHR is therefore imcompatible here with the theoretical view of 
civil liberties.
SECTION III 
STRUCTURE: THE LIBERTIES TO ASSEMBLE
So much for the legal status of the liberties to assemble in France and 
England. Another issue will now be looked at: that of the structure of the 
liberty in question. In the discussion above as to the legal status of the right to 
assemble, it has been assumed that its structure is settled but it will be 
recalled that questions were raised in chapter III: as to whether it is a single, 
unified right, what are its distinguishing characteristics, what values among 
the many illustrated above does it function to serve and what are the range of 
activities that it protects etc. These questions will be looked at in this chapter.
The questions can be broken down into the following (1) does the liberty to 
assemble represent a single, unified liberty or does it represent a series of 
distinct liberties, including most centrally the liberty to process and the liberty
S2 See Chap.lII, section I.
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to meet? (2) has the liberty been constructed as an independent liberty, distinct 
from other liberties, more specifically freedom of speech? (3) what valued 
function does the liberty perform - it was seen that a number of possibilities 
exist, among these are democracy, protest, safety-valve and expression 
functions or combinations thereof. Questions (1) and (2) concern content, 
whereas question (3) is directed to function. These will be analysed in turn.
FRANCE AND ENGLAND COM PARED
Content
(a) a single liberty or a plurality of liberties?
This is a question whose response suffers from the tendency of not adverting 
to theory in English human rights law. The result is that while some 
commentators, such as Supperstone, speak of the freedom of assembly and 
claim that this
may be taken to include public meetings, processions, and other types of assembly in the 
broadest sense of the word.53
which would seem to indicate a single liberty but one that encompasses 
several activities, the question left unanswered as to what unites or justifies 
the presence of these different liberties within this category? Without a 
theoretical inquiry this question cannot be answered.
Similarly, Goodhart asserts that the law regulating meetings and processions 
is different but that they have often been confused. He therefore advocates 
studying the two separately.54 This is also the method adopted by Bevan.55 
Once again a lack of a theoretical basis becomes evident. The justification for 
treating activities separately is merely presented as a given - simply that the
53 op. cit., 25, n.l. The author expands upon the notion of assembly at pg.31 by contrasting its 
breadth with the narrower notion of meeting which he claims belongs within it;
'...the term "meeting" connotes prior or contemporaneous organisation, with an order of 
business however informal and the transaction of business including delivery of speeches 
and the passing of resolutions. The concept of assembly is probably wider and includes any 
coming together of persons. Thus it includes processions, political vigils, prayer meetings, 
demonstrations, a group at a cenotaph ceremony, sandwich-board men walking in a line, and 
a cycling club en route. An assembly is complete, as it were, by collection or aggregation: no 
form or object in coming together is required.'
54 op. at., 161-2.
55 op. at., 167.
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law treats them separately. There is no further inquiry as to the justification 
for this distinction.
On the one hand, these remarks can be viewed as claims to the existence of 
two distinct liberties. However, on the other hand, as noted above, on the 
occasions when the judiciary have made reference to the liberty, their remarks 
indicate a single liberty.56 On other occasions, the terminology becomes even 
more confusing with talk of liberties to protest and demonstrate.57 
Furthermore, the word 'assembly' is often restricted to meaning stationary 
gatherings, as in s. 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (infra.). This looseness of 
meaning can also be seen if reference is made to the remarks of Lord. Elwyn- 
Jones in the House of Lords debate on the 1986 Act, in which he refers to
the right to freedom of speech and lawful protest, the right of public assembly and of 
procession, all the hallmarks of a democratic society^
Again no reference is made to what justifies these distinct rights and the 
characteristics that distinguish them from each other. It would therefore 
appear that there is no agreement in England as to the structure of the liberty.
How is this position compared with that in France? Although the response 
there is by no means uniform, or certain, it is suggested that French law 
generally displays a pluralistic view; in that the liberty to assemble is seen as 
a broad category that contains other liberties, most prominently the liberties 
to process and to meet. This view is evidenced by the following points.
Firstly, it has been noted that French theorists on civil liberties invariably treat 
the liberty to meet and the liberty to process as two separate aspects within a 
broader category of the freedom of expression59 and indeed Costa was seen 
to have gone even further by treating the two as separate liberties within a 
wider category of group liberties.60 Secondly, the distinction that is made 
between the two activities has a long pedigree, for example, it can be seen in
56 See for example, note 10, supra., where Forbes J and Lord Denning speak about a right, as 
opposed to rights to assemble.
57 Alderson, op. cit., 29 and Robertson, op. at., 66 et. seq.
58 H.L. Deb., Vol. 481 col. 749, Oct. 29th 1986.
59 See chaps.IV, section I and V, section I.
60 See chaps.IV, section I and V, section I.
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the studies of Baffrey, Le Clere and Mousset in the 1930's.61 Tercinet has also 
noted that the liberty to process was mentioned separately from the liberty to 
meet in government debates.62 Furthermore, the difference between the two 
can be supported by the fact that there exist separate laws regulating 
meetings and processions and one can also point to the criticism that resulted 
from the administration's mixing of these laws in the Paganon circular.63
Thirdly, a distinction in practice (i.e. by legal commentators, judges and 
government) is supported in France, unlike England, by theory. Therefore 
attempts have been seen to have been made to isolate the characteristics of 
meetings (momentary, organised, intentional and specific goal)64 and 
processions (demonstration, mobility, expression of a collective will and the 
use of the public highway as a location).65 Cases have dealt with the delicate 
issues of the degree to which these elements need to be present in differing 
factual circumstances. This emphasis on definition must be contrasted with 
the position in England. There, any definitions that exist are either circular (as 
in the definition of a public procession in S.16 of the POA 1986 as being 'a 
procession in a public place.'),66 assume a pre-existing definition (for example, 
'assembly' remains undefined in the definition of a public assembly in S.16 of 
the POA 1986: 'an assembly of 20 or more persons in a public place which is 
wholly or partly open to the air;'), partial, as in Flockhart v Robinson67 
(concerning 'organisation' for the purposes of imposing sanctions on the 
organisers of an illegal procession, infra.) or merely rely on dictionary 
meanings, as per Lord Denning MR in Kent v MPC68 (defining a procession 
via the dictionary definition as 'a proceeding of any body of persons in an 
orderly succession').
There is a lack of overall attention to defining the liberty by focusing on the 
nature of the interests that are claimed to be protected. By way of an 
exception to this tendency, Smith is found isolating certain, specific
61 Respectively, op. cit., 7, op. cit., 5-7 and op. cit., 7.
62 op. cit., 1011.
63 See chaps.IV, section II and V, section II.
64 Chap.IV, section I.
65 Chap.V, section I.
66 See Ward v Holman [1964] 1 Q.B. 580.
67 [1950] 2 K.B. 498.
68 (1981) Times, 15th May.
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characteristics: 'an assembly need not have a common purpose' and doubting 
if moving in a circle could constitute an procession because the term denotes 
moving from one location to another.69 Williams provides yet another 
example with his claim that processions require some element of 
organisation.70 It follows that on the rare occasions that commentators and 
judges in England advert to definitional questions, they do not do so to 
anything like the same extent as their French counterparts. It is by adverting 
to theory that French law is able to make a relatively certain distinction 
between meetings and processions so that in turn two separate but related 
human rights can be identified and regulated.
(b) an independent liberty?
In England, among those that actually identify a category called the liberty to 
assemble, as opposed to 'public order', the majority do not view it as an 
independent liberty. Most commonly it is seen as being an aspect of the 
freedom of speech.71 However, in France it will be recalled that processions 
are defined as a form of demonstration which entails the expression of a 
collective opinion and the liberty to meet is seen as being an aspect of the 
liberty of expression.72 It appears that in France the liberties enjoy a relative 
independence - they are specifically valued means of expression - very much 
¿dong the lines advocated by Baker, who sees the liberties as protecting 
substantively valued behaviour73 but they are seen as specific and important 
forms of expressive activity. The importance of meetings and processions is 
such that they are often even given a separate mention as from the liberty of 
expression. Evidence to support this claim can be seen in the tendency in the 
case law not to invoke the freedom of expression and the above noted 
existence of legal enactments, including art.431-1 of the new penal code, 
which protects the rights to meet, process and the liberty of expression as 
separate liberties.74 The French construction of the liberties emphasises their 
communicative qualities but does not limit this communication to speech. At
69 Smith, op. cit., 138 & 144.
70 (1967) op. cit., 62-3 and see Supperstone, note 53, supru.
71 For example, Wade, 'The Law of Public Meeting1 [1938] 2 M.L.R. 177, Williams, (1967), op. 
cit., 10, Bevan, op. cit., 163-4 and for the Government's view, see Bonner & Stone, op. cit., 229- 
30.
72 Chaps.IV, section 1 and V, section I.
73 Chap.III, section II.
74 Chaps.IV, section III and V, section III and see infra.
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the same time, the mode of expression that meetings or processions constitute 
is so highly valued as to be considered to be relatively independent of the 
liberty of expression.
From the theoretical perspective of analysing the specific qualities of the 
liberty to assemble, it would appear that the French view should be adopted 
because this provides an account of why the liberties to assemble are 
accorded such high value as to be human rights. It also avoids the earlier 
raised problem of having to distinguish speech from conduct,75 which would 
make the protection of the liberties dependent on this somewhat 
unsatisfactory and problematic distinction. This view also leaves intact the 
possibility that expression then performs the many valued functions claimed 
of free speech (see infra.).
Therefore, the term the liberty of expression is claimed to represent a bundle 
of relatively independent but related liberties.76 As a consequence, the term 
can encompass such a wide range of activities as to be almost meaningless 
and it is only by uncoupling and separating out the particular activities 
contained therein that any sense can be made of the term, such that it can 
have relevance for legal practice. The result is that the liberties to assemble are 
isolated as important components that require specific legal regulation, given 
the specific way in which they provide for expression.
Valued function
This has been one of the least satisfactory areas of comparison. English law 
shows that there is no agreement as to what values the liberties function to 
secure, except that they generally secure expression. However, beyond this, 
views radically diverge as to the value of expression (a value in itself or an 
instrumental value that secures other more fundamental values: protest, 
democracy, a safety valve, truth etc.).77 Strangely, this issue does not appear 
to have been addressed in France. However, it might be said that given the 
already-mentioned claim that elements of the freedom of expression are part 
of the definitions of the liberty, expression is seen as the value of the liberty.
75 Chap.IIl, section II.
76 The freedom to associate, freedom of information, freedom of the press, freedom of speech 
and religious freedoms are among the most obvious examples.
77 Chap.IV, section 1.
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However, if this point is conceded, there is the still the further question as to 
the function of expression, which has been responded to with a diversity of 
opinions.78
Comparison on this issue would therefore have to conclude that a plurality of 
expression functions is the function of the liberty. Thus meetings and 
processions can be the means to express protest, provide a safety valve for 
pent-up frustrations and anger, aid the democratic process or the self­
achievement of participants and organisers, or combinations thereof, as well 
as other traditionally claimed functions of the freedom of expression. 
Nevertheless, the jurisprudential criteria insists that these diverse valued 
functions should all serve the value of social and political change. They 
should allow members of the community to challenge dominant views and to 
change accepted values.
Although the liberty to assemble is in turn generally seen as part of the right 
to free speech in England, in France there has been noted to be an implicit 
recognition that the liberty, if not completely independent, is relatively 
independent. This means that while it is seen to be a part of the liberty of 
expression, it is seen to be an aspect that merits being regulated and 
mentioned independently. The French view can therefore more easily 
accommodate the above-formulated view of the liberty. Thus, like the view 
favoured by theory, the French law recognises that the liberty performs 
expressive functions that go beyond merely speech but at the same time 
justify an independent mention and regulation as apart from expression.
These comparative conclusions as to the content and function of the liberty 
now provide the basis for the resolution of some questions that were earlier 
raised as to the structure of the liberty to assemble.
ANSW ERING LONG POSED QUESTIONS
From the time that the point was raised in chapter III, this study has 
attempted not to foreclose and prejudge the question of whether there is a 
single liberty to assemble or rather liberties to assemble. To this effect, terms 
have been used interchangeably. However, now that a comparison has been
78 Chap.III, section II.
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undertaken between England and France, a choice can be made but this will 
be an informed choice; informed by the jurisprudential theory of human 
rights that has been applied throughout this work. The choice is therefore a 
normative one: what ought to be the structure of the liberty under study, 
given the jurisprudential view of civil liberties adopted here. Comparison is 
therefore only half the story; it provides options from among which a choice 
can be made but it does not necessarily indicate that the best conception of the 
liberties is to be found in either France or England because there must also be 
evaluation.
Henceforth, the terms the liberties/rights to meet and process or, in the 
alternative, the liberties/rights to assemble shall be employed. This reflects the 
view that it is better to have a series of distinct but related rights. In this way 
the liberties can be more meaningfully treated as legal categories and legal 
regulation can take account of their specific needs. This is not to deny that 
they are related, indeed they are both viewed as forms of assembly. However, 
to insist upon a single liberty to assemble would be to the deny the 
differences between meetings and processions that have been revealed and 
will be further seen in the next chapter. The term 'assembly' may then be 
employed as a general label, much like Costa’s 'group liberties'79 in order to 
designate a series of more precise human rights to which the liberties to meet 
and process belong.
Such a choice encourages a closer investigation into the particular problems, 
content and functions of the two valued activities. As such, it is an application 
of the jurisprudential theory that emphasises the specific, displays a 
preference for 'local narrative' and for breaking down broad and general 
categories in order to investigate particular needs that may arise when 
previously hidden differences are revealed.80 The tendency in studying civil 
liberties in England to treat them as a homogenous category that is 
susceptible to the same problems and resolutions has been shown to distort 
the way that human rights are actually constructed as social values and 
obscures what these values are held to be. In short, the fact that at an abstract 
level these values serve the same or similar purposes has been allowed to 
obscure particularity and distinctness on a practical level.
79 Chaps.IV, section 1 and V, section I.
80 Chap.I, sections II & III.
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Apart form being jurisprudentiaUy justified, this preference for the pluralistic 
view is also peculiarly compatible with another practical measure that is 
generated by theory: that human rights can be better protected by detailed 
statutory enactments. Thus, attention has been turned away from the US, 
where English theorists have traditionally firmly placed it,81 to France with its 
tradition of statutory protection.82 In addition, a broad legal category such as 
that provided by art.11 of the ECHR in which, inter alia, a right to assemble is 
protected does not allow for a concentration on the specific and particular 
activities that this includes, for this reason it is jurisprudentially 
objectionable.83
Furthermore, the formulation in the ECHR is rejected on practical grounds 
because it does not provide the same detailed framework and directions to 
citizens and state officials as can be provided in a statute and as has been 
done for the liberty to meet in France. These practical disadvantages will be 
continually encountered in the next chapters, however, here it can be briefly 
noted that in the US the judiciary has had to fill in the gaps that have been left 
by the broadly worded First Amendment, which, inter alia protects the 'right 
of the people to peacefully assemble'.84 It will be seen that the differing 
factual circumstances of cases make detailed adjudication and decisions 
concerning assembly rights unavoidable. Statutory enactments show the 
judges enmeshed in detail and compromise, whereas in the US judges can 
conceal the exact same types of decisions behind a broad and fixed 
constitutional enactment. The result is that change has to be camouflaged as 
giving effect to what is pre-existing in the Constitution. Human rights have 
been shown in this study to be centrally about values but these are values that 
change in response to social changes. This fact is brought to the surface more 
easily by statutory enactments that are subject to repeal and amendment. In 
turn, this form of protection is better suited to specific, more precise liberties.
81 Chap.II, section I.
82 Chap.II, section II.
83 Art. 11 covers the freedom of assembly and association. Leaving aside the breadth of 
activities encompassed within the latter freedom, the simple reference to the liberty to 
assemble is contended to be too broad and general to allow for the kind of detailed protection 
that is argued for here. However, it will be seen that in certain respects the detail has been 
provided by the case-law under this article.
84 For a criticism of such generality, see Waldron, (1993), op. di.
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Opting for a pluralistic view of the liberties, based on jurisprudential analysis 
also justifies a second choice that has to be made as to whether or not the 
liberties to meet and process are independent liberties. It has been seen that 
this issue has by no means any clear cut response in either England or France 
but after comparing the two it was suggested that there are grounds for 
believing that in France there is a stronger tendency to favour the 
independent view. Once again, from the jurisprudential perspective of an 
interest in difference and the particular, this view is to be preferred. However, 
this degree of independence is limited by a view, as shown in the two 
jurisdictions, that meetings and processions are different forms of expression 
and this common function tends to deny or obscure the differences between 
the activities.85
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the liberties are or simply constitute 
freedom of speech. Unique and valued activities are involved when assembly 
rights are exercised, if this were not the case, it could be asked why the 
message of a march is simply not broadcast or published, instead of people 
going to the effort of marching? The response is that the way of 
communicating the message, via a collection of persons, changes the 
message.86 Moreover, it has been noted that both historically and in 
contemporary times meetings and processions have often proven to be the 
means by which citizens have chosen to convey their views87 and if, as was 
noted in chapter I, human rights are still to be available as a means of 
achieving social and political change,88 then channelling communication 
through unconventional and unsupervised channels may have more effect 
than doing so through established channels, such as the media.
85 This is also the view in the US, see T. Scanlon, 'A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ 1 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1971-72,204, especially, 206.
86 See Baker's theory in chap.IIl, section I and Murdoch, op. at., 173,174;
It might be thought that freedom of protest is simply one aspect of the more general right of 
freedom of speech. Restraints on protest may be applied as a form of "pre-publication” 
censorship, or as "post-publication” penalties enforced by the courts. But protest involves the 
communication of ideas, not their formulation or validity. This aspect of human rights is about 
the means of persuasion or airing grievances, and public protest is seen as a distinct human 
right worthy of individual treatment.’
87 Chap.m, section 1 and cf. JL Murdoch, op. cit. 173 and J. Aldenon, op. cit., 29.
88 Chap.l, section III.
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For these reasons the view that the liberties to assemble are merely 
expression plus'89 is rejected in favour of seeing them as belonging to an 
extremely wide category of rights that involve communication but which 
because of their diverse means of communication justify an independent 
existence.
Two questions as to the structure of the liberties to assemble have been 
answered using the comparative method and jurisprudence. The responses 
may be diagrammatically presented as follows
FIGURE A
Three levels of abstraction, (A), (B) and (C) can be seen. At the highest level 
(A) is found the liberty of expression. It is an abstract and broad category 
which encompasses a series of different human rights, these are of a less 
abstract nature but are still very broad. They are located at level (B), and
89 This is a modification of the phrase 'speech-plus' which was used in Cox v Louisiana. 379 
U.S. 536 (1965) at 555.
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among which the liberties to assemble are to be found. Other liberties at this 
level would include for example, press freedom, free speech and the freedom 
of association. What this study urges is for yet further specificity in order to 
better protect civil liberty. The result is a third level (C) where the liberties to 
meet and process are located. These have been claimed to be central aspects of 
the liberties to assemble found at level (B). Thus, this study has investigated 
the regulation of certain aspects of this broad category. However, other 
activities, such as occupations, sit-ins and pickets are also located at level (C). 
Clearly, the move from level (A) to (C) is an exercise in analysing civil 
liberties with increasing specificity.
HIGHER STANDARDS: US AND ECHR
The preference for a differentiation between the liberty to meet and the liberty 
to process, as well as the pluralistic view of the liberties to assemble is not 
how these rights are mentioned in the US and ECHR systems. Thus they 
cannot be used as higher standards of comparison. The jurisprudential view 
of this work justifies the preferences that have been expressed but it is 
conceded, as already noted that an alternative theoretical perspective would 
justify an alternative construction of the liberties. Therefore, all that is 




COMPARING REGULATION OF THE LIBERTIES: BEFORE 
MEETINGS AND PROCESSIONS
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of regulations before meetings and processions begins with the 
regulation of location in section I. This will be seen to be regulated by a 
complex battery of laws. Before an assembly takes place the authorities may 
ban it or impose conditions upon it. Banning powers are thus investigated in 
section II and section III examines conditions. It will be recalled that the 
general structure of the analysis is set out in the previous chapter in Table II 
and the main features of the comparisons made with US and ECHR law are 
set out in Table III.
SECTION I 
THE LOCATION OF ASSEM BLIES
The analysis of location will first look at liberty to meet and then the liberty to 
process because in English law they are subject to different legal regulation.
THE LIBERTY TO MEET
In England the liberty to meet can be widely regulated as concerns its 
location. Bylaws, statutes and the common law can all be applied to prohibit 
meetings held in certain areas. At the same time, the location of a meeting 
may be crucial to the organisers, in terms of publicity and effectiveness. Who 
makes these decisions and on what grounds are they based? These issues will 
be looked at here.
It will be also be seen to what extent the authorities do and should provide 
locations and premises for meetings and whether citizens should be granted a 
right of access to certain premises in order to hold meetings. These two 
related questions have come to be known as 'public forum' regulation.
Finally, English regulation in this area is identified as being strongly 
conditioned by a property conception. The result of this conception is that 
government authorities are treated as owners of private property whose
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rights are not to be interfered with by the exercise of the liberty to meet. In 
comparison, such a view is not present in France. This fact is linked to a 
conception of the public domain which is claimed to be in turn linked to the 
French theory of public law. French law then compares well, using the US 
case law as a comparative criterion. It is shown that in both these jurisdictions 
the discretion that is left to government authorities is more narrowly drawn 
and subject to more extensive judicial review than is the case in England.
The positions in England
Those that seek to exercise the liberty to meet and thereby organise a meeting 
in England must do so in the area of legality that remains after statute and 
common law.1 Choosing a location can as a result be problematic. The body 
of laws concerning location has been treated at great length elsewhere,2 
therefore instead of repeating these restrictions in detail here, they shall be 
presented more briefly as part of the comparison with those in France.
It must be first noted that a meeting that takes place on the public highway in 
England can immediately constitute a rivil wrong because it is a trespass. This 
common law offence is essentially part of the law of property. The public 
highway is invariably owned by the local authority (acting as the highway 
authority) but the public enjoy a common law easement or right of passage. 
Therefore the public is permitted onto the highway in order to pass and 
repass. Consequently, to perform other activities on the highway is to breach 
these terms of entry onto the highway and constitutes a trespass. The local 
authority can then have recourse to civil remedies (declarations and 
injunctions) and also the remedy of self-help: it can attempt to remove the 
trespassers by reasonable force.3 Although the action has never been used in 
a reported case against meetings, it sets the context of restriction that 
characterises regulation.4
1 See Wallington, op. tit., quoted in chap.VI, note 9, supra.
2 For example, Supperstone, 'op. tit., Williams, op. tit., (1967), Sherr, op. tit., (1989), Bailey, et. 
ai, op. tit., (1991), 161-238, Thornton, (1987), op. tit., R. Card, 'Public Order The New Law' 
(1987), Smith, op. tit. and J. Marston ’Public Order: A Guide to the 1986 Public Order Act’ 
(1987).
3 See Goodhart, op. tit., 162-4, Wallington, op. tit., 95-7 and the cases of Hickman v Maisev 
[1900] 1 Q.B. 753 and Had well v Riehton [1907] 2 K.B. 345,348.
4 The fact that there are no reported cases in which the local authority as the owner of the 
public highway have sued for trespass against a meeting is claimed by Wallington, op. tit., 96-
97 not to be surprising, given the technicalities involved in this action.
Smith, op. tit., 5-6, responding to Lord Scarman's view that police conduct and their use of 
police powers in this area is more important than the law, notes;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Other restrictions on meetings on the public highway also exist and again 
although rarely used, are indicative of the regulatory environment. Firstly, 
the Highways Act 1980 S.137(1) makes it a criminal offence to wilfully 
obstruct the free passage of the highway without lawful authority or excuse. 
The offence has been used against static assemblies.5 Essentially, the same 
offence is found in the bylaws and statutes that provide for local regulations 
to be made.6 Secondly, there is the common law offence of public nuisance, 
this is based on an obstruction of the highway caused by its unreasonable 
use.7 It is widely accepted that meetings are not considered to be reasonable
’..the law establishes a framework by which the standards of police conduct are guided and 
shaped, and against which they are measured.'
5 For more information on this statutory offence, see Sherr, op. cit., 134-37, Bailey et. al., op. tit., 
164-8, Smith, op. tit., 198-206 and Supperstone, op. tit., 77-81. The offence has a long pedigree 
as can be seen by its use against public meetings in Homer v Cadman (1886) 16 Cox CC 51 
and Arrowsmith v lenkins [1963] 2 Q.B. 561, respectively under S.72 of the Highways Act 
1835 and S.121(l) of the Highways Act 1959 which both constituted the offence found in the 
current statute.
6 For examples of bylaws, see Supperstone, op. tit., 82. The Town Police Clauses Act 1847, 
S.28 creates an offence of obstructing any public footpath or other public thoroughfare by 
means of objects therein listed, or by 'other means'. (This Act applies to boroughs and urban 
districts outside London but the same provision exists for London by virtue of S.54(6) of the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839). Could the latter refer to obstructions caused by meetings? 
Supperstone argues that 'other means' should be interpreted ejusdem generis with the 
preceding list so that the offence would not be applicable to meetings (op. tit., 81). Section 21 
of this same Act provides that the police can make regulations to prevent obstructions of the 
streets (op. tit., 61-82). The power in London is found in the Metropolitan Police Act, s.52.
7 To cause or incite a public nuisance is a crime. The offence differs from trespass in that 
public nuisance is an interference with public rights on the highway, whereas trespass is an 
interference with the private rights of the owner (Wallington, op. cit., 95). The offence should 
not be confused with private nuisance; as Smith, op. tit., 206 notes, private nuisance is a tort 
and can be actioned by an individual once the crime of public nuisance has been proved and 
he/she can show that they have suffered special damage. Public nuisance has been defined as 
'....an act not warranted by law or an omission to discharge a legal duty, which act or 
omission obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all Her Majesty's subjects.'
(Stephen's Digest 9th ed. 1950, art .235).
It will be noted that the offence can (and indeed does) cover a wide variety of acts (c.f. Smith, 
op. tit., 206, n.69 and Supperstone, op. tit., 74, n.9). However, as regards meetings on the 
public highway, it covers interference with the public right of passage and repassing on the 
public highway. The interference must result from unreasonable user and reasonableness is 
judged from the public's interest. The obstruction must be actual and substantial (c.f. 
Goodhart, op. tit., 165 et. seq., Smith, op. tit., 206-9 and Supperstone, op. tit., 74-81).
The width of common law nuisance appears to be one feature by which it may be 
distinguished from statutory obstruction offences. Therefore, both concern obstructions but 
the statutory offences are more specific, whereas the common law offence covers obstruction 
as part of a wide range of illegal activities. Another distinguishing characteristic is that public 
nuisance requires actual obstruction but this is not the case for the statutory offences (c.f. 
Smith, op. tit., 199-208). Essentially, the offence calls for 
’...a value judgement as to the reasonableness of a particular behaviour.’
(Footnote continues on next page)
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user of the highway. The paramount importance that is traditionally given to 
passage results in marches enjoying a more favourable position (infra.) and 
meetings are therefore seen as being of a greater threat to the rights of 
passage.8
France and England compared
In France the position at first sight seems equally restrictive. It will be 
remembered that by virtue of art.6 of the 1881 Act, meetings are prohibited 
from the public highway (this is repeated in the 1935 decree-law). The first 
thing to therefore note is that this restriction is carried out in a statute that 
was purposely drafted to regulate the liberty to meet. On the other hand, 
English law regulates the liberty by employing laws that were not passed 
with the liberty in mind.9
However, the real differences lie in the greater control of discretion and the 
lack of a private property conception in France. It will be recalled that local 
authorities in France enjoy a discretion to authorise meetings on the public 
highway. This discretionary power was seen to be at the centre of the dispute 
in Mutuelle nationale des Etudiants de France. Meetings can be permitted if
(Supperstone, op. tit., 75).
8 Public nuisance firstly requires an obstruction that is secondly caused by the unreasonable 
user of the highway. It has commonly been stated that because processions involve 
movement they are not prima fade unlawful, whereas a meeting is unlawful because its 
stationary nature renders it an unreasonable use of the highway. For example;
'A procession...which allows room for others to go on their way is lawful: but it is open to 
question whether a public meeting held on a highway could ever be lawful, for it is not in 
any way incidental to the exercise of the right of passage.'
(Lord Scarman op. at., para.122), 
and Good hart, op. tit., 171;
'As a public meeting is not one of the uses for which the highway has been dedicated, it is a 
nuisance if it appreciably obstructs the road...But, and this is most important, in the case of a 
procession the test is whether in all the circumstances such a procession is a reasonable user 
of the highway, and not merely whether it causes an obstruction.'
This view has not been without criticism;
The test should not be whether a demonstration is something reasonably incidental to 
passage, but whether it is reasonable in the context of the rights of the highway users 
generally. If nobody is obstructed, it will be reasonable. If passers-by must make a detour, 
their inconvenience should be balanced against the interest in allowing demonstrations.' 
(Supperstone, op. tit., 126 and c.f. Williams, (1967), op. tit., 209 & 216).
There have also been judicial statements to the effect that the rights of passage on the 
highway include other activities beyond simply passing and repassing, e.g. Lord Esher MR 
(dissenting) in Harrison v Puke of Rutland [1893] 1 Q.B. at 146-7 (c.f. Supperstone, op. tit., 47), 
however the traditional view remains.
9 Sherr, op. tit., 60 notes;
'Much of the effective law has grown out of historical usage intended for purposes quite 
different from the controlling of demonstration and protest.’
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they are judged not to be unduly restrictive.10 However, a discretion to allow 
meetings on the public highway, even where they cause an obstruction (at 
common law or statute) is also in practice enjoyed by the police in England.11 
Thus in Arrowsmith v lenkins. the courts refused to accept that previous 
forbearance on the part of the police of obstructions caused by the appellant 
on the public highway could crystallise into some form of immunity from 
later prosecution for that offence.12 If discretion exists in both jurisdictions, 
why is it claimed that French law is better? The response points to the fact 
that in France discretion is much more readily subject to review than in 
England.13 Secondly, the courts have refused to countenance discrimination
10 Chap.IV, section ID.
11 The police and local authorities can decide whether to permit activities which cause public 
nuisances on the highway but this is very much an extra-legal exercise of discretion. 
Therefore, the fact that a local authority authorises an obstruction cannot be used by way of a 
defence in criminal proceedings (Redbridpe LB v lacques [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1604 and 
Cambridge and Isle of Ely CC v Rust [1972] 2 Q.B. 426) and the police cannot, from a strict 
legal perspective, authorise a meeting that would be an unreasonable obstruction (and thus 
authorise a public nuisance and/or a statutoiy obstruction) but the position is in practice 
different;
'If the traditional view is accepted, that all meetings on the highway are unlawful, neither the 
highway authority nor the police have the power to authorise them. However, often in 
practice, if no serious obstruction is caused and there is not likely to be a breach of the peace, 
meetings take place with the tacit approval of the police.'
(Supperstone, op. til., 80).
12 [1963] 2 All E.R. 210. The case involved a prosecution for statutory obstruction and has 
been much criticised because the courts condoned the exercise of the liberty to meet as being 
dependent on police discretion (Supperstone, op. tit., 80-1). The court refused to investigate 
the appellant's allegation of police partiality, as per Lord Parker C] at 211;
'For my part, I think that the appellant feels she is under a grievance which she puts in effect 
in this way - "Why pick on me? There have been many meetings held in this street from time 
to time. The police, as on this occasion, have attended those meetings and assisted to make a 
free passage" and she says that there is no evidence that anybody else has ever been 
prosecuted. "Why pick on me?", she says. That, of course, is nothing to do with this court. The 
sole question here is whether she contravened S.121(l) of the Highways Act, 1959.'
Williams, op. tit., 211 objects to the court's refusal to look into the question of discrimination 
and adds (at pg.212);
’..it would certainly seem to be desirable that the courts should show readiness to admit the 
reasonableness, or fairness, of the decision to prosecute as a factor in determining the 
reasonableness of the alleged obstruction.'
13 The much noted reluctance of English courts to review police discretion is evidenced by 
Williams, (1987), op. tit., 178-9 and Smith, op. tit., 177 points to the increased willingness only 
recently to subject police decisions to judicial review (citing Mohammed-Holgate v Duke 
[1984] A.C. 437). He notes that the courts require that a constable's decision is made upon 
reasonable grounds and that once he/she has come to a reasonable conclusion, the decision 
he/she takes must be reasonable. However, he notes that this is merely procedural review (at 
pg.178) and that the courts are 'diffident' about interfering in police decisions for a number of 
reasons (pg.179). Furthermore, it seems Likely that the courts would be unwilling to review 
such a wide degree of discretion as enjoyed by the police as regards meetings located on the 
public highway.
(Footnote continues on next page)
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on the part of the police in the exercise of their discretionary powers.14 
Although, this principle has yet to be tested in France as regards the 
regulation of locations, it is a firmly established principle and this should 
ensure that in the future it is extended to this area. Exacting judicial review 
and the prohibition against discrimination will be recalled to be supported by 
theory and its for this reason that they are preferred here.
The continuing view that government authorities should be treated as private 
property holders, directly supports the very wide degree of discretion 
enjoyed by them under English law. Such a view is not accepted in France, 
despite several statutes that could perhaps be applied to restrict the location 
of meetings.15 Instead a public law perception prevails, in such a way that 
public authorities must exercise their discretion according to certain values - 
i.e. non-discrimination.16
Aside from the public highway, English law also restricts meetings from other 
areas. These restrictions are of varying degrees; ranging from absolute 
prohibitions to requirements to seek permission.17 Where these same type of
The English position can be contrasted with that of the French where police decisions and 
public order are viewed as ’traditional' areas of judicial review (see Ktistaki, (1991), op. cit., 89 
et. seq. and J.M. Aubry & R. Drago, Traité des Recours en matière Administrative’ (1992), 524 
et. seq.). In addition, where a civil liberty is involved police decisions must be necessary and 
proportional, having regard to the risk of public disorder and the value of the liberty in 
question (c.f. op. cit., 94 et. seq. and chap.IV, section III). From this strong position of judicial 
review it is but a small step to control wider discretion, as will be seen below.
14 See Communes de Tourrettes-sur-loup. op. cit., in chap.IV, section III, supra..
15 It will be recalled that the public highway is state property in France (c.f. art.538 of the 
Civil Code and Ordinance No.59-115 of 7th Jan. 1959, art.l; chap.V, section I) and that in 
addition there are prohibitions against causing an obstruction on the public highway; 
'Quiconque aura, en vue d'entraver ou de gêner la circulation, placé ou tenté de placer, sur 
une voie ouverte à la circulation publique, un objet faisant obstacle du passage des véhicules 
ou qui aura employé ou tenté d'employer un moyen quelconque pour y mettre obstacle, sera 
puni d'un emprisonnement..'
(Code de la route, Art.L.7).
Nevertheless, despite the existence of these offences, no cases or documentary evidence has 
been found showing that these are in practice used to prosecute those that meet on the public 
highway.
16 The principle prohibition against discrimination by police authorities was noted above in 
Communes de Tourrettes-sur-loup and Préfet du Finistère (chap.IV, section, III).
17 For an example of an absolute prohibition, see the prohibition of meetings and processions 
in the precincts of the Houses of Parliament. This is renewed each year by Sessional Orders 
from both Houses and is put into effect by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner via 
directions made under S52 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (see Bailey et. al. op. cit., 173 
and Papworth v Coventry [1967] 2 All E.R. 41).
Parks and open spaces are generally under less severe restrictions, although it has been held 
that there is no right to hold meetings in Trafalgar Square (R v Cunninghame Graham and 
(Footnote continues on next page)
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restrictions exist in France, there is a strong likelihood, according to the 
authority of Commune de Tourrettes-sur-loup. that they must be justified on 
the grounds of public order or considerations of practical management and 
administration. This latter requirement may be quite wide and so could 
include inconvenience and the obstruction of the general public. However, 
once again the risk that officials will abuse this power by unduly restricting 
the liberty to meet is reduced by reason of a more expansive judicial review 
than that in England.18
French law requires that restrictions also be shown to be the minimum 
necessary to secure public order and must be proportional to the importance 
of the liberty and the evil that it is sought to avoid. These principles similarly 
apply to restrictions on the grounds of the administration and management of 
a location. Judicial review in France is also more exacting because it involves 
a review of the merits of the case where a civil liberty is involved. Thus it has 
been seen that there is a sliding scale of judicial review, which is at its most 
demanding when human rights would be restricted.
It is therefore likely that the courts will more strictly review restrictions on the 
grounds of public order and administrative and managerial necessity than 
their counterparts would review the reasons for restrictions in England. This 
is because English judicial review is primarily procedural, as will be seen as 
regards the review of other aspects of regulation and the doctrines of 
proportionality and necessity have only recently been applied by the courts.19
Bums (1888) 16 Cox CC 420 and Ex. p. Lewis (1888) 21 Q.B. 191, c.f. Williams, op. cit., 73-86). 
Written permission can be sought from the Secretary of State for the Environment by virtue 
of the Trafalgar Sq. Regulations 1952 S.I. No. 776. The same regime exists as regards Hyde 
Park (c.f. Bailev v Williamson (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 118, the Royal and Other Parks and Gardens 
Regulations 1977 S.I. No. 217 and Williams, op. cit., 70-3).
Only on one occasion does English law grant a right to meet in the strict legal sense. This is 
by virtue of S.95 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (as amended). This statute 
grants candidates at parliamentary elections the right to hold election meetings in local 
authority schools and premises. Thus, the wide discretion that is normally enjoyed by the 
local authority is here strictly curtailed.
18 The prohibition against discrimination by government authorities is a principe général du 
droit, more specifically, that of equality before public services. Examples of its application can 
be found in C.E. 10th May 1912 Abbé Boutevre Rec.553, C.E. Ass. 25th June 1948 Société du 
lnurnal 'L ’Aurore'. Rec.289 and C.E. sect. 9th March 1951 Société des Concerts du 
Conservatiore. Rec.151. and see chap.IV, section HI.
19 See P. Cane, 'An Introduction to Administrative Law’ (1992), 216 and J.L. Jowell & A. 
Lester QC. 'Proportionality: Neither Novel or Dangerous1 in J.L. Jowell & D. Oliver (eds.), 
'New Directions in ludidal Review'. (1988), 51.
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It has been seen that France compares favourably with England as far as 
restrictive regulations concerning locations and now it will be seen that 
French practice in this area, also matches the high standards developed in the 
US case law. French regulation is supported by theory, thus in comparing it 
with the US it is the theory, as well as French law that is being evaluated.
High standards: the US
Since the ECHR has not dealt with the issue of the location of the liberty to 
meet, only US case-law will be examined. Furthermore, the issue of the public 
forum will be dealt with further on, as this concerns both meetings and 
processions. American theorists display a great degree of sophistication in the 
analysis of the case law in this area. Tribe provides typical example. He 
claims that government restrictions in this area are aimed at the 
'noncommunicative impact' of assemblies, which are seen as communicative 
activities. Here are grouped restrictions that whilst not aimed at the ideas or 
information contained in assemblies, have the effect of discouraging their 
communication. Restrictions as to location therefore fall into this category and 
Tribe goes on to argue that the court must here balance competing interests. 
In this connection, he states that the Supreme Court has developed a kind of 
rule of thumb that a regulation is constitutional as long as it does not unduly 
constrict the flow of information and ideas.20
20 Tribe, (1988), op. cit. Adopting the view that freedom of speech is
'...shorthand for the entire collection of freedoms...secured from government interference by 
the first amendment.'
( at pg.75),
Tribe asserts that there are two ways that government can abridge speech. The first method is 
aimed at ideas or information. The second method is not aimed at ideas or information but 
the government restricts the flow of information while pursuing other goals. This second 
method of restriction is aimed at the 'noncommunicative impact' of speech (pgs.789-90). It 
would thus appear that restrictions on the locations of meetings based on the apprehension of 
public disorder or obstruction are restrictions of the second kind. In such cases, the courts 
must balance interests;
'Where government aims at the noncommunicative impact of an act, the correct result in any 
particular case thus reflects some "balancing" of the competing interests; regulatory choices 
aimed at harms not caused by ideas or information as such are acceptable so long as they do 
not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas. In such cases, the first amendment 
does not make the choice, but instead requires a "thumb" on the scale to assure that the 
balance struck in any particular situation properly reflects the central position of free 
expression in the constitutional scheme.1
Corresponding to these two forms of restriction, Tribe sees the court as having developed 
two ways of resolving 1st Amendment claims. The resolution of noncommunicative impact 
issues is termed 'the track two' approach - a regulation is therefore constitutional, as long as it 
does not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas (pgs.791).
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How is this level of theoretical sophistication supported in the case law? The 
courts have laid down a prohibition against the uneven application of a 
restrictive regulation between different persons and groups. Therefore, in Cox 
v Louisiana, the court stated that a uniform, non-discriminatory ban on all 
processions and meetings on city streets and in other public places under an 
obstruction of the highway statute would be unconstitutional.21 In Cox v New 
Hampshire, the court upheld a 'reasonable' and 'non-discriminatory' permit 
requirement for the holding of parades as a proper municipal regulation of 
the use of the streets.22 The courts will therefore uphold non-discriminatory 
measures that seek to regulate meetings because of the need to 'manage' 
certain locations.23
Essentially, this approach is very similar to that seen in France - locations 
must be administered and managed to ensure the fairest and best possible 
usage between citizens but in pursuing this aim, discrimination will not be 
tolerated, as this indicates an abuse of administrative prerogative.
Aside from discrimination, another similarity can be found as regards 
regulations imposed because of public order reasons. In both jurisdictions 
such justifications can be upheld if they are valued more than the dvil liberty 
in the specific circumstances. Therefore, as in French law, administrative and 
managerial requirements (e.g. traffic control) and public order are accepted 
values that may be weighed against the values served by the liberty to meet. 
In the US these two broad interests are generally referred to as significant 
government interests.24
In effect, what occurs is that different values are weighed against one another 
in France and the US. This process occurs in England but the value of the 
liberty to meet is only put into the balancing equation with some difficulty. 
The police and local authorities carry out the balancing, as in Arrowsmith and 
as that case shows and the liberty in question is not always accorded a fair
21 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
22 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (c.f. M.G. Abernathy, 'Civil Liberties Under the Constitution' (1977), 
421).
23 Thus in Cox v New Hampshire, op. at., Hughes J upheld the conviction of eighty six 
Jehovah's witnesses for parading without a permit. The ’licensing’ procedure was said to 
afford the opportunity for proper policing, the prevention of confusion and the overlapping 
of assemblies.
24 See for example, Heffron v International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 US. 640,101 
S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed. 2d 298 (1981).
307
value. A fair value means that a weight that accords with the liberty to meet 
being a social value. In England and France the liberty to meet is claimed to 
have been determined by socio-political forces, it is seen as securing values 
that make it worthy of protection. This is the view in England but it has not 
been accompanied by institutional arrangements that can reflect and protect 
this socially accorded value. While US practice is at odds with the 
jurisprudential theory in this study, in that it attempts to hide the contingency 
of human rights by fixing them in a non-politicised and relatively fixed 
constitution, it at least, along with France has laid down a set of rules by 
which human rights can prevail and be clearly weighed against 
countervailing interests.25
This analysis of general location restrictions of the liberty to meet can be 
concluded by noting that in England the battery of laws and the prevalent 
private property view have combined to allow the police and local authorities 
to make decisions as to where meetings will take place. These decisions can 
be exercised with a wide degree of discretion, which is subject to minimal 
review. The liberty to meet does not appear as a valued interest that can be 
counterbalanced against public order and the rights of passage. This position 
has been compared unfavourably with that in France and it has been seen in 
turn that French law compares well with US law, as seen as an example of a 
legal framework that protects the liberty to meet to a high standard.
THE LIBERTY TO PROCESS
Before going on to look at the regulations regarding the location of 
processions, it should be noted in passing that by virtue of S. 11 of the Public 
Order Act 1986, written notice has to be given to the police six days before a 
public procession is intended to take place. However, S.ll(2) exempts 
processions that are ’customarily held' in the area and funeral processions 
from this requirement.
25 Frankfurter ] stated in Dennis v United States 341 U.S. 494;
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security 
are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the 
confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non- 
Euclidean problems to be solved.'
Despite the incompatibility of the U.S. institutional structure with the theory adopted here, 
this dictum indicates the dear political choices that are involved in regulating human rights. 
France and the U.S., in their different ways permit these choices to be made, the same is less 
true in England.
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Returning to the regulation of locations, just as the location of a meeting can 
be of great importance to its organisers, the same holds true for the exercise of 
the liberty to process. However, in practice, given the size and mobility of the 
majority of marches, the desired location will more often than not be the 
public highway. Much the same remarks that were made above concerning 
restrictions of the location of the liberty to meet in England can be made here 
with one important qualification that alters the way in which marches on the 
public highway are viewed and treated. This qualification is linked to the 
private property view.
As for the position in France, it will be seen that processions are commonly 
seen as being exercised solely on the public highway. Finally US law views 
the liberty to process as an activity that has a normal and justifiable home on 
the public highway.
Therefore, in general both in France and England processions on the public 
highway benefit from a more liberal regime than that of the liberty to meet. 
However, the extent of this liberality differs between the two jurisdictions and 
the reason why will be revealed.
*
The position in England
It was seen above as regards meetings that English law is strongly influenced 
by a private property approach to locations, and that this extends to the 
public highway. For this reason meetings are widely considered as prima facie 
unlawful because they go beyond the purpose for which the general public is 
allowed to use the local authority-owned highway. This purpose is that of 
passing and repassing. Meetings, by virtue of their stationary nature, breach 
the terms of this common law licence.
However, what about mobile assemblies, in other words, processions? Here, 
the position has traditionally been seen differently. By reason of their 
mobility, processions on the public highway may constitute a normal user of 
the public highway and can be lawful. In fact, it may be said that whereas 
meetings are prima facie unlawful, marches, on the other hand, are prima facie 
lawful. The result is that processions have enjoyed a more liberal regulatory
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framework because they are perceived, a priori, to be compatible with the 
common law rights of passage.26
This liberal framework is illustrated by the way the common law and 
statutory offences that were applicable to meetings held on the public 
highway are only made out as far as processions where the prosecution 
authority has proved that the procession went beyond the purposes of the 
public highway. In other words, the onus of proof that rests on those 
exercising the liberty to meet is shifted to the police and prosecution 
authorities as far as the liberty to process is concerned.
Therefore, under both common law public nuisance and the statutory offence 
of obstruction of the highway, the fact of an obstruction is not sufficient, what 
must also be proved is that the obstruction was the result of an unreasonable 
user.27 Failure to address this issue of reasonableness has been held to be fatal 
to a prosecution.28 However, that processions are only prima facie lawful is 
underlined by the case of Tynan v Balmer.29 in which it was held that pickets 
moving in a circle were guilty of a public nuisance/obstruction of the 
highway. The circular movement was not reasonable user because the passing 
and repassing was not for the purpose of travel. The court in this case can be 
seen to have accorded the picket prima facie legality (because of the passing 
and repassing) but then to have subjected the activities to a closer 
investigation (the purpose of the passing and repassing). This case follows the 
logic of Hickman v Maisev. although this time a civil case, where the 
defendant was found guilty of a trespass on the plaintiff's land: his passing 
and repassing were for the purposes of spying on the plaintiff s race-horses 
and not for travel. As a result, he was found to have exceeded the licence to
26 See, for example, Goodhart, op. cit., 169 & 171, Williams, (1967), op. cit., 63 & 213, 
Supperstone, op. cit., 32, Smith, op. cit., 131, Thornton, op. cit., 134 and Lowdens v Keavenev 
[1903] 2 1.R. 82.
27 See Nagv v Weston [1965] 1 W.L.R. 280, per Parker CJ at 284;
There must be proof that the use in question was unreasonable use. Whether or not the user 
amounting to an obstruction is or is not an unreasonable use of the highway is a question of 
fact. It depends upon all the circumstances, including the length of time the obstruction 
continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and of course whether 
it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential obstruction.’
28 See, R v Clark flSJo.21 [1964] 2 Q.B. 315.
29 [1967] 1 Q.B. 91.
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enter the plaintiff's land. Here once again the purpose o f the passing and 
repassing was investigated.30
The element of mobility that constitutes processions may therefore be enough 
to secure prima facie lawfulness but any movement must still be within the 
terms of the private property right. Consequently, the favoured position 
enjoyed by processions is clearly not because of a view that they are a better 
means of exercising the liberty to assemble than meetings. In other words, 
processions are favoured in England because of no«-human rights 
considerations.31
France compared
Before comparing the regulation of locations, it should be noted that the 
English exemption from the written notice requirement, for commonly or 
customarily held processions in S.ll(2) of the POA 1986 is mirrored by the 
exemption for local and traditional marches as far as the prior declaration 
requirement is concerned.32 This would seem to confirm the suggestion that 
these types of procession are not generally viewed as raising public order 
problems.
Returning to locations, it will be recalled that processions in France are 
commonly defined as mobile demonstrations that take place on the public 
highway .33 Thus the French regulation of location only concerns the public 
highway. Processions enjoy a privileged position in comparison to meetings 
because the latter, as was noted above, are prohibited from taking place on 
the public highway (although there is a discretion to permit them).
It can therefore be said that both England and France privilege processions on 
the public highway over meetings. It is unclear why this in France since, this
30 (1900] 1 Q.B. 752 and c.f. Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 Q.B. 142, especially Lopes LJ 
at 154;
’If a person uses the soil of the highway for any purpose other than in respect of which the 
dedication was made and the easement acquired, he is a trespasser. The easement acquired 
by the public is a right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the purpose of legitimate 
travel, and the use of the soil for any other purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, is an 
infringement of the rights of the owner of the soil...’.
31 It will be seen below that statute has to some extent reduced the favoured position of 
processions at common law as far as the imposition of bans and conditions are concerned.
32 Chap.V, section III.
33 See, chap.V, section I.
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location is merely mentioned in its definition by legal commentators and the 
decree-law without explanation. However, French law would seem preferable 
in that the law grants it a clear location; the public highway. In England, the 
right to process is permitted as far as it is consonant with a property right, as 
is illustrated by Tvnan v Balmer. and it would appear that this does not 
accord the right to process a weight that reflects its social value. More 
precisely, the private property view sees it as a particular means of travel and 
little more. Such a view therefore ignores the valued functions performed by 
the liberty.
Furthermore, it would seem that in France aside from public order, 
processions on the public highway can only be restricted for administrative 
and managerial considerations. This is not the case in England, where the 
private property conception results in restrictions to uphold this value. 
Therefore while it is clear that the common law offence of public nuisance is 
aimed at preventing disruption,34 the same cannot be said for statutory 
obstruction, where it has been stated (albeit obiter) that no one need actually 
have been obstructed in order for the offence to be made out.35 Trespass can 
also be made out without an actual obstruction.36 The result seems to be that 
even where a procession causes no obstruction (i.e. causes no inconvenience 
and disruption), there may still be liability for the offence obstruction. The 
conclusion must be that property rights on the public highway can justify 
more restrictions than is the case in France.
34 This follows from cases such as Bartholomew [1908] 1 K.B. 554 in which it was held that 
public nuisance requires an actual obstruction and c.f. Dvmond v Pearce and others [197211 
All E.R. 1142.
35 Gill v Carson and Nield [1917] 2 K.B. 674 and Nagy v Weston [1965] 1 All E.R. 78. As 
Supperstone, op. cit., 77 observes, the question of whether there is an obstruction or not 
would seem to go to the issue of reasonable user (c.f. Lord Parker in the latter case, at 284). 
Therefore, although it may be difficult to establish a public nuisance without an actual 
obstruction, this is not a necessary element of the offence.
It is furthermore suggested that the tendency of the courts to find a statutory obstruction 
even where the obstruction is partial and / or temporary reveals that the offence is not aimed 
solely at inconvenience to passers by (c.f. Homer v Cadman op. cit.)
36 See Goodhart, op. cit., 162;
'If the highway is used for any purpose other than travel a trespass is committed even though 
no one is obstructed and no injury is done.'
To illustrate this point, he dtes Hickman v Maisev. op. cit.;
'...in this case it was held that a racing tout, who walked up and down the highway for the 
purpose of watching horses which were being trained in an adjoining field, committed a 
trespass against the owner of the land on which the highway was situated even though his act 
obviously was in no way injurious to the owner or an interference with the use of the highway.' 
(emphasis added).
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As between the two jurisdictions, French regulation would appear to be better 
because it does not appear to subordinate the liberty to process to property 
rights. Instead it will be recalled that the restrictions are limited to two 
grounds (see infra.) and that the courts will review decisions to restrict the 
liberty in such a way as to balance them against countervailing values. In 
England no such balancing occurs as far as property rights are concerned, so 
that a finding that they have been interfered with justifies the restriction of 
the liberty.
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HIGHER STANDARDS: THE PUBLIC FORUM
The public forum doctrine concerns the degree to which citizens have access 
to certain areas in which to hold meetings and processions and as a 
counterpart, the degree to which these areas are provided by the government 
authorities. This doctrine originated in the US, where it was felt that certain 
locations should exist in which assemblies enjoyed a privileged position and 
where government restrictions would need to be more strongly justified. In 
addition, it was felt that such areas should be set aside to facilitate the 
exercise of the liberties. The public forum doctrine, can therefore be seen as 
having a protective aspect and an aspect that is concerned with affirmative 
action.37
37 For the origins and development of this doctrine, see Bamum, op. tit., 314-8 and Tribe, op. 
tit., 986 et. seq., who defines the doctrine as requiring
’...that restrictions on speech should be subject to higher scrutiny when, all other things being 
equal, that speech occurs in areas playing a vital role in communication - such as in those 
places historically associated with first amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and 
parks - especially because of how indispensable communication in these places is to people 
who lack access to more elaborate (and more costly) channels.'
(pg.987).
It has also been stated that;
The animating idea was that government does not have absolute control over public speech 
on its property.'
(M. An 'Free Speech. Post Office Sidewalks and the Public Forum Doctrine - United States v 
Kokinda HOS.Ct. 3115 (1990)’ in Harv.Civ.Lib.Rev. 26 [1991] 633, 634).
The seminal case in this area is Hague v QO 307 U.S. 416 (1939) in which Roberts ] at 515-6 
stated;
'Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights and liberties of citizens.'
One criticism of the doctrine that can be made is that if assemblies were limited to public 
forums, this might seriously limit the messages that they seek to convey to the wider public. 
Such messages are sometimes conveyed by causing inconvenience or shock;
'An intrinsic strategic feature of any well-planned or purposeful modem protest is surely to 
cause society at large (or at least some of its members) a certain amount of both physical and 
psychological discomfort...Moreover, even supposing it were not true that access to the 
streets, as such was essential to the attainment of modem protest goals, it remains a fact that 
highly ritualised or formalised expressions of dissatisfaction will have perhaps the least 
impact of all. Once allowance is made for the need to permit not only freedom of expression 
in society, but also freedom of effective expression, then the statutory provision of official 
public forums may be viewed by some as less than wholly satisfactory.'
(Bamum, op. tit., 321).
Given these dangers, it is suggested that assemblies should not be restricted to public forums, 
instead public forums are seen as being beneficial because they provide additional locations 
where assemblies can take place.
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France and England compared
In England there is no general legal obligation to provide locations in which 
meetings can be held. This situation is subject to the already noted exception 
that is provided for election meetings, by virtue of SS.95 & 96 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 (as amended by the Representation of 
the People Act 1985). The effect of this Act is stated by Marston to be as 
follows;
Candidates in Parliamentary and local elections may use certain local authority rooms for the 
purposes of holding public meetings in connection with their candidacy.3®
As regards election meetings, local authorities lose the discretion that they 
normally enjoy (supra.). The result is that there are much tighter limits on the 
regulations that can be imposed on election meetings; once again Marston 
notes,
A local authority may not impose a ban on a particular group (or on all groups) based on 
irrelevant considerations such as political views, or even for reasons which might be 
considered relevant, e.g. the risk of disorder. 39
The result is a right of access to local authority premises. The English position 
as regards election meetings accords with the position as regards meetings in 
general in France but goes even further by refusing to accept public disorder 
as a ground for refusing access. Nevertheless, it should be noted that English 
law still treats the local authority as a private citizen that owns property; thus 
breaches of this statutory duty lie in private law and not public law.40
However, this is very much an exceptional state of affairs and one that 
therefore reflects the importance accorded to electoral meetings. For other 
types of meetings, the public forum doctrine is not accepted. Despite strong 
calls for an obligation to provide assembly facilities and for rights of access to 
certain areas by both the judiciary and legal commentators,41 local authorities
38 Marston, op. cit., 112.
39 op. cit., 112.
40 The use of private law remedies in this area is illustrated in Webster v Southwark BC
[1983] Q.B. 698, Webster v Newham BC (1980) Times, 22 Nov. Ettridge v Morrell (1986) 85 
L.G.R. 100 and Verrall v Great Yarmouth [1981] Q.B. 202.
41 For example, Lord Scarman recommended the provision of 'speakers comers' (op. cit., para. 
134(7)) and Supperstone, op. cit., 41. E.C.S. Wade, The Law of Public Meeting' 3 M.L.R. [1938] 
177,180 and Bevan, op. cit., 177 are amongst the many academics that have over the years 
called for the introduction of a right of access and the provision of facilities to hold meetings.
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enjoy complete discretion as to whether to allow the use of halls or other 
areas which they own. There is even some evidence that this discretion has in 
the past been used as a preventative power.42
Even on the rare occasions when local authorities decide to create public 
forums, regulation is still permissible. This was the case in De Morgan v 
Metropolitan Board of Works43 where by virtue of two local Acts, Clapham 
Common in South-West London was dedicated to the use and recreation of 
the public as an open and unenclosed space in perpetuity. However, a bylaw 
required that the permission of the local authority be granted before a speech 
could be made there. On appeal against a conviction for delivering a sermon 
without permission, De Morgan sought to have the bylaw declared ultra vires 
the two Acts. The court upheld the bylaw, stating that regulations were 
lawful in order to ensure the use dedicated in local Act and that furthermore, 
without regulation, such use might become impossible.
Cases such as these confirm the lack of any rights of access enjoyed by the 
general public, even where public forums are created. Alternatively, they can 
be seen as stating that even in public forums, where a right of access is not 
granted but facilities and land are put at the disposal of the general public, 
restrictive regulations may still be applied. In De Morgan, the regulation was 
based on administrative/managerial considerations44 and it is suggested that 
public order would also be an acceptable reason. If decisions as to location 
were limited to these considerations, the English position would be very 
similar to that in France but it should be once again underlined that 
government authorities can discriminate and their decisions are subject to a 
less robust judicial review.
The French approach has been seen to be one that seeks to limit discretion in 
order to minimise the risk of discrimination and one in which public order 
and managerial considerations are normally the only generally accepted 
justifications for restricting meetings and processions. There is no explicit
42 See Williams (1967), op. at., 65-66.
43 (1880) 5 Q.B. 155, 49 LJ.M.C. 51, 42 L.T. 238, 44 J.P. 296 and see also Brighton Corpn. v 
Packham (1908) 72 J.P. 318 and cases dted in Bailey et. al., op. at., 170.
44 As was stated by Lush J in the case;
'Modes of user which, if enjoyed without limitation as to time or place, would unduly 
interfere with the comfort and enjoyment of others, such as riding, boating, cricketing, 
bathing, and the like, are put under reasonable restrictions.’
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public forum doctrine but nevertheless it could be said that a right to hold 
peaceful assemblies which do not conflict with the use of the location (or 
cause undue inconvenience) by others does exist. Therefore, a right can be 
said to derive from the circumstances in which neither of the two 
justifications can be relied upon in order to restrict assemblies on government 
property. Such circumstances are constituted by the kind of assemblies of the 
quality just described (i.e. peaceful) and so those refused access to local 
authority property would have a strong claim against the refusing authority. 
Indeed, this claim might be so strong as to be called a right.45
The US compared
In the US the public forum doctrine has developed more as regards claims 
that citizens have a right to use certain locations to assemble. Therefore, 
strong justifications for restrictions on the liberties to meet and to process in 
these locations have to be provided. Stated in these terms, the doctrine looks 
very similar to the position in France.
This can be illustrated by looking once again at Cox v New Hampshire.46 It is 
clear from this case that a public forum is not a legal vacuum, where there can 
be no regulation of the location/forum whatsoever. The Supreme Court 
recognised in this case that a statute could be enacted that sought to prevent 
serious interference with the normal use of parks and streets and furthermore 
that there was nothing unconstitutional about a provision that provided for a 
fee to be charged for the use of a forum. However, any restrictions that were 
imposed had to be reasonable, in that firstly, they were not to be imposed 
because of the content of the assembly. Secondly, they must serve significant 
government interests and thirdly, that while doing so, they must leave open 
'ample alternative channels for the communication of information'.47 The 
reasonableness that is required of the restrictions comes very close to the 
French prohibition against discrimination, the acceptance of public order and 
managerial reasons as the sole grounds for restrictions and the doctrines of
45 What results is a right to assemble in parks, open spaces and local authority halls and 
meeting rooms. This right exists in the space left between non-peaceful and unduly 
disruptive assemblies. This right would prevail against a local authority which decided to 
refuse permission to assemble in a park for example, on grounds other than the two just 
mentioned.
46 op. tit.
47 For a further example, see Clark v Community For Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288
(1984).
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proportionality and necessity. The French position may even be said to accord 
greater protection as a result of the recent US case of Ward v Rock Against 
Racism in which the Supreme Court stated;
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we affirm today that a regulation of the time, place or 
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate 
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of 
doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.4®
The result of this case is that restrictions that are non-discriminatory and 
serve significant government interests may restrict the liberties more than is 
strictly necessary.49
However, the US position is clearly stronger than that in France and England 
when it comes to nominating locations that are to be considered as public 
forums. In the US it was decided as long ago as 1939 that public highways 
and parks were public forums. This point was made by Roberts J in Hague v 
CIO.50 who by rejecting the view that government authorities should be 
treated as private property owners, laid the legal foundations for the doctrine 
of the public forum.51
More recently, in Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators 
Association.52 per White J, the case law on the issue has been synthesised and 
the Court has set out three categories of fora, which Tribe summarises as 
follows;
(1) traditional, 'quintessential public forums' - 'places which by long tradition or by 
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,' such as 'streets and parks'; (2) 
'limited purpose' or 'state-created semi-public forums opened for use by the public as a place
48 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Translated into French law terms, this case asserts the continued 
importance of the principle of necessity but restricts the application of the principle of 
proportionality.
49 This signals a clear retreat from Frisbv v Schultz 487 U.S. 474 (1988), per O'Connor J;
'A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 
"evil" it seeks to remedy.',
and the approach in Schneider v State. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
50 op. at.
51 The common law concept that government should be treated as a private property owner 
had been previously adopted by Holmes J in Massachusetts v Davis. 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 
N.E. 113,113 (1895) and affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal (167 U.S. 43,17 S.Ct. 731,
42 L.Ed. 71 (1897)) but was finally overruled by the instant case.
52 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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for expressive activity,’ such as university meeting facilities or school board meetings; and 
finally, (3) public property 'which is not by tradition or designation for public 
communication' at all.^3
Despite criticisms as to the criteria used to place certain locations in these 
categories,54 the clear identification of parks and streets as public forums 
means that assemblies held in those locations can immediately benefit from 
increased protection. The position is not so clear cut in France and certainly 
not in England. There is no explicit identification of areas in which the 
liberties to assemble are especially protected. Put simply, French law would 
seem to better protect liberties when it comes to the reasons for which the 
liberties can be restricted in public fora but US law seems to provide a higher 
standard of protection by clearly setting aside areas in which their exercise is 
a priority, thus better reflecting their social importance.
A SUMMARY OF LOCATION RESTRICTIONS
English law has a central theme that runs through the regulation of the 
location of assemblies: the view that the property of state authorities (the 
public highway, parks, open spaces, halls and other premises) should be 
treated in legal terms as private property. Thus, the liberties to assemble are 
exercised after these property considerations have been taken into account. 
Admittedly, the common law offences of trespass and public nuisance are 
rarely (and never in the case of the former) applied to assemblies but the same 
cannot be said of statutory restrictions such as those set out in the Highways 
Act 198055 and local Acts and bylaws.56
It may be claimed that this problem results from the oft-cited lack of a 
distinction between public and private law.57 This claim may be exaggerated
53 op. cit., 987.
54 For example, M. An, op. cit.
55 As well as other statutes that contain similar provisions; see note 6 supra.
56 See Bailey et. al. 170 and Supperstone, op. at., 82 for examples of local Acts, bylaws and 
cases in which they have been challenged, invariably unsuccessfully.
57 For the classic expression of the denial of this distinction, see A.V. Dicey, 'Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution' (1897), chap.XII. See also J.D.B. Mitchell, The 
Causes and Consequences of the Absence of a System of Public Law in the United Kingdom' 
[1965] P.L. 95 and C. Harlow, '"Public" and "Private’’ Law: Definition Without Distinction' 43 
M.L.R. [1980] 241;
’When in England we talk about "public law" we all know roughly what we are talking about 
and this is normally enough for U.S. We do not need to define the term more precisely 
because, although we may sense in the common law a latent distinction between the "public" 
and the "private," we do not use these terms as classificatory terms of art in the same way, for 
(Footnote continues on next page)
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but in any case the prevalence of the private property perspective in English 
law may be more directly attributed to the relative lack of importance of civil 
liberties in English law, so that there is little with which to provide a 
counterbalance to this view.58
On the other hand, in France a serious attempt is made to give the liberties to 
meet and process a weight that accords with the importance social forces have 
given them. Legal regulation as to location has been limited in order to give 
effect to this social importance. In concrete terms, the liberties to assemble are 
weighed against managerial considerations and public order. Regulations 
must also be 'narrowly tailored', to adopt the American terminology. 
Although, France does not have a public forum doctrine as such, it does 
prevent the kind of discrimination by government authorities that has been 
permitted in England and it does this via public law remedies. In England 
discrimination is the prerogative of the private individual: he/ she can refuse 
to permit assemblies on his/her property if he/she disagrees with the 
purposes of the assembly or the views of its holders. Hence remedies against 
such refusals lie in private law. Discrimination is not generally remedied by 
private law. Even in the exceptional case where the government landowner is 
under a legal obligation to permit assemblies (as in some local bylaws and 
Acts), the applicable ultra vires doctrine does not require that regulations as 
regards managerial concerns and public order be the minimum necessary or 
proportional; in other words, that they be 'narrowly tailored'. They may 
therefore restrict the liberties in question.59
example, as we use the terms "contract," "tort” and "crime". Nor do legal consequences 
usually flow from the distinction.'
(Pg-241)-
58 It will be seen below that as far as regards content restrictions and the imposition of bans 
and conditions, the liberties to assemble come off rather badly as against more concrete 
interests; as J. Murdoch, op. tit., 180 notes;
The rhetoric of fundamental rights competes at a disadvantage with more concrete and more 
valued considerations such as preventing violence, minimising the cost of policing and 
containing disruption in the community.'
(c.f. Smith, op. tit., 1 and Wallington, op. tit., 94).
Judicial attempts to grant the liberties of assembly a greater weight in the balancing process 
have been made but it is too early to assess their effect. Thus, for example Otton J in Hirst and 
Agu v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1986) 85 Cr.App.Rep. 143, (1986) 151 J.P. felt that 
the requirement that the issue of the reasonableness of the obstruction should be looked at 
under a charge of statutory obstruction would lead to a proper balance being struck 
’..and that the "freedom of protest on issues of public concern" would be given the recognition 
it deserves.'
59 Note the absence of such requirements in Brighton Corpn v Packham. op. tit.
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The conclusion must be that in England the crucial decision of where a 
meeting or procession can be held is subject to the wide discretion of the 
police and state authorities. The actual practice might be a liberal one but 
there is no guarantee that this is or will remain so.
As regards the public highway, France and England compare rather poorly 
with the USA, where because of the public forum doctrine, processions and 
meetings are envisaged as activities that are integral to the purposes of the 
public highway. Thus, prima facie there does not seem to be any privileging as 
between the liberties to meet and process. Neither has to justify itself against 
other interests from a weak position of being viewed as being beyond the 
normal and reasonable user of the public highway. The US regulatory 
framework can be seen as according the liberties to assemble an opportunity 
to express their political import as against other values.
This analysis of restrictions as to location concludes by restating the relatively 
inferior position of the two aspects of the liberty to assemble in England. This 
has been seen to have been in large part due to the prevalence of the private 
property view. France, however, presents a better regulatory framework and 
compares well with that of the US. Along with the preferred institutional 
structure and status of civil liberties, France also therefore presents a 




Bans are another example of restrictions on the liberty to assemble that take 
effect before the assembly has got under way. They have also, like location 
restrictions, been the subject of much analysis in England,60 where different 
rules apply as to meetings and processions. In this section, the provisions as 
regards bans in England and France will be compared, using the USA and the 
ECHR as examples of high standards of protection in this area.
60 For example, Bailey, et. al„ op. cit., 177-185, Supperstone, op. cit., 50-62, Marston, op. cit., 
122-136, Card, op. cit., 68-91, Smith, op. cit., 130-2 & 134-41 and for a more historical 
perspective, see Kidd, op. cit., 68-74 and Williams, (1967), op. cit., 54-63.
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THE POSITION IN ENGLAND
The liberty to meet
As far as the liberty to meet is concerned, there are no powers either at 
common law or statute to ban them in advance. Although, this may not 
always have been the position,61 the current situation would seem to be 
confirmed by the Government's decision to reject the inclusion of a power to 
ban static assemblies (which can be taken to include meetings) in the POA 
1986.“
As this chapter will show, the often heard claim that powers to ban before a 
meeting are not needed because of the existence of other restrictions may 
have much to say for itself and it should be recalled that meetings already 
suffer from a more restrictive framework on the public highway compared 
with processions. Thus, it may be contended that the absence of banning 
powers here is because they would be superfluous.63
The liberty to process
The situation is somewhat different as regards the liberty to process: here 
banning powers exist by virtue of S.13 of the POA 1986. The existence and the 
extension of these powers since their first appearance in S.3(2) of the POA
1936 has caused much concern.64 This concern may be seen to cover four 
areas: firstly, on what grounds may a ban be made? By a virtual repetition of 
the 1936 provision, S.13(1) of the 1986 Act provides that bans can be made on 
the grounds of 'serious public disorder', however the factual circumstances 
must be reasonably believed to be such that the powers to impose conditions
61 Williams (1967), op. cit., 51 et. seq., notes a belief at the end of the nineteenth century that 
magistrates had the power to issue 'proclamations' to ban assemblies. There, however, 
seemed to be no basis in either common law or statute for such a power.
62 The Government's reasoning was based on human rights considerations and interestingly 
a view of the relative importance of meetings and processions, as Card, op. cit., 82 notes;
The Government...rejected a power to ban static demonstrations on the ground that this 
would be a substantial limitation on the right of assembly and the right to demonstrate which 
would go further than strictly necessary; particularly as meetings and assemblies were a 
more important means of exercising freedom of speech than are marches.',
and see the Government White Paper, Review of Public Order Law (Cmnd. 9510,1985), 31-2. 
This reveals that the Government sees the primary function of assemblies as vehicles for 
exercising the freedom of expression.
63 As Williams (1967), op. cit., 63 observes;
There is no general power allowed by statute in this country to interfere with the holding of 
stationary public meetings in public places....One reason for this is that the police find it 
easier in practice to utilise the ordinary criminal law to control public meetings...'.
64 See for example, Thornton, op. cit., 144-5, Bonner & Stone, op. cit., and Williams, (1967), op. 
cit., 175.
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on processions (S.12, infra.) are insufficient to prevent public disorder. Once 
again it should be noted that the Government rejected the inclusion of 
grounds other than public order in this provision.65
Secondly, what kind of ban may be imposed? As far as its duration is 
concerned, a ban cannot be declared for longer than three months and it may 
be applied to any public procession or a procession of any other class that may 
be specified.66 A choice between specific and general bans therefore presents 
itself and it has been noted that the latter are the more common. The average 
duration of a ban would appear to be around thirty days, and longer than 
this is claimed to be exceptional.67 Despite calls to employ bans in a 'bolder' 
fashion - more precisely, to make greater use of specific bans - the police have 
resisted such calls because they claim that specific bans would expose them to 
accusations of political bias.68 As a consequence, the criticism is often made 
that general bans catch 'innocent' marches69 and this has lead to an 
application to the European Commission in Christians Against Racism and 
Fascism v UK. The claim was however found to be manifestly ill-founded and 
inadmissible.70 More importantly, the use of general bans was upheld, as long 
as they were used as a last resort;
A general ban of demonstrations can only be justified if there is a real danger of their 
resulting in disorder which cannot be prevented by other less stringent means.71
65 See White Paper, op. cit., chap .4.
66 S.13<1).
67 See Marston, op. cit., 133-4.
68 The Government made such a proposal in its White Paper, op. cit., para.4.14 and Sir Leslie 
Scarman (as he then was) in his report on the Red Lion Square Disorders of 15th June 1974 op. 
cit., urged a Txilder use' of specific bans.
(He repeated this call in 'The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981' (Cmnd. 8427), (1981), 
paras.7.41-7.49).
The police grounds for rejecting these calls were not accepted by Card, op. cit., 79;
'...this is not very convincing, because if a blanket or class ban is imposed it will generally be 
known that this is to prevent a particular organisation holding a procession, and equally lay 
the police open to such accusations and disputes.’
69 For example, Robertson, op. cit., 73-4 and at 73, referring to the use of general (or blanket) 
bans in the 1980s;
'Most of these recent blanket bans have been imposed to stop just one march with a racist 
message. But a banning order is a scatter-gun which hits and hurts all sorts of innocent 
targets.'
70 Application No. 8440/78 of 16th July 1980,21 D & R March 1981,138. Earlier the ban had 
been unsuccessfully challenged in the domestic courts in Kent v MPC, op. cit., For the 
background to these cases, see Robertson, op. cit., 73 and Bailey et. al., 182.
71 op. cit., 150.
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The Commission further recognised that general bans existed because of a 
desire
to ensure an even application of the law...that...aims at the exclusion of any possibility for the 
taking of arbitrary measures against a particular dem onstration.^
A closely related point that may be mentioned here, although it has received 
little attention in England, is that banning powers are stated to only be 
applicable to 'public' processions. It follows that a distinction between public 
and private is important here but the definition of a public procession that is 
given in S.16 is of little help. This is because it is circular: a public procession 
is one that is held in a public place.
Thirdly, who decides whether to ban? Outside London, the decision is a 
three-stage process involving the chief officer of police, the local police 
authority (LPA) and the Secretary of State. S. 13(2) provides that a police 
application for a ban shall be made to the LPA, who upon receiving it
may with the consent of the Secretary of State make an order either in the terms of the 
application or with such modifications as may be approved by the Secretary of State.
Thornton notes that LPAs have been known to refuse police applications but 
that the Home Secretary has never refused his consent once the LPA has 
consented.73 In the absence of an LPA in London, the decision to ban becomes 
a two-stage process, whereby the police (the Commissioner of Police for the 
City of London or the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis) applies 
directly to the Secretary of State.74
Fourthly, when and under what conditions may a decision to ban be 
reviewed?75 The simple answer is that bans may be reviewed but the chances 
of a successful challenge seem slight. Although the terms of S.12 in the POA 
1986 are more susceptible to judicial review than its 1936 predecessor, the 
already noted dominance of procedural review and the reluctance of the 
courts to enter into the domain of operational considerations, combines to
72 op. cit., 150.
73 (1987), op. cit., 146.
74 S.13(4).
75 Notwithstanding the fact that often the time which such legal processes take proves fatal to 
the exercise of the liberties (see chap.II. ? & V, ?), they still may be of considerable use in 
protecting them.
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confirm the general view that the chances of a successful challenge are 
small.76
The decision in Kent v MPC77 provides a clear example of the limitations of 
judicial review. Here, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament sought to 
challenge a general ban on processions in London. They claimed that the 
Commissioner of Police had not properly considered the effect that a London- 
wide ban would have on certain marches, including theirs. This argument 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal, holding that even though the police 
reasoning was 'meagre', the Court would not substitute its judgement for that 
of the police unless it could be proved that an irrelevant factor had been taken 
into consideration.78 Thus, even though it was admitted that the reasons 
given by the police lacked substance, the court insisted on a procedural 
approach that looked at the decision as a process: since none of the 
considerations in this process had been proved to be irrelevant and/or 
irrational, the process was deemed unimpeachable.79 The judicial avowal of 
the insubstantial nature of reasons in this case highlights how little English
76 S.12 makes bans more susceptible to judicial review, as is noted, inter alia, by Smith, op. cit., 
137;
The new position differs from the old in one significant way, by altering the terminology in 
which the Act is couched from the senior police officer's "opinion" that he is unable to prevent 
the serious public disorder to "reasonably believes" that the imposition of conditions will not 
enable him to preserve order. Because of the more objective terminology in which this is 
couched, it invites the readier use of the powers of judicial review.'
Despite this improvement, Smith is less than sanguine as to the chances of a successful 
review of a banning decision, op. at., 137;
Whether this will in practice make a great difference may be doubted, since it seems unlikely 
that a court will come to the conclusion that a chief constable of police has come to a decision 
that he could not reasonably arrive at, which is the critical test for the exercise of the powers 
of judicial review.'
and see also Thornton, (1987), op. cit., 148.
Card, op. cit., 89 points out that the chances of success are even slimmer as regards challenges 
as to the nature of a ban (and the same point is made as far as conditions);
'...if it cannot be proved that there was not a reasonable belief in a ground for imposing a 
condition or a ban, but objection is taken to the nature of the condition or ban, an application 
for judicial review of it is most unlikely to succeed. The reason is that there is no requirement 
for a reasonable belief in the necessity for a particular condition or ban.'
77 op. cit.
78 This decision was eventually challenged before the European Commission of Human 
Rights, in Christians Against Racism and Fascism v UK. supra.
79 For the general grounds of judicial review, see, Cane, op. cit., 105-229 and a good summary 
of judicial review for present purposes is provided by Smith, op. cit., 139-40;
'...a decision is open to review where it has been arrived at as a result of a mistaken view of 
the law, or where the decision is one that could not reasonably have been arrived at, in the 
sense that the person deciding must have taken into account irrelevant considerations, or 
failed to take into account relevant ones, or where he failed to observe the dictates of natural 
justice which require him to give the parties a hearing before arriving at his decision.'
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courts are prepared to go in reviewing the merits of police decisions. To have 
investigated whether the police reasons held water would have required 
going beyond procedural judicial review and would have meant encroaching 
on police operational competence.80
FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPARED
How, if at all, are these issues regulated in France? Is the situation there 
helped by constitutional enactments or by other legal mechanisms? It will be 
seen that in France, the existence of a constitutional enactment has proven to 
be less important than the operation of judicial review and statute as means to 
protect the liberties.
Unlike England, both meetings and processions may be banned in France. It 
was seen that by virtue of art.9 of the 1881 Act, the general public order 
powers of the police were made applicable to the liberty to meet and that the 
Conseil in Beniamin81 interpreted this as authorising the police to ban 
meetings. Furthermore, processions can be banned using these same general 
powers by virtue of art.3 of the 1935 decree-law.82 At the outset, the French 
framework therefore seems the more restrictive but the picture changes if the 
regulation of meetings and processions is analysed and compared according 
to the four areas just outlined above as regards England.
On what grounds may a ban be made?
As regards meetings, according to Beniamin and the cases that have followed 
it, meetings may only be banned by reason of serious public disorder and/or 
administrative and managerial considerations.83 This public order reason is 
the same as in England and the similarity continues because of the 
requirement that the exercise of banning powers must be a last resort when 
other measures are not available to the police in order to maintain public 
order.84 The last resort requirement in France is, however, a case-law creation 
and is used to limit the application of the general public order police powers. 
The French courts have proved that they will review police decisions in order 
to verify that they have been used as a last resort, as in the case of Naud.
80 See Lustgarten op. cit., 20-2 & 78, who notes that though this oft-cited the term does not 
appear in a legislative text;
'Yet the power of this conventional understanding is immense.'
(Pg-78).
81 Chap.IV, section III.
82 Chap.V, section III.
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where it will be recalled that the Conseil struck down a ban because other 
police measures could have been taken.85 This degree of review gives teeth to 
the last resort requirement and it is made possible by a willingness to 
investigate what in England would be considered an operational domain that 
is the exclusive province and competence of the police.86
Furthermore, it is important to note that the ban of a procession in England is 
only a last resort in a partial sense; in that by virtue of S.13(l) it only has to be 
shown that conditions would not have been sufficient to maintain public 
order.87 Therefore, regard does not have to be had to other police measures, 
such as using police reinforcements, as was the case in Naud.
Despite all the advantages of French law, English law still remains without 
any powers to ban meetings, does this fact not make the English position 
more libertarian? Although it may seem that way at first sight, it will be 
remembered that the absence of banning powers in England was seen as 
being due to the ample restrictive powers available at other stages of a 
meeting. It has been seen that this is certainly the case as regards restrictions 
on locations. Once this global view is taken into account, it is French law that 
is preferred.
As regards processions in France, the situation differs from that in England. 
The police enjoy a discretion as to whether to ban either under the general 
public order powers or to use those powers as they are laid down in the in the 
1935 decree-law.88
In France the police general public order powers have been seen to be wider 
than merely public order in the English sense of the term. Hence, in 
Legastelois it was seen that the Conseil upheld a ban on a march because of
83 See chap.IV, section III.
84 For example in Buiadoux. o p .  cit., and see chap.IV, section III. The decision to ban a 
Monarchist banquet was struck down because the Mayor had failed to show that he did not 
have other means at his disposal by which to maintain public order.
85 Chap.IV, section III. In this case the court reviewed the factual circumstances around the 
time of the proposed meeting and the decision in Bujadoux (op. cit.) shows that the burden of 
proving that a ban was a last resort lies on the police.
86 Lustgarten, op. cit., 20-2.
87 According to this provision, it must believed that the power to impose conditions;
'...will not be sufficient to prevent the holding of public processions...resulting in serious 
public disorder...'.
88 Chap.V, section III.
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the problems caused to traffic.89 Therefore, unlike the liberty to meet, the 
courts have permitted bans to be employed on the basis of a wider conception 
of public order but at the same time they have strictly reviewed the reasons 
for the exercise of these powers.90 However, this time, the position is worse 
than that in England, where the sole ground upon which a procession may be 
banned remains serious public order. Therefore, processions are subject to 
less restriction and can thus more readily perform the valued functions that 
have been identified in this study. This remains the case even if attention is 
turned to the greater number of restrictions that exist as regards locations in 
England because it will be recalled that processions enjoy a privileged 
position as regards the public highway.
The other source of banning powers as regards processions is art.3 of the 
decree-law and it has been seen that its terms result in a lower justificatory 
burden than that required in order to ban meetings.91 Nevertheless, even in 
this area of lower justification, the courts have introduced the doctrine of 
proportionality.92 Furthermore, despite the restrictive interpretations of this 
banning power by successive administrative circulars,93 the formulation of 
the general police powers in art.3 has an advantage over the general powers 
as laid out in the Code des Communes because it would appear to lay down a 
narrow conception of public order as the sole justification for a ban. Thus bans 
can only be issued on the basis of apprehended violence. This conclusion is 
based both on its drafting history, which was a response to the serious public 
disorder of the 1930s94 and the recent case from the Administrative Tribunal 
of Nantes, where it will be remembered that a ban based on the fact that 
organisers of a procession were 'outsiders' was struck down.95 This contrasts 
with the general public order powers in the Code, which were originally 
enacted in the aftermath of the Revolution in order to accord wide powers to 
the police in order to maintain public order during this turbulent period. By 
way of summary, it can be seen that as far as the liberty to process, French
89 Chap.V, section III.
90 See Belmas et Brépeon and Association des Combattants de la Paix et de la Liberté et 
autres. (chap.V, section III).
91 Chap.IV, section III.
92 As seen in Anciens Combattants de Gondrecourt (chap.V, section III).
93 Chap.V, section III.
94 Chap.V, section II.
95 Chap.V, section III.
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regulation would appear to offer the police wider grounds upon which to ban 
than exist in England.
What kind of ban may be imposed?
It was noted that in England, as far as processions, the police may use general 
or specific bans. In France, a similar situation exists, with the difference that 
the courts have shown themselves to be hostile towards general bans.96
By reason of the above noted discretion as to which banning power to use, the 
police in France can decide to issue specific or general bans.97 Thus, under the 
decree-law, a specific power is indicated, whereas the width of the general 
police powers would appear to provide ample basis for general bans. Even 
more discretion might be enjoyed because cases such as Abbé Marzv. Belmas 
et Brégeon and Dupont et autres have shown that the courts have not clearly 
limited the police to specific bans even under the decree-law.98
An interesting difference between France and England presents itself here. As 
was just stated, in France the courts have traditionally been hostile towards 
general bans, to the extent that in the 1920s and 1930s they almost became 
non-existent.99 On the other hand, in England, general or blanket bans have 
been the norm, as the police have tended to eschew specific bans for fear of 
being seen to be overly political. Why such a difference?
The answer is suggested to be to a large degree linked to the nature of judicial 
review in France, where the courts have proved willing and able to strike 
down specific bans that are discriminatory. The police may then exercise 
banning powers of a specific nature with less fear of appearing overtly 
political because decisions can be validated by an exacting judicial review, in 
which any such allegations can be investigated. Contrast this with the 
position in England, where the police do not have recourse to judicial review 
in order to validate the exercise of their powers. Therefore, the police enjoy a 
type of 'bare' discretion which the English courts refuse to investigate and the 
consequence is a strong tendency to seek to minimise discrimination in the 
exercise of discretion, hence general bans. However, given the price that must
96 Chap.V, section II.
97 Chap.V, section III.
98 Chap.V, section III.
99 Chap.V, section II.
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be paid by those who wish to exercise their rights it might be felt that the 
police should exercise their discretion more flexibly.100
The mere enactment of a constitutional provision enshrining assembly rights 
without more would probably leave this situation unresolved. Instead, what 
is required is a detailed legal measure setting out what types of bans can be 
made and, of equal importance, a degree of judicial review that can 
investigate the political issues that the police must inevitably become 
involved in.
As far as the type of meetings and marches that may be banned in France, it 
will be noted that the width of the general police powers means that both 
public and private assemblies can be banned. This would appear to be the 
foundation for the assertion of such powers over marches held on private 
land in the Paganon circular.101 The distinction between public and private 
assemblies is therefore unimportant as far as bans are concerned. This can be 
contrasted with the position in England where only public marches may be 
banned.102
Paradoxically, it is in France, where the distinction is of little relevance (at 
least as far as bans are concerned) that greater attention has been paid to the 
formulation of a definition of public and private meetings, whereas in 
England, where the distinction is of more importance, little attention has been 
paid to this issue.103
In this area, French regulation appears to allow for a greater restriction of 
liberty by extending banning powers to private meetings. It might be argued 
that the State should be doubly reluctant to restrict activities that are in the 
'private' sphere of the lives of citizens. Given this view, the non-existence of 
bans over private assemblies in England is to be commended. However, as 
stated above, the English position should be looked at in the light of the 
totality of restrictions. It is submitted that from the point of view of the 
conception of human rights adopted in this study, the possible restriction of 
private meetings, where the political motivation behind bans can be publicly
100 As was urged by some commentators, see note 68, supra.
101 Chap.V, section III.
102 POA 1986, SS.13 & 16.
103 Chap.V, section I.
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and fully reviewed, is less objectionable than a system in which no such 
restrictions of this nature exist but in which restrictions of other kinds can not 
be closely checked and analysed. The former scenario is that of France, the 
latter that of England.
Finally, a serious deficiency in France is the lack of a time limit on bans. In 
neither of the two formulations of banning powers are such limits found, 
unlike the clear three month limitation in England. Even if the existence of 
judicial review means that it is likely that French bans will be reviewed in 
order to see if their duration is not more than necessary and proportional, this 
seems a dangerous lacuna that is in need of remedy. This is especially so since 
there is no guarantee that excessively long bans will be challenged and 
because of the normal long delay in deciding challenges to bans.
Who decides whether to ban?
Although in both England and France the decision to ban involves more than 
one person, the differences between the two may be claimed to be of such a 
nature that to compare them would be akin to 'comparing apples with pears'. 
This is the sort of argument that has been used to justify the relative lack of 
work on comparative public law and civil liberties in particular.104 Whilst it 
may be true that the police structure differs markedly in the two jurisdictions, 
it will be seen that each jurisdiction can learn valuable lessons from the other.
As has been seen, police powers in France traditionally involve a dual control 
exercised by prefect and mayor. This tradition remains today despite the 
reforms carried out in the early 1980s.105 Formally, police powers were vested 
in the mayor, with a 'tutelle' power in the prefect. Thus, now when a ban is 
made by the mayor, s/he exercises these powers subject to the 'administrative 
tutelle' of the prefect. The mayor is then obliged to send a copy of the decision 
to the prefect,106 who can request an interim injunction to suspend the ban107. 
On other occasions, as when public order affects more than one commune or 
where the mayor refuses to use his/her police powers or in those areas served
104 Chap.II, section I.
105 Chap.IV, section III.
106 Chap.II, section II.
107Chap.V, section, III, especially Commr. de la République du Département de l'Essonne c. 
Commune de Monteeron op. dt., and the 1985 decision of the Administrative Tribunal of 
Nantes, op. dt.
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by the Police nationale, the prefect can ban assemblies.108 Thus the traditional 
system of dual control has been preserved as regards bans using the police 
general public order powers in the Code des communes and under the 
decree-law (art.3).
Despite their different police systems, both France and England have sought 
to involve local and central government elements in banning decisions. There 
are however exceptions: in London (where it was seen that central authority 
is dominant because of the non-existence of a local public authority), in areas 
with a national police force in France (where the prefect exclusively exercises 
police powers) and Paris (where the Prefect of Police is the sole police 
authority). Nevertheless, both systems have, from their different perspectives, 
generated similar balancing structures in which the interests of central and 
local government can be given weight.
An important difference is that this structure of balancing the often 
countervailing interests at the central and local level is not put into effect in 
England. Instead, it is in France where disputes over the exercise of banning 
powers between prefect and mayor are seen (i.e. between central and local 
government). Despite some above noted claims that some local authorities 
have in the past refused to consent to banning applications,109 there have 
been no cases on this point in England. Furthermore, it may be doubted after 
the decision in R v Sec, of State for the Home Dept, ex. p. Northumbria Police 
Authority110 whether the courts would uphold an LPA's refusal to consent to 
a ban in the face of opposition from the Chief Constable and the Home 
Secretary. If a look is taken beyond the centralised administration of France, it 
can be seen that the mayor constitutes an important counterweight to central 
power: s/he is a locally elected representative with extensive police powers.
If one searches for an analogous body in England one would have to choose 
the LPA. However, this is not a fully elected body of persons and its powers -
108 Chap.IV, section III.
109 Thornton, (1987), op. cit., 146.
110 [1988] 2 W.L.R. 590. In this case the Court of Appeal upheld a circular issued by the Home 
Secretary that authorised the stocking of plastic bullets and CS gas by local police forces, 
despite the opposition of the LPA. What should be noted is the extent the court went to in 
order to support the position of the Home Secretary and the Chief Constable, even resorting 
to a claim that the former enjoyed 'a prerogative power to keep the peace.' (c.f. Ewing & 
Gearty, op. cit., 106-8).
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being limited to maintaining a police force - are of a considerably reduced 
scope compared to those enjoyed by the French mayor.111
It can be concluded by seeing France as an attempt to create a structure in 
which the political considerations involved in the use of banning powers can 
be brought to the fore. In England a similar structure is available but by a 
combination of an unwillingness to put it into effect and the weakness of the 
police powers enjoyed by local bodies, is not as strong as that in France. 
However, France may see in England's multi-person, semi-elected, local LPA 
a model for improving its current arrangements whereby the mayor at the 
level of the commune is the only elected person who exercises police 
powers.112 Since a ban involves the interests of a variety of citizens and 
groups: the police, local business, residents, organisers, participants etc., it 
would make sense to allow these actors to play a part, or at least be heard, in 
the decision-making process. The LPA could be expanded for this purpose 
but this is more difficult in France where the sole local decision-maker is the 
mayor. Such an improvement would once again strongly accord with the 
jurisprudential conception of human rights; in that the liberties to assemble 
would be regulated in a political forum via the participation of political actors, 
who represent the community and are accountable to it. Such a body would 
be in a position to take account of the particular circumstances at the local 
level. Moreover, a reform of this nature highlights that the protection of these 
liberties requires more than the mere enactment of constitutional rights. 
Clearly other more detailed issues need to be addressed.
111 The LPA is the descendant of the directly elected Watch Committee of the Victorian era. 
Today it consists of two-thirds elected local counsellors and one third nominated local 
magistrates, hence it is not an entirely elected body. By virtue of s.4 of the Police Act 1964 the 
LPA must, inter alia, maintain an adequate and effective police force and may provide 
equipment. However, the extent of LPA control is considerably weakened by the provision in 
s.5(l) that the police force is under the ’direction and control’ of the Chief Constable. 
Lustgarten, op. tit., chap.3 details the gradual marginalisation of LPAs in the tripartite 
governing structure of the police at the expense of greater powers being enjoyed by the Chief 
Constable.
112 The Minister of the Interior also exercises police powers and is elected but these powers 
are rarely used and in any case do not usually affect the liberties to assemble. At 
departmental level it was noted that the prefect shares some police powers and duties with 
an elected General Council (see Chap.IV, section III) but the department is not as clearly local 




The greater scope and possibility for bans to be challenged in France has 
already been noted and so little more needs to be added here except a 
summary of these preferred qualities: the existence of a review of the merits 
of police decisions, the review of operational matters that involve police 
expertise, a value accorded to human rights in balancing them against other 
interests and the firm application of the principles of proportionality and 
necessity. These qualities have been favourably compared with the English 
application for judicial review and that of the US as far as regulation of the 
location meetings and processions. Therefore, bans may be successfully 
challenged in France, whereas in England, as in the decision in Kent v MPC. 
the courts have refused to review police decisions to ban, other than on 
procedural grounds.
A factor that has not as yet been mentioned is that of time. In discussing the 
possibilities afforded in each jurisdiction to challenge bans, it has been 
assumed that the relevant review body is able to render judgement 
sufficiently quickly for the assembly to go ahead as planned should the ban 
be struck down. However, the average time in which these decisions are 
handed down in both the jurisdictions shows that in the vast majority of 
cases, a judgement will come too late. Therefore a finding that a ban was 
illegal some two to three months after the date intended for an assembly 
presents a hollow victory and more importantly a successful restriction of the 
liberties. It is worth repeating, therefore, that the liberties to assemble are of a 
temporally delicate nature.
Given this nature, decisions must be able to be challenged with sufficient 
speed. As far as human rights are concerned, it was seen that the 'déféré 
préfectoral' in France provides that a challenged police decision that 
'compromises' a civil liberty must be suspended via an interim injunction 
within 48 hours of the administrative tribunal being seized by an application 
to review the decision.113 The advantages of this emergency procedure for the 
liberties to assemble were, for example, seen, in Commr. de la République de 
l'Essonne c. Commune de Montgeron.114 In England no such procedure exists 




a procedure is needed in order to protect the liberties to assemble. The 
combination of a lack of an expedited review procedure and inadequate 
judicial review lends strong support to the criticism that bans are for all 
practical purposes beyond effective challenge.
SECTION III 
CONDITIONS BEFORE ASSEMBLIES
A final group of restrictions that can be applied prior to meetings and 
processions is constituted by the power to impose conditions. These might be 
of various kinds (e.g. concerning the size or duration of an assembly) but they 
all have the effect of limiting liberty. Specifying locations may be seen as a 
particular kind of condition but because it has a more extensive regulatory 
framework than the conditions that will be considered here this justifies the 
special attention that has been given to them in section I.
The following analysis of conditions follows the same structure as that used 
for bans, except the comparison with the US and the ECHR will be made at 
the end of the section for both bans and conditions. This reflects the fact that a 
distinction is not generally made between these two kinds of restriction in 
these legal systems.
THE POSITION IN ENGLAND
On what grounds may conditions be imposed?
The main source of police powers to impose conditions on meetings and 
processions before they take place is the POA 1986. By virtue of SS.12(1) and 
14(1), conditions may be imposed on the basis of four grounds: (1) serious 
public disorder, (2) serious damage to property, (3) serious disruption to the 
life of the community and (4) where the purpose of the organiser(s) is the 
intimidation of others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they 
have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do.
Previously the 1936 provision as to conditions merely provided that 
conditions could be imposed on the ground of serious public disorder115 and 
the current extension beyond public order reasons has been strongly
115 S.3(l).
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criticised. Essentially, these criticisms have been focused on ground (3), which 
has been seen as posing a serious threat to the liberties of assembly because of 
a vagueness as to the degree of disruption that would justify the imposition of 
conditions.116 These fears of greater discretion have not been assuaged by the 
rarity of the use of these powers and the probability that the previous practice 
of negotiations between police and organisers will continue.117
Although the POA 1986 is the main source of conditions, Supperstone has 
pointed to the possibility of imposing conditions under the Metropolitan 
Police Act and the Town Police Clauses Act, as well as certain local bylaws.118 
However, these are invariably conditions that relate to location and 
consequently attention will be focused here on powers located in the POA 
1986.
The extension of the power to impose conditions on meetings has been 
described as the most controversial measure in the 1986 Act.119 In its defence 
it was claimed that firstly, this extension removed the favourable treatment of 
meetings vis a vis processions, which was considered to be anomalous, given 
that they were just as often the cause of disorder120 and secondly, that such 
powers would lead to negotiations between organisers and police.121 
However, despite these claims, it will be seen below that meetings still enjoy a 
favoured position as regards the conditions imposed upon them.
Finally, it should be noted that like bans, conditions can only be imposed on 
public meetings and marches.
116 For example, Williams, (1987), op. cit., 72-3, Robertson, op. cit., 71-2, Thornton, (1987), op. 
cit., 142, Card, op. cit., 71-2, Smith, op. cit., 134-6 and Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 118-121. Both 
Smith, op. cit., 135 and Card, op. cit., 71 also note that the grounds in the provisions provide 
for the imposition of conditions by reason of the apprehended reaction of others to the 
meeting or march (the so-called 'heckler's veto', infra.).
117 Card, op. cit., 68 and Smith, op. cit., 134-6, n.26. Even if informal negotiations continue, 
police powers to impose conditions may be seen as constituting a powerful bargaining 
position. As a consequence, the police may ultimately dictate terms, instead of negotiating 
them. This would be contrary to one of the avowed aims of the condition power which was to 
provide a framework for negotiations, not police coercion (see the Fifth Report from the 
Home Affairs Committee, Session 1979-80, ’The Law Relating to Public Order' (1979-80 HC 
756), vol. 1, para.35).
118 op. cit., 59-62.
119 Robertson, op. cit., 74.
120 See White Paper, 'Review of Public Order Law', op. cit., para. 5.1.
121 note 117, supra.
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What kinds of conditions can be imposed?
Here the position differs as between processions and meetings. Nevertheless, 
for both kinds of assembly the condition that is imposed must 'appear...to 
prevent' the disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation which were 
mentioned above as being the grounds upon which conditions are based.122
However, meetings may only have conditions as to place, maximum duration 
or maximum number of participants imposed upon them, whereas for 
processions 'such conditions as appear...necessary' to prevent the four 
situations laid out in SS.12 & 14 may be imposed.123 The result is a wider 
discretion as regards conditions that may be imposed upon the liberty to 
process.
No explanation has been given for this difference but it may be surmised that 
the conditions for meetings correspond to the police view of what is necessary 
to avoid the four evils, whereas a wider and more flexible approach was 
preferred as regards processions.
Who decides whether to impose conditions?
Whereas this power was exercised by the Chief Constable in the 1936 Act, the 
1986 provisions provide that as regards processions the 'senior police officer’ 
may impose conditions where 'persons are assembling with a view to taking 
part in it...'. Where the march is in the actual process of assembling, the 'senior 
police officer1 is defined as the 'most senior in rank of the police officers 
present at the scene.'124 On the other hand, when a procession is intended to 
take place but with less immediacy, 'senior police officer' means Chief 
Constable.125 Thus, apart from processions that are in the process of 
assembling, prior conditions on assemblies remain the decision of the Chief 
Constable. The probable reason why the former decision can be taken by a 
police officer of less than the rank of Chief Constable without consulting 
either the LPA or the Home Secretary is that conditions in such circumstances 
are seen as more clearly involving the operational expertise of the police on 
the spot, which as was noted with regard to judicial review, is generally felt to 
be beyond the competence of the courts. Nevertheless, given the width of the
122 S.12(l)(b) and S.14(l)(b).
123 Marston, op. cit., 130.
124 S.12(2)(a).
125 S.12(2)(b) and S.14(2)(b).
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conditions that may be imposed, especially as far as processions are 
concerned, it may be justifiably claimed that such decisions should be open to 
scrutiny and involve other and more locally accountable parties.
Reviewing decisions
Much the same comments as were made about the possibilities of challenging 
bans are applicable as regards conditions. However, three factors would seem 
to further reduce the chances of a successful challenge: firstly, conditions are 
imposed as 'appear necessary' not as 'reasonably' appear necessary. This 
omission allows for a wide degree of subjectivity that may not easily be open 
to judicial review. This wide discretion in turn means that conditions may be 
imposed which may be unduly (i.e. disproportionally) restrictive of the 
liberties but because they appear to be necessary are unimpeachable.126 This 
possibility is especially heightened as regards processions, where the wider 
discretion excludes any meaningful requirement of proportionality or 
necessity as far as conditions are concerned. Instead all the police must prove 
is the weakest of links between the reason and condition in order to have 
shifted a monumental burden of proof on those who seek to challenge the 
condition.
Secondly, there is no requirement that the imposition of conditions be a 
measure of last resort, indeed nothing in the relevant provisions would 
prevent them being imposed as a first resort. Hence, conditions used too 
readily would seem to be beyond challenge.127
Thirdly, as was noted above, judicial review-proof subjective opinions seem 
to be laid down in order to impose conditions on the grounds of serious 
disruption and intimidation.128
126 It is worth repeating the remarks by Card, op. tit., 89;
'...if...objection is taken to the nature of the condition or a ban, an application for judicial 
review of it is most unlikely to succeed. The reason is that there is no requirement for a 
reasonable belief in the necessity for a particular condition or ban. In fact, in relation to a 
condition it is expressly stated that such conditions may be imposed "as appear necessary" to 
the officer imposing them. This means that a condition or ban can only be impugned on the 
grounds of ultra vires, breach of duty to act fairly, or abuse or misuse of power.'
127 This is unlike bans, which were at least required to be a partial last resort; see section II, 
supra..
128 The intimidation ground was the subject of review in Police v Reid [1987] Crim.L.R. 702, 
where it was held that 'discomfort' was not to be equated with intimidation.
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COMPARING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
No specific powers to impose conditions on the liberties to meet and to 
process exist in French law, however such powers would seem to be 
implicitly part of the wider public order powers belonging to the police. This 
would indeed seem to be the case if Abbé Olivier is recalled, where a mayor 
attempted to impose a condition on a funeral procession, using these 
powers.129 This case confirms that conditions may only be imposed for public 
order reasons, although it will be recalled that this is a wider notion than in 
England. Given that conditions are probably within the competence of the 
general public order powers, the same comments that were previously made 
in section II as regards banning powers in France are applicable here.
Essentially, this means firsly, that conditions will be subject to a more 
exacting judicial review (including the expedited emergency procedure), 
secondly, must be a last resort and thirdly, must be necessary and 
proportional.
Consequently, the wide subjective terms in the POA 1986 would in France be 
subject to a detailed investigation of the factual circumstances surrounding a 
belief that disruption to the community or intimidation would occur. The 
police would have to show that no other choice was available. This would 
give teeth to the requirement of necessity. Furthermore, a link or a 
proportional relation would be required between the condition and the 
ground upon which it is based. Finally, unlike England, the decision as to 
conditions would, as part of the police general public order powers, be 
generally subject to a dual police authority control rather than being a 
decision within the discretion of one person. While, as was shown above, 
there is room for some improvement in the French system in order to provide 
greater access to other interested and affected parties, it provides better 
protection of the liberties than the English framework, which leaves decision­
making solely in the Chief Constable or senior officer s hands.
Furthermore, despite the fact that conditions can be as damaging to the 
liberty to assemble as bans, this is not reflected in the legal framework in 
England,130 where they are left to the wide discretion of the police. This is a
129 Chap.V, section ID.
130 As is forcefully put by Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 119; 
(Footnote continues on next page)
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danger that ought to be remedied but that once again calls for wider action 
than simply calling for the constitutional enactment of rights, that has 
traditionally been the focus of attention of the Bill of Rights campaign. 
Instead, detailed regulation could be set out in an Act of Parliament, thus 
achieving protection but via a means that is more readily subject to alteration 
in the face of political and social forces.
HIGHER STANDARDS: USA and ECHR
How do French and English regulations of bans and conditions before 
meetings and marches measure up against the supposed higher standards of 
the US and the ECHR? The answer requires some extrapolation from US and 
Convention law because of the lack of case law in this area. This means that 
such questions as the grounds upon which conditions and bans may be made, 
the kinds of bans and conditions and judicial review have to be compared 
with principles drawn from other, but related, areas. Nevertheless, it will be 
contended, that as with restrictions as to location in section I, French law 
protects the liberties to assemble at least as well as US law and the 
Convention.
US law
Given that in the US the liberties of assembly are constructed as a single 
liberty, which is guaranteed as one of the rights within the First Amendment, 
the liberties are seen as part of the freedom of speech and consequently, little 
or no distinction is made between the liberty to meet and the liberty to 
process. Furthermore, bans and conditions are analysed according to whether 
they are aimed at the communicative impact or non-communicative impact of an 
assembly.131
Non-communicative impact would be characterised by bans or conditions 
that are imposed because of prior knowledge of the message of the assembly, 
for example. Normally, such a restriction of meetings and marches in a public 
forum (for example the public highway or a local authority meeting hall) 
would be invalid because restrictions in these areas must normally be
'It is quite dear that the imposition of conditions may be as effective as an outright ban. A 
CND march around an empty common is less effective, if causing less inconvenience, than 
one down a High Street. A meeting about South Africa [House] is less meaningful at 
Waterloo Bridge than in front of the country's embassy in Trafalgar Square, especially if the 
number is cut to 20 after 2,000 turn up.'
131 Tribe, op. at., 789-90 and see section I, supra.
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content-neutral.132 An exception is however made as regards a certain 
category of unprotected speech. Therefore, if in a procession or meeting it is 
reasonably believed that words will be spoken in order to directly incite or 
produce imminent lawless action and that this advocacy is also 'likely to 
incite or produce such action' bans or conditions may be upheld.133 This 
means that bans and conditions may be imposed where the content of 
assemblies is likely to involve the advocacy of illegal conduct.
However, there are further limits which are imposed even on restrictions of 
this kind of speech. These consist of the doctrines of prior restraint, vagueness 
and overbreadth. Common to all is that restrictions on speech will be held to be 
invalid if they use impermissible means, even though the speech could 
legitimately have been restricted using other means. Essentially, these 
doctrines regulate the ways in which speech may be limited. For example, 
bans and conditions carry a presumption of illegality because US courts assert 
that restrictions should normally only be applied ex post facto the speech, for 
example, a criminal prosecution. This is the known as the doctrine of prior 
restraint.134 These restrictions must also not be so vague that 'persons of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application' (vagueness)135 and a restriction (or legal measure that provides 
for it) may not have potential applications that would unduly and
132 See, for example, Gravned v Rockford, supra.
133 This is the two part test laid down in Brandenburg v Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The test is 
somewhat of a synthesis of the previously dominant 'dear and present danger test' (as per 
Holmes J in Schenck v U.S. 249 U.S. 47 (1919)) and Learned Hand J's test focusing solely on 
the words spoken and not on the surrounding circumstances (laid down in Masses 
Publishing Co. v Patten. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
134 Prior restraint is a doctrine that has mainly developed as regards press and publishing 
(see Tribe, op. at., 1039-55 and W.B. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J.H. Choper and S.H Shiffrin, 
Constitutional Rights and Liberties, cases-comments-questions'. (1991), (598-605). However, 
the impositions of bans and conditions prior to an assembly have also been seen to be 
examples of prior restraints (see V. Blasi, 'Prior Restraints on Demonstrations’ Mich.L.Rev. 68 
(1969-70), 1482) and restrictions as to location have also been seen as a particular form of 
prior restraint (see for example, the cases on permit requirements: Carroll v Princess Anne , 
339 U.S. 175 (1968), Kunz v New York. 340 U.S. 290 (1951) and Shuttlesworth v Birmingham. 
394 U.S. 147 (1969). Prior restraints therefore carry a burden of showing that ex ante 
punishment would not be suitable and thus the Court stated in Bantam Books, Inc. v 
Sullivan. 372 U.S. 58,70 (1963) that any
’...system of prior restraints comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against 
constitutional validity.'
135 This was the test laid down in Connolly v General Construction Co.. 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
The doctrine can be seen to stem from the requirement of the Due Process Clause that dtizens 
should have fair notice of illegal conduct and that uncertainty of the law may discourage 
dtizens from exercising their liberties. Another aim is to reduce the discretion enjoyed by 
state officials.
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substantially restrict other forms of protected speech (unconstitutional on its 
face for reasons of overbreadth).136
Where bans and conditions are imposed on the grounds of content-neutral 
reasons, the same comments as were made above as regards restrictions on 
locations would appear to apply. Consequently, bans and conditions must be 
narrowly tailored, serve a significant government interest and not close adequate 
alternative channels for communication.137
Apart from this general rule, the courts have been active as regards two other 
areas of content-neutral restrictions. The first is the so-called 'hecklers' veto'. 
This refers to the restriction of assemblies (in the present context, via bans and 
conditions) based upon an apprehension of the violent reaction of others, be 
they the audience or those engaged in a counter-assembly. However, the 
cases have actually concerned hostile reactions during assemblies.138 The 
second area concerns the 'sensitive audience'. In this case the question 
concerns whether speech may be restricted because listeners will find it 
offensive and then react violently.139 Although the cases have concerned 
restrictions during assemblies, the principles may be extended to the prior 
situation but given the fact that the cases therefore concern restrictions during 
assemblies they will be returned to in greater detail in the next section. Here it 
will be noted that the principles concerning the hecklers' veto and the 
sensitive audience were laid down in Chaplinskv v New Hampshire, in 
which it was stated that;
136 The overbreadth doctrine (see Thornhill v Alabama. 310 U.S. 88 (1940)) allows the court to 
go beyond the application of a statute or measure 'as applied' (the normal method) and to 
look at potential applications in order to see its effects ('on its face review'). Thus, as another 
exception to the general rule, an individual can litigate the rights of third parties not before 
the court by showing that a measure if applied according to its terms would violate the First 
Amendment rights of others (see Tribe, op. tit., 1022-29).
137 See Gravned v Rockford, supra.
138 A crucial distinction must be made here between the 'hecklers' veto' as a ground for a ban 
or condition and this same reason employed as a justification for interference with an 
assembly when it has already got under way. It will be noted that English law has been far 
more concerned with the latter, whereas U.S. law has primarily focused on the former (see for 
example, Feiner v New York. 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303, 95 L.Ed. 295). Therefore in the next 
section the principles of U.S. law (involving restrictions prior to assemblies) will also be 
applied as higher standards as far as restrictions in England (during assemblies).
The term 'heckler's veto' was first used by H. Kalven, 'The Negro and the First Amendment'
(1965) 140-5.
139 See for example, Terminiello v Chicago. 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894,93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) and 
Street v New York 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, and the insulting or "fighting" words
- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.14®
Following on from this case it may therefore be claimed that bans and 
conditions may be imposed where fighting words or speech that will inflict 
injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace are apprehended. However, 
on the authority of Cox v Louisiana,141 it would seem that restrictions must be 
a last resort in the sense that the police must have been unable to 'handle the 
crowd' by other means except via bans and conditions.142
ECHRlaw
As far as the ECHR is concerned a series of grounds are set out in art.11 for 
the imposition of restrictions on the liberties, where they are constructed as a 
single, unified liberty to assemble, but there has been little case law as to the 
application of these grounds.143 However, it has been held by the 
Commission that while restrictions may be imposed on the grounds of 'public 
safety' and the 'prevention of disorder', such measures must be necessary and 
proportional.144
140 315 U.S. 568,572.
141 op. cit., 550.
142 See also Feiner v New York, op. cit., 326-7, Black J dissenting;
'If in the name of preserving order [the police] ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, 
they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him.'
(c.f. Edwards v South Carolina. 372 U.S. 229,232-3 (1963) and Gregory v Chicago 394 U.S. 111 
(1969)).
These cases have sought to limit and prevent the discretion the police enjoy as to whether to 
'silence a provocative speaker or instead...control the hostile audience' (Tribe, op. cit., 852). 
Much depends on the context (Cohen v Carolina. 403 U.S. 15 (1971)) and so no hard and fast 
rule can be found. Therefore, there is no rule that a speaker's interests will always prevail (see 
Niemotko v Maryland. 340 U.S. 268, 289 (1951), per Frankfurter J; 'It is not a constitutional 
principle that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd 
whatever its size and temper and not against the speaker.'), nor that the audience's interest 
will always be prioritised (see Cantwell v Connecticut. 310 U.S. 2%, 311 (1940)).
Thus, the imposition of bans and conditions very much depends on the context; the purpose 
and message of the proposed assembly, as well as that of the hecklers will be very important 
and if the willingness of the Supreme Court to strictly examine police accounts of the facts 
during assemblies (as in Hess v Indiana. 414 U.S. 105 (1973)) is extended to the prior situation, 
exacting judicial review can be expected to be extended to apprehended circumstances.
143 P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, 'Theory and Practice of the European convention of 
Human Rights' (1990), 429 note;
'...freedom of assembly still has not played an important part in the Strasbourg case-law.'
144 Appl. No. 8191/78 Rassemblement jurassien et Unité jurassienne v Switzerland. 17 (1980) 
D & R, 93,120.
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The hecklers' veto situation has also been pronounced upon; in Christians 
Against Racism and Fascism v UK.145 where the Commission asserted that 
the prospect of violent reactions or counter-demonstrations did not remove 
the obligation to protect the freedom of assembly. The Commission strongly 
underlined this view in Platform 'Àrtze für das Leben' v Austria by stating 
that the right to assemble included the right to protection against counter­
demonstrators;
because it is only in this way that its effective exercise can be secured to social groups 
wishing to demonstrate for certain principles on highly controversial issues.146
After this brief summary of the US and Convention positions as regards 
conditions and bans, French and English practice can now be compared with 
these standards.
Comparison
on what grounds may bans and conditions be imposed?
It will be recalled that in France bans and conditions may only be imposed as 
a last resort for reasons of public disorder and administrative and managerial 
considerations. This is also the case in England. In both the USA and under 
the Convention public disorder has been seen to be a legitimate ground. 
However, it was noted that public order had quite a wide meaning under the 
general police powers in France, that goes beyond violence. At the same time, 
it should be noted that in the US, as regards non-communicative impact 
restrictions, 'significant government interests' have been held to include 
interests such as the 'well-being, tranquillity, and privacy of the home'.147 
Therefore, providing that bans and conditions are narrowly tailored to effect 
these government interests, it would appear that restrictions may also be 
imposed for non-public order reasons in the US (i.e. reasons that go beyond 
violence).148 The review of facts and circumstances which the US courts 
undertake is remarkably similar to the review carried out in the French 
administrative courts, using the principles of proportionality and necessity
145 op. tit., at 148.
146 Appl. No. 10126/82, (1985), 44 D & R, 65, 72-4.
147 See Carev v Brown. 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980), most recently affirmed in Frisbv v Schultz. 
101 L.Ed. 2d. 420,431 (1988), per O'Connor J.
148 For example, in Cox v New Hampshire, (op. tit., 572), the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
that required marchers to pay the costs of policing . Having secured constitutional validity, a 
refusal to pay would presumably have been a justified and hence a non-public order ground 
for a ban or condition (c.f. Blasi, op. tit., 1527-32).
and examining the merits of police decisions. On the other hand, in England it 
has been seen that the courts have declared themselves incompetent to review 
what they consider to be matters of operational policy. From a theoretical 
perspective, French arrangements are not only preferred but once again 
compare well with higher standards.
Similarly, the ECHR provides a range of grounds which probably include 
non-public order considerations (e.g. the 'protection of health or morals' or 
the 'protection of the rights and freedoms of others'). It follows that both 
France and England accept grounds for bans and conditions that would be 
acceptable under US law and the ECHR. However, the need for reform as far 
as its less exacting review seems imperative in England, now that bans and 
conditions may be imposed for non-public order reasons in the POA 1986. It 
is precisely because of the existence of exacting judicial review in France that 
it is claimed that it affords greater protection even though its notion of public 
disorder is wider than that in England. Thus, although both the US and the 
ECHR have shown that bans and conditions may be imposed for reasons that 
go beyond public disorder in the English sense, it is contended that the 
decision to go beyond this relatively narrow justification must be 
accompanied with tighter and tougher review mechanisms - this has not been 
the case in England.
France would also seem to be in a somewhat stronger position than England 
and the ECHR as far as the last resort requirement. It has been shown why 
this is so vis à vis England but in comparison to the Convention it is 
contended that despite the avowed requirements of proportionality and 
necessity, the fact that the Convention permits the Contracting States a 
'margin of appreciation' as regards what is a necessary reaction, provides a 
weaker degree of protection than in France. This is because of the acceptance 
by both the Court and Commission of factual judgements at the national 
level, especially when 'on the spot' decisions have to made.149 Thus in the 
Christians Against Racism case, the UK Government was able to invoke a 
margin of appreciation in order to have its view of the necessity of the general
149 See van Dijk & van Hoof, op. cit., 583-606 and the cases cited therein. The authors 
conclude (op. cit., 605), as regards the margin of appreciation left to States, that;
The Commission and the Court appear to follow in many cases what might be called a raison 
d'état interpretation: when they weigh the full enjoyment of the rights and freedoms on the 
one hand and the interests advanced by the State for their restriction on the other hand. They 
appear to be inclined to pay more weight to the latter.'
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ban accepted, despite the Commission's admission that the parties were ’in 
fundamental disagreement as to the justification of the measure complained 
of.’150
In France, on the other hand, state authorities do not enjoy this presumption 
of truth, instead they must show that they have exhausted all other police 
measures before restricting the liberties. In addition, the previous behaviour 
of those wishing to assemble is not so readily admitted as it was in the instant 
case,151 as is seen by Naud.152
Furthermore, France compares well with the US by reason of the same 
insistence that restrictions be a last resort when all else has failed or shown to 
be ineffective.153
what kind of bans and conditions may be imposed?
The English tendency to use general bans has been upheld by the 
Commission in the Christians Against Racism case, which accepted the UK 
Government's contention that;
this legal situation is based on considerations designed to ensure an even application of the 
law in that it aims at the exclusion of any possibility for the talcing of arbitrary measures 
against a particular demonstration.154
However, it was stated that general bans of processions would only be 
permitted where disorder could not be prevented by less stringent measures 
(i.e. as a last resort) and the authorities had to show that the disadvantages 
caused to other processions must be 'clearly outweighed by the security 
considerations justifying the issue of the ban.'155 US standards would seem to 
be tougher as regards communicative impact restrictions, in that the doctrine 
of overbreadth indicates the need for strong justificatory grounds before
150 op. cit., 149.
151 op. cit., 151;
The Commission considers that in these circumstances it was not unreasonable for the 
competent authorities to prohibit all public processions other than customary ones during the 
relevant two months period i.e. extending three days after the by-election in Lambeth. Hairing 
regard to the previous experience in Manchester where the National Front had circumvented a 
local ban by marching in another district it was not unreasonable to extend the ban to the 
whole of the London police area.' (emphasis added).
152 Chap.IV, section III.
153 See supra., and Cox v Louisiana, op. cit.
154 op. dt., 150.
155 op. cit., 150.
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general bans can be used.156 As a consequence, the English policy of general 
bans would probably be struck down under US standards. Although in 
France such general bans are possible under the general police powers, it has 
been seen that on the rare occasions they have been employed they have been 
struck down. However, general bans would seem to carry a heavy burden of 
justification as in the US, at least when they are based on the communicative 
content of an assembly.
Strong arguments have been presented to justify specific, as opposed to 
general bans and vice-versa.157 Which of these is to be preferred from the 
jurisprudential perspective that was formulated in Part I of this study? The 
answer is that specific bans are preferred because they are more likely to take 
account of the specific circumstances of a particular meeting or march; in 
other words, an emphasis on the specific. It would thus seem that none of the 
legal systems meets the standards set by the theoiy but at least France comes 
closer than England to doing so.
This is because of the legal context of a specific or general ban. In cases such 
as Kent v MPC where an innocent march is caught by a general ban, liberty 
would seem to be better protected by the existence of a review body that 
could engage in an in-depth investigation of the factual circumstances and 
reasons at issue. Moreover, since controversial and political issues may need 
to be dealt with, it would make sense if such a body was composed of persons 
who are representatives of interested political groups. Such a body has been 
seen in the shape of the Cc in France, although this is a national, as opposed 
to a preferred local body. Thus the English use of general bans is less open to 
criticism, given its use in other legal systems but its use in a context in which 
adequate review is not provided is certainly a source of concern that can be 
criticised. In comparison, France's system of judicial review more closely 
approximates to the ideal. In addition, future legislative changes to the 
framework are likely to undergo the highly political and exacting review that 
is carried out by the Cc, as was seen in chapter II. Both these factors ensure, to 
a greater degree than in England, that the use of general (and for that matter,
156 However, the generality of the ban would have to be such that overbreadth was 
substantial, in that the number of potentially restricted assemblies was large in comparison to 
those legitimately restricted by the measure (c.f. Broadrick v Oklahoma. 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
157 In favour of specific bans, see note 68, supra., and against, see G. Shaw MP, Home Office 
Minister of State House of Commons, Second Reading, col. 861 (expressing the reservations 
of Chief Constables) and see the Christians Against Racism case, supra.
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specific) bans will be closely scrutinised as to their political contexts and 
consequences.
However, it must be added that England seems to stand its own in providing 
for time limits on bans. Although it may be assumed that France, the US and 
the ECHR would subject this question to the requirements of necessity, 
proportionality, narrow tailoring etc., it would seem better to make an 
express legal enactment to this effect. This is furthermore submitted to be a 
serious deficiency in the ECHR which purports to set European-wide 
minimum standards.
who decides whether to impose bans?
US law has not pronounced on this issue and so seems to be of no help in 
providing a higher standard as far as who should impose conditions and 
bans. Although it should be noted that here the interaction between central 
and local power is also found (i.e. between the Federal and State 
governments). In a similar fashion, the requirement in art.ll of the 
Convention that any restrictions on the freedom of assembly must be 
proscribed by law has not been expanded upon and, as it stands, appears to 
be of little guidance in comparing France and England.158
reviewing decisions
Both the US and the ECHR provide review bodies that, as has been seen in 
the cases, can go some way beyond the limited procedural review in England. 
Hence in the US, the Supreme Court will engage in a fresh review of the 
finding of fact of the lower court and the lower courts themselves are able to 
investigate the factual circumstances at the time a decision was made to 
restrict the liberties in question. As far as the ECHR, the Commission and the 
Court, although allowing a margin of appreciation to the domestic 
authorities, will also investigate the merits of the case. This is the type of 
review that was noted in France and is the exacting degree of review that is 
supported by theory. Therefore, it can again be claimed that the theory and 
France stand up to comparison with higher standards. Indeed, France may 
even provide better protection by reason of the emergency administrative 
review procedure as regards human rights, which can be said to reflect the
158 van Dijk & van Hoof, op. at., 578-83.
348
social importance and value of human rights by according them special 
protection.
On the other hand, the lack of such exacting review in England isolates it and 
means that meetings and processions are more likely to be subject to the 
unchecked discretion of the police and other government officials. It suffices 
to repeat here that reforms as regards judicial review are therefore required to 
bring England up to, not only the French standard, but also those of the US 
and the ECHR. It is worth repeating that this is more likely to be 
accomplished via an approach that is based on theory and which looks at the 
detailed legal reforms that are necessary to improve the legal protection of the 
liberties, as opposed to a broad and general constitutional enactment.
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CHAPTER VIII
COMPARING REGULATION OF THE LIBERTIES: DURING 
MEETINGS AND PROCESSIONS
INTRODUCTION
Having looked at the framework of laws that may be applied to meetings and 
processions before they commence, attention will now turn to the regulation of 
these two aspects of the liberty to assemble during their exercise. Firstly, the 
position in England will be briefly set out. Since there is little difference as 
between meetings and processions as far as this type of regulation is 
concerned, they will be treated together. Secondly, a comparison will be made 
with France, using the theoretical conception of civil liberties. Thirdly, the 
resultant evaluations will be compared with the standards provided by the 
USA and the ECHR.
Finally, for the sake of simplicity, the term 'conduct regulations' will be 
employed henceforth in order to refer to legal regulations during assemblies. 
This term also focuses attention on the reasons normally given for such 
regulation; namely the conduct (in the widest sense and therefore including 
what is said or done) of those assembling or those not taking part.
SECTION I 
THE POSITION  IN ENGLAND
Conduct regulations in England either provided by the common law or 
statutory enactments.
COMMON LAW
At common law, the liberties to meet and process are most likely to be 
regulated on the basis of the breach of the peace power. Essentially, this refers 
to a duty at common law on all the subjects of Her Majesty to prevent 
breaches of the peace.1 It is essentially a preventative power, in that it is
1 The authoritative decision on the nature of the breach of the peace power is R v Howell 
fErroin [1982] Q.B. 416, in which Watkins LJ, at 427 stated;
(Footnote continues on next page)
350
doubtful if a substantive offence of breaching the peace exists in England.2 The 
aim of the doctrine is to prevent reasonably apprehended breaches of the 
public peace. In practical terms it is the police constable who most commonly 
carries out this duty.3 What is the genus of conduct that constitutes a breach 
of the peace? Williams has claimed that a core element is conduct involving 
danger to the person as well as the apprehension of a threat or use of force.4
At this point it may be objected that the common law duty to prevent a 
breach of the peace is part of the legal framework applicable before meetings 
and processions, as opposed to during their exercise. This would seem to be 
clear given that the police are justified in acting upon a reasonable 
apprehension and this in turn indicates a priori application. In a sense this 
point must be conceded but the breach of the peace duty has been limited to 
an immediate apprehension of a breach. The consequence of this is that it is the 
police constable on the spot who carries out the duty; it is his/her reasonable
'We are emboldened to say that there is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done 
or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of 
being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other 
disturbance. It is for this breach of the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable 
apprehension of it taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender 
without warrant.'
In this case it was stated that the activity which causes a breach of the peace must be linked to 
harm (either to the person or to property); at 426;
'...we cannot accept that there can be a breach of the peace unless there has been an act done 
or threatened to be done which either actually harms a person, or in his presence his 
property, or is likely to cause such harm, or which puts someone in fear of such harm being 
done.'
(c.f. A.T.H. Smith, 'Breaching the Peace and Disturbing the Quiet' [1982] P.L. 12-8).
Doubt has been thrown on this link by reason of the more recent comments in R v Chief 
Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex. p. Central Electricity Generating Board [1982] Q.B. 458, 
in which Lord Denning claimed that a criminal obstruction was a breach of the peace without 
making any reference to the likelihood of harm. However, these remarks have not been taken 
up and it is suggested that R v Howell (ErrolU is still good law.
2 Supperstone, op. cit., 1, points to the fact that breaching the peace is probably not a 
substantive crime in England, although it is in Scotland (ci. Thornton, (1987), op. cit., 75 and 
Sherr, op. cit., 111-2).
3 The police have been noted to have
'...a common law duty to take such steps as are reasonably required to quell a breach of the peace 
and to prevent a reasonably apprehended breach of the peace.'
(Supperstone, op. cit., 328, emphasis added).
However, it is a duty that is shared by ordinary citizens (see Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546, 
565).
4 G. Williams 'Arrest for Breach of the Peace' [1954] Crim.LR 578 at 579. This would accord 
with the views expressed in R v Howell (note 1, supra.).
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apprehension that justifies restrictions.5 If this were not the case, the Chief 
Constable could ban an assembly on the basis of an apprehended breach of 
the peace but it has been held that at common law no such powers exist and 
that their attempted use was discredited in Beatty v Gilbanks.6 Given the 
requirement of close temporal proximity, the breach of the peace power has 
therefore been applied on the basis of conduct during meetings and 
processions. The common situation has been acts or words during an 
assembly that a police constable then present has believed would lead to an 
imminent breach of the peace. The power is also preserved in the POA 19867 
Therefore, as presently formulated, the power is part of the legal regulation of 
conduct during assemblies.
Having disposed of this possible objection, it should be noted that the police 
enjoy a wide discretion as to what action should be taken to prevent a breach 
of the peace. In fact, it has been held that all reasonable steps must be taken. 
This might mean the arrest of those believed to be about to cause a breach, the 
dispersal of the assembly, the attendance of police, re-routing and moving the 
location of the assembly, in short, the police constable must do all that is 
reasonably necessary.8
Finally, it should be noted that as far as the 'heckler's veto', the police 
constable may restrict a meeting or procession on the basis that the 
apprehended reaction of others would constitute a breach of the peace.
5 See generally Marston, (1985) J.P.N. 403 and 423, R v Chief Constable of Devon and 
Cornwall, ex. p. CEGB. op. cit., at 476 and G. Williams, 'Dealing with Breaches of the Peace' 
(1982) 146 J.P.N. 199-200,217-219 at 200.
6 (1882) 9 Q.B. 308 and see Williams (1967), op. cit., 49-54.
7 S.40(4);
'Nothing in this Act affects the common law powers in England and Wales to deal with or 
prevent a breach of the peace.'
For an example of the application of the breach of the peace power to the liberty to meet, see 
Thomas v Sawkins [1935] 2 K.B., 249 and for the liberty to process, R v Londonderry lustices 
(1891) 28 L.R.Ir. 440.
8 See Thornton (1987), op. cit., 75, Sherr, op. cit., 112-3 and Humphries v O'Connor (1864) 17 
1.C.LJL 1, where a police officer's removal of an orange lily which 'was calculated and tended 
to provoke animosity between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects' was upheld, Hayes J 
stating;
'A constable, by his very appointment, is by law charged with the solemn duty of seeing that 
the peace is preserved. The law has not ventured to lay down what precise measures shall be 
adopted by him in every state of facts which calls for interference. But it has done far better; it 
has announced to him, and to the public over whom he is placed, that he is not only at 
liberty, but is bound, to see that the peace is preserved, and that he is to do everything that is 
necessary for the purpose, neither more nor less.'
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Although it was held in Beatty v Gilbanks that those engaged in otherwise 
lawful activities could not have those activities restricted because of the 
apprehended violent reaction of others,9 later cases have created exceptions to 
this principle. For example, restrictions may be justified if there is conduct 
that deliberately provokes a violent reaction and where the natural consequences 
of conduct in an assembly would be a breach of the peace by others.10
STATUTES
Three statutes are of relevance here (1) the Public Meeting Act 1908, (2) the 
Police Act 1964 and (3) the Public Order Act 1986. Each will be looked at in 
turn but it should be underlined that they can operate in conjunction with 
each other and can consequently reinforce each other.
The Public Meeting Act
The Public Meeting Act 1908 was originally passed in order to prevent the 
disruption of public meetings by the suffragettes.11 By virtue of S.l
9 op. tit.. Field J stating;
The appellants were guilty of no offence in their passing through the streets, and why should 
other persons interfere with or molest them? What right had they to do so? If they were doing 
anything unlawful it was for the magistrates and the police, the appointed guardians of law 
and order, to interpose. The law...affords no support to the view of the matter which the 
learned counsel for the respondent was obliged to contend, viz., that persons acting lawfully 
are to be held responsible and punished merely because other persons are thereby induced to 
act unlawfully and create a disturbance.'
10 This 'chipping away' at the Beatty v Gilbanks principle has been noted by W. Birtles, The 
Common Law Power of the Police to Control Public Meetings' (1937) 34 M.L.R. 587, at 591 
and Williams, (1978), op. tit., 31-2 and (1967), op. tit., 106-7. In Wise v Dunning [1902] 1 K.B. 
167, Wise was bound over to keep the peace (see chap.IX, infra.) after addressing a meeting 
using words and gestures that were insulting to Roman Catholics. The order was upheld on 
appeal because the breaches of the peace were the 'natural consequence' of his provocative 
conduct. The case distinguished Beatty v Gilbanks because of the presence of deliberately 
provocative conduct that had the clearly foreseeable consequences of causing a breach of the 
peace. This distinguishing, based on a causal view, can paradoxically be seen to have been 
drawn from statements in Beattv v Gilbanks itself where Field J stated;
'Now, without a doubt, as a general rule it must be taken that every person intends what are 
the natural and necessary consequences of his own acts, and if in the present case it had been 
their [the Salvation Army's] intention, or if it had been the natural and necessary consequence 
of their acts, to produce the disturbance of the peace which occurred, then the appellants 
would have been responsible for it, and the magistrates would have been right in binding 
them over to keep the peace.'
Thus, it may be claimed that Beattv v Gilbanks 'contains the seeds of its own destruction', 
independently from the later glosses and critical comments like that in O'Kellv v Harvey 
(1883) 15 Cox CC 435 per Law LC;
’I frankly own that I cannot understand that decision...'.
11 Williams (1967), op. tit., 138.
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Any person who at a lawful public meeting acts in a disorderly manner for the purpose of 
preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called together shall be 
guilty of an offence
An offence is also committed by 'any person who incites others to commit an 
offence' under S.l. In addition, S.3 provides that if a police constable 
'reasonably suspects' someone of committing a S.l offence s/he may, if 
requested by the chair of the meeting, require that person's name and 
address. If that person then refuses or fails give this information or gives a 
false name and address, this also constitutes an offence.12
This statute is important in the heckler's veto situation, in that even if the 
breach of peace power permits the unrequested presence of the police in an 
assembly, at least as far as meetings are concerned,13 the police by virtue of 
this Act should first take steps against those disrupting a meeting rather than 
those acting lawfully.14 Having said this, the statute does not appear to have 
been widely used in modem times. This is probably due to a lack of a power 
of arrest in s.l and because the police feel they should not interfere except on 
the grounds of a breach of the peace.15
The Police Act
The Police Act 1964 creates two offences of relevance here, both by virtue of 
S.51. The first is by virtue of S.51(l) which creates the offence of assaulting a 
constable in the execution of his duty and the second, to be found in S.51 (3), is 
that of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty. In relation to the 
former, in order to be applied to peaceful assemblies (i.e. those by which the 
liberty to meet or to process is exercised) a finding of conduct that 
intentionally or recklessly causes another (i.e. the police constable) to 
apprehend immediate and lawful personal violence is required.16 Given this 
necessary element of violence, this offence is of less relevance to the liberty to 
assemble than is the second, obstruction offence. This is an offence that has 
been widened by the judiciary to extend to non-physical obstruction of the
12 See Burden v Rigler and Another 1 K.B. [1911] 337 for the application of this statute.
13 Thomas v Sawkins [1935] 2 K.B. 249, see infra.
14 As is stated by Bailey et. al, op. tit., 214 when discussing this statute;
'It is arguable that the police should act first against persons who disrupt or threaten to 
disrupt a lawful meeting, and disperse the meeting itself if necessary in the last resort.'
15 See Card, op. tit., 92.
16 See Supperstone, op. tit., 109 et. seq., and Smith (1987), op. tit., 183-190.
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police.17 It has been held that the duty that the police constable must be 
exercising when obstructed does not have to be derived from a specific rule of 
law. Therefore, the duty to prevent breaches of the peace would seem to be 
covered by this statutory offence.18
The obstruction offence is one of the most common means by which 
assemblies are restricted. As is instanced by Duncan v lones.19 it usually 
operates in tandem with other powers. In this case a police constable, 
apprehending a breach of the peace asked Duncan not to address a meeting 
outside a labour exchange where there had been some disorder connected 
with a public meeting on a previous occasion. Duncan was instead asked to 
hold the meeting in another location. She was arrested for obstructing a 
policeman in the execution of his duty when she nevertheless attempted to 
address the crowd.20 The duty that the policeman was found to be executing 
was that of preventing a reasonably apprehended breach of the peace. Thus, 
in this case the statutory obstruction offence is seen as working together with 
the common law breach of the peace power. The case appears to be authority 
for the proposition that a refusal by those exercising the liberties to assemble 
to obey police commands issued in the execution of their duty is an 
obstruction offence.21 An assembly may also be restricted where there is a
17 See Bastable v Little [1907] 1 K.B. 59, Hinchcliffe v Sheldon [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1207 and 
generally Smith, op. tit., 190-5.
18 The view that the duty of a police constable does not have to derive form a specific rule of 
law was laid down in Coffin v Smith (1980) 71 Cr.App.Rep. 221.
19 op. at.
20 At the time of the case, the obstruction offence was found in Prevention of Crimes Act 
1871, S.12 (as amended by the Prevention Crimes Amendment Act 1885, SJt).
21 Supperstone, op. at., 113 sums this up;
'Arguably the decision in Duncan v lones gives the police officer the power to prevent the 
holding of a lawful meeting if he suspects, not that the meeting itself may be disorderly, but 
that breaches of the peace may occur a result of the meeting. This is so whether those 
breaches are by supporters or opponents of a speaker at the meeting.'
The case has been criticised on several grounds: the way the court upheld the apprehension 
of public disorder by making a causal connection between events of some fourteen months 
previous and the meeting in the instant case (Williams (1967), op. at., 121); the fact that the 
criminal offence was not based on some independent illegality but on a refusal to obey the 
orders of a police constable which were based on an apprehended breach of the peace (Smith, 
op. at., 175 and Sherr, op. tit., 127); that the breach of the peace that was apprehended was 
going to be caused by others (Wade, op. at., 179); that non-physical; obstruction was accepted 
as founding the offence (Birtles, op. at., 598) and that the police common law preventative 
powers were found to be self-legislating, in that lawful acts in themselves (the holding of a 
meeting) became unlawful upon a police constable's say-so (Supperstone, op. at., 112). For 
further criticism, see T. Daintith, 'Obeying a Policeman: A Fresh Look at Duncan v lones'
[1966] P.L. 248, Williams, (1967), op. at., 119-23 and Kidd, op. cit., 22-4.
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refusal to obey an order to move on when an obstruction of the highway is 
being caused.22 Thus, the 1964 Act provides yet another source of wide 
powers to regulate the conduct of assemblies.
The Public Order Act 1986
Sections 4 & 5 of the POA 1986 respectively create two distinct offences of 
firstly, causing fear or provoking violence and secondly, causing harassment, 
alarm or distress. Both offences can be committed in public and private 
assemblies and are made out by a wide variety of conduct: using (but only 
towards another person for the S.4 offence) threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour or displaying any writing, sign or other visible 
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting. S.4 is a modification 
of the old S.5 POA 1936 offence of threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour 
that is likely to cause a breach of the peace. The new provision replaces the 
breach of the peace requirement with that of the provocation of violence. A more 
fundamental change is brought about by the reversal of cases such as Marsh v 
Arscott. Parkin v Norman and Nicholson v Cage.23 in which the courts 
refused to uphold prosecutions for the offence where the only persons 
present were police officers because since their duty was to keep the peace, it 
was held that they could not be expected to be threatened or insulted as easily 
as ordinary members of the public. However, the new provision requires only 
that there is a likelihood of a victim fearing violence, thus, as Thornton has 
noted;
the offence will be committed even if there is no possibility that the victim will react with 
violence, for example, if the victim is old and frail, or the victim is a police officer who is not 
expected to resort to violence, or any other law-abiding citizen likely to ignore the threat or 
insult.^4
As a consequence, the new offence could be applied to conduct during an 
assembly when the police constable who is present is the only person likely to 
be insulted etc.
22 Supperstone, op. cit., 109;
'Even where no breach of the peace is anticipated, a police officer may be under a duty to give 
instructions to members of the public. He may, for example require pickets to move on when 
they are obstructing the highway. A deliberate refusal to obey such an instruction may 
amount to an obstruction for the purposes of S.51(3).'
23 Respectively, (1982) 75 Cr.App.Rep. 211; [1983] Q.B. 92; (1985) 80 Cr.App.Rep. 40.
24 (1987), op. cit., 37.
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As far as the meanings of 'threatening', 'abusive' and 'insulting' under these 
sections, the cases under the 1936 Act would still appear to be instructive. 
Therefore, the words are to be given their ordinary meaning25 and as far as 
the heckler's veto, a kind of public law 'thin-skulT rule applies;26 namely if an 
audience or onlookers feels threatened etc. by the speaker's conduct due to 
some special characteristic that makes them more sensitive than an ordinary 
audience, for example, belonging to a particular race vis a vis racist speech, 
this does not constitute a defence to a charge under the provision - the rule is 
that one must take one's audience as one finds it.27
The new S.5 offence is an extension of the law to cover acts that were formerly 
not criminalised.28 Once again there is only a requirement that a person is 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm and distress. It has been held that the 
provision does not apply the previous case law29 and that therefore it remains 
a possibility that a police constable could be caused the harassment, alarm or 
distress under this section.30 The major importance of this offence is that it 
shifts the focus away from the physical reaction of the victim to their mental 
reaction.31 Both these offences require a specific intention and an awareness 
that the words or behaviour are threatening etc. The main area of concern has 
been over the breadth and the subjectivity involved in interpreting the terms 
threatening, abusive and insulting.32 As a result, conduct in meetings and
25 Brutus v Cozens [1973] A.C. 854.
26 This rules comes originally from the law of tort, see Dulieu v White [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679 
per Kennedy J.
27 R v Iordan and Tvndall [1963] Crim.L.R. 124.
28 See Thornton, (1987), op. tit., 40.
29 As was set out in note 23, supra.
30 DPP v Orum [1988] 3 All E.R. 449,451 per Glidewell LJ;
'1 find nothing in the context of the 1986 Act to persuade me that a police officer may not be a 
person who is caused harassment, alarm or distress by the various kinds of words and 
conduct which S5(l) applies.’
31 Bailey et. al., op. tit., 205 and per McCullough J in DPP v Orum. op. tit., at 453;
'In enacting S.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 in place of S.5 of the Public Order Act 1936, 
Parliament advisedly deleted the requirement that a breach of the peace was either intended 
by the defendant or was likely to result from his conduct. In its place was put the 
requirement that someone within sight or sound of the defendant at the material time would 
be likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distressed by his conduct. Thus, what matters is 
not the likely physical reaction to the conduct complained of, but the likely mental reaction to 
it.’
32 See Masterson v Holden [1986] 3 All E.R. 39 whereby the conduct of two homosexuals 
kissing in public was found to be ’insulting’ under S34{13) of the Metropolitan Police Act 
1839, which repeated the old S.5 POA 1936 offence; as per Glidewell J, at 44;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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processions may be criminalised due to the opinions and possible reactions of 
the police and the audience.
It will be recalled that the POA 1986 is also the source of the power to impose 
conditions on the liberty to meet and the liberty to process33 but in yet 
another novel departure, conditions may now be imposed during a public 
procession.34 Such action must based upon the view that because of the time 
or place or circumstances in which a procession is being held and its route it 
is reasonably believed that serious disorder, serious damage to property or 
serious disruption to the life of the community may result. The comments 
made above on the use of conditions as part of the body of laws applicable 
before an assembly can be generally applied here but it must be added that 
the decision as to the imposition of a condition is here granted to the most 
senior ranking police officer present at the scene.35
Finally, mention should be made of the miscellany of offences that may be 
committed during an assembly. Many of these, such as criminal damage,36 
riot, violent disorder and affray37 are not generally used against the liberties 
because of their peaceful nature. On the relatively rare occasions that 
prosecutions for these offences are brought, there has to have been serious 
public disorder and this kind of behaviour can be seen to have moved beyond 
the realm of peaceful assembly that has been explained to be the focus of 
attention. Offences such as incitement to disaffection,38 incitement to racial
'Overt homosexual conduct in a public street, indeed overt heterosexual conduct in a public 
street, may well be considered by many persons to be objectionable, to be conduct which 
ought to be confined to a private place. The fact it is objectionable does not constitute an 
offence. But the display of such objectionable conduct in a public street may well be regarded 
by another person, particularly by a young woman, as conduct which insults her by 
suggesting that she is somebody who would find such conduct in public acceptable herself.' 
(c.f. Lodge v DPP (1988) Times 26th Oct., where jaywalking was caught by S.5). For further 
criticisms of the offence, see Bailey et. ai, op. cit., 206-7, C. Douzinas, S. Homewood & R. 
Warrington, The Shrinking Scope for Public Protest' in Index on Censorship (1988), 12 and 
Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., 122-3 for the attempted prosecution of demonstrators for canying an 
effigy of Margaret Thatcher as a dominatrix carrying a whip).
33 SS.12 & 14, supra., chap.VII, section III.
34 S. 12(1).
35 S.12(2)(a).
36 See the Criminal Damage Act 1971, S.l(l).
37 See POA 1986, SS.l, 2, & 3.
38 See the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934.
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hatred39 and defamation40 which however do not necessarily include an 
element of violence are also rarely used. This study has therefore 
concentrated on the more common restrictions of the liberties to assemble. It 
follows that since the focus is on the peaceful exercise of the liberties under 
study, much of what is known as 'public order' law in England is not of 
relevance. One criticism that was made earlier should be recalled: that is a 
tendency by commentators to equate the liberties to assemble and public 
order law.41 While it may be true that some parts of this body of law apply to 
peaceful assemblies (e.g. the breach of the peace and SS.4 & 5 of the POA 
1986), it must be underlined that the liberties to meet and to march concern 
peaceful activities. With this in mind, it should be asked on what grounds and 
who decides that an assembly is no longer peaceful and that public order 
measures are then applicable. It has been seen that the police constable on the 
spot plays an important role in this area.42 This role is crucial because public 
disorder justifies a whole battery of restrictions, that is why review 
mechanisms are essential and that laws granting these powers should be 
narrowly drawn in order to limit discretion and abuse. If restrictions can be 
too readily applied to assemblies, the status of the liberties will be 
considerably weakened and, in any case, subject to the discretion of the state 
and its officials.
SECTION II 
FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPARED
A miscellany of possible offences exist in France by which to restrict conduct 
during the exercise of the liberties to assemble: insulting a police officer in the 
exercise of his/her duties and press offences, among others.43 This has also 
been seen to be the case in England and similarly these offences are rarely, if
39 See s.18 POA 1986.
40 See Williams (1967)), op. cit., 229 and W.V.H. Rodgers, 'Winfield & lolowicz on Tort' (1989), 
294 et. seq.
41 Chaps.1 & VI.
42 Williams (1967), op. cit., 114 states in this connection;
'A vitally important role in the prevention of disorder is played by the police officer on the 
spot. His is the final responsibility. Whatever prior action may have been taken it is he alone 
who can assess the situation at first hand and, in the light of that assessment, take 
appropriate preventative measures.'
43 As briefly noted in Chaps.IV, section III and V, section III.
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ever, applied to assemblies. In fact, with the exception of the attroupement 
offence and the new offence of interfering with the liberties to meet and to 
process, French law does not appear to have specifically dealt with conduct. 
Instead, it would seem that the laws applicable prior to assemblies can be 
extended to conduct during assemblies. However, no cases have actually 
applied this body of law to conduct during assemblies.
Nevertheless, a comparison will be made with the attroupement offence, by 
viewing it as playing an analogous role to public disorder in England. This is 
because it triggers restrictions on otherwise peaceful activities by reason of 
actual or apprehended violence. A decision must then be taken that such 
violence is actually present or is likely to occur. Secondly, attention will also 
be focused on the police general public order powers and judicial review, 
thirdly, the English obstruction offences will be compared and finally art.431- 
1 of the new penal code which introduces the offence of interference with the 
liberties to meet and to process will be compared with the Public Meeting Act 
1908.
ATTROUPEM ENTS AND PUBLIC ORDER
Dealing first with the attroupement offence, it has already been noted that it 
was in the past defined in such wide terms that it could justify the restriction 
of processions.44 The police were then able to interpret peaceful processions 
as actually or threatening to become violent, in order to disperse them by 
force. However, eventually the offence was defined according to the 
formulation in Gras.45 such that an attroupement was not made out simply by 
reason of a banned procession taking place on the public highway and this 
was seen to have been taken up in the current formulation of the offence in 
art.431-3 of the penal code.46 Essentially it was noted that the offence required 
an element of public disorder.
This is similar to the English breach of the peace powers and S.4 of the POA 
(as well as the serious public order offences such as riot, affray etc.), where an 
element of public disorder or violence is an essential element. In France a 
procession or a meeting must be shown to be likely to cause public disorder
44 Chap.V, section II.
45 Chap.V, section III.
46 Chap.V, section HI.
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before it can be interfered with. This likely or actual public disorder has been 
seen to be a finding of fact for the court to decide upon and failure to address 
the question will be fatal to a prosecution, as seen in Puaux.47 This case 
showed how the French courts will analyse and investigate the reasons given 
by the police. Once again the nature of judicial review in France would 
appear to prevent police accounts from simply being accepted without more 
and as a result the possible abuse of discretion is minimised.
Therefore, although English law and French law appear very similar, French 
law is to be preferred because of the existence of exacting judicial review. This 
better ensures the separation is maintained between public disorder offences 
and the liberties to assemble. In turn, this accords a greater degree of 
protection and reflects the social importance of the liberties. In short, French 
law is claimed to minimise the on the spot discretion enjoyed by the police in 
both countries by subjecting their decisions to stricter scrutiny in recognition 
that civil liberties are in play.
GENERAL PUBLIC O RD ER POW ERS AND THE BREACH OF THE 
PEACE POWER
The role of judicial review in France can also be seen if attention is now 
turned to general public order police powers. Here, these are extended from 
restrictions prior to assemblies that were dealt with in the previous chapter to 
conduct during them. These powers could easily be applied in order to 
restrict assemblies where conduct is apprehended to cause public disorder. In 
this sense, the width of these powers presents a striking similarity with the 
breach of the peace power in England. In addition, both are akin to original 
powers, since they date back to the creation of the first police forces in the 
respective countries. However, here the similarity ends, it is difficult to see, 
for example, how the discretion left to the police in Moss v McLachlan.48 
would have been permitted in France. In this case, police roadblocks 
preventing striking miners from attending picket lines in another part of the 
country, based upon an apprehension of public disorder upon their arrival, 
were upheld. The police were found to be taking reasonable steps to prevent
47 Chap.V, section III.
48 [1985] I.R.L.R. 76.
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a breach of the peace.49 This case may be compared with Naud,50 where it 
will be recalled that a limiting principle was laid down on the use of general 
police powers, in that there had to be some degree of immediacy as far as the 
disorder was concerned. The same requirement seems to exist in England51 
but as this case indicates, the courts prefer to accept the police view of 
immediacy without further investigation, unlike in Naud. where it was 
subject to close scrutiny.52 Therefore, French law provides greater protection 
because it requires the police to prove the immediacy of the apprehended 
order, whereas in England police accounts of the facts enjoy a heavy 
presumption of truth.
English law in theory limits the breach of the peace power, but without 
adequate judicial review, these limits are claimed to be ineffectual. Thus, the 
'reasonable steps' that may be taken to prevent a breach of the peace may 
have provided a ground for considering whether the presence of the police in 
a meeting in Thomas v Sawkins53 or the command to move elsewhere in
49 Thornton, (1987), op. cit., 97 observes that the police action taken in Moss v McLachlan was 
widely used in the Miners' strike and was referred to as the ’intercept policy'. He points to the 
more extreme example in the unreported decision in Fov v Chief Constable of Kent (20th 
March 1984) in which
'...the same policy was applied to stop Kent miners at the Dartford Tunnel some 200 miles 
from their destination.’
A similar wide use of the breach of the peace power is instanced by R v Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, ex. p. Atkinson [1987] 8 N.I.J.B. 6, in which a Catholic band in Northern 
Ireland was prevented from travelling to Keady (a predominantly Nationalist area) in order 
to take part in a parade. Hutton J accepted, inter alia, that the police honestly believed that 
their actions were necessary to prevent a breach of the peace.
50 Chap.IV, section III.
51 Thornton, (1987), op. cit., 74.
52 In Moss v McLachlan. Skinner J stated at 78;
The situation has to be assessed by the senior police officer present. Provided they honestly 
and reasonably form the opinion that there is a real risk of a breach of the peace in the sense 
that it is in close proximity both in place and time, then the conditions exist for reasonable 
preventative act[ion] including, if necessary, the measures taken in this case.'
Ewing & Gearty, op. cit., I l l  have criticised the readiness of the court to accept the police 
account of the circumstances;
'...according to the law report the police officers did not know to which specific pits the 
pickets were travelling and...some of the evidence of violence on which the police officers 
relied was that which they had gathered from press and television reports.'
53 [1935] 2 K.B. 249. In this case a public meeting had been called in a private hall to protest 
against the Incitement to Disaffection Bill. In previous meetings, the speaker (Thomas) had 
made complaints concerning the police refusal to leave. At a subsequent meeting the police 
were refused admittance but nevertheless managed to enter and sit down. Thomas 
threatened them with being ejected, he then attempted to eject them and was physically 
restrained by Sergeant Sawkins, against whom he brought an action for assault. The court
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Duncan v Tones was in fact reasonable, but these points were never taken up. 
In France, reasonableness is sought to be guaranteed by the requirements of 
proportionality and necessity. Therefore, in the latter case, it could be 
claimed, using these principles, that the police could have fielded extra police 
and allowed Duncan to speak. The result would have been that the court 
would not have conceded to the hecklers' veto and the decision would have 
constituted an effective limit on an otherwise large degree of police 
discretion. Such a possibility exists in France by virtue of the last resort 
requirement as noted, for example in Buiadoux.54
The same principles, if applied to threatening, abusive or insulting conduct 
(under SS.4 & 5) would again restrict police discretion. Furthermore, the 
requirement under the police general public order powers in France that the 
conduct must be likely to cause public disorder keeps the focus on physical 
reactions and not the more subjectively ascertained mental states that were 
noted as regards S.5 of the POA 1986. This requirement also makes it most 
unlikely that restrictions can be justified on the basis of the reactions of the 
police as victims, which was now seen to be the case by virtue of sections 4 & 
5 of the POA 1986.
It was also seen that the principle in English law of not conceding to the 
hecklers' veto when lawful activities are being exercised was upheld in Beattv 
v Gilbanks but that this has been eroded by subsequent cases such as 
Humphries v O'Connor and O'Kellv v Harvev.55 The result of this erosion 
can thus be seen in Wise v Dunning.56 where the court held that the 
defendant had deliberately used insulting words and gestures to provoke 
others to react in a violent way. In contrast to Beatty v Gilbanks, the court in 
Wise v Dunning examined the content of the defendant's message in order to 
discover that there were limits to the amount of provocation others could 
endure. What is unclear is why the courts did not do this in Beatty v 
Gilbanks. where it might also have been claimed that the marching of the
accepted that the police presence was justifiable in order to, inter alia, prevent a reasonably 
anticipated and imminent breach of the peace.
It should be recalled that in France, under art.9 of the 1881 Act the police may be present at 
public meetings (see chap.IV, section II), however this case is referred to here in order to 
highlight the inadequacies of English judicial review.
54 Chap.IV, section III.
55 (1864) 1 7 1.C.L.R. and (1883) 15 Cox CC 435.
56 [1902] 1 KJB. 167.
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Salvation Army was deliberately provocative. Wise v Dunning, along with 
the other cases mentioned above, therefore signals a move away from the 
principle in Beatty v Gilbanks. Another reason for this erosion has been 
because of the application of a causality test, formulated in Wise v Dunning. 
as to whether it could be reasonably foreseen that conduct would provoke 
violence; in other words, whether violence was the natural and foreseeable 
consequence of conduct.57
Although there are no specific cases on the hecklers' veto issue, the 
application of the French principles that have been recognised above would 
seem to provide a stronger degree of protection to the liberties to meet and to 
process in this situation. Therefore, restrictions on the liberties to assemble 
would once again have to be a 'last resort'; this requires that other measures 
were either not available or were insufficient to maintain order.58 This last 
resort requirement is not addressed in the English cases (i.e. Wise v Dunning. 
O'Kelly v Harvey and Humphries v O'Connor), thus the question is not put 
as to whether extra police could have been deployed, for example, or whether 
the existing police presence was sufficient. Similarly, whereas French law 
applies doctrines of proportionality and necessity to this area, the English 
cases at best only appear to stress the former, thus in Humphries v O'Connor. 
per Hayes J;
A constable, by his very appointment, is by law charged with the solemn duty of seeing that 
the peace is preserved. The law has not ventured to lay down what precise measures shall be 
adopted by him in every state of facts which calls for interference. But it has done far better; it 
has announced to him, and to the public over whom he is placed, that he is not only at 
liberty, but is bound to see the peace be preserved, and that he is to do everything that is 
necessary for that purpose, neither more nor less, (emphasis added).
57 per Darling J, at 178;
'In my view, the natural consequences of those people's conduct has been to create the 
disturbances and riots which have so often given rise to this sort of case.' 
and per Channell J, at 179-80;
'I agree with the proposition...that the law does not as a rule regard an illegal act as being the 
natural consequence of a temptation which may be held out to commit it. For instance, a 
person who exposes his goods outside his shop is often said to tempt people to steal them, 
but it cannot be said that it is the natural consequence of what he does...The proposition is 
correct and really familiar; but I think the cases with respect to apprehended breaches of the 
peace shew (sic.) that the law does regard the infirmity of human temper to the extent of 
considering a breach of the peace, although an illegal act, may be the natural consequence of 
insulting or abusive language or conduct.'
58 See for example, Naud and Demazieres et autres; chap.IV, section III.
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To insist on the necessity of a restriction without the requirement of 
proportionality is to require that it merely be effective as to purpose. 
Therefore, the requirement of 'neither more nor less' than is necessary in this 
context, simply counsels sufficiency. It then follows that a measure can be 
unduly restrictive, as perhaps in Duncan v lones. where the measure was the 
moving of a meeting to another location or Thomas v Sawkins, where it was 
the unwanted presence of the police in a public meeting, without any inquiry 
as to whether it was proportional, as in having a reasonable relationship to 
the disorder expected, bearing in mind the value of the restricted activity (i.e. 
the liberties to assemble).
Following on from this last point, the hecklers' veto would seem difficult to 
uphold in France where the liberties in question have been accorded a higher 
value than in England. Thus, liberty is the rule and restriction the exception.59 
It is therefore possible for the liberties to meet and to process to be protected 
in the face of violent reactions from onlookers. This is more likely in the case 
of the liberty to meet because its statutory status makes it a 'pedigree' civil 
liberty. However, the liberty to process has also been recognised by the courts 
and upheld against other values on many occasions,60 which shows that it 
enjoys a value that gives it weight in order to prevail in the heckler's veto 
situation. This must be contrasted with the refusal (sometimes hostile) to 
accord value to the liberties to assemble in English law.61 This lack of value 
results in the prioritising of what are viewed as the more valuable and 
concrete public order values.62 Accordingly, French law better meets the 
criteria of according importance to human rights in this aspect of regulation.
59 See Berthenet et Baldv. op. cit. chap.IV, section III.
60 For example, see Abbé Chapalain. Abbé Marzy. the decision of the Administrative 
Tribunal of Nantes, 10th Oct. 1985 and that of the Administrative Tribunal of Versailles, 5th 
July 1985 (chap.V, section III).
61 The caustic remarks of Lord Hewart CJ in Duncan v lones, may be taken as an example; 
'There have been moments during the argument in this case when it appeared to be 
suggested that the court had to do with a grave case involving what is called the right of 
public meting. I say "called," because English law does not recognise any special right of 
public meeting for political or other purposes.’
62 Smith, (1987), op. cit., 1, claims that in comparison with 'dearly visible social needs' such as 
'personal safety and physical integrity, and rights in property', the 'interests protected by 
public order law are much more diffuse and indeterminate.' This would seem to be more so 
for the liberties to meet and process vis à vis public order interests, even if these latter values 
are relatively indeterminate.
Murdoch, op. cit., 180 also observes that the rhetoric of rights in England is in a 
disadvantageous position vis à vis more concrete rights.
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Finally, the liberties to meet and process would also be better protected in 
France because of the exactitude of judicial and not just because of the 
doctrines of proportionality and necessity that have just been mentioned. 
Therefore, it should be underlined again that French review looks at the 
merits of a decision, as opposed to the English emphasis on procedural 
review. It has been noted on several occasions that in France police accounts 
of the facts are subject to stricter scrutiny and this contrasts with the widely 
accepted belief that English judges too readily accept police evidence,63 even 
when it is admitted to be meagre.64
OBSTRUCTION
What of the obstruction offences, how do they compare? Comparable offences 
such as these do not exist in French law. However, French law can be seen 
from what has been said above to require that the police exercise their duties 
by according importance to the liberties to assemble and this has been 
reinforced by exacting judicial review and principles. Thus, the restrictive 
effects in English law of the combination of wide discretionary powers and 
the statutory obstruction offence would be considerably eased if French law 
principles were applied. The wide discretionary powers would be limited by 
principles of necessity, proportionality, last resort and the requirement of the 
immediacy of disorder. This claim can be illustrated by briefly applying these 
to Duncan v Tones. Applying principles derived from French law, the police 
would have had to have shown that the command to move the meeting 
elsewhere was the only way to prevent public disorder (the last resort 
requirement), was necessary, proportional and that the previous disorder that 
had occurred was sufficiently proximate to be a relevant consideration in 
supporting an imminent apprehension of public disorder.
63 For example, Williams (1987), op. tit., 178;
There is...some measure of scepticism about the efficacy of judicial review. In the first place, 
there are those who would argue that judges traditionally lean towards the police and 
exercise too much self-restraint. Reference is sometimes made to Kent v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner. The decision itself by no means involves a full scale acceptance of police 
evidence, though along with other (less directly relevant) cases it undoubtedly reflects a 
policy of judicial restraint.'
64 As in Kent v MPC. supra.
366
This section on conduct regulations will conclude by looking at how 
assemblies are protected from the conduct of those who deliberately seek to 
disrupt them.
THE PUBLIC MEETING ACT AND ART.431-1
It was note above that the Public Meeting Act 1908 provides some protection 
against those who seek to disrupt public meetings by 'disorderly' conduct. 
This statute can be compared with Art.431-1 of the new French penal code. 
However, the latter is somewhat wider in that it makes it an offence to 
interfere with the exercise of the freedoms of expression, work, association, 
the liberties to meet and to process. On the other hand, the measure would 
seem to be of a narrower application in that interference must be in 
conjunction with others and be accompanied by either threats, assault, 
destruction of property or other forms of violence, whereas in England the 
1908 Act covers a wider range of acts that may not necessarily be violent or 
carried out in a group. Consequently, the two measures seek to protect 
assemblies from different types of interference but what they do have in 
common is a recognition of the need to protect assemblies.
Having isolated this common aim, it is suggested that the French provision is 
better for two reasons. Firstly, Art.431-1 makes clear reference to liberties; 
therefore fundamental rights are recognised in the criminal law and the 
nature of the particular offence is seen in a new light because of this civil 
libertarian context. Contrast this with the 1908 Act, where no mention is made 
of the liberty to meet. As a result, it is easy to see the measure as merely one 
more public order provision and there is no recognition of a valued activity 
that is sought to be protected.
Secondly, the French provision reflects modem considerations. Its terms 
suggest the need to protect the liberties to assemble from deliberate and 
violent attempts to disrupt its exercise. It is also comprehensive in that it also 
makes reference to processions. In comparison, the English statute reflects 
particular historical circumstances that are no longer relevant. Therefore, 
although processions are also in need of similar protection, the concern of the 
1908 Act is with the protection of public meetings, a legacy of its suffragette 
origins. Another consequence that is linked to the out-datedness of the 
English provision is that the reference to 'disorderly' conduct might, for 
example, catch mere heckling, even though it might be argued that today this
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is legitimate activity in a public meeting. This danger is however reduced by 
the requirement in the French provision that the disruption should be violent 
and reflects a contemporary tolerance for a level of non-violent, if disruptive, 
behaviour in public meetings - today the danger to assemblies comes more 
from violence, actual or threatened and the English provision does not reflect 
this.
It might be claimed that English law supports and supplements the 1908 
statutory protection of meetings with the more expansive breach of the peace 
powers that were illustrated in Thomas v Sawkins. This point may be 
conceded, so that it can be claimed that the police may also be present to 
protect processions should disorder arise. The problem is that the breach of 
the peace power has been clearly seen to have been applied with considerable 
uncertainty as far as the liberties in question are concerned. For example, in 
Beatty v Gilbanks it protected the liberty to process but in Thomas v Sawkins 
and other cases65 it restricted liberty in the face of disorder on the part of 
onlookers.
The breach of the peace powers are at their most certain when they support 
the presence of the police in an assembly but they do not indicate how the 
police should act once present; should they uphold liberty or curtail it? 
Art.431 provides a powerful direction to the police as to how to exercise what 
are in abstract extremely wide general powers and counterbalances the legal 
right police have to attend public meetings under the 1881 statute. Moreover, 
if one looks instead at the legal context that the French provision inhabits (i.e. 
exacting judicial review and legally valued civil liberties) one sees this 
direction reinforced: a direction to protect liberty and to restrict it only in 
exceptional circumstances.
SECTION III
HIGHER STANDARDS: THE USA AND THE ECHR
How does English and French conduct regulation compare with US and 
ECHR standards? More particularly, French law which is generally seen to
65 To take Duncan v tones and Wise v Punning as but two examples.
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accord better protection according to the theoretically derived evaluative 
criteria? A comparison with the US will be undertaken first, followed by the 
ECHR.
COM PARISON W ITH US LAW
In looking at US law it should be once more recalled that a distinction is made 
between restrictions aimed at communicative impact and those aimed at 
noncommunicative impact.
Communicative impact
As far as communicative impact is concerned, a regulation must be struck 
down as unconstitutional
unless it falls within one of several exceptions to the principle that government may not 
prescribe the form or content of individual expression.66
If content based regulations are applied to circumstances that fall outside one 
of these pre-existing categories, there is a strong presumption of 
unconstitutionality. Here, the court will strictly scrutinise the regulation and 
consequently the government bears the burden of showing that it is narrowly 
drawn and serves a compelling government interest.67 Even where restriction 
is legitimate it must not be a prior restraint, vague or overbroad. However, 
returning to the narrow categories that normally fall outside constitutional 
protection, these are based upon the view that
expression has special value only in the context of 'dialogue': communication in which the 
participants seek to persuade, or are persuaded; communication which is about changing or 
maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to take action on the basis of one's beliefs.6**
Two categories would seem to be of relevance here, firstly the one currently 
formulated in Brandenburg v Ohio.69 which provides under the 'clear and 
present danger' test for the restriction of speech that advocates illegal action.
66Tribe, op. tit., 832. These categories traditionally include obscenity, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, advocacy of imminent lawless behaviour, defamation and fighting words 
(c.f. Lockhart, et. al„ op. cit., 374-522 and G.R. Stone, L.M. Seidman, C.R. Sunstein & M.V. 
Tushnet 'Constitutional Law' (1986), 938-1169).
67 See Widmar v Vincent. (1981) 454 U.S. 530.
68 Stone, et. aL, op. at., 1006.
69 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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The second is the 'fighting words' doctrine that was seen to have been first 
laid down in Chaplinskv v New Hampshire.70
In neither England nor France has the reason for conduct restrictions of the 
liberties to assemble been generally stated to be based upon what is said. 
Instead, problems have been identified because of the reactions to what is said. 
If such is the case, it is the second of the US categories that is in fact of 
relevance here. It will be recalled that according to this test, the speech must 
by its 'very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace ' (emphasis added). The test has been contextualised so that the words 
must be looked at in the context of the factual circumstances in which they 
were uttered. Therefore, according to Houston v Hill they must
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the 
remark is addressed.71
If this test is compared with the offences set out in sections 4 & 5 of the POA 
1986 an insistence on an element of violence is found in the US cases before 
speech may be restricted72 and not merely harassment, alarm or distress as in 
S.5. At the same time, given the violent reaction that must be likely to ensue, 
it is most unlikely that the police could be victims of such speech as was seen 
to be the case in Parkin v Norman.73 As far as France is concerned, it should 
be noted that the American insistence on physical violence is also generally at 
the base of the French police general public order powers, in the sense that 
mental states are not normally seen to be of relevance and so they favourably 
compare. However, the possibility of the police being provoked has not as yet 
been raised in France.
70 op. cit.
71 (1987) 107 S. Ct. 2502,2510.
72 See for example, Gooding v Wilson. (1972) 405 U.S. 518, Rosenfield v New lersev. (1972) 
408 U.S. 901, Brown v Oklahoma. (1972) 408 U.S. 914 and Lewis v New Orleans II. (1974) 415 
U.S. 130.
73 This point is underlined by the comments in Lewis v City of New Orleans (Lewis I). (1972) 
408 U.S. 913. The issue here was whether 'fighting words' were used where a police officer, in 
the performance of his duty, was called 'G_D_M_F_police'. The case was remanded to the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana for reconsideration but Powell J stated;
'If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another, face to face and in a hostile 
manner, I would have no doubt that they would be "fighting words." But the situation may be 
different where such words are addressed to a police officer trained to exercise a higher degree of 
restraint than the average citizen.' (emphasis added).
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Even if speech presents a clear and present danger or advocates or provokes 
violence/illegal conduct it was noted that further limits on restrictions, such 
as the doctrines of overbreadth, prior restriction and vagueness, still apply. 
Thus, in Terminiello v Chicago a statute that made speech that 'stirs up the 
public to anger, [or] invites dispute,' an offence was struck down as being 
overbroad.74 These doctrines can be favourably compared with the French 
doctrines of proportionality and necessity but this is not the case as regards 
England where the cases do not show that the judiciary have adverted to the 
need to tailor means to ends.75
Similarly, it has been seen that England lacks a notion that restrictions should 
only be used in the 'last resort', unlike France.76 US law can be seen to have 
laid down such a requirement in Edwards v South Carolina.77 In this case a 
demonstration attracted some 200 to 300 onlookers but the police had been 
informed well in advance and had stationed 30 officers at the scene, with 
adequate reinforcements which could be called upon at short notice. These 
measures were found to be sufficient to maintain public order and hence the 
order to disperse because of an apprehended violent reaction from the 
onlookers was not a last resort. At the same time, the US courts will strictly 
review the factual circumstances in order to see whether the measures were a
74 op. tit.
75 For example, Wise v Punning and O'Kellv v Harvey, supra. In fact, it was claimed that 
English law in this area shows elements of necessity but not proportionality; for example, per 
Hayes J in Humphries v O'Connor, op. tit.;
'But whether the act which he [the police constable] did [removing a political emblem] was or 
was not, under all the circumstances, necessary to preserve the peace, is for the jury to decide.1
76 It should be added that the principle has at best been treated in passing by the English 
judiciary, for example, per Law LC in O'Kellv v Harvev. supra;
The question then seems to be reduced to this: assuming the plaintiff and others assembled 
with him to be doing nothing unlawful, but yet that there were reasonable grounds for the 
defendant believing as he did that there would be a breach of the peace if they continued so 
assembled, and that there was no other way in which the breach of the peace could be avoided 
but by stopping and dispersing the plaintiffs meeting - was the defendant justified in taking 
the necessary steps to stop and disperse it?' (emphasis added).
In addition, the commentators assert a last resort principle, for example, Bailey et. al. op. tit., 
223 and Smith, (1987), op. tit., 181. The latter also points to R v Londonderry Justices, op. tit., 
per O'Brien J to support his claim. However, it was noted that the last resort principle was not 
adverted to in Moss v McLachlan or Duncan v lones for example. This would indicate that it 
is a principle of considerable uncertainty as compared to France.
77 (1963) 372 U.S. 229 and see also Cox v Louisiana, op. tit., and Gregory v Chicago (1969) 394 
U.S. 111.
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last resort, as in Hess v Indiana.78 Contrary to the English position, the French 
principles of last resort and exacting review of the facts accorded with the 
higher standards of the US.
Non-communicative impact
If attention is now turned to noncommunicative impact restrictions, it will be 
recalled that restrictive regulations must bear a less heavy burden but a 
burden nevertheless. This is the combined result of the doctrines of the public 
forum, the prohibition against excessive administrative discretion, as well as 
the requirement that regulations are narrowly tailored, with the purpose of 
serving a significant government interests and leave open ample channels of 
alternate communication.79
US law insists that only conduct which threatens to break out into public 
disorder may be restricted, thus in Cohen v California where the appellant 
wore a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft' in a court-house corridor, 
there was found to be no evidence that there was an intention to provoke 
violence or that this was likely on the facts.80
This insistence on a link between conduct and violence has been noted in 
France but is not always the case in England where by reason of S.5 of the 
POA it is mental states that are of greater relevance. This can be contrasted 
with the judgment in Collin v Smith, concerning a proposed march by a 
group of neo-Nazis through the Village of Skokie, which adopted the 
language of Terminiello v Chicago in stating that;
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
78 (1963) 414 U.S. 229. This factual review can be contrasted with the English tendency to 
accept police accounts of the facts if based upon an honest and reasonable belief, see per 
Skinner J in Moss v McLachlan. note 52, supra.
79 For example, Clark v Community For Creative Non-Violence, op. cit., and Ward v Rock 
Against Racism, op. cit.
80 (1971) 403 U.S. 15. See also Collin v Smith, op. cit., where a 'Racial Slur Ordinance' in the 
Village of Skokie was struck down because, inter alia, the local authority did not rely on a fear 
of a violent response to justify the ordinance and Edwards v Carolina, supra., where the Court 
found that the onlookers did not in fact threaten violence.
81 op. cit., 1206.
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Thus, in Collin v Smith, despite a finding that a procession by the neo-Nazis 
would 'seriously disturb, emotionally and mentally, at least some, and 
probably many of the Village's residents', this was deemed to be an 
insufficient reason for restricting conduct. Therefore, US law clearly limits 
interference to where there is a proven and high probability of violence. 
English law is alone in emphasising mental states (by virtue of S.5 of the POA 
1986) and given its already relatively limited judicial review, it would appear 
to grant even more discretion to the police authorities as far as their being 
able to assert without more that conduct is likely to lead to the mental states 
of either fear, harassment or distress.
As regards S.4 of the POA 1986, which links threatening, abusive and 
insulting conduct to violence, it is submitted that an improvement has been 
made vis a vis the former breach of the peace requirement in the POA 1936. 
The motivation behind this change was the uncertainty as to the meaning of a 
breach of the peace.82 Thus, it now has to be proved that the relevant conduct 
induced a fear of violence or that it was likely that such fear would have been 
provoked. This is submitted to be closer to the US test of 'fighting words', as 
seen in Chaplinskv v New Hampshire, which states that conduct must be 
more than merely making others angry: there must be an incitement to 
violence, as was stated in Terminiello v Chicago. However, further 
improvement would seem to necessitate a last resort and proportionality 
requirement «ilong French and US lines which seems absent under S.4. French 
principles would seem to indicate similar standards to the US because of the 
link that is insisted upon between disorder and the use of the police general 
public order powers in response. Even though public order has been noted to 
have a w ider ambit in France, the existence of judicial review and 
concomitant principles provides strong protection to the liberties to assemble, 
as was suggested earlier.
It is clear that if violence is the trigger to the restriction of the liberties to 
assemble in England, France and the US, then the decision as to when 
violence is apprehended is crucial. It has been noted how France places more 
exacting limitations on this discretion than England. In contrast to England, 
the French position appears to meet the high standards of the US. Therefore,
82 See Bevan, op. cit., 182.
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it was noted that as far as restrictions on location, the US courts have shown a 
hostile attitude towards wide discretionary powers given to the police. As a 
consequence, in Kunz v New York,83 the Court insisted on clear standards in 
order to guide officials in exercising discretion. Although it may be argued 
that clear standards are lacking in France as regards general public order 
powers, at least in this jurisdiction there are limits placed on police discretion 
over the liberties to assemble, by virtue once again of exacting judicial review. 
This is not the case in England, as cases such as Arrowsmith v Jenkins and 
Duncan v I ones (among many possible examples) have shown. It must be 
underlined that without the legal limitation and control of discretion the 
suggestion of limiting conduct restrictions to conduct that incites violence will 
be largely ineffective as a way of protecting the liberties in question.
The hostility towards granting wide discretion to the police in US law is 
further illustrated in Houston v Hill,84 which also touches on the question of 
the obstruction of the police in the exercise of their duty. In the instant case a 
Houston ordinance forbidding 'speech that in any manner interrupts a police 
officer in the performance of his/her duties' was struck down as being 
overbroad. It was shown that the ordinance was broken daily on scores of 
occasions but that only some people, singled out by the police using an 
unguided discretion, were arrested. It would seem doubtful in the light of this 
case and other prohibitions against wide discretion and unclear standards in 
US law,85 that S.51(l) of the Police Act (that lays down the offence of 
obstruction in England) could be seen as placing sufficient limits on official 
discretion. The combination of an extremely wide breach of the peace power 
and the on the spot discretion granted by the statute would not seem to meet 
the US standard. Again, this does not appear to be the case in France, where a 
similar wide discretion is strictly construed by the courts, especially the 
administrative tribunals.86 French law, as preferred by the theoretical criteria 
of this study, thus once more acquits itself well as against an evulation with 
US law.
83 (1951) 340 U.S. 290 and see Gooding v Wilson, op. at.
84 op. at.
85 See for example, Lovell v Griffin. (1938) 303 U.S. 444.
86 This view can be supported if regard is had to the principles derived from the cases on 
discriminatory access to local authority premises, for example Communes de Tourrettes-sur- 
loup. op. at., chap.IV, section III.
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Another aspect of noncommunicative regulation in which US law has been 
very active is the concern as regards the hecklers' veto situation. It was noted 
above, in chapter VII, when discussing regulations prior to assemblies that 
the courts displayed a presumption against the restriction of the liberties to 
meet and process where this was based upon the apprehended hostile 
reaction of either onlookers or counter groups. This doctrine was seen to be 
the 'other side' of the Chaplinskv judgment. Therefore, the police must show 
that conduct is likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace. This would 
seem to be very similar to the English breach of the peace standard which was 
used in cases such as Thomas v Sawkins. Duncan v tones and O'Kellv v 
Harvev. However, the crucial difference is that in US law, as instanced by Cox 
v Louisiana and Edwards v South Carolina, breach of the peace convictions 
were overturned by the Supreme Court upon a finding that the police 
presence was sufficient to have contained a hostile reaction from the crowd. 
The US position is therefore again see to require that restriction be a last 
resort, when all other measures are impossible or inadequate for the 
maintenance of public order. It has been claimed that there is little trace of a 
similar doctrine in the English cases.87 On the other hand, French law has on 
several occasions been seen to have developed a doctrine of last resort. For 
example this has been seen as far as the liberty to meet in the case of 
Bujadoux.88 It would appear that this is a general principle that is applicable 
to all civil liberties, including therefore the liberty to process.89
The efficacy of the last resort principle depends on the degree to which 
accounts of the factual circumstances of meetings and processions can be 
reviewed. Consequently, attention should be drawn to the judgments in both 
Edwards v South Carolina and Cox v Louisiana, in which the Court stated 
that when constitutional rights are at stake
we cannot avoid our responsibilities by permitting ourselves to be completely bound by state 
court determination of any [essential] issue, [else] federal law could be frustrated by distorted 
fact-finding.^®
87 See for example, cases at note 76, supra.
88 Chap.IV, section III.
89 See Aubry & Drago, op. cit., 527-8 and Ktistaki, op. cit., 128-38.
90 op. cit..
375
The Court therefore engaged in an 'independent review' of the facts. This 
means it reviewed the facts that had been presented before the lower court 
and more importantly made a detailed assessment of the factual 
circumstances that was independent of police accounts.91 Again this can be 
contrasted with the tendency by the judiciary in England to accept police 
accounts and favourably compares with the French system in which both the 
merits and procedures of restrictions on the liberties of assembly are 
reviewed.
Finally, no cases seem to have directly dealt with the protection of the 
liberties to meet and to process from those who seek to disrupt them via 
disorderly conduct. As a consequence, in this area France on its own would 
appear to provide clear standards for England by which to further secure the 
protection of the liberties and thus accord them a legal importance that 
reflects their social value.
COM PARISON W ITH THE ECHR
How do French and English law compare with the standards derived from 
the Convention? This question can be answered briefly given the above-noted 
lack of elaboration of the Convention via case law.92 As far as relevant 
aspects, it was seen above that the Convention had only been elaborated as 
far as the heckler's veto' situation. However, this was as regards regulation 
prior to assemblies.93 Nevertheless, if these principles are applied to conduct 
regulations during assemblies it will be seen that French law matches these
91 The extent to which American judges are prepared to undertake an independent review 
may be instanced by Black J’s dissent in Feiner v New York, op. cit. In this case the Supreme 
Court upheld a disorderly conduct conviction against a speaker who refused to obey a police
command to cease addressing a racially-mixed crowd. It was found that the speaker had 
given
'...the impression that he was endeavouring to arouse the Negro people against the whites, 
urging that they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights...',
and that at least one of the eighty or so crowd of people had threatened violence if the police 
did not act to silence the speaker. Black J fundamentally disagreed with these findings of fact
- in other words he engaged in an independent review of the pertinent circumstances;
'As to the existence of a dangerous situation on the street comer, it seems far-fetched to 
suggest that the "facts" show any imminent threat of riot or uncontrollable 
disorder... According to the officers' testimony, the crowd was restless but there is no showing 
of any attempt to quiet it; pedestrians were forced to walk into the street, but there was no 
effort to clear a path on the sidewalk; one person threatened to assault petitioner but the 
officers did nothing to discourage this when even a word might have sufficed.'
92 Chap.VII, section III.
93 Chap.VII, section III.
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standards. Thus, in Platform 'Arzte fur das Leben1 v Austria it was stated that
disorder on the part of others could not, without more justify a ban on a 
procession. In this case, the Court and the Commission found that the police 
had a duty to provide protection to those who wished to exercise their rights 
to meet and march. In effect, the Court laid down a positive obligation on 
states, in detailing the action they should take. The case can be read as stating 
that authorities should take all possible steps to secure the liberty.94
Thus, the Court went on to state that;
In a democracy the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of 
the right to demonstrate.
Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty 
on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible 
with the object and purpose of Article 11...Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to 
be taken95
Such a doctrine is consonant with the French principle that restriction should 
only be as a last resort and further highlights the higher standards in France 
in comparison to England. However, the Court and the Commission seem to 
have gone further in laying down a type of 'affirmative action' principle. Such 
a principle would certainly accord more importance to the liberties by 
requiring a greater degree of protection. The social value that would be 
reflected by an obligation on the state to take certain positive steps is 
therefore supported by theory, even if it has not been previously articulated. 
However, if such a measure is taken as a higher standard, neither France nor 
England can be said to have met this standard of protection since neither 
seems to have made provision or formulated such principles. Perhaps France 
has come closer by virtue of Art.431-1 (supra.) but it should be recalled that 
this article merely punishes conduct that interferes with the liberties to meet 
and to process and fails to include any measures which the police are obliged 
to take in order to protect these liberties. At the same time, it could be argued
94 21st June, A.139 (1988), 12. This is a decision from the Court, whereas it was that of the 
Commission was cited earlier. Both however agree on this heckler's veto point.
95 op. cit., 12. See also Christians Against Racism And Fascism v UK, op cit., which expresses 
the previous view of the Commission concerning the heckler's veto;
'...the possibility of violent counter-demonstrations, or the possibility of extremists with 
violent intentions, not members of the organising association, joining the demonstration 
cannot as such take away that right..'.
It can be seen that the previous view lacked a positive action element which was added by the 
Platform case.
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that the provision lays down a clear message that interference is unacceptable 
and regarded as criminal, this therefore can be seen as a positive step in 
securing the necessary conditions for the liberties to be exercised.
A SUM M ARY
French regulation in this area, as supported by theory has been argued to 
provide greater protection than England. Moreover, this degree of protection 
and the criteria used to compare France and England seem to be mirrored in 
the standards derived from the US and often provide more comprehensive 
regulation than the ECHR. Elements favoured by the jurisprudential theory 
adopted in this study have been continually pointed to as being the reason for 
the higher standards in France. The are also elements that highlight the detail 
and specific needs that legal regulation must meet. Moreover, this has been 
argued to be better achieved by statute.
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CHAPTER IX
COMPARING REGULATION OF THE LIBERTIES: AFTER
ASSEMBLIES
INTRODUCTION
The legal regulation of the liberties to meet and to process has been analysed 
from the point of view of restrictions that may be imposed before and during 
their exercise. It follows that in order to complete the comparison, this chapter 
focuses on restrictions after an assembly. Hence, attention is here turned to 
sanctions because of the possibility that their potential and actual application 
that may dissuade people from exercising the liberties in question and that 
such an effect would then restrict the liberties.
The method that will be followed here will be to set out those sanctions which 
have been of particular concern in England. Next, French law will be 
compared and evaluated to see whether it better protects the liberties in 
question. It is claimed that US and ECHR are of little use in this area. US law 
does not seem to have dealt with the issue of sanctions as regards the liberties 
and because of the Convention's instance that sanctions should be prescribed 
by law1 there is no scope for its application to France and England, where 
restrictions are always prescribed by law. This is thus an example of an area 
of regulation where the ECHR provides a minimum standard that has been 
met by both France and England.
SECTION I 
THE POSITION IN ENGLAND
Two types of sanctions have caused concern in England. The first are those 
resulting from the POA 1986 which concern the failure to fulfil requirements 
as to notice and failing to follow conditions and bans imposed before and 
during meetings and processions. The second is the use by the judiciary of a 
wide discretion to bind over persons to keep the peace. These two sanctions 
will be briefly set out here, before an analysis of French law is undertaken.
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SANCTION S IN THE POA 1986
The POA 1986 creates three broad categories of offences. Firstly, by virtue of 
S.ll(7) those that organise a public procession (as defined by S.16) without 
fulfilling the requirements as to giving written notice are guilty of a criminal 
offence punishable by a fine (S.ll(lO)).
Secondly, by virtue of S.12(4),(5) & (6) those who organise, participate in or 
incite others to take part in a public procession whilst knowingly failing to 
comply with a condition imposed under S.12 are guilty of an offence. 
However, the punishments differ according to the specific criminal activity. 
Therefore, organisers and inciters are liable to heavier fines and 
imprisonment (S.12(8) & (10)) compared to participants who are liable to a 
smaller fine (S. 12(4)). In addition, a police constable, unlike the notice offence 
above, is given the power to arrest those he/she reasonably suspects to be 
committing this offence. Exactly the same offence is provided for as regards 
conditions imposed on meetings (S. 14(4), (5) & (6)), as well as the same power 
of arrest without warrant (S.14(7)) and the gradation of penalties (S.14(8), (9) 
& (10).
Thirdly, by virtue of S.13(7), (8) & (9), those who organise, participate in or 
incite others to take part in a public procession that has been banned, are 
guilty of an offence. Once again a power of arrest is provided (S.13(10)), as 
well as the same distribution of punishments as in second set of offences 
above (S.13(ll), (12) & (13)). In summary, the 1986 Act penalises organisers 
that breach the notice requirement and organisers, participants and inciters 
who breach conditions and bans.2
It will be noted that organisers are liable to criminal sanctions under all of the 
offences. It follows that a finding that a person or group of persons were 
organisers is very important. Consequently, uncertainty as to the legal 
meaning of 'organiser' may dissuade some from exercising their liberties to 
assemble because of fears of being found liable under one of the offences. As 
a disincentive to the exercise of the liberty to assemble, it would therefore be a 
restriction.
2 See generally, Marston, op. cit., 120 et. seq.
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Given the importance of the term, it is surprising that it is left undefined in 
the Act. The only case that has dealt with its meaning is that of Flockhart v 
Robinson.3 which was decided under the 1936 Act and concerned the liberty 
to process. Most attention has been paid to the remarks of Finnemore J who 
stated that mere stewarding of a march did not constitute organisation and 
that;
The mere fact that a person takes part in a procession would not of itself be enough. I do not 
think that the fact that the appellant was the leading person in the procession would by itself 
be enough, although it might be some evidence to be considered...I think organising a 
procession means something in the nature of arranging or planning a procession. It is not 
necessary...for the plans to be made long in advance or perhaps in advance at alL.The 
procession could be organised on the spot in the street...4
Furthermore, Goddard CJ stated;
'organised' is not a term of art. When a procession is organised what happens? A procession 
is not a mere body of person; it is a body of persons who are moving along a route. Therefore 
the person who organises the route is the person who organises the procession...by indicating 
or planning the route a person is in my opinion organising a procession.5
This case only lays down advice as regards the organisation of processions and 
so therefore there is no authoritative advice as regards what constitutes the 
organisation of a meeting, not to mention the meaning of participation and 
incitement which are also of fundamental importance to the question of 
liability and consequently, the exercise of the liberties.
Aside from these definitional problems, there has also been criticism of the 
arrest without warrant power as far as the condition offences are concerned. 
Card has indeed questioned the need for such a power.6 It has also been 
observed that the offences as regards bans in S.13, provide, by reason of 
S. 13(7), that a person can be found liable for organising a banned procession
3 (1950] 2 K.B. 498.
4 op. cit., at 504-5.
5 op. cit., at 502-3.
6 op. cit., 87;
The necessity for it is open to question. Quite apart from the common law power to arrest for 
an actual or apprehended breach of the peace, in many instances one of the general arrest 
conditions in S.25 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will be satisfied and where 
none of them is satisfied it is questionable why there should be a power of arrest for these 
summary offences.'
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even where that procession does not take place.7 This omission of a reference 
to a procession actually having been held appears strange since all the other 
offences require that the assembly is actually held. In any case, it is clear that 
as the provision currently stands it could be used to punish those who merely 
take preparatory steps in the organisation of a procession in an attempt to 
breach a ban. On the other hand, the liability of organisers does not stretch to 
responsibility 'for any default that might have occurred in the conduct of the 
meeting or procession.'8
Lastly, a defence to the notice offence is found in S .ll(l) & (6). Here a person 
who organises a procession without advance notice can claim that it was 'not 
reasonably practicable' to do so. Similarly, if notice is not delivered in the 
required six days before the date when the procession is intended to be held, 
delivery may be made as soon as is 'reasonably practicable'. The burden of 
proof falls on the organiser but the intention behind the provision was to 
protect spontaneous processions. However, Smith points out a possible 
problem
where a group claims that it was unaware of an intention to hold a march by a group to 
which it holds opposing views until some time within the notification period. In such 
circumstances, it would still be under an obligation to give notification of its intention to 
march, and the courts should perhaps hold no offence is committed under section 11(7) if 
notice has been given, however shortly before the proposed 'counter march,' where this 
would still permit the imposition of conditions by the police, if necessary, under section 12. 
This would mean that the courts could take into account, as in other contexts where the 
expression is encountered, the purpose for which the notification is required.^
THE BINDIN G OVER POWER
The second sanction that is of relevance is that of the power to bind over and 
is more contentious. Most commonly, judges may bind a person over to keep 
the peace under the Justice of the Peace Act 1361.10 The order can be made in 
lieu of or in addition to another sentence and it has been noted that a person 
may be bound over even where he/ she has not been convicted of an offence. 
The order functions by requiring the person to enter into a surety to keep the
7 Marston, op. cit., 135.
8 Smith, (1987), op. cit., 141;
The offences are subject to defences that may be summarised as being "no-negligence" 
defences, that is, that the organiser was not responsible for any default that may have 
occurred in the conduct of the meeting or procession.'
9 Smith, (1987), op. cit., 143.
10 For an historical analysis, see D. Feldman, The King's Peace. The Roval Prerogative and 
Public Order; The Roots and Development of Binding Over Powers' [1988] C.L.J. 101.
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peace and in the case of a refusal to provide a satisfactory surety, a prison 
sentence can be imposed. The judges enjoy an extremely wide discretion as to 
the amount of the surety and the length of time during which a person is 
bound over, although this is normally twelve months.11
The power has been observed to have been applied in the context of the 
liberties to meet and to process as a preventative power.12 In this sense it is 
applied by the judges against those they apprehend will commit future 
breaches of the peace in forthcoming meetings and processions. For example, 
Williams has noted that it has in the past been used against meetings to 
deprive them of their leaders.13 The major concern as regards this power has 
been that it can be imposed at the discretion of the judge upon people who 
have not committed an offence. The effect is to make attendance at meetings 
and processions by persons who have been bound over perilous, since if they 
are found to have breached the peace (which, as has been seen, is not 
exclusively a result of violent assemblies), the surety can be forfeited, thus 
constituting a type of fine. The binding over power can therefore be seen as a 
sanction that restricts the liberties to assemble.
Having set out the two general types of sanctions that have caused concern 
and may restrict the liberties to meet and process, comparison will now be 
made with the French law on sanctions.
SECTION II 
FRANCE AND ENGLAND COMPARED
COMPARING THE PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES
Similar offences to those found in the POA 1986 are found in Art.431-9 of the 
new French penal code, where it will be recalled that (a) organising a 
procession on the public highway without making a prior declaration, (b) 
making an incomplete or inaccurate declaration with the aim of evading the 
conditions laid down for organising a procession and (c) organising a
11 See generally, Supperstone, op. cit., 312-15, Williams (1967), op. cit., 87-101 and Smith, 
(1987), op. cit., 36-7.
12 Williams (1967), op. at., 94.
13 (1967), op. at., 97
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procession on the public highway which had been banned, are punished by 
either a term of imprisonment or a fine.14
It should be noted that these offences place liability solely on organisers and 
unlike England there is no sanctioning of participants or inciters.15 It could be 
claimed, given the overall approach to regulating the liberties in France, that 
the difference here is because in France it is generally recognised that a civil 
liberty and not public order is in issue. It follows that the scope of liability is 
kept to a minimum, so that it is the organisers who are sanctioned. It may be 
objected in response that the requirement in England that the participants 
must knowingly commit the offences (and that the same requirement might 
well be extended to inciters) means that it must be proved that they are 
responsible. Nevertheless, it is contended that the offence in England will be 
so difficult to prove and risks creating martyrs, that it is actually virtually 
useless in practice.16 Bereft of this function, the offences against participants 
and inciters appear as empty warnings that may however have a dissuasive 
effect on the exercise of the liberties. Furthermore, the French provisions, in 
imposing sanctions only on organisers, seek to limit the possible restrictive 
consequences on the liberty to assemble. This is compared to the English
14 Chap.V, section III.
15 Art431-10 is an exception but this concerns the carrying of weapons in a public procession. 
Since, the concern in this study is with the liberties to assemble - peaceful activities - this 
article is of no relevance here.
A more relevant exception to this position is art.R.26(15) of the penal code which provides for 
an offence of violating a legally made administrative regulation (this would include a police 
constable's command, for example to disperse). Despite the obvious scope for its application, 
as has been the case in England regarding similar laws, it has not been used in the cases (see 
generally J-H. Robert 'Contraventions et peines (première classe)' J.-Cl. (Pénal) 460 à R-D, 
Art.R26(15), (1984), Fasc.l, 2.
16 For example, Card, op. cit., 75 daims that the condition offence is unlikely to be often 
brought against participants;
'It is hard to believe that there will be mass prosecutions for the offence under S.12(5), if 
thousands of marchers knowingly break a condition, and in relation to this offence in 
particular there is the risk of creating martyrs and of bringing the law into contempt whether 
it is enforced or whether it is not.'
He feels that the offences will only function to
'...strengthen the framework within which negotiations take place between the police and 
organisers.'
( at pg.75).
However, it will be recalled that in the discussion on the imposition of conditions before 
assemblies (chap.VII, section III, supra.), it was suggested that a detailed statute should 
explicitly address negotiations instead of approaching the issue obliquely and enacting 
provisions that strengthen the hand of the police. If Card's point is accepted, this offence 
would seem to be a typical example of the practice that was criticised.
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offences which are clearly have public order as their origin,17 since there is no 
similar attempt to limit liability. The consequence of the wider scope of 
potential liability is a greater risk of dissuading participants and others from 
exercising their rights. This, in turn cannot be said to be according value to 
the liberties.
It follows from the French focus on organisers that the meaning of this term is 
of fundamental importance. As in English law, the French courts have also 
been seen to have grappled with the question of what is an organiser. 
Therefore, a comparison can be made between Flockhart v Robinson and the 
French case law. Firstly, it would seem that on the strength of Merabet 
Bourogaa et autres.18 that in the case of processions the courts will require 
more than merely physically leading. Instead, they will require some kind of 
de facto organisation. This would seem to concur with the above-noted dictum 
of Finnemore J, except that he clearly accepted the possibility of considering 
physically leading a march as a relevant consideration. However, a greater 
difference may arise if closer attention is paid to the opinion of Lord Goddard 
CJ, where he mentions that organisation may, inter alia, be constituted by 
those who indicate or point out the route by which other persons are to go. 
There may consequently be difficulties in distinguishing physical leadership 
from this, since it might be said that being at the head of the procession is a 
way of pointing out the route to others.19
Secondly, the case of Calas,20 which concerns a demonstration but which may 
be used to shed some light on the difference between organisation and 
participation as regards processions. It will be recalled in this case that it was 
held that mere participation, in the form of addressing a demonstration, is 
insufficient to constitute organisation. This position may well be contained in 
the Flockhart decision but since this case concerned processions, the court's 
attention was occupied with laying down a rule that participation in a
17 For yet another example of the dominant public order approach, see Wade, op. cit., 177, 
who claims that the 'law of public meetings’ functions 'primarily to prevent and to punish 
outbreaks of disorder'; significantly he does not assert that it should function to uphold 
liberty.
18 Chap.V, section III.
19 See also Marston, op. cit., 122 who quotes Lord Goddard CJ as stating;
'If a person indicates the route, plans the route, or points out the route by which other 
persons are to go, I think he is organising a procession.'
20op. cit., and see chap.V, section HI.
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procession did not necessarily constitute organisation. In comparison, French 
law has the benefit of a clear statement that can be applied to meetings and it 
is submitted that the Flockhart view on processions should be similarly 
extended to the liberty to meet, in order to reduce the ambiguity between 
organisation and participation.
Thirdly, both jurisdictions have developed fairly loose tests that turn on the 
particular fact situations.21 It is submitted that as a guide the courts should 
recall the context of their decisions; that of civil liberty, as well as public 
order. Thus, they should be aware that an overly broad view of what 
constitutes organisation may dissuade people from exercising their rights. In 
France it has been seen that the sanctions reflect civil liberty concerns and this 
gives human rights a weight when balanced against public order 
considerations. The same is doubtful in England where both the location of 
the sanctions - in the 'Public Order' Act - and their wider incidence of liability 
can be seen to again dearly indicate a public order emphasis.
COM PARING THE BINDIN G OVER POWER
As regards comparison with the English binding over power, briefer 
comments can be made. The simple fact is that what has been referred to as 
the constitutionally objectionable power to bind over22 knows no counterpart 
in France. Certainly there are various provisions in the penal code to suspend 
the execution of sentences on condition of future good behaviour but these 
are all only applicable when a person has been found guilty of an offence. 
Then, the application of one of the forms of suspended sentence clearly does 
and must constitute a criminal sanction.23 From a comparative perspective, 
English law provides for the restriction of the future actions of persons 
without their first being proved guilty of having committed a criminal 
offence. Since it is normally the element of guilt that acts as a trigger for the 
application of restrictions on liberty, the binding over power appears aberrant 
to the principles of criminal law.
Reform of the binding over power has, however, been suggested;
21 For France, see M.P. c Texereau et autres, op. cit.
22 Smith, (1987), op. cit., 38.
23 See for example, arts.132-29-39 and arts.132-40-53 and generally R. Merle & A. Vitu, Traité 
de droit criming]’ (1981), 938-60.
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There is much to be said for a return to the view that some specific offence...should be shown 
to exist as in an ordinary prosecution. Furthermore, the court should be satisfied that there 
are good reasons for using the processes of preventative justice as opposed to bringing a 
prosecution. The magistrates perhaps should themselves be required to explain their 
decisions in full, thus allowing a reasonable opportunity to the defendants to challenge their 
discretion on appeal.^4
These comments are strongly endorsed here but in the light of French law it 
would seem that they could be best effected by integrating the binding over 
power into the criminal law proper. This would mean that a person would 
have to have been found guilty of a specific offence before the power could be 
used. The defendant would have the rights of challenge that are called for 
above and the judge would be under the normal obligation to give reasons for 
his/her decision, as well as having these open to appellate review. More 
importantly, the personal liberty of innocent persons could no longer be 
restricted in this way and the scope for using the power in order to prevent 
people exercising their liberties to meet and process would be considerably 
limited.
A SUMMARY
Analysis of restrictions after assemblies once again reveals that the adequate 
protection of the liberties under study requires more substantial reform than 
is likely to be provided by the constitutional entrenchment of the liberty to 
assembly. In fact, here it has been shown that at least as far as the binding 
over powers are concerned, a reform of the criminal law is a necessity. This 
would be best affected by detailed statutory enactments. As far as the POA 
offences are concerned, a valued conception of civil liberties has been shown 
to be lacking. Thus offences in England are inspired by public order 
considerations without the counterbalance of civil libertarian considerations 
and this is clearly instanced by the wider range of persons (participants and 
inciters) who may be found criminally liable.
Lastly, it is worth underlining that the binding over power deprives people of 
liberty but it does so according to terms prescribed by law (i.e. the justice of 
the Peace Act). The inadequacy of the Convention on this issue adds further 
weight to the arguments in favour of the enactment of detailed statute, that 
has been major theme of this study.
24 Williams (1967), op. tit., 101.
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS: A RE-EXAMINATION OF TWO PRACTICAL 
CONCERNS
INTRODUCTION
The conclusions that this study draws as to the application of theory to 
practice can be best illustrated in the context of the two practical concerns that 
were mentioned in Part I: the Bill of Rights debate in the UK and the 
protection of human rights in the EU. In applying human rights and 
comparative theory to civil liberties it will be seen that new light can be shed 
on these issues and more importantly new possibilities for resolution reveal 
themselves.
The two issues will be dealt with in turn, beginning with the Bill of Rights 
debate in the UK and then attention will be focused on the protection of 
human rights in the EU. Before commencing, the conclusions will be explicitly 
stated in order to be able to recognise them and their relevance to the two 




The relevance of France
The French system of protecting human rights is of great relevance to 
England because of the highly political character of that protection. It follows 
that the tendency to make comparisons between jurisdictions that belong to 
the same legal family is shown to be unduly limiting. In short, valuable 
comparisons can be made between common-law and civil law systems which 
share the same basic constitutional traditions. Membership of a particular 
legal family should not be allowed to obscure basic problems that are shared 
between these jurisdictions. As a consequence, the orthodox view of 
comparative law that tends to limit comparison to that between members of 
the same legal family should be treated with caution.
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The benefits of statutory protection
The French system of utilising statutes to protect civil liberties reveals an 
alternative to constitutional enactments. This method has the advantage of 
being more open to political change and is better able to accommodate a 
detailed concentration on specific liberties. Therefore, this form of protection 
sits well with the conception of human rights that was formulated in this 
thesis on the basis of a possible consensus between liberal and critical 
theorists. It was claimed that both groups would agree that human rights are 
political and social values and as a consequence statutes were the best way of 
giving effect to this conception while at the same time protecting them. 
Unlike the judicial model in, for example, North America, political choices are 
made more transparent in the French political and statutory model and 
human rights can consequently be more clearly seen to be the product of 
political processes. This is not to suggest that mechanisms like that in the 
United States are of no worth. On the contrary, it is accepted that they could 
be justified by an alternative theory of human rights. However, according to 
the view formulated here, a political conception is to be preferred.
Constitutional protection
The focus, hitherto, on a constitutional protection of human rights which 
dominates the debate as to the improvement and reform of human rights law 
in England, neglects the need to reform other areas of law. Energy is largely 
devoted to a method of protection that while undoubtedly having the benefit 
of indicating a general statement of principle, does not provide the detailed 
mechanisms that would in practice be needed to protect human rights in 
England. The current preference for broad constitutional enactments is 
claimed to be based upon an impoverished view of the theoretical nature of 
civil liberties and furthermore, it tends to obscure the work that must be done 
to reform judicial review, emergency remedies, police powers and 
accountability and binding over powers, to take but a few examples that have 
been raised in the previous chapters.
A common constitutional tradition
A strong tradition of the liberties to meet and to process in France and 
England has been identified, even though different values are given to the 
different liberties in the two jurisdictions. This tradition should form a major 
component of any common constitutional tradition from which the protection 
of human rights is derived. The comparative method is therefore proven to be
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essential to such an enterprise, if it is to be taken seriously. Moreover, 
although comparative theory will need to be employed to other civil liberties 
in order to discover their common constitutional traditions, where these 
traditions reveal practices or methods of protection that are lower than 
desired there must a theory of human rights by which to then construct the 
desired standards. In consequence, the protection of civil liberties in the EU is 
not a purely descriptive exercise, instead normative decisions and choices will 
need to be made on the basis of jurisprudential theory.
Emphasis on the specific
It has been shown via the liberties to assemble that specific liberties have 
different needs and problems and so may often need to be specifically 
analysed. Hitherto this has not been the dominant tendency in England. To 
treat civil liberties as a homogenous, undifferentiated category risks 
obscuring crucial differences. The consequence may also be that there is no 
one answer, such as the enactment of a Bill of Rights, that will solve the 
problems of all the different human rights. This would lend further support 
to the use of statutes to remedy the specific problems encountered by a 
specific liberty. It also suggests that in formulating protective measures in the 
EU, regard should be had to the specific and particular context of each right, 
as well as their tradition in each member state. There are however common 
features to human rights, for example, they have been claimed to be social 
and political values. Given this commonalty, general measures, such as an 
unentrenched list of fundamental rights may be of value in laying down the 
spirit and general manner in which civil liberties are to regulated and treated. 
A Bill of Rights reformulated in this way, may therefore have a role to play.
T h e o ry  a n d  p ra c tic e
Finally, reform of the law on civil liberties in England and the search for a 
common tradition of human rights protection in Europe benefit in theoretical 
and practical terms from a theoretical underpinning. Thus, the comparative 
method and jurisprudential theories of human rights have been utilised and 
applied to a particular area of civil liberties law. The results are claimed to 
have been the opening up of new vistas of possible legal protection and a 




THE BILL OF RIGH TS DEBATE: A COM PROM ISE
The Bill of Rights debate in the UK was examined earlier in chapter I. It was 
seen that the debate was very much a struggle between political and 
jurisprudential viewpoints and choices, for example the sovereignty of 
parliament versus the recognition and protection of human rights: how could 
the possibility of changes in social values be accommodated by a need to 
develop measures to secure these values against such change? The debate 
was therefore revealed to be the locus of political struggle and a compromise 
was claimed to be needed. This compromise would need to be able 
accommodate change at the same time as the recognition that certain socially 
constructed values, namely human rights, are felt to be of higher value than 
others, such that they are deserving of extra respect in the face of change.1
In England debate has become polarised between those calling for the 
enactment of a Bill of Rights or the incorporation of the ECHR and those who 
favour the status quo; the sovereignty of Parliament. This study has revealed, 
as part of the French legal machinery for protecting human rights, the 
existence of a political organ which could constitute a compromise in the 
debate. This is the Conseil constitutionnel (Cc). It will be recalled that such an 
organ permits the French Parliament to continue its claim to being sovereign, 
whilst at the same time recognising the special status of civil liberties. 
Therefore, Parliamentary bills can only be struck down before they become 
law and they are reviewed by a political, as opposed to a judicial, body. The 
Cc can change its view to reflect changes in human rights, so they are not 
fixed categories and are more open to political and social forces. However, 
when a bill contradicts an existing civil liberty that still enjoys the support of 
the political community, it can be struck down. In such a way human rights 
are accorded weight and value - in other words they are both respected and 
protected. The Cc's decisions are controversial and involve political choices 





Enacting a Bill of Rights along US lines (i.e. a constitutionally entrenched list 
of rights) would mean to a large degree fixing human rights against changes 
in the values of the community. Moreover, when change would be 
permissible under such arrangements, decisions to this effect are not to be 
taken by the political community or its representatives but rather by the 
judiciary, which in England is unelected. Handing over this highly political 
and controversial function to the judiciary risks masking the political 
character of human rights behind the claimed objectivity of the law. A 
political organ does not need to hide behind such language, on the contrary, it 
can, and by definition, does act politically.
However, why should this political conception be preferred? The response is 
because this accords with the jurisprudential view of the nature of human 
rights, which sees them as social constructs that are intimately linked to the 
politics of the community. They embody socio-political values and as a result 
can be changed, but such change should be administered as far as possible by 
the body politic.3 Such change should be seen for what it is and not dressed 
up as a question of declaring a pre-existing and immanent legal truth that 
merely requires judicial expertise to bring it to the surface. This conception 
reflects the 'political' constitution in England, in which traditionally 
parliamentary sovereignty and human rights questions have not been left to 
the judiciary.4 It must be underlined that notwithstanding the way this 
conception 'fits' English arrangements, it is preferred because of 
jurisprudential reasons. In addition, even if it points towards a conception of 
human rights that is found in England, it has been seen that English law has 
been found wanting as regards several of the reforms that it has generated.
As for comparative theory, it has presented an alternative to the focus on the 
enactment of a Bill of Rights. By looking at France it has been seen that 
beneath the label 'dvil law', it shares a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty
3 Waldron (1993), op. tit.
4 Griffiths (1979), op. tit., and at 16;
The fundamental political objection is this: the law is not and cannot be a substitute for 
politics. This is a hard truth, perhaps an unpleasant truth. For centuries political philosophers 
have sought that society in which government is by laws and not by men. It is an 
unattainable ideal. Written constitutions do not achieve it. Nor do Bills of Rights or any other 
devices. They merely pass political decisions out of the hands of politicians and into the 
hands of judges or other persons. To require a supreme court to make certain kinds of 
political decisions does not make those decisions any less political.'
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with England, much more so than the 'common law' system of the US with 
which comparisons are overwhelmingly made. Given the theoretical interest 
in a political conception of civil liberties, a focus on French law has been 
proven to be of great interest to England. One method of protecting human 
rights has been shown to be via a political organ along the lines of the Cc. 
Much work would however need to be done in order to translate a similar 
organ into the English legal system but it is suggested that most importantly 
its political nature should be retained in any such process. Another method of 
protection that has been revealed is that of statute but that can be better 
explained in relation to the other major suggestion in the Bill of Rights debate, 
namely the incorporation of the ECHR into English law.
Comparative evaluation has consistently revealed the benefits of specific 
provisions dealing with the specific context and problems of the liberties to 
meet and process.5 France has been seen to have adopted precisely this form 
of regulation. In contrast, the Convention speaks merely of a 'freedom of 
assembly', with no detailed provisions as to bans, conditions or sanctions. 
Furthermore, there is no elaboration of the activities that are covered by this 
right and the interests that may justify its restriction are vague. To incorporate 
such a right into English law may be politically attractive but its benefits are 
outweighed by its disadvantages; these chiefly being insufficiency. In these 
circumstances there is no guarantee that judicial interpretation will not be 
restrictive. There is no provision that would prevent the introduction of a 
system of prior authorisation, for example and nothing is said as to the need 
for emergency procedures for review of restrictions, the involvement of local 
elements or the provision of public fora. These are but a few examples of the 
detailed provisions that are lacking in the Convention. Others have been 
pointed to in chapters VI-IX.
In comparison, France has employed statutes to protect meetings and to a 
lesser extent processions. In the case of meetings, which enjoy a higher status, 
a statute provides detailed provisions as regards bans and sanctions.6
5 Chaps. Vl-IX. Some English commentators have on occasion called for the use of statutes to 
protect these liberties but without providing any supporting justifications for such demands, 
for example, Card, op. at., 6 and Bevan, op. at., 174-5 & 184.
6 See the 1881 Act, chap.IV.
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Although more detail would be welcome as regards certain aspects of 
protection,7 the French approach is a step in the right direction.
It might be objected that a Bill of Rights could be enacted in which detailed 
provisions could be contained. In theory there is indeed nothing to prevent 
this but in practice it is doubtful if this legal form would be used in such a 
way. To do so would radically alter the traditional utilisation of constitutional 
provisions, by which they tend to indicate broad principles.
A second possible objection is linked to the last point, in that constitutional 
enactments contain statements of principle, which are usually lacking in 
statutes, which are on the contrary predominately concerned with technical 
matters. Thus the argument might run that detail might be acceptable in such 
areas as taxation and construction but surely human rights are such 
important values that they need to be seen as such? In other words, 
something more, beyond the merely technical is required in order to signal 
and underline the importance of rights. Such an objection would seem to be 
given further weight given the lack of value accorded to the liberties to meet 
and to process in England.8 It could then be claimed that the police and the 
judiciary are in need of precisely the kind of statements of principle that 
constitutional enactments contain.
These are powerful arguments but are rebuttable because they are based 
upon the fallacy that statutes cannot contain statements of principle. This 
might be an accurate description of the current practice in England9 but even 
if this controversial claim is conceded, French practice has shown that this 
need not be the case; that is statutes can be used to contain principles. This 
has been seen in the 1881 Act and Art.431-1. More importantly, such an 
objection misconstrues the claims made here. Therefore, it is argued that
7 For example, time limits on bans and the lack of a public forum doctrine; see chaps.VlIl & 
VI, respectively.
8 A point consistently made in the preceding chapters and see for example, Dworkin, (1990), 
op. cit., 1-12 and 'Devaluing Liberty' in Index on Censorship' 17 (1988), 7.
9 Even so, S.43(l) of the Education CNo.2) Act 1986 can be pointed to as an example of a 
statement of principle contained in a statute;
'Every individual and body of persons concerned in the government of any establishment to 
which this section applies shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that 
freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the 
establishment and for visiting speakers.1 (emphasis added).
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statutory and detailed protection should play a central role in the protection 
of human rights but this does not mean that Bills of Rights (with the 
appropriate flexibility) should not be enacted in order to lay down a general 
statement of intent. Only a reorientation toward statute is asserted and not 
the complete rejection of a Bills of Rights.
Another advantage of statute over constitutional enactment is that English 
judges are accustomed to interpreting the former as opposed to the latter. A 
traditional objection to enacting a Bill or Rights or incorporating the 
Convention was seen to be the claim that the English judiciary would 
interpret such a text in a narrow, technical manner, as if it were a tax statute.10 
If this point is accepted, it may be countered by giving the judiciary statutes 
to interpret, which contain the type of detailed provisions to which they are 
claimed to be accustomed. A statement of principle could be made therein in 
order to guide their interpretation. This could be made in the Preamble to the 
statutes or the main body of the text itself. Moreover, it is contended that the 
judiciary may be more likely to uphold the will of Parliament since it accords 
more closely with their own view of their constitutional role,11 rather than 
requiring them to make sorties into the uncharted waters of a Bill of Rights or 
the Convention, that may often require them to oppose the will of Parliament. 
Therefore, the statutory protection of human rights actually seeks to draw 
advantage from the much criticised mode of English judicial interpretation.
Detailed statutory texts may also provide clear directions to the police and 
other state authorities. These bodies are also accustomed to following statutes 
and once again added weight may be derived from the fact that they can be 
seen as embodying the will of the legislature. This view was seen as a central 
explanation of the supremacy of loi in France and why human rights are 
ideally protected by loi.12 Both there and in England a deference is shown 
towards statute and it is argued that this could be harnessed to the service of 
civil liberties.
Consequently, both the enactment of a Bill of Rights and the incorporation of 
the Convention have been shown to be problematic on jurisprudential
10 See for example, Zander, op. tit., 57-64 and Lester (1969), op. tit., 15.
11 See Jaconelli, op. tit., 178-186.
12 Chap.II, section II.
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grounds. The comparative method has pointed to possible alternatives: 
political review and statute that should be a part of the current debate as to 
the reform of the law.
Comparison with France has also shown that the debate has rather narrowly 
focused on one issue; a Bill of Rights, whereas the liberties to meet and to 
process are in need of other forms of protection. It has been seen that police 
discretion, especially that exercised on the spot is an important factor in the 
exercise of these liberties.13 A question that an advocate of a Bill of Rights 
and/or the incorporation of the Convention must respond to, is how these 
measures would prevent and punish abuses of this discretion.
Taking as an example, the simple enactment of a Bill of Rights in which either 
a liberty to assemble or the liberties to meet and process were included, it 
may be doubted whether this provision would be of any aid as regards police 
discretion. More precisely, how would such an enactment ensure that breach 
of the peace powers are exercised as last resort, are necessary and 
proportional? The response to these problems in France has been to develop 
principles of judicial review that submit such discretion to exacting review 
and as a consequence, the principles of last resort, proportionality and 
necessity have been developed. Admittedly, this has been a development that 
was felt to be necessary to protect the already valued category of human 
rights but for the reasons stated above, it would seem preferable to use 
statutes to give weight to human rights as opposed to constitutional 
enactments. Furthermore, statutes could easily make reference to these 
principles of judicial review and thus a connection between human rights and 
judicial review could more easily be made then between constitutional 
enactments and judicial review. Therefore, the first problem with a 
constitutional provision to protect the liberties to assemble is that it would not 
focus attention on the need for exacting review, let alone the need to examine 
the merits of a restriction.
A second problem is that of time. Above, it was stated that the liberties in 
question require methods of protection that can be exercised rapidly.14 There 
is little value in a finding that an assembly was banned illegally some four to
13 See chaps. VU & VIII.
14 See chap.V, section HI, as regards the French déféré préfectoral.
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six months after its intended date. The exercise of the liberty to assemble is 
not about pyrrhic victories of this kind. An enacted constitutional provision, 
without more, would not provide for the kind of emergency procedure that is 
required to protect the liberties under study. Once again, statutes laying 
down detailed provisions to protect the liberties to meet and process could 
also lay down an emergency procedure. As the French example has shown, 
such an emergency procedure could be set out in its own statute and it would 
also appear possible to make such provision within the statute protecting the 
liberties, but all that is claimed here is that statutory enactments can embody 
the rapid protective procedures that are claimed to be necessary.
Turning now to the incorporation of the Convention, it can be seen that 
problems as to emergency procedures still persist. Admittedly, art.ll and the 
case law on that provision contain the last resort principle15 and English 
judges would be able to apply this in order to review discretion. It follows 
that at least this could provide a means of developing more exacting judicial 
review in England. However, there is a lack of emergency procedures in the 
Convention, which is most tellingly manifested by the paucity of case law on 
these liberties. Given the lengthy period that is required before a judgement is 
laid down from either the Court or the Commission, the Convention is, at 
best, only of use as far as declaring illegality and perhaps dissuading a 
repetition of such behaviour in the future. This function should not be too 
readily dismissed but it should not be over-estimated. The protection of the 
liberties to assemble also requires legal mechanisms that aim at ensuring their 
immediate exercise. Constitutional enactments and the Convention seem 
generally better suited to securing a moral vindication of the liberties but not 
to securing practical benefits.
Applying comparative theory and jurisprudence to human rights shifts the 
focus of debate to the practical needs and problems of specific liberties, as well 
as re-introducing the political element into the regulation and adjudication of 
civil liberties. Paradoxically, theory brings the debate down from the abstract 
level and seeks to give practical effect to the principled values that a 
community has created. The result aimed for is a legal and political 
framework in which citizens can exercise the liberties for the diverse purposes
15 See chap.VII.
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revealed, and ultimately as means of effecting social and political change and 
challenging the status quo.16 Recourse to theory changes the nature of debate 
and proves the value of theory.
This study has shown that creating the kind of legal framework desired 
requires more than superficially attractive measures such as enacting a Bill of 
Rights. These reforms may historically have proven invaluable as a rallying 
point for the extension of liberty where it had not previously existed or had 
been curtailed but as far as specific liberties in modem society are concerned, 
more widespread reforms are also called for. This is instanced by the 
importance of police structures in France and England. This thesis has called 
for greater political participation in decisions that regulate the liberties under 
study. Such participation has been argued to accord with a conception of 
human rights as politically and socially contingent constructions. Therefore, 
those in the community who are affected by the exercise of these liberties 
should have a say in their regulation. The resultant decisions may be 
controversial and uncertain but this merely reflects the uncertainty and acute 
controversy that often attends police decisions today.17 The improvement that 
would result would be that at least the decisions would have involved the 
people whose lives are touched by it. The values and interests would clash in 
a more politically transparent manner. If liberty prevailed or was restricted it 
would be seen to be the result of clear but contested political choices. 
However, the local view would be constrained by a statutory framework that 
accorded priority to the liberties to assemble but the local community, along 
with representatives of the national interest, should ideally have a say in the 
particular decisions within this general framework.
Concentration on the specific liberties to assemble consequently leads to a 
wider outlook that even raises the issue of structures of police governance. 
However, the question that then follows is how can this structure be changed 
in order to meet the demands outlined above? It has been argued that this 
may be done by expanding the role of the local police authority (especially as 
regards its representation of the local interest) in England and further 
decentralising the relatively centralised police forces in France. These are
16 Chap.I.
17 For example, the London-wide ban that caught the procession arranged by CARAF and 
led to the cases of Kent v MPC and Christians Against Racism And Fascism v UK, supra.
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broad measures but are claimed to be essential. However, despite their 
importance, they are not adverted to in the Bill of Rights debate in the UK. 
This should not be surprising, given the failure to analyse specific liberties 
and the insistence on a very broad and general method of protecting human 
rights. Turning the focus of attention to the French system with its similar 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty leads to these questions being 
adverted to.
Despite these criticisms, it has been underlined that there is a role for a Bill of 
Rights. After all, the Cc in France, despite being a political organ, has drawn 
inspiration from such a text; the 1789 Declaration.18 From where would the 
similar body that has been argued for in England draw its catalogue of rights? 
Similarly, is there not a need to re-inculcate a culture of liberty in both citizens 
and officials in England? Is this not best achieved by a Bill of Rights - 
containing a provision or provisions covering the liberties to meet and to 
process? Once again, a Bill of Rights may indeed have a role to play here.
Despite the dominance of the constitutional view in the Bill of Rights debate, 
there is also a fundamental role to be played by statute and politics. However, 
caution has been counselled in interpreting this as denying any role for a Bill 
of Rights. Nevertheless, it does follow from the conception of human rights 
adopted here that a Bill of Rights should be employed with extreme caution 
because as traditionally conceived it would put a brake on change and it 
would lack the degree of precision required to protect the liberties under 
study. The same may not be true for all liberties and it may be possible to 
enact constitutional provisions for certain human rights.19 Even so the 
problem of change remains.
Consequently, it is suggested that if a Bill of Rights is used it should be open 
to change and not be shielded from it as has traditionally been the case.20 
Procedures to ensure ready change would then be imperative. In addition, 
such provisions must not claim to enshrine values that are over and above the
18 Chap.II, section II and see generally B. Nicholas, ’Fundamental Riphts and ludidal Review 
in France’ P.L. [1978] 82 & 155.
19 This might, for example, be the case for the freedom of expression. This term has been 
suggested to actually cover a wide variety of human rights (chap.VI, section III) and a 
constitutional enactment could serve as a statement of intent and principle.
20 Waldron, (1993), op. tit.
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body politic. It should always be clear that human rights are constructed and 
this would be made easier by leaving rights open to change. This study 
therefore leaves the door open for the employment of a Bill of Rights but 
subject to the correction of certain problematic elements as regards change. 
Once these have been remedied, a Bill of Rights may be of use in re­
establishing a culture of liberty but as has been argued above, statutes should 
provide the mainstay of protection by laying down detailed and specific 
regulation.
In response to the question as to where a political organ along the lines of the 
Cc would derive the rights it is to protect, it is contended that this should not 
be from a de novo Bill of Rights but based on the Convention. However, this 
should be achieved on a statutory basis, in order to facilitate and ensure the 
possibility of change.21 Therefore, a review organ could be set up which 
would review Parliamentary Bills upon request from a prescribed number of 
politicians from either House. The same statute that sets up this body could 
also provide that such bills were to be reviewed to see if they were contrary to 
the provisions derived from the Convention.22 This would not necessarily 
mean incorporating the Convention because its provisions could be simply 
copied into the establishing statute. By reason of the statutory basis of these 
measures, they could be repealed or amended by a future parliament. 
Parliamentary sovereignty would therefore remain intact but be limited by a 
concern for human rights. This concern would be political because the review
21 This method of incorporating the Convention is not novel, and in any case no international 
treaty can be made a part of English law without a statute being passed to this effect; see, 
Jaconelli, op. at., 261-70 and A X. Drzemczewski, 'European Human Rights Convention in 
Domestic Law: A Comparative Study1 (1983), 177-87 and for a recent explanation of this rule, 
see Sir J. Laws, 'Is The High Court The Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?' P.L. 
[1993] 59 at 61;
The true basis for the rule is surely this: since a treaty is made by the Executive, generally as 
an act of prerogative power, it cannot have the force of law for the very good reason that the 
Crown is not a source of law: the only sources of law under our constitution are the other two 
arms of government, the Judiciary and the Legislature.'
The benefit of the Convention is that it is already drawn on by the judiciary as providing 
guidance for the protection of human rights; for recent cases to this effect, see Rantzen v 
Mirror Group Newspapers [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, R. v Chief Metropolitan Stipendary 
Magistrate ex. p. Choudhurv [1991] 1 All E.R. 306 and Derbyshire County Council v Times 
Newspapers Ltd. [1991] 4 All E.R. 795 (and c.f. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, The Infiltration of A 
Bill of Rights' P.L. [1992] 397).
22 This proposal may seem less novel than it appears when it is recalled that a Human Rights 
Commission and a Human Rights Council to advise Parliament on statutory bills have been 
proposed in the past, see Zander, op. at., 87 and chap.I, section I.
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body would be composed of political nominees. In such a way it would 
occupy political space and constitute a compromise between respect for 
human rights and politico and social change.
Of course, there is nothing to stop the review body drawing the rights from a 
series of statutes, in which each one laid down the detailed regulation of a 
specific right and directed the body to review proposed statutes against such 
rights. However, given the political will that would be required, the large 
degree of disagreement as to liberties and the tight legislative calendar, it 
might be more realistic to turn to a ready made text, so to speak, that enjoys 
wide support. In any case, statutes would still be needed to direct judges and 
officials as far as the regulation of liberties beyond the review of proposed 
legislation. This detail has been shown to be lacking in the Convention as far 
as certain aspects of the regulation of the liberties to assemble, for example, as 
regards sanctions.23 What is therefore proposed here is a minimal role for the 
Convention and one that must be supported by statute. The establishing 
statute or statutes could also include rights that are not in the Convention and 
similarly, leave out those that it is felt are not relevant according to current 
values.
Laying down detailed provisions as regards the review of Parliamentary bills 
is not intended to be carried out here and so only what are considered to be 
the essential features have been considered. The precise content and rules of 
political review must be the product of political procedures and choices. The 
essential features that should however be retained are change, the political 
conception of civil liberties and a means of according value to human rights. 
Thus, as with a Bill of Rights, there remain possible limited uses for the 
Convention. However, these are strongly conditioned by the need to keep 
open avenues for affecting social and political change in order to reflect 
changes in socio-political values and the need to focus on a range of issues 
that affect the protection of human rights.
Finally, in criticising the Bill of Rights debate the intention has also been to 
provide a compromise that both sides could find acceptable or at least use as 
a basis for further negotiation. Therefore, by insisting on statutory enactments
23 Chap.IX.
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an attempt has been made to leave parliamentary sovereignty intact. On the 
other hand, the calls for the political review of laws, better judicial review, the 
improvement of structures of police governance and other reforms have been 
motivated by a need to create a framework to better protect and respect 
human rights. These reforms are based upon the study of two liberties and 
the same method can and should be used to reveal the specific needs and 
contexts of each civil liberty. The Bill of Rights debate should be replaced by a 
debate as to how best to protect human rights and it should be informed by a 
theoretical perspective which states why these rights are so special as to merit 
special protection.
SECTION III
HUMAN RIG H TS IN THE EU: TOW ARDS COMMON TRADITIO N S
The practical problem of how to ensure that Union institutions respect human 
rights was seen above to have been responded to in Nold v Commission. In 
this case it was stated that civil liberties would be protected by the ECJ 
according, inter alia, to the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. It was then argued in this essay that this formulation raised the need 
for a method by which to discern what was a common tradition, in short, a 
method derived from comparative theory.24 This conclusion was based upon 
the assumption that the judges of the ECJ were taken to be serious in their 
intention of deriving protection from a European tradition as opposed to 
simply imposing their own value judgements.
Therefore, assuming the Nold formulation can be taken at face value, this 
study has attempted to show the type of analysis that judges must engage in 
and a way of assessing their judgements, or more precisely, the common 
traditions that they arrive at. What this method of comparative civil liberties 
entails will firstly be set out before looking at the results of employing that 
methodology; in other words what is the common tradition of the liberties of 
assembly as between France and England. Finally, suggestions as to how this 
tradition should be improved are then made.
24 Chap.II, section III.
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Comparative civil liberties in the context of the EU firstly require that specific 
civil liberties are analysed. Thus, in this study the liberties to assemble were 
looked at. The specific problems and tensions concerning these liberties were 
brought to the surface.25 As a result, it is suggested that in order to identify 
common traditions, judges will have to analyse specific human rights.
Secondly, analysis has used history, in the sense of looking at the histories of 
the liberties concerned in order to illustrate its importance for understanding 
current regulation. Consequently, history has been seen to have left a large 
imprint on the way the liberties are regulated today. For example, the public 
order crises in the 1930s still to a great extent (more so in England than in 
France26) colours the present framework in which the liberties are regulated. 
Moreover, traditions are formed over time. This may seem trite but the study 
has shown that it would be inaccurate merely to look at current regulation 
without its preceding history. The ECJ must therefore avoid this kind of 
snapshot view. In order to discern tradition it must engage in historical 
investigation and comparison.
Thirdly, a comparative study should minimise the risks of imposing 
particular cultural value-judgements on the practices of others. It follows that 
conceptions such as human rights and the specific liberties under study, must 
be formulated in such a way as to be capable of encompassing the different 
perspectives of the jurisdictions to be compared. As a consequence, much 
time was spent in seeking a definition of the rights to assemble that would 
neither prioritise French nor English conceptions.27 Such a conception was 
derived from theory and this leads to the fourth point; the relevance of theory 
to practical questions.
The judges of the ECJ must be clear as to the nature of the rights they seek to 
protect. More particularly, what are the these rights and why should they be 
protected? The jurisprudential view in this study provides a response and 
what is more a response that does not seem to prioritise the view of one 
Member State over another. This is achieved by claiming that human rights
25 Chaps. VI-IX.
26 Consider, for example the 1881 Act and art.431-1 of the new penal code in France, which 
are not a product of this turbulent period.
27 Chap. Ill, section II.
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represent social values, this provides room for different constructions, 
according to different traditions. The one insistence of the theory was that 
human rights were valued because of their potential to effect social and 
political change. Nevertheless, it was conceded that other theories might 
construct liberties in other ways.
At the same time, comparative theory was again shown to be important. 
Without it there was a temptation not to carry out comparison between 
France and England on the grounds that they belonged to different legal 
families that were diametrically opposed to one another.28 Using the 
comparative method to its full potential means looking at substance as 
opposed to being content with surface form. From this standpoint, it was 
revealed that France and England shared a similar scepticism towards higher 
law, a belief in the sovereignty of Parliament and proceeding from this basis, 
a tradition of meeting and processing.29 By reason of the fact that Member 
States of the EU belonging to different legal families,30 a theoretical 
perspective that looks beyond form to substance seems essential if common 
constitutional traditions are really to be identified.
The final point is the most controversial because it is explicitly normative and 
activist. Comparing the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States might reveal traditions of systematic restriction of a liberty. Does this 
mean that the ECJ should view such traditions as a source of inspiration as to 
how civil liberties are to be treated? Firstly, it should be recalled that the ECJ 
has laid down other sources from which it will derive inspiration: 
international treaties to which Member States are signatories and the 
objectives of the EU.31 Nevertheless, an important source remains the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member states and furthermore it 
may be that it will be given more weight than the other sources. In any case, 
the question remains, what are the judges to do in the face of a discovery of 
an illiberal tradition?
28 Chap.II, section I.
29 Chap.III, section I
30 Using the legal families idetified by Zweigert & Kôtz, op. cit., 75, the EU consists of legal 
systems from the Romanistic, Germanic, Nordic and Common Law families.
31 For example, Nold. op. cit., Hauer v Land Rheinland - Pfalz, op. at., and National Panasonic 
v Commission, op. cit.; see chap.II, section III.
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In this thesis it has been suggested that there is a normative element to 
comparison, thus comparative evaluation adopted, inter alia, comparative 
criteria derived from the jurisprudential perspectives set out in Part I.32 These 
were employed in order to evaluate the degree to which civil liberty, as 
formulated by the jurisprudential theory, was respected by the law in France 
and England. It is not suggested that these exact same criteria and the same 
background theory of rights should be applied by the ECJ but rather that they 
should be prepared to make normative decisions in very much the following 
manner: 'yes, the tradition between the Member States reveals an illiberal 
practice but nevertheless it ought to be as follows..'. A purely reflexive 
comparative method may not necessarily protect liberties, whereas protection 
is more likely to be secured where this approach is combined with a 
normative theory. It is in this second sense that it is strongly contended that 
judges should act.
To act in this way is no longer to solely derive standards from traditions. 
What is urged is to leave the path that tradition indicates, no matter how 
strongly, where not to do so would be restrictive of liberty. Perhaps this 
might not prove necessary where traditions reveal practices that uphold 
liberties but in the event of a worst case scenario it is argued that a 
mechanical application of a restrictive tradition turns the ultimate aim of 
protecting human rights in the EU on its head. Normative theory can also be 
used to assess the protection that is accorded by the ECJ in its judgements 
because it provides a yardstick of what ought to be. Such an evaluative 
criteria is important if there is to be some means to check if liberties are being 
sufficiently protected.
So much for the method of comparative civil liberties. The next area of 
interest is the results that employing this method has yielded; in other words, 
what is the common constitutional tradition between France and England as 
regards the liberty to assemble? The response can be set out as follows:
(a) It has been shown that the two jurisdictions recognise (although to 
different degrees) two distinct but related liberties - the liberty to meet and
32 Chap.VI, section I.
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the liberty to process. Thus, these two socially valued activities are subject to 
different legal regimes, which reflect different and specific problems.
(b) The liberties may be restricted on the grounds of violence or because they 
infringe the interests or rights of others or society at large, such as the 
circulation of traffic or the rights of passage. Therefore, the liberties are not 
absolute and are given differing values in each system, but what is common 
to both is that the liberties must be weighed up against other interests and 
rights and they may not always prevail.
(c) The liberties are seen as performing a variety of functions; democratic, 
safety-valve, self-fulfilment and protest. There is no agreement as to one 
particular and exclusive function, apart from expression, but even if this view 
is accepted, there are different views as to the value of expression. In 
consequence, the liberties can be claimed to be multi-functional.
(d) Heavy reliance, despite the presence of quite detailed regulation, is placed 
on a kind of catch-all, original power in the hands of the police. This is the 
main source of the police discretion that is so often applied to the liberties. 
The precise contours of these powers is uncertain because they are extremely 
reflexive and flexible in the face of unforeseen and ever-changing 
circumstances. By reason of their antiquity, their fundamental nature and 
existence are to all intents and purposes beyond challenge. However, they are 
generally limited to the function of preventing public disorder, even though 
this is defined differently in the two jurisdictions.
(e) The liberty to meet enjoys a privileged position in both systems in terms of 
banning powers, in that a greater justification is required to ban meetings 
than for processions. This is claimed to reflect a view that there is less chance 
of public disorder resulting from the exercise of the liberty to meet and it is a 
more important medium for the freedom of expression function of the 
liberties to assemble. Interestingly, religious and traditional marches are for 
similar reasons treated more liberally than ordinary marches, since they are 
commonly exempted from an obligation that is imposed on ordinary marches 
of having to provide written notice.
(f) The authorities in both systems commonly subject assemblies to restrictive 
regulation as regards locations. This seems to be based upon excluding
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assemblies from areas where they may infringe upon other rights and 
interests, be they of other persons or the community as a whole. This is 
especially the case as regards the liberty to meet and the public highway.
(g) Both jurisdictions share a history of exercising the liberties to assemble 
and they have often been used as a means for calling for change or expressing 
protest. In response, they have sometimes met with forceful and violent 
repression at the hands of the authorities and restrictive measures, often 
under the guise of preventing violence have often curtailed peaceful 
assemblies. By reason of this history they are claimed to be closely linked to 
the political and social culture of the two Member States.
(h) The historical background of the liberties also reveals that they have often 
been regulated via texts that have had public disorder as there first concern. 
This has generally not made for a regulatory framework that sets out the 
conditions by which those who wish to peacefully assemble may do so and 
also be protected from attempts to curtail this exercise. When regulation has 
occurred with liberty in mind, this has been accompanied by a view that the 
particular activity does not generally present a public order problem.
(i) In neither of the systems is there a tradition of positive action on the part of 
the authorities in order to secure the liberty. Thus there is no tradition of 
setting aside specific locations in which assemblies are a priority activity. 
Instead, the focus of regulation has been on preventing interference from the 
authorities. This has meant that there has generally been felt to be little need 
to take 'affirmative action1 to protect the liberties from restriction from other 
members of society.
(j) In both systems an attempt is made to accommodate central and local 
interests in the regulation of the liberties. Police structures therefore reflect 
the involvement of central and local viewpoints.
These are the results of the comparison between France and England. They 
are the result of a synthesis that is concerned to identify common aspects of 
regulation. However, there are some areas which ought to be included in the 
tradition but which are not shared between the jurisdictions or are not found 
in either of them. These will set out here.
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Neither jurisdiction has a statutory framework for negotiations between 
police and assembly organisers over bans and conditions, despite evidence 
that this is a regular practice and that certain provisions have been enacted 
with the aim of encouraging such steps. It is suggested that statutes should 
formulate negotiatory procedures so that, where reasonable, the police, 
organisers and other interested parties should consult and negotiate. Such a 
framework could also embody wider participation in the negotiations and 
consultation so as to include, for example, local businesses, residents and 
community groups; in this way a wider degree of political participation in 
decisions than merely that of local and central government could be achieved. 
This would better capture the extent of political controversy that is sometimes 
involved in regulating the liberties.
It follows that the common tradition should provide the means by which 
those affected by the exercise of the liberty can be heard and participate in its 
regulation. This point essentially calls for local interests and not merely the 
local police, to be heard. The result would be that local differences and 
interests could conflict and be resolved openly and clearly. The political 
choices and compromises involved would also be more apparent and be seen 
as integral to the exercise and regulation of the liberties.
A common tradition should also insist that public forums are set aside. The 
state should be obliged to provide locations whose primary use would be the 
exercise of assembly rights. This should not however mean that such activities 
are then to be restricted to these locations but it does ensure that those who 
wish to exercise their rights are accorded a priority.
Similarly, the common tradition should contain emergency procedures by 
which restrictions on the liberties can be reviewed quickly. That such a 
system can work has been shown by the French example. The inclusion of 
such a mechanism in the protection of the liberties in the EU would reflect the 
delicate nature of the liberties in terms of time and this in turn would reflect 
their social importance.
The previous legal measure and the last one below that ought to be included 
within the tradition are of a more general nature and were also present in 
France but not in England. Hence, the tradition should contain an emphasis 
on specific statutes regulating the liberties, perhaps containing a statement of
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principle and exacting judicial review which could, if necessary, extend to the 
merits of the decision. The arguments in favour of these points have been 
made at several points above and do not need to be repeated here, suffice it to 
say that they accord greater protection to the liberties, given the theoretical 
view of human rights that underpins this study.
Lastly, it should be underlined that this resulting tradition of the liberties to 
assemble in France and England is but one step in the formulation of a 
European-wide tradition; the laws of other Member States must be 
investigated and what is more, this needs to be done for each liberty. 
Nevertheless, England and France represent important elements in this 
tradition, especially as regards the liberties under study, as history shows. 
Perhaps an alternative method may be chosen by which to effect this task but 
it is submitted that any alternative must by the very nature of the enterprise 
make use of theory (both comparative and jurisprudential) and in some way 
introduce and apply theoretical perspectives to human rights law, as has been 
attempted in this study.
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